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This thesis is about the cultures, pedagogies and practices of beauty therapy courses, 
about the young women who undertake those courses, and the complex matrix of 
social, cultural and dispositional factors which shape their subjectivities and trajectories.   
 
Firstly, it investigates the factors influencing students’ decisions to enrol on their 
courses.  Secondly, it investigates how the gendered and classed dispositions they 
bring to their courses are reinforced, modified or changed by their experiences as 
beauty therapy students.  Lastly, it explores the ways in which these processes might 
be embedded in different forms of violence connected to beauty practices, interpersonal 
relationships and education, and to the forms of social and economic injustice that 
adhere in these.   
 
The research was based on an ethnographic case study of NVQ beauty therapy 
courses in two English further education colleges.  This thesis explores the 
methodological, epistemological, ethical and political issues involved in the  
research process, from design and data collection to analysis and interpretation.  
 
The study is situated in radical materialist feminism but also draws particularly on 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice to situate the subjectivities and trajectories of participants 
and their engagement with beauty practices in the dynamics of agency and structure.  
Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic violence, and its interrelationships with structural and 
direct forms of violence, provides a conceptual thread through this thesis linking the 
themes of vocational education and beauty practices.  
 
In focusing on the under-researched area of beauty therapy training, the thesis 
contributes to our knowledge about the gendered and classed nature of vocational 
education. In situating young women’s engagement with beauty practices in the context 
of symbolic and other forms of violence, it also aims to contribute to our understanding 
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This thesis is about the cultures, pedagogies and practices of beauty therapy courses 
and the students who undertake those courses.  Based on an ethnographic case study 
of NVQ1 beauty therapy training in two Further Education colleges, it explores three key 
issues. Firstly, it interrogates the social, cultural and dispositional factors influencing 
young women’s decisions to enrol on these courses.  Secondly, it investigates how the 
gendered and classed dispositions that young women bring to their courses are 
reinforced, modified or changed by their experiences as beauty therapy students.  
Lastly, it explores the processes involved in shaping the trajectories and subjectivities of 
‘beauty girls’ and how these might be embedded in different forms of violence 
connected to beauty practices, interpersonal relationships, education, and the forms of 
social and economic injustice that adhere in these.  These concerns are encapsulated 
in the research questions presented in chapter six. 
Why beauty therapy training? 
 
I began working as a lecturer in further education colleges 1991, leaving in 2001 to work 
in the community sector.  In 2006, I returned to FE and to what appeared to be a much 
changed educational and institutional landscape.  In the intervening time, changes that 
had been initiated in the early 1980s by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s 
Conservative government had gathered momentum. The FE world I came back to was 
bigger (the result of a succession of mergers), more impersonal and increasingly 
dominated by decision-making processes led by layers of managers.  More importantly, 
from my perspective as a lecturer dedicated to the idea of teaching and learning as a 
                                                
1 National Vocational Qualification (see chapter two). 
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critical, reflective and potentially emancipatory endeavour, this new educational 
landscape and the curricula associated with it seemed more dominated than ever by 
what Colley calls “narrow and… behaviourist approaches focused on skills, 
competences and economic instrumentalism” (Colley, 2006: 26).  One of the most 
obvious changes to the social geography of my college was that the staffroom and 
some of the classrooms had been converted into beauty or hairdressing salons.  There 
were many more young women, immediately recognizable as beauty therapy or 
hairdressing students, dressed identically in salon uniforms, wearing immaculately 
applied make-up and trailing pink ‘kit cases’.  Their appearance was in sharp contrast to 
that of other students, particularly to that of the predominantly male construction and 
engineering students whose base rooms and workshops were housed in the building 
next door to the beauty and hair salons.  My concern, however, was not just with how 
this reflected the increasingly powerful ‘skills agenda’ which has reframed education 
and training in terms of ‘employability’ and economic productivity, but also, as a 
feminist, with what this overt gender segregation meant in relation to the college’s 
stated policy commitment to equality.  In broader terms, I was also concerned with the 
role played by the beauty industry in marshalling women into an obsession with 
appearance.   Deciding to undertake a PhD was the product of several factors 
connected to my personal and employment situation, but the concerns outlined above 
provided a potential research direction and a catalyst for submitting a proposal. From 
the outset, therefore, my position has been thoroughly invested in a set of assumptions 
about what the purpose of education should be and in my feminist political 
commitments.  
 
After designing my research project and piloting student interview schedules, I spent 
one academic year with Level 1 and 2 NVQ beauty therapy students and their tutors in 
two FE colleges in South West England.  My ethnographic collective case study 
employed multiple methods for investigating students’ investments in beauty practices, 
their decisions to enrol on a beauty course and the effect of these courses on their 
identities and possible trajectories. I observed lessons in classrooms and teaching 
salons, talked informally with staff and students, conducted focus groups and 
3 
 
interviewed fourteen students at the beginning of the academic year and thirteen of 
these again at the end.  These I refer to as the ‘core group’ since their accounts 
provided most of the data for exploring the research questions, particularly in terms of 
how the courses shaped their self-perceptions as young women, learners and future 
workers.  These were also the students I had most contact with and who allowed me 
access to information about multiple aspects of their lives.  The group was made up of 
twelve White and two Black students and all but one came from working class 
backgrounds.   In addition, I interviewed seven tutors who also acted as my ‘key 
informants’, facilitating access to students, teaching sessions and information about the 
courses and broader institutional issues.   
Thesis structure, themes and perspectives 
 
My study is situated in the intersection between vocational education and training 
(VET), beauty practices and the beauty therapy industry.  Chapter two places beauty 
therapy training in the wider context of vocational learning in post-16 further education. 
It outlines the economic and educational policy trajectories which have shaped this 
sector in the last three decades and considers the effect of these on vocational 
provision and practice. Drawing on a range of research and theory I argue that the 
increasingly individualized and instrumental approaches to learning and 
educational/occupational ‘choice’ promoted by these changes retrenches structural 
inequalities associated with gender and class. Whilst some theorists point to the 
potential of certain vocational programmes to broaden ‘horizons for action’ (Hodkinson 
& Sparkes, 1997) beyond the confines of gendered and classed stereotypes (Bloomer 
et al, 2002 ), a key question here is how far the ‘choices’ of beauty therapy students and 
the ‘transformations’ they undergo whilst on their courses retrench those stereotypes.   
 
This possibility is underscored by feminist work which points to beauty practices and the 
beauty industry as key sites in the production and regulation of femininity, sexual 
difference and gendered power relations.  Chapter three provides an overview of the 
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feminist research and theory which illuminates women’s lived experience of these 
practices.  I also discuss women’s involvement in the contemporary beauty industry, 
particularly beauty therapy.  The students in this study are positioned both as 
consumers and trainee workers in this context so I focus on what the literature has to 
say about the role of beauty therapy in shaping the meanings attached to femininity, 
and the forms of work, particularly ‘emotional’ and ‘aesthetic’ labour, involved in being 
and becoming a beauty therapist. This chapter also explores feminist debates around 
agency, domination and violence in relation to beauty practices. These themes are 
analytically central in this thesis and I return to them again in chapters four and five.  
 
Chapter four discusses the theoretical perspectives I have drawn on in order to make 
sense of participants’  ‘choices’, subjectivities and trajectories.  Radical materialist 
feminism is the political and theoretical springboard for this thesis.  It has been 
instrumental in revealing the categories of gender and sex as socially constructed 
oppositions which both produce and are produced by the social relations of 
heterosexuality. In this context, the production of gender/sexual difference through 
beauty (Jeffreys, 2005) and other social and cultural practices simultaneously involves 
the reproduction of heterosexuality.  This is the basis for my use of the term 
‘heterogender’ (Ingraham, 1994), and for my references to ‘(hetero)sexuality’, where the 
use of ‘gender’ and ‘sexuality’’  would otherwise conceal heteronormative assumptions 
(Jackson, 2006).    
 
Materialist feminist accounts have also stressed the impossibility of understanding the 
lived experience of gender outside of its intersections with class, ‘race’ and other axes 
of inequality (Jackson, 2001; Skeggs, 1997), and the importance of attending to post-
structuralist understandings of the subject as an unstable effect of power (Holland et al, 
1998; Ramazanoglu & Holland 1999).  In the feminist tradition of appropriating 
theoretical tools from non-feminist frameworks (Moi, 1991), I draw on two other key 
perspectives.  Firstly, in order to theorize the way in which power is implicated in 
participants’ immersion in feminine appearance practices, I make use of Foucault’s 
concepts of ‘disciplinary power’ (1995) and ‘technologies of the self’  (1985).  However, 
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because of the problems associated with Foucault’s “normatively neutral” conception of 
power (Fraser, 1989:28) and with the voluntaristic notion of agency contained in his 
conception of the ‘reflexive self’,  I have tended to center my analysis on feminist 
readings of Bourdieu’s theory of practice.  This has allowed me to situate the 
subjectivities and trajectories of participants, and the pleasures and pains involved in 
beauty practices, in the interrelationships between agency and structure.  Bourdieu’s 
notions of ‘habitus’, ‘field ‘and ‘capital’ allow three important questions to be explored: 
How do dominant power relations operating in and outside the beauty training salons 
produce the choices, trajectories and identities of beauty girls?  How do beauty girls 
exercise agency in ways that reproduce their own domination?  Within the context of 
beauty therapy courses, under what conditions is resistant agency possible? One of the 
key notions underpinning these questions, and one which provides a conceptual thread 
through this thesis linking the themes of education and beauty practices, is Bourdieu’s 
notion of symbolic violence as a ‘gentle violence, imperceptible and invisible even to its 
victims” (Bourdieu, 2001:2) which works to legitimize “relations of oppression by hiding 
them under a cloak of nature, benevolence, meritocracy” (Wacquant, 1993:1). 
 
When I started out on this research project, my main intention was to use beauty 
therapy training as the basis for an empirical exploration of Sheila Jeffrey’s (2005) 
argument, that beauty practices constitute a culturally embedded form of violence 
against women (Jeffreys, 2005).  Though the idea of beauty as violence remains a key 
concern of my thesis, during the research process it became clear that the harms 
caused by the ‘beauty imperative’ (Frost, 2001) and by the ways it is played out on 
beauty therapy courses, could not be understood in isolation from the other injuries 
sustained by participants in a range of contexts. Starting from the premise that forms of 
violence adhere in inequality and injustice when these cause suffering on a social, 
physical or psychological level (Menjivar, 2008), chapter five lays out the conceptual 
terrain for understanding beauty girls’ trajectories as shaped by symbolic, economic, 




Chapter six presents the research questions, discusses their relationship to the 
literature on education, beauty practices and violence and indicates how this study aims 
to contribute to knowledge in all three areas.  It explores the methodological, 
epistemological, ethical and political issues involved in the research process from 
design and data collection to analysis and interpretation. I also discuss the 
shortcomings of this process and the inevitably partial nature of the knowledge 
produced through it.  However, this chapter also emphasizes the reflexive rigour of my 
approach and how this has led to what I think is a convincing account of the issues and 
to the production of a valid piece of feminist research.    
 
The next four chapters explore the accounts of participants in relation to the research 
questions and the issues and concerns outlined above. Chapter seven addresses the 
social, cultural and dispositional factors involved in students’ post-16 decision-making 
and explores the way in which they account for their decisions to enrol on a beauty 
therapy course.  Here, I focus particularly on the extent to which they draw on 
discourses of choice or recognize the role played by external constraints in shaping 
their trajectories. It explores the pre-dispositions which may have made beauty therapy 
a ‘choosable identity’ (Colley, 2006), and points to how symbolic violence may be bound 
up in this process, producing a ‘sense of limits’ (Bourdieu, 2010) and  obscuring, to 
greater or lesser extents, the systematic gendered and classed inequalities 
underpinning post-16 decision making.  
 
Chapter eight interrogates tutors’ perceptions of the ‘types’ of young women who 
become beauty therapy students.  It explores the discourses of ‘success’, ‘failure’ and 
deficit invoked to legitimize a range of institutionalized practices and the 
heterogendered, classed and racialized meanings which adhere in these.  Tutors’ 
accounts also reveal the kinds of pedagogical practices used to reconfigure students’ 
bodily and emotional displays in conformity with the ethos of beauty therapy.  I point to 
the symbolic violence at work in these processes and in the normalizing discourses 
through which tutors imagine students’ futures as low paid workers organizing their lives 
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around the needs of men and children.  Here, I draw attention to the way in which 
symbolic violence legitimizes gendered and classed structural and economic violence.  
 
Chapter nine explores how participants’ sense of themselves as young women, learners 
and future workers is shaped by the pedagogies, discourses and disciplinary practices 
of their courses. I investigate the mechanisms through which dispositional change is 
brought about and the work students are required to do on their bodies and emotional 
displays in order to become ‘the right person for the job’.  I also explore the conditions 
under which some students are able to maintain a critical distance from these practices 
and the mechanisms of symbolic and structural violence which simultaneously short-
circuit resistant agency.   
 
In chapter ten I focus more specifically on the interdependence of different forms of 
violence in shaping students’ trajectories.  Here I address some of the forms of symbolic 
and direct violence involved in childhood and teenage appearance practices, the 
gendering of post-16 ‘choices’,  the institutionalized practices which may lead to self-
exclusion from school or from particular types of learning, and in the dispositional and 
appearance practices engaged in on beauty therapy courses.   All these are implicated 
in producing an embodied ‘sense of limits’ that ultimately reproduce the structural 
violence of gendered and classed inequalities.   
 
Finally, in the concluding chapter I summarize the key findings in relation to the 
research questions and indicate the way in which this study contributes to our 
knowledge about vocational training, about violence in social life, and about the social 
implications of beauty practices.   
 
In focusing on the neglected area of beauty therapy training I hope to make a 
contribution to our knowledge about the gendered and classed nature of vocational 
education. In situating young women’s engagement with beauty practices in the context 
of symbolic and other forms of violence, I also aim to further illuminate how these 





 Vocational Education and Training in FE and the 
Reproduction of Gender and Class 
 
Until the collapse of the youth labour market in the late 1970s, the norm was for most 
young people to make a direct transition from compulsory education to the workplace 
(Colley et al, 2003). In contrast, 70.6 % of 16-18 year olds were in some form of full-time 
education or training in 2010 (BIS, 2010).  The beauty therapy students in this study 
were amongst the 41% of these students on government funded further education 
programmes (Ibid: 2010). Their experiences are clearly shaped by the employment 
sector to which their courses are connected - the beauty industry - and I address this in 
more detail in chapter three. However, the learning cultures, curricula and pedagogies 
of NVQ beauty therapy courses also need to be understood in relation to the historical, 
economic and social factors which have shaped vocational education and training 
(VET), and the further education sector in general, over the last three decades.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is firstly to situate beauty therapy training in the wider 
context of vocational further education, and secondly to critically consider the 
ideological and structural forces shaping policy and practice in this context.  Part one 
considers the characteristics of further education and the affects of government 
economic and educational policy on it in the last three decades. In part two, I address 
the way in which educational policies, shaped by broader neo-liberal economic and 
social agendas, have given rise to new types of vocational education provision based 
on reworked definitions of ‘skill’.  In this section I consider the extent to which these 
changes have strengthened the traditional hierarchy between vocational and academic 
qualifications and reproduced social inequalities in education.  In part three, I focus 
down on the discourse and practice of ‘learning styles’ which is now firmly rooted in 
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further education, and the way in which this mirrors increasingly individualized and 
instrumental approaches to education.   I compare this to more complex models in 
which learning is understood as inextricably linked to broader social, cultural and 
economic processes.  In the final part, I explore this idea in relation to educational 
decision making. Here I outline some of the key approaches to understanding how 
young people make decisions about transitions from school to further education and 
work. Here I introduce Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and argue that it can be used to 
illuminate the ways in which ‘choice’ acts as an unconscious mechanism of social 
reproduction. However, a model of habitus which emphasizes the flexible nature of 
dispositions allows us to also consider the conscious and sometimes strategic and 
‘rational’ nature of educational decision-making whilst acknowledging its embeddedness 
in gendered and classed power relations.    
The historical and social context of further education and VET 
 
The Further Education sector in England is characterized by its size and diversity.   
In 2009/10, the academic year in which my fieldwork was conducted, there were 
4,621,3004 learners participating in some form of government further education and 
1,094,800 of these were under 19 (BIS, 2011). The bulk of FE provision is delivered in 
or through FE colleges, although voluntary sector and private training providers are 
increasingly delivering FE funded programmes.  Traditionally, most FE students have 
undertaken courses designed as a preparation for the workplace. Work-based learning, 
including Modern Apprenticeships and Entry level programmes for 16-19 year olds 
accounts for some of this provision (Simmons, 2009)  although many vocational 
students undertake their training in college workshops (for instance, engineering and 
construction), or in ‘realistic work environments’ (college-based commercial restaurants, 
travel and tourism offices and hairdressing and beauty salons).  Reflecting the decline 
of the industrial sector and the rise in the size and profitability of the service sector 
(Lynch, 2006:6), industrial and manufacturing related courses are increasingly being 
displaced by training for service industry employment (Fisher & Simmons, 2012).   
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FE college provision also includes academic programmes including A Levels and 
Access to HE courses2.   
 
The origins of FE in the nineteenth century ‘mechanics’ institutes’ and technical training 
schools (Simmons, 2009), and its more recent history of underfunding and 
marginalization in comparison to the compulsory and higher education sectors 
underscores both its traditionally working-class nature and the entrenched lack of parity 
of esteem, particularly in England,  between vocational and academic learning (Fisher & 
Simmons, 2012).  However, against a backdrop of intensified concerns with the UK’s 
economic productivity and competitiveness in an increasingly globalized market place, 
successive governments over the last three decades have refocused attention on 
vocational education and training (VET) in FE.  The resulting plethora of centrally 
directed policy initiatives and strategies (Benn & Chitty, 1996)  have been heralded as 
the key to ‘up-skilling’ the work force, increasing economic competitiveness and 
promoting ‘social inclusion’ through the participation of ‘non-traditional’ learners 
(Simmons, 2010). There has also been a putative consensus across the political 
spectrum, and amongst educationalists and policy makers, about the need to tackle the 
deep seated divide between academic and vocational education.  In practice, however, 
proposals to create a unified system of qualifications to bridge this gap have been 
resisted by successive governments3. This intransigence has been widely seen by 
educationalists as reinforcing the stigma attached to vocational learning as a route for 
the ‘disaffected’ and less able and therefore as reinforcing the inequalities underpinning 
the English education system (Fisher & Simmons, 2012; Apple, 2001). Whilst the long 
standing defense of A Levels as the ‘gold standard’ qualification was challenged under 
                                                
2 Since the late 1990s, vocationally oriented foundation degrees have been delivered in many FE colleges 
in partnership with post-92 universities (Webb et al, 2006). In addition, most FE colleges deliver programmes 
specifically targeted at young people and adults with learning difficulties as well as collaborative provision 
with schools for 14-16 year olds deemed to be more suited to ‘practical’ learning rather than the academic 
subjects still central to the school curriculum (Fisher & Simmons, 2012).   
 
3 Most notable were the Conservative administration’s rejection of the Dearing Report’s (1996) proposals 
to create a coherent system of post-14 education encompassing academic and vocational learning (Benn & 
Chitty, 1996), and the New Labour government’s rejection of Tomlinson’s (2004) proposal to replace GCSEs, 
A Levels and vocational qualifications with a new four-level modular diploma.   
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Gordon Brown’s premiership by proposals in line with Tomlinson’s, these were thwarted 
by the general election of 2009 and the incoming coalition government 4.   
 
The similarities  between Conservative and  New Labour policy with respect to 
vocational education  are mirrored in broader continuities in the cross- party 
commitment to an ideological and economic project rooted in neo-liberalism (Fisher & 
Simmons: 2012).  The dominant consensus since the mid 1990s has lead to the 
promotion of policies that emphasize “the deregulation of the economy, trade 
liberalization, the dismantling of the public sector…. and the predominance of the 
financial sector of the economy over production and commerce” (Vilas, 1996, cited in 
Hursh, 2005: 4).  This agenda underpinned the Further and Higher Education Act 
(1992) which removed FE colleges from local authority control, and effectively from 
democratic accountability.  Under the process of ‘Incorporation’,   FE became 
“dominated by quasi-markets and competition engineered and controlled by the state” 
(Fisher & Simmons, 2012:36).  Alongside the constant stream of government imposed 
initiatives, targets and funding cuts, this major change heralded an era of industrial 
unrest in FE  (Ibid, 2012), continuing  job insecurity, increased workloads,  and the 
erosion of pay and conditions (Orr, 2011).  Whilst increasingly scarce resources were 
directed to marketing and PR, funding became dependent on competitive student 
recruitment and retention and achievement rates. At the heart of the neo-liberal project 
is the idea that ‘employability’ and economic productivity should be the central goal of 
education, displacing traditional liberal-humanist and critical approaches to teaching and 
learning that emphasize the developmental, social, or emancipatory role of education 
(Giroux, 2003; Lynch, 2006). The positioning of education as a market commodity like 
any other is consistent with trends in the development of vocational curricula and with 
the changing definition of skills on which they are based.  
 
                                                
4 The  educational agenda of the current Coalition government, under the auspices of Michael Gove, 
favours the retrenchment of rigid academic-vocational divisions and increased institutional exclusivity 




Skills, competencies and the new vocationalism 
 
Payne traces the shifts in policy discourses surrounding the concept of skills from a 
focus in the 1950s on analytical capacities, dexterity and technical know-how related to 
specific occupations to a preoccupation with generic “social and life skills” (Payne, 
2000) as a basis for re-constructing the dispositions of young people towards life and 
work and strengthening their adaptability, versatility and `employability’ in a rapidly 
changing labour market (Payne, 2000): 
  
  By the time Mrs. Thatcher entered office in 1979… `skill’ had already 
begun to be associated with compensatory education and training programmes 
for disadvantaged youth, aimed at remedying the failures of previous 
socialization (Ibid:356). 
 
The trajectory of this new ‘vocationalism’ has been shaped by the notion “that it is 
possible to identify a series of ‘generic, `transferable’ competencies capable of being 
taught and portable across occupations” (Ibid: 356).   ‘Competence Based Education 
and Training’ (CBET) is based on “what an individual can do rather than what they 
know” (Fisher & Simmons, 2012:39), on ‘performance’ rather than knowledge or 
understanding and is “more a question of transmitting dispositions and attitudes than of 
giving the knowledge and skills for specific tasks” (Frykholm & Nitzler, cited in Colley et 
al, 2003).  In addition, the emphasis on “‘soft’, relational skills to effect positive face-to-
face or voice-to-voice interaction with customers and clients” (Payne, 2000: 354) 
reflects the shift to a service-based economy.  These developments can be seen as 
constituting a particular neo-liberal form of regulation, helping to create the conditions in 
which young working class people with few or no qualifications are ostensibly ‘brought 
into’ the new economy as low paid, semi-skilled workers-  in Lash’s terms, as the 
“upgraded working class” (Lash, 1994:130)- by being given the ‘skills’ necessary for 
economic productivity and by the incitement to gain qualifications as evidence of self-
management and value on the job market (Hursh, 2005).  Neo-liberalism, as Olsen 
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argues, “does indeed demand the constant production of evidence that one is in fact 
‘making an enterprise of oneself’ (Olsen, 1996, cited in Apple, 2001: 416).  
  
In this sense, the ‘progressive vocationalism’ (Fisher & Simmons, 2012) associated with 
neoliberal education policies contains a “hidden curriculum which is an “expression of 
possessive individualism in market economies” (Moore, 1887, cited in ibid, 2012).  
Boreham illustrates the determination with which the ‘individualization of occupational 
competencies’ has been promoted by pointing to the Thatcher government’s directive 
forbidding FE college lecturers “to attribute unemployment to its economic policy. 
Instead, lecturers were required to convince their students that their lack of a job was 
due to deficits in their personal repertoire of skills” (Boreham, 2004:7).  Payne points to 
the duplicity in this agenda by highlighting the way in which the competencies described 
in new vocational curricula are often at very low levels and “specified in ways that could 
only be understood as an attempt to create a cheap pool of malleable, submissive, 
semi-skilled labour” (Payne, 2000:357).  He cites examples of written competencies 
from a qualification in ‘food preparation and service`- “dress correctly”, “maintain clean 
and tidy work station”, “use appropriate language” (Ibid: 357) – which are not far 
removed from the ‘learning outcomes’ specified in the NVQ Level 2 Beauty Therapy 
programme directing students to demonstrate their learning by “ensuring your personal 
hygiene and appearance meets accepted standards” and “effectively disinfecting your 
hands prior to treatment” (Hiscock & Lovett, 2009).  
 
CBET is probably most clearly associated with what Hayward (2004) defines as ‘weak’ 
Vocational Programmes.  Unlike the more traditional, ‘stronger’ forms vocational 
learning, for instance craft apprenticeships (Young, 2011)  and qualifications such as 
BTEC National Diplomas/Certificates which emphasize the skills, knowledge and 
understanding needed for entry to a broad vocational area, ‘weak’ vocational courses 
are geared towards the performance of a  particular job role and are typically delivered 
with “fewer resources and less specialized staff” (Hayward, 2004: 13). Included in this 
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category are General National Vocational Qualifications (GNVQs)5.   Moreover, 
research suggest that many young people take these courses as a ‘second chance’ 
after leaving school with few or no qualifications and may actually be seeking a general 
education rather than training for a specific job (Wahlberg & Glesson, 2004). The same 
may be true for many of those who find themselves on National Vocational Qualification 
(NVQ) courses, another type of ‘weak’ vocational qualification based on workplace 
competencies. Indeed, NVQs have been a mainstay of FE provision and represent the 
first incarnation of national attempts to base vocational qualifications on the notion of 
‘competence’ (Young, 2011).  
 
The introduction of NVQs in the mid-1980s began a trend in which the expression of 
qualifications by written outcomes detached from the process of learning became “an 
unquestioned element of all vocational qualification reforms since” (Ibid: 260). This 
model was arguably a reflection of the desire to control both public expenditure and 
educational institutions (Ibid, 2011) and to define education in terms that were 
instrumental to the needs of employers and the economy (Fisher & Simmons, 2012).  
Firstly, as an assessment - led system detached from any particular programme of 
learning or institution, policy makers saw NVQs as a way of breaking the monopoly of 
qualification providers like FE colleges and opening “ the way for qualifications to be 
branded by employers as other products ‘on the market’” (Young, 2011:261).  Secondly, 
they were seen as a tool for making education providers ‘accountable’ by providing a 
basis for comparability and tracking and for establishing a funding mechanism which 
linked payment to results, in this case, numbers of NVQs delivered (Ibid, 2011). Thirdly, 
they were seen as cheap method of dealing with the problem of the perceived ‘skills 
deficit’.  The original intention was for NVQs to be tools for accrediting existing skills 
acquired on work placements and to avoid any need for additional resources to be 
allocated to educational institutions for their delivery. However, widespread reluctance 
on the part of employers to offer work placements or to be involved in administration 
                                                
5 ‘Weak’ qualifications might also include the now defunct Advanced Vocational Certificates of Education 
(AVCEs or ‘Vocational A Levels’), criticized by the education inspectorate, Ofsted, as being “neither very 
advanced nor very vocational” (Ofsted, 2004, cited in Hayward, 2004: 13). Hayward argues that Level 3 
GVNQs accounted for most of the growth in vocational provision in schools up to the mid 1990s, whilst FE 
colleges were left to deliver at Level 1 and 2. 
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and assessment meant that colleges became key providers of NVQs (Ibid, 2011).  
Lastly, NVQs were legitimized on the basis that they would promote ‘social inclusion’ by 
making qualifications accessible to those without prior formal accreditation or access to 
educational institutions (Fisher & Simmons, 2012).   
 
The idea of vocational training as a solution to social exclusion is one that links 
administrations from Thatcher to the present coalition government. Under New Labour 
this was conceptualized in the concept of NEET- young people ‘Not in Education, 
Employment or Training’ (Bynner & Parsons, 2002), and in setting targets for 
decreasing the numbers in this category.  However, this rhetorical commitment to 
equality, as suggested earlier, is belied by the discursive focus on “the working class, 
rather than capitalist economic relations…. as the problem to be solved” (Fisher & 
Simmons, 2012:37)6 and on the characteristics and outcomes of competence –based 
vocational education and training. The focus of successive governments on ‘basic skills’ 
or ‘skills for life’ as the basis of vocational qualifications perpetuates the idea that they 
are “inherently inferior to those attained at school or university “(Young, 2000: 263).  In 
addition, it confirms the notion that they are unlikely to lead to progression, an idea 
consolidated by the focus of the NVQ model on accrediting pre-existing skills and on the 
mastery of a narrow range of tasks rather than theoretical knowledge (Brockmann et al, 
2008). The criticisms leveled at the NVQ system have led to a number of attempts to 
bolster ‘underpinning knowledge and understanding’ and to incorporate literacy and 
numeracy skills.  In terms of the former, because ‘performance’ remains the criteria on 
which knowledge is judged (by assessors who are not necessarily subject specialists) “it 
is invariably expressed as a list of topics with no curricular or pedagogic coherence” 
(Young, 2012: 271). Consequently, what tends to be emphasized is “’knowledge as 
facts” rather that ‘knowledge as understanding” (Ibid:271).  In Smithers’ view, this 
makes competence based qualifications ones “that candidates can cope with, rather 
than ones that increase their skills” (Smithers, 1993, cited in Grugulis, 2002:9). 
                                                
6  Hursh suggests that by focusing on educational reform, neo-liberalism is able to divert attention “away 
from the negative implications of other policies”  and to transform the relationship between the individual 
and society so that in “shifting responsibility for…welfare away from society… to the individual, fewer expect 




Furthermore, the privileging of performance over theory and knowledge is partly the 
result of “a largely unspoken assumption that understanding was beyond the 
capabilities of those likely to take such qualifications” (Young, 2012: 277).   In the case 
of literacy, language and numeracy (LLN), programmes are now provided for those 
without a level 2 qualification (DfES, 2001) and are most often ‘embedded’ in the 
delivery of the substantive elements of learning for those on vocational courses. Whilst 
research suggests that ‘embedding’ can have positive results where LLN specialists are 
used as part of a teaching team, restricted funding often means that vocational tutors 
are left to deliver language and literacy skills alone.  A study by Casey et al (2006) 
found that in these circumstances, vocational students were twice as likely to fail literacy 
and numeracy tests. As Hayward (2004) points out, for students without these skills 
there is little chance of progression in terms of either education or employment. What 
the evidence outlined here suggests is that competence based vocational models have 
created new barriers to progression and serve to reproduce existing social inequalities.   
 
However, other ‘stronger’ types of vocational programmes may have far more potential 
to encourage progression and to ‘expand horizons’.  Research conducted as part of the 
‘Transforming Learning Cultures in Further Education’7 project suggests that some 
courses which have a strong underpinning knowledge base and require academic 
study, for instance BTEC health studies courses containing a science and social studies 
components, may be capable of “transforming the aspirations of students into 
something less tightly bound by classed and gendered values and stereotypes [by 
prompting] new identifications and aspirations” (Bloomer et al, 2002:16).  For instance, 
Bloomer et al point to the way in which students’ definitions of nursing shifted from 
‘caring practice’ to ‘science practice’. Whilst this may introduce another set of 
exclusionary dichotomies, it does suggest that such courses may have a ‘transformative 
potential’.  It could also be assumed that introducing care students to areas of social 
science may have some potential for facilitating access to the conceptual tools needed 
for critical reflection on the gendered and classed construction of caring labour (Skeggs, 
                                                





1997).  By implication, competence-based courses are by definition limited in the extent 
to which they are able to encourage this kind of intellectual change and critical insight8.  
 
The NVQ model has, ironically, proved unpopular with many employers including those 
in the beauty industry (Black, 2004), in part because they do not address “the depth and 
breadth of knowledge that is constructed in the workplace” (James, 2006, cited in 
Young, 2011).  In Young’s (2011) view, its continued currency amongst policy makers 
can be understood in terms of their ‘cost effectiveness’.  This may also explain why they 
have remained popular  with colleges for whom a result-based funding mechanism may 
provide an incentive for recruiting and retaining ‘low achieving’ students on ‘easy to 
pass’ vocational courses, even in the face of evidence that they offer little prospect of 
progression to work (Gardiner & Wilson, 2012).  This appears to be confirmed by the 
recent Wolf Report commissioned by Michael Gove which maintains that up to one third 
of the post -16 cohort in FE “are following low level vocational provision which has little 
or no labour market value” (Wolf, 2011).  Nevertheless, some academics point to 
examples of NVQs being used by employers in ways that have benefitted low-skilled 
workers. For instance, Cox (2007) argues that whilst employers have typically used 
NVQs at Levels 1 to 3 to train employees for lower skilled labour, National Health 
Service staff have been able to use them as tools for accessing promotion 
opportunities. In her view, the reason for this is less to do with the qualification itself and 
more to do with the fact that the NHS has been a relatively well resourced sector with a 
strong Human Resource Development policy and an organizational commitment to staff 
progression across traditional occupational boundaries. In comparison, other 
workplaces are more ‘restricted’ (Fuller & Unwin, 2004) as learning environments and in 
these contexts, competence –based qualifications offer little to employees in the way of 
skills and career development.  
 
                                                
8 As Glesson argues  “`skill’ had become so watered down that personal effectiveness training for 
disadvantaged youth offered neither bona fide marketable skills, nor a rigorous general education….that 
might afford genuine critical insight into the world of work, economy, politics and society” (Gleeson, 1990, 




The potential usefulness of NVQs in spite of their ideological underpinnings is echoed in 
Payne’s argument that they can benefit low paid workers in the care sector by 
recognizing “skill elements in interpersonal care relationships” (Payne, 1999;4).  Whilst 
this may be important in “challenging the exclusions” produced by definitions of ‘skill’ 
rooted in male industrial labour (Ibid: 4), his argument ignores the exploitative potential 
of broadening out the notion of skills to include ‘emotional’ competencies. Business 
management theorists have also been keen to recognize emotional skills and 
competencies as ways of maximizing productivity (Colley, 2006) and as Colley argues, 
this discourse “constitutes a celebration of emotional labour” [that] resists 
acknowledging its costs to the employee”. (Ibid:17).  In chapter three I discuss the 
issues raised by this in more depth. However, Payne’s emphasis on the role of NVQs in 
the recognition of skills raises an important issue in relation to vocational qualifications 
in the largely female areas of ‘caring’ labour and personal service work, including 
beauty therapy.  As Colley’s research on CACHE9 childcare courses suggests, the 
personal attributes they aim to inculcate are largely hidden beneath a discourse of 
technical skills and conceptual knowledge.  The courses rely on an “unwritten 
curriculum” of disciplinary practices through which ‘suitable’ girls are socialized into the 
work and those deemed unsuitable are ‘screened out’.  What is being produced here, 
according to Colley et al, is an orientation to a specific vocation, or being “the right 
person for the job” (Colley et, 2003: 477), which in the case of nursery nursing 
emphasizes ‘caring for people’ and ‘caring about people’ and a set of gendered 
characteristics including gentleness, self-denial, sensitivity, and enthusiasm. Even in the 
case of NVQ beauty therapy in which written competencies are often measures of  
personal dispositions in relation to appearance and behavior,  the ‘caring’ skills required 
in this type of work (Black, 2004) are largely absent from the formal  ‘learning outcomes’ 
(Hiscock & Lovett, 2010).    
 
                                                
9 The Council for Awards in Childcare and Education (CACHE) validates programmes from Level 1 
upwards. The Diploma is a recognized qualification for entry into nursery nursing, a registered occupation in 
the UK.  Whilst Colley’s (2006) study highlights the hidden curriculum involved in inculcating a gendered 
vocational habitus into working class girls, the qualification can also open routes to further training in 





Research using the notion of ‘vocational habitus’ underscores the way in which official 
notions of learning as achieving technical skills and behavioural competences fail to 
recognize learning as always intimately connected to identity.  The Transforming 
Learning Cultures research emphasizes the nature of learning, even on competency 
based programmes, as a ‘process of becoming’.  For instance, Colley et al’s (2003) 
case studies of vocational courses in FE colleges draw on Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, 
a key concept in this thesis and one I return to in chapter four, to argue that vocational 
learning cultures “transform those who enter them” (Ibid: 471) by requiring students to 
orient themselves to particular dispositions suited to the relevant occupational sectors. 
Vocational courses build on, reinforce or change the dispositions students bring to their 
learning and develop a ‘practical sense’ of how to be’ and a ‘sensibility’ around the 
“requisite feelings and morals” (Ibid:471)  embedded in the particular ethos of a 
vocational area.  In the process of dispositional change, gendered and classed 
dispositions and inequalities may be reproduced. For instance, they point to the way in 
which childcare and engineering have two distinct “guiding ideologies of practice” which 
reflect both ‘sides’ of the “male-female, rational-emotional hierarchy” (Ibid: 488)  Whilst 
childcare courses emphasize an ideology of “sacrificial femininity”, engineering courses 
stress” logical thinking, technological invention and judgment divorced from the ‘human 
side’ of problems” (Ibid:488).   
 ‘Types’ of students: the discourse of ‘learning styles’ 
 
In neo-liberal models of education, the detachment of learning from other areas of 
human experience “in order to render it tangible, observable and measurable” (Bloomer 
et al, 2002:1) is consistent with a number of theoretical traditions which have developed 
over the course of the twentieth century.  Behaviourist and cognitive learning theories, 
for example, have supported the idea that individual and ‘cultural’ differences in the way 
people learn can be understood in  terms of stable personality traits or, more recently, in 
terms of conscious ‘preferences’ for particular ways of learning, which can be observed 
and measured (Reynolds, 1997). This idea gained ascendency in schools, FE  and 
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management education in the 1980s (Ibid, 1997) and resulted in a range of diagnostic 
tools based on a plethora of often contradictory and contested research largely in the 
areas of  experimental and cognitive psychology (Coffield et al, 2004a). By the mid 
2000s the Learning and Skills Council (LSC), the government body then funding FE in 
England and Wales, required all post-16 institutions to undertake pre-programme 
diagnostic assessments of ‘learning styles’ for new students with the intention of 
providing an ‘objective’ basis on which teachers could develop a range of pedagogies to 
suit the diverse ‘learning attributes’ of students (Bloomer and Hodkinson, 2000). 
 
The notion of learning styles has been subjected to sustained criticism on the grounds 
that the notion of ‘permanent or semi-permanent ‘traits’ decontextualizes dispositions to 
learning from the institutionalized power relationships through which they are produced  
(Bloomer et al, 2002) . The emphasis on the psychology of learning has meant that the 
complexities of social class, gender and ethnicity are obscured or denied and “political 
concerns are translated into scientific” and technical problems (Popkewitz, 1988, cited 
in Reynolds, 1997:124).  For instance divisions made by the Kolb10 inventory between 
those who learn from ‘concrete experience’ (practical learning) and those who favour 
‘abstract conceptualization’ is ostensibly a neutral categorization although it mirrors the 
classed divisions between practical and academic education.   If working class students 
are more likely to value practical aspects of the curriculum, it is arguably because of 
they are aware of the high probability of ending up in jobs requiring practical skills rather 
than conceptual or academic skills (Willis, 1977; Skeggs, 1997; Bourdieu, 2010)11.   
 
One of the difficulties involved in challenging the learning styles agenda in the context of 
FE and is that for practitioners it can appear to offer a concrete way of addressing the 
seemingly worthy causes of  ‘diversity and difference’ in the classroom, ‘meeting needs’ 
                                                
10 The Kolb Learning Style Inventory was developed by David A. Kolb and is based on the idea of 
‘experiential learning’. It is ostensibly designed to help individuals identify the way they learn from 
experience (Kolb, 1984). 
 
11 Skeggs (1997), for instance, argues that the working class students in her study aligned themselves 
with the practical side of their care course because this confirmed their vocational aspirations and identities 




and encouraging the participation of  the least ‘academic’ learners12. Research on 
learning styles has been used to support the idea that women and men typically have 
different ways of learning.  For instance, Philbin et al (1995), using the Kolb inventory, 
conducted research which supports earlier findings using the same scale (Belenky, 
1986, cited in Ibid, 1995) that women are ‘accommodators’, learning from practical, 
hands-on experience, whilst men are ‘assimilators’ with a tendency to abstract 
conceptualization.  Whilst they argue that women are disadvantaged because ‘male 
styles’ are positioned as the norm, their argument relies on essentialized, or at least 
normative, understandings of gender difference  and excludes an analysis of how these 
differences might be produced in the context of gendered power relations.  In contrast, 
other research points to the way in which psychologized approaches which 
decontextualize learning from its social context can reinforce the kinds of “crude human 
stereotypes” which have otherwise been delegitimized by “moral and legal process” 
(Bloomer et al, 2002:2) in the mid to late 20th century13.   More recent UK-based 
research has explored how relationships to learning are shaped by complex situational, 
cultural, social and economic factors.  The kinds of ‘learning identities’ which these 
factors produce are more usefully thought of as socially grounded dispositions 
(Hodkinson et al, 2007) which can only be understood in the context of  learners’ social 
positions in relation to gender, class and  ‘race’ in specific historical and institutional 
contexts. For example, some research has focused how the marketization of further and 
higher education and its effects on funding and management practices have a 
differential impact on young people’s relationship to education and their longer term life 
                                                
12 For institutions, the attraction of learning styles may also due to its compatibility with “the machinery 
of measurement and credentialism” (Reynolds, 1997:125) at the heart of the ‘skills agenda’. 
 
13 For instance, a project undertaken by a group of teachers in the US was designed to address the 
widespread assumption that Native American children are ‘field-dependent’ and ‘non-analytical’ learners and 
‘doers’ rather than ‘talkers’ (McCarty et al, 1991, cited in Renold, 1997),  distinctions reminiscent of the 
vocational-academic divide in the UK.  Through an enquiry- based programme aimed at developing “concepts, 
ideas and problem solving abilities in the context of culturally relevant experiences and topics” (Ibid: 60) the 
researchers showed that a group of Navajo children were willing to use analytical skills, to engage in 
discussion, and to carry their responsiveness into other learning activities.  McCarty et al concluded that 
understanding how this particular group of students learn requires “a more complex analysis of the 
relationship between pedagogy, learner characteristics and classroom interaction than is afforded by 
conventional categorizations of “learning styles”  according to analytical versus holistic  or verbal versus non-




chances (Gewirtz et al., 1995; Ainley & Bailey, 1997).   Other work suggests that  
gender and/or class in an increasingly competitive and individualized education system 
shapes people’s experiences of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in school, further, and higher 
education (Walkerdine et al, 2001; Lehmann, 2009).  This research underscores the 
way in which learning, far from being a product of stable individual traits, is shaped by 
‘dispositions’ and ‘positions’ which may change over time and from context to context 
(Bloomer & Hodkinson, 2000).  As Hodkinson et al argue: 
 
 …learning may be understood as one way in which dispositional change 
occurs.  However, changing or unchanging, the inherently social nature of being 
human is significant for learning (Hodkinson et al, 2007: 417).  
 
The idea that learning cannot be separated from its context is one now widely accepted 
by educational theorists. However, what may be less obvious are the implications of this 
for understanding the relationship between agency and social structure in relation to 
education.  Hodkinson et al argue that whilst social structures and systems bear down 
on individuals they also, produce and “operate through the person” so that: 
 
…people are subject to structures even as they take agentic actions, and that 
any such agentic actions contribute to the on- going 
development/change/reinforcement of the social structures that are part of them, 
and part of the social settings where they live their lives (Ibid: 418). 
 
This clearly has implications for understanding how young people ‘navigate’ through 
their ‘learning careers’ (Bloomer & Hodkinson, 2002) and how they make their post -16 







Understanding Post-16 ‘choices’ 
 
The imposition of market ideologies on education is linked to the discourse of ‘choice’, 
constituting students and parents as free consumers of education (Ball, 1993) and as 
‘reflexive choosers’ using education as a root to self-production and ‘capital 
accumulation’.  In this section I explore how this discourse reproduces structural 
inequalities and how it obscures the complexities and social embeddedness of 
educational decision-making. 
 
Hodkinson et al’s view of structure and agency as having an integrated, dialectical 
relationship to each other is influenced by Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’,  a central 
element in his theory of social practice, discussed further in chapter four. Though 
habitus is given a range of subtly different meanings throughout Bourdieu’s work 
(Jenkins, 1992), it relates to the ‘dispositions’ or mental structures through which social 
agents apprehend the world and which are “essentially a product of the internalization of 
that world” (Bourdieu, 1990, cited in Hatcher, 1998:18).   Because agency is an 
expression of these dispositions, it tends (though is not deterministically programmed) 
towards conformity to the terms of the dominant social order. The internalization of 
social structure in the form of dispositions “is not just manifest in behavior, it is an 
integral part of it” (Jenkins, 1992:75) and “prompts us to act in certain ways without 
having to go through the mechanism of conscious thought or rational decision making” 
(Chambers, 2005:331).  Bourdieu’s model is one that emphasizes the dialectical 
relationship between habitus as the internalization of class cultures and hierarchy and 
the education system which selects and filters students. Together these work to 
reproduce middle class advantage and working class disadvantage (Bourdieu & 
Passeron, 1990; Bourdieu, 2010).  In his later work on masculine domination, Bourdieu 
also argues that girls are guided towards certain subjects and careers both because of  
objective constraints on their ‘choices’ and because of the way in which women 
internalize the gendered symbolic order so that their habitus will ‘guide’ them towards 




Objective limits become a sense of limits, a practical anticipation of objective 
limits acquired by experience of objective limits. A ‘sense of one’s place’ which 
leads one to exclude oneself from the goods, persons, places and so forth from 
which one is excluded (Bourdieu, 2010:473). 
 
The extent to which people have a ‘feel for the game’ of education as a transmitter of 
class and gender privilege is informed by the unequal distribution of economic, social 
and, most importantly, cultural capital (resources). The latter is ‘inherited’ from the 
family through childhood socialization and relates to familiarity with dominant cultural 
norms (those that inform the education system, school curricula and so on), language 
use, values and motivations, and is internalized as dispositions of habitus.  Middle class 
people typically follow a trajectory from A Levels to university not because they have 
made a conscious strategic calculation about the best way to maximize longer term 
gains, but because their social position gives them access to greater amounts of valued 
cultural capital and disposes them towards a ‘practical sense’ which guides their actions 
“without rational computation and without the conscious positing of ends” (Bourdieu, 
1990, cited in Hatcher, 1998:18)14:  
 
This model can be used to explain why working class students with similar academic 
ability to their middle class peers are more likely to follow a vocational rather than 
academic route through post-16 education (Roberts, 1993) or why, in spite of the rising 
levels of post-16 participation in education, low achieving young people from middle 
class backgrounds are more likely to remain in full time education than those from 
working class backgrounds (Croll, 2009)15.  However, Bourdieu’s model has been 
criticized as over-deterministic in that its focus on reproduction appears to cancel out 
the possibility of social change. It has also been seen as incomplete in its failure to 
                                                
14 Bourdieu argues that “…one of the privileges of the dominant, who move in their world as fish in water, 
resides in the fact that they need not engage in rational computation in order to reach the goals that best suit 
their interests. All they have to do is follow their dispositions which, being adjusted to their positions, 
‘naturally’ generate practices adjusted to their situation (Bourdieu, 1990, cited in Hatcher, 1998:18).  
 
15
  Bourdieu’s model may also explain why, even when ‘objective’ measures of  ‘ability’ are held constant, 
middle class pupils are more likely than those from working class backgrounds to elect to study ‘prestigious’ 
subjects like  modern languages or science (Coxford, 1994).  
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recognize the ways in which “deliberate, knowing decision-making, informed by 
whatever rationality is the order of the day” (Jenkins, 1992: 97) may co-exist with 
‘choices’ made in more unplanned and ‘intuitive’ ways. However, if it is one-sided it is 
certainly no more so than the model proposed by sociological Rational Action Theory 
which presents a radical challenge to cultural reproduction explanations.  
 
Following Boudon (1974), a number of theorists have used RAT to explain class 
differences in educational decision –making beyond the ‘primary effects’ of socially 
produced differences in ‘academic ability’.   In this model, decisions are based on 
conscious calculations of the “costs, benefits and probabilities of success” (Hatcher, 
1998:10) attached to available options.  Working class people do not de-select 
themselves from higher education or from academic courses because they value 
education less, but because class position, defined in relation to economic resources, 
means that their cost-benefit evaluations are of necessity different to those of middle 
class people. For instance Goldthorpe (1996), Breen (1997) and Erikson & Jonsson 
(1996) argue that rational choice is based on a mechanism of ‘relative risk aversion’ in 
which “the most important goal…is to avoid downward mobility” (Werfhorst & Hofstede, 
2007:392). On this basis, an individual will tend to strive for a level of attainment that 
allows them to maintain an educational and social position comparable to that of their 
parents. Middle class people are more likely to follow a route from school to university 
because they need more education to achieve the goal of maintaining their class 
position.  One implication of this model is that children from working class backgrounds 
have to be more ambitious than middle class children in order to achieve upward social 
mobility through higher education (Ibid, 2007), and the costs of a failed attempt at 
university will be relatively greater (Goldthorpe, 1996).   In addition, working class 
students and their families may make strategic decisions to take vocational courses 
because “they offer the best protection against relegation to the ranks of unskilled 
labour or the unemployed” (Hatcher, 1998:11). This model, however, does not explain 
why some working class students may also aspire to middle class destinations 
(Riseborough, 1993, Mirza, 1992). 
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Other studies have also applied variations of RAT to the relationship between gender 
and educational choice.  Jonsson’s (1999) study of gender segregation in subject 
choice in Sweden uses a ‘weaker’, less narrowly economistic model of rational choice 
but she argues that girls and boys choose gender-typical subjects at university level on 
the basis of rational calculations of optimal utility.  Gendered subject preferences, and 
thus the horizontal segregation of labour markets,  is explained as the outcome of the 
relatively high costs and risks (discrimination, lower probability of success and 
employment) associated with gender a-typical ‘choices’16.   
 
Other approaches which assume that choices involve a high degree of technical 
rationality are less concerned with social structure and more focused on the idea that 
decision making is essentially an individual process.  For instance, careers guidance in 
the UK has historically drawn on trait theory (the idea that good career decisions involve 
matching personal ‘skills’ or interests to jobs), developmental models and ‘social 
learning theory’, all of which rely on the idea that choice is, or should be, controlled by 
individuals themselves and that it is, or should be, based on rational processes.  In 
other words, they “[a]ll present a model of planned decision-making as the realistic ideal 
to be worked towards” (Hodkinson & Sparkes, 1997:32). Colley and Hodkinson’s (2001) 
analysis of New Labour’s ‘Bridging the Gap’ policy on young people and social 
exclusion shows how those who do not match up to this model of the ideal, reflexive 
‘chooser’ have been demonized through a discourse which locates the causes of social 
exclusion in faulty attitudes, wrong choices and other personal (though implicitly 
classed) deficits. The solution to the problems identified in this document was the 
provision of personal life and career advice and guidance through the Connexions 
                                                
16 Jonsson suggests that the gender segregation determined by ‘rational choice’ is not a matter of vertical 
gender inequality. However, this misses the way in which ‘choices’, made on whatever basis, are shaped by 
structural power relations,  and also disconnects the notion of ‘rational choice’ from its social and historical 
context in which rationality has been constructed as an expression of masculinity and defined against 
femininity and other subjectivities marginalized by class and race ( see chapter three). In this sense, Jonsson 
underplays the way in which ‘rationality’ has been used to legitimize for gender segregation in the public and 
private spheres in the first place and how its assumed use in educational decision retrenches gendered 




service17.  This was an attempt, Colley & Hodkinson argue, to “address deep seated 
problems through a strongly individualistic agency approach” (Ibid:14). In practice, the 
Connexions service has suffered from underfunding and lack of cooperation between 
schools and other agencies (Hoggarth et al, 2004).  However, as Colley suggests, it the 
individualistic model of decision –making on which careers advice and guidance is 
based that makes it inadequate for the needs of young people because: 
 
It fails to acknowledge the functioning of deep-rooted, structural factors in 
society, such as class, race, and gender, which profoundly affect young people’s 
life chances….While stigmatizing whole communities, it neglects issues such as 
the unequal operation of cultural capital…. although this has been shown to 
influence children’s allocation to better or worse-performing schools… as well as 
post-16 transitions (Colley & Hodkinson, 2001: 8). 
 
In addition current advice and guidance provision does not provide a context in which 
young people can critically reflect on social pressures guiding them towards particular 
courses (Colley, 2006).    Beck & Fuller et al’s (2006b) research on the gendered and 
racialized nature of apprenticeships, education and work  found that young people 
receive very little practical information and advice to help them make transitions. This, 
they argue has particular implications for young women who are concentrated in 
apprenticeships in low-pay sectors with fewer opportunities for progression.  Like 
Colley, they suggest that what is also missing from advice and guidance provision is the 
opportunity to engage in critical debate about the reasons and consequences of gender, 
class and ethnic stereotyping.  
 
Hodkinson & Sparkes (1997) suggest that dominant models of decision-making in 
careers advice provision are likely to have limited success when they are applied to 
policy because they bear little relation to the ways in which educational and career 
decisions are actually made. They argue instead for a model which recognizes 
                                                
17 The Connexions Service was launched in 2001 “with the aim of helping young people make informed 




individual agency but which contextualizes it in relation to the social, cultural and 
economic factors through which individual trajectories are produced.  Bourdieu’s 
concept of habitus as a bridge between agency and structure is, they argue, the most 
useful tool for developing such a model.  Indeed, as suggested above, it forms a key 
part of the theoretical underpinnings of much subsequent work on young people’s 
experience of education and ‘learning cultures’  (Bloomer et al, 2002; Hodkinson et al, 
2007; 2008 Colley, 2003; 2006, Colley et al, 2003).  In this context, how young people 
make educational and life transitions can be seen in a much broader context, influenced 
by gendered and classed dispositions, the opportunity structures of the labour market, 
family and friendship networks and the inequalities built into the education system.   On 
this view, habitus does not determine trajectories in a mechanistic way but is a ‘filtering’ 
mechanism (Hodkinson, 1995) for social experiences, producing subjective ‘horizons for 
action’ which can both limit or enable life chances. Habitus is produced, reproduced or, 
potentially, modified by social experience (Hodkinson, 1995) in a way that is consistent 
with Bourdieu’s claim that it is a ‘transposable’ source of strategies allowing individuals 
to generate an ‘infinite range’ of practices to suit specific situations (Bourdieu, 1977).  
Far from implying a voluntaristic view of agency, however, habitus is always constrained 
by the conditions of its production. For example, whilst engineering jobs may be formally 
open to girls this is an irrelevancy if they do not perceive this route as appropriate (as 
consistent with habitus) (Hodkinson, 1995).   A considerable body of research now 
points to the way in which gender in intersection with class shapes girls and boys 
dispositions in both vocational and academic terms with girls often aspiring to service or 
care related work from hairdressing to social work and nursing, and boys expressing a 
preference for technical jobs or professions (Furlong & Biggert, 1999). In spite of the 
ubiquitous discourse of equal opportunities, continuities in the way in which traditional 
gender stereotypes inform educational and occupational destinations is also 
demonstrated in research by Miller and Hayward (2006) and Fuller et al (2005).  Beck et 
al (2006a; 2006b) focus on the perceived risks involved in crossing gender boundaries 
in apprenticeships including ‘not fitting in’, being harassed or teased, having sexuality 
questioned.   However, some girls do elect, or aspire, to follow gender a-typical career 
routes. This suggests that any useful model of decision-making must take account of 
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the ways in which dispositions are produced and the conditions under which they might 
be changed or modified (Hodkinson, 1995), and under which resistant agency might be 
possible. 
 
Young people’s ‘horizons for action’ may allow them to engage in forms of ‘rational’ 
decision making, though research using this expanded model suggests that this is not 
the technical rationality  proposed by RAT but rather a ‘pragmatic rationality’ which may 
be instrumental but always related to family and cultural background. Decisions may be 
opportunistic, based on partial knowledge and information from an individual’s local 
contexts. They may be ‘partially rational’ (Hodkinson & Sparkes, 2006) in the sense that 
decisions are never disconnected from feelings.  In addition, as far as educational 
‘choices’ are informed by particular subject or vocational ‘interests’, these are embodied 
as part of identity.  Vocational ‘choices’ are ‘choosable identities’, predispositions rooted 
in an individual’s gendered and classed experiences (Colley, 2003) and “intimately 
linked to the economic, political and ideological trajectories of their families and 
communities” (Ball et al, 2000:9, Walkerdine et al, 2001).   Habitus, as Reay argues, 
always “holds powerful structural influences within its frame” (Reay, 1995, cited in 
Colley, 2006:29). Those with most cultural, economic and social capital are more likely 
to be able to engage in, or appear to engage in, strategic forms of ‘career planning’ or 
‘reflexive decision-making’. Those with least may be severely limited in their ability to 
construct ‘choice biographies’ (Du Bois- Raymond,1998).  As Ball et al argue “reflexivity 
will get you only so far if you leave school without qualifications” (Ball et al, 2000:22).  
However, in a cultural context in which individual rights are ostensibly ‘balanced’ by a 
moral obligation to plan and control one’s life18, failure becomes an indication of ‘poor 
choices’ and individual inadequacy. Being “forced to negotiate lifestyle choices” without 
the resources to do so (Ibid: 22) is the condition of those that Lash calls ‘reflexive losers’ 
(Lash, 1994). These are the young people who Du Bois- Reymond characterizes  as 
‘the undecided’ (1998), those with limited ‘horizons for action’ whose post-16 trajectories 
                                                
18  The discourse of’ ‘rights and responsibilities’ was at the centre of New Labour’s ideological trajectory 
and continues to inform the rhetoric and policies of subsequent administrations. See Tony Blair’s article 





are more likely to be shaped by temporary or arbitrary decisions, or by ‘localism’, ‘drift’ 
or ‘fatalism’ (Ball et al, 2000).  However, these characterizations also run the risk of 
reinforcing the discourse of deficit and of  misreading the responses of those positioned 
outside of the ‘learning society’ as maladaptations rather than expressions of frustration 
or resistance  (Skeggs, 1997). Reay & Ball (1997), for instance, argue that when 
working class parents prioritize the happiness of their children over considerations of 
longer term educational attainment they are making a ‘rational’ response to their own 
experiences of educational ‘failure’.  In keeping with RAT, they can also be seen as 
refusing to engage in the kinds of strategic ‘choice games’ which are understood in 
terms of middle class norms, and which they expect to lose.  
 
What is clear, however, is that post-16 progression routes cannot be simply be seen in 
terms of ‘choice’ and ‘rational planning’ (Bloomer et al, 2002).  As Bloomer et al argue of 
young people’s transitions: 
 
In so far as they are choices or decisions at all, they are very heavily 
constrained choices and decisions.  The idealized rational planning 
agent….which provides the platform for public policy is little more than a figment 
of the imagination (Ibid: 8). 
 
However, some research suggests that the rhetoric of choice is increasingly 
emphasized in young people’s narratives about their lives (Baker, 2009; Rich, 2005; 
Wakerdine, 2003; Brannen & Nilsen, 2005).  Brannen and Nilsen, for example, argue 
that in these narratives  “the structural side of life… is more often expressed in the 
silences which punctuate narratives” (Ibid: 2005:423), or in the tensions between claims 
to autonomous selfhood and the (partial) recognition of gendered and classed dynamics 
around which this self is ‘negotiated’ (Rich, 2005). In this sense, late modernity revolves 
around an ‘epistemological fallacy’ in which social structures, whilst continuing to shape 
and predict life chances, have “become more obscure as collectivist traditions. 
Therefore people come to think of the social world as unpredictable, filled with risk 





The changes in further education and the vocational curricula in England since the 
1980s are a consequence of broader social and economic processes including global 
economic restructuring and neo-liberal economic and educational policies. It is in this 
context that qualifications based on traditional conceptions of skill as technical ability 
underpinned by knowledge and theory have been displaced by qualifications based on 
the notion of generic, measurable competencies, often conflated with the personal, 
behavioural characteristics required of low status workers in the new economy.  The 
stress on dispositions rather than technical skills and knowledge may have a particular 
significance for women training for work in ‘caring’ and service occupations, including 
beauty therapy.  In this context, competence-based qualifications may highlight some of 
the lower level skills involved in interpersonal, ‘emotional’ forms of labour, but in so 
doing they may also normalize and obscure the gendered and classed nature of this 
work, reinforcing its low status and normalizing the potential harm involved for workers 
undertaking ‘emotional labour’, an issue I return to in chapter three.  
 
Some ‘stronger’ vocational qualifications, however,  retain more traditional notions of 
skill and may offer more ‘transformative’ learning experiences which may have the 
potential to challenge class and gender stereotypes in the construction of ‘vocational 
identities’.  By implication, competence-based courses are unlikely to offer the same 
opportunities for critical reflection.  The reproduction of social inequalities through such 
courses, and through the entrenchment of the academic/vocational divide, belies the 
ubiquitous discourse of inclusion and equality in the educational policies of successive 
governments, a rhetoric that has also found its way into pedagogic practice through the 
notion of ‘learning styles’ which require teachers to identify and cater for individualized 
‘traits’ or preferences in classroom delivery in order to ensure ‘inclusivity’. However, in 
keeping with other individualized discourses, the concept of learning styles 
decontextualizes individual dispositions from the social and cultural contexts in which 
they are produced and obscures structural and political nature of educational 




Individualized models of behavior also inform dominant discourses about how young 
people make, or should make, life decisions. Voluntaristic notions of agency are 
embedded in careers advice and guidance policy and provision and ignore the structural 
factors shaping and constraining ‘choice’.  Whilst young people’s ‘choices’ do not 
always reproduce their disadvantage in any straightforward way, the most useful 
approach to understanding post-16 decision-making is one that emphasizes the 
dialectical relationship between agency and structure.  Bourdieu’s notion of Habitus is of 
key importance here. Whilst it can imply the inevitability of ‘choice’ as a mechanism of 
unconscious social reproduction, when habitus is understood as a ‘transposable’ source 
of strategies which may allow for conscious as well as unconscious action,  it can be 
used as a tool for exploring the complexity of post-16 decision making.  Whilst an 
individual’s ‘choices’ may be guided by gendered and classed dispositions sedimented 
in childhood or through prior educational experience, habitus can also incorporate the 
schematic repertoire necessary for types of ‘rational’ calculation, though this is always 
informed by access to information, family and cultural backgrounds, labour market 
opportunity structures and  ‘learning identities’.   
 
In chapter three I turn my attention to beauty practices and the beauty industry as the 
other key area influencing the trajectories of the young women in this study. In the 
course of reviewing the empirical and theoretical literature connected to beauty, I revisit 
several of themes emerging from the above discussion:  the significance of skills and 
‘emotional’ labour in the context of beauty therapy; individualized notions of reflexive 
self-production in the context of women’s relationships to their bodies; the significance 









Beauty Practices and the Beauty Therapy Industry:  
Sexual Difference, Domination and Agency 
 
Young women’s decisions to enrol on beauty therapy courses and their experiences on 
those courses are inevitably bound up with beauty as a cultural practice associated with 
historically and culturally specific constructions of heterosexual femininity.  To explore 
this, I draw on an international body of feminist work which, since the 1970s, has 
addressed the effect of the feminine appearance practices on women, gender relations 
and constructions of class and ‘race’. The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview 
of some the key issues arising from this field with a particular focus on questions of 
sexual difference, agency, pleasure, domination and harm/violence.  I present a largely 
descriptive account of how these issues have been debated in empirical and theoretical 
work on beauty, with the intention of subjecting them to a more theoretical exploration in 
chapters four and five. 
 
Part one addresses the idea that feminine appearance practices of all kinds produce 
and reproduce gender/sexual difference, structural inequalities and physical or 
psychological harms.  I argue that women’s involvement in ‘beauty culture’ cannot be 
understood simply as an exercise of choice in the pursuit of ‘pleasure’ or  identity as has 
been suggested by some research, although these responses are centrally important in 
understanding the relationship between beauty and domination.  In part two, I consider 
feminist research and theory which has focused on how women’s engagement with 
beauty practices is shaped by their social locations in relation to class, ‘race’ and age as 
well as gender.  I also discuss the historical specificity of ‘beauty’ and the significance of 
appearance practices in the context of contemporary consumer capitalism.  In the final 
section I discuss the contemporary beauty therapy industry, drawing on research which 
has addressed women’s involvement in this as clients and workers. Because the 
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participants in this study are both consumers of beauty and potential workers in the 
industry, I focus on what the literature tells us about how beauty therapy shapes the 
meanings attached to femininity and appearance, and the forms of work, specifically 
‘emotional’ and ‘aesthetic’ labour,  involved in being a beauty therapist. 
Beauty, Sexual difference, Power and Agency 
 
One of the of the key questions in feminist debates on beauty practices is whether they 
function to control, repress or disguise a ‘natural’ female body or to create the illusion of 
an absolute and universal difference between men and women. The question is 
underpinned by different approaches to the relationship between ‘sex’, usually referring 
to biological differences, and ‘gender’, usually referring to socially constructed 
characteristics (Oakley, 1972). Within the feminist literature, two main ways of 
understanding this relationship have been incorporated into analyses of beauty.  The 
first of these understands sex and gender to be related but distinct categories. This 
assumption informs Wendy Chapkis’ (1986) empirical study of the ‘politics of 
appearance’19  in which beauty practices are seen as part of ‘the sex-gender system”, a 
concept used by Gail Rubin (1975) to refer to the social arrangements by which 
biological sex is transformed into the social hierarchy of gender.  Chapkis extends this 
concept to include the process by which women and men are obliged to alter 
appearance to more closely approximate social definitions of femininity or masculinity. 
In discussing the processes through which women are expected to create an image of 
‘natural’ femininity through cosmetics and beauty regimes she argues that: 
 
Despite the fact that each woman knows her own belabored transformation from female 
to feminine is artificial, she harbors the secret conviction that it should be effortless 
(Chapkis, 1986: 5). 
 
                                                
19
 Chapkis’ work  frames beauty in social and political terms arguing that the Western cosmetics industry, 
advertising and the communications media creates a model of feminine beauty which becomes mandatory for 
all women.   
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This idea resonates with other contemporary and later analyses of how the labour 
involved in producing feminine beauty must simultaneously be denied in order to sustain 
the idea of gender as a natural category. However, Chapkis’ work is underpinned by the 
assumption that there is an imminent ‘femaleness’ which is covered-up by the disguise 
of beauty.  The problem for feminism is how to make visible and celebrate women’s 
selves and bodies ‘as they really are’.  Her model of the relationship between sex and 
gender can be seen, using Nicholson’s analogy, as a ‘coat rack’ where biological sex 
serves as the frame on which historically and culturally specific definitions of gender are 
hung (Nicholson, 1994: 81). The idea that the sexed body has an a priori existence 
independently of gender relies on the assumption that definitions of maleness and 
femaleness are universally agreed and unproblematic.  This is suggestive of the 
dangers of exposing gender as a social construction whilst leaving sexual difference to 
the realm of biology: 
 
 We cannot look to the body to ground cross cultural claims about the 
male/female distinction…differences go ‘all the way down’…tied not just to the 
limited phenomenon many of us associate with gender … but also to a culturally 
various understandings of the body, and to what it means to be a woman and a 
man (Nicholson, 1994:83). 
 
Joan Scott argues that whilst gender might be “the social organization of sexual 
difference”, this does not mean that it “reflects or implements fixed and natural physical 
differences between women and men”. (Scott, 1988, cited in Nicolson, 1994: 79). 
Indeed, it is impossible to understand sexual differences outside out historically and 
culturally constructed discourses about the body.  
 
One of the important aspects of ‘beauty practices is that they act not just to veil the ‘real’ 
woman beneath the ‘masquerade’, but also to create the idea of real and absolute 
physical differences between men and women;  to create women and men as universal 
givens.  Judith Butler (1990) argues that once we have established this, sex itself 
becomes a gendered category and neither sex nor gender can be seen as constituting 
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any prediscursive substance.  The cultural production of sex conceals “the very 
operation of [its] discursive production” (Ibid, 1990:7). It also conceals the power 
relations and interests at work in producing the idea of women and men as the basis of 
‘compulsory heterosexuality’ (Rich, 1986).  This idea is reflected in the work of French 
radical materialist feminists which has denaturalized this difference, uncovering its 
social and political nature.  Monique Wittig, for example, argues that “’man’ and ‘woman’ 
are political concepts of opposition” (Wittig, 1988a:436) which both create 
heterosexuality and are created by it, and that “(T)he function of difference is to mask at 
every level the conflicts of interest (between men and women), including ideological 
ones” (Ibid, 1988a: 436)20.  Moreover, from Wittig’s perspective, women are not just a 
category of sex marked as different from men, but are defined as ‘sex itself’: 
 
The category of sex is the product of heterosexual society that turns half of its 
population into sexual beings. Whatever they are, whatever they do… they are 
seen and made sexually available to men, and they, breasts, buttocks, costume, 
must be visible. They must wear their yellow star, their constant smile, day and 
night” (Wittig, 2005:22).  
 
Sheila Jeffreys (2005) argues that in order for sexual difference to appear natural 
women must both learn to ‘do’ femininity and internalize it through routinely engaging in 
appearance related practices. In this process, girls make the transition from a condition 
of physical strength and self-confidence to one of self-consciousness and bodily 
constraint 21.  From the perspective of radical and materialist feminists, the practices of 
beauty have both symbolic power in defining sex/gender, and direct material effects in 
                                                
20
 On this view, the production of sex/gender is the production of heterosexuality and vice versa. 
Women’s difference from men is fundamental  to the definition of ‘woman’ under male domination and this 
difference is made most clearly manifest in physical characteristics and appearance (Guillaumin, 2005) 
 
 
21 Jeffreys argues that “The process of transitioning from the condition in which a girl may…. use her 
strong body in physical activities and give no thought to how she looks, to “femininity” in which she must 
learn to walk in crippling shoes …and constantly paint and check her face…. is a harsh one…Their mothers, 
girls and women’s magazines, and their friends, train them and there is much to learn…Girls have to practice 




prescribing how women are able to use their bodies and therefore “the dimensions of 
[their] physical freedom”  and hence their social freedoms (Dworkin, 1979: 113-114). 
However, women’s embrace of beauty practices is at least partly a ‘rational’ response to 
conditions under which their social and sexual value depends upon it.  To do otherwise 
would be to risk “desexualization, if not outright annihilation” (Bartky, 1990: 77)22. 
 
These accounts emphasize the body’s materiality, in the sense that it ‘embodies’ social 
relations and is constrained (or enabled) by them (Bordo, 2003).  On this view, the 
female body is a target of gender power relations and its objectification is sometimes 
explicitly understood as a violating or violent enactment of those relations.  Dworkin 
makes this clear in her argument that pornography not only causes violence, but is 
violence against women because the sexual objectification on which it is premised 
normalizes the construction of women as ‘things’ for men’s use.  Kilbourne makes a 
similar point: 
 
Turning a human being into a thing, an object, is almost always the first step 
towards justifying violence against that person…this step is already taken with 
women. The violence, the abuse, is partly the chilling but logical result of the 
objectification (Kilbourne, 1999, cited in Gill, 2007a). 
 
Though the connection between beauty practices and violence via the notion of 
objectification is implicit in many feminist accounts, it is rarely subjected to further 
analysis. Even the physical suffering involved in some beauty practices is seen as a 
measure of the power of beauty culture in women’s lives (Bartky, 2002) rather than an 
enactment of violence.  However, Shelia Jeffreys makes the connection more explicit in 
positioning Western beauty practices under the rubric of ‘harmful traditional practices 
(HTPs) as defined in the United Nation’s Convention on the Elimination of All forms of 
                                                
22 As Dworkin argues, “[s]carcely any woman dares to ignore male ideas of ideal female beauty 





Discrimination Against Women (1979)23.  The idea of establishing particular gendered 
practices as HTPs was an attempt “to get culturally condoned forms of violence against 
women included within a UN human rights agenda” (Winter et al, 2002:72).  In practice, 
however, it has been almost exclusively applied to non-western practices such as 
female genital cutting and polygamy. The implication here is that the cultures of 
individualistic liberal western democracies are not harmful to women because even 
some of its most physically damaging manifestations, for instance cosmetic surgery, are 
understood as freely chosen (Ibid, 2002, Jeffreys, 2005). The attribution of free-will and 
self-determination to Western subjects both retrenches an imperialist view of the global 
South as ‘uncivilized’ or ‘backward’ (Gill, 2007a), and erases:  
  
…the more subtle ways in which male domination operates under conditions 
of modernity, including the way in which women come to subject themselves to 
practices which maintain their subordination to men and male interests (Winter et 
al, 2002: 72). 
 
The UN defines HTPs as: 
…being “harmful to the health of girls and women; arising from the material 
power differences between the sexes; being for the benefit of men; creating 
stereotyped masculinity and femininity which damage the opportunities of women 
and girls; being justified by tradition (Jeffreys, 2005: 29). 
 
Western beauty practices on a continuum from lipstick to cosmetic surgery, Jeffreys 
argues, fit this definition. Firstly, she points to the obvious health risks of cosmetic 
surgery, although there is evidence that the chemicals in everyday beauty products 
carry significant longer term risks, particular for girls and young women (Koo & Lee, 
2004) and for beauty workers (Yeomans et al, H& S Executive, 2009). In addition, it 
                                                
23  State Parties to the convention are asked to: “modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men 
and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices 
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles 





could also be argued that insofar as everyday beauty practices mark the female body as 
subordinate, objectified and stigmatized (Tseelon,1992) they are implicated in the socio-
psychological effects of oppression which may be more insidious and profound (Bartky, 
1990).  Secondly, Jeffreys argues that beauty practices arise out of the lower value 
placed on women- a status which is both produced by and reflected in employment and 
wage inequalities, in domestic and sexual violence and in pornography and the sex 
industry.  Thirdly, she maintains that through the production of (hetero)sexual 
difference, beauty practices help to sustain broader machinery of male domination and 
are therefore in the interests of men within patriarchal social structures.  Lastly, beauty 
practices produce gender stereotypes which not only define women in terms of their 
bodies but also circumscribe the ways in which they are able to enter work and other 
public spaces. This is underscored by research showing how women workers may be 
forced to negotiate conflicting demands to present themselves as ‘professional’ on 
masculine terms and acceptably feminine (Puwar, 2004, cited in Jeffreys, 2005).  In 
their study of make-up at work, Dellinger & Williams (1997) point to the accounts of their 
lesbian participants whose negotiation of heterosexual workplace appearance norms  
dramatizes the personal and professional costs of non-conformity.  Producing bodily 
femininity at work may be particularly relevant for workers whose jobs, as discussed in 
the final section of this chapter, involve face-to-face service work.   
 
One of the major criticisms leveled at materialist and radical feminist approaches like 
Jeffreys’ is that they use a ‘top-down” model of power (Davis, 1999). Whether explicitly 
acknowledged or not, this critique is informed by post-structuralist and post-modern 
frameworks and by the ‘turn to culture’ in social and feminist theory (Jackson, 2001) 
which, as discussed in chapter four, shifts the focus of debate from material inequalities 
and the ideologies and practices which sustain them, to a concern with the discursive 
construction of subjectivities and technologies of reflexive self-production. 
 
Liz Frost (1999), for example, argues that whilst ’doing looks’ might be shaped by 
‘cultural norms’ it is also a source of ‘pleasure’, an expression of embodied ‘personhood’ 
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and an ‘identificatory’ practice in which women (she is interestingly silent about male 
‘personhood’) can achieve positive self-identity.  Women, she argues; 
 
 …must be given every encouragement to value their knowledge and skills 
(about ‘doing looks’), and indeed the outcomes of this range of activities as highly 
as possible (Ibid, 1999:134).  
 
Similarly, in Kathy Davis’ (1995) study of women undergoing breast augmentation 
surgery, research participants are represented as being critical and aware of the moral 
contradictions involved in their ‘choices’ , and as acting actively and strategically to ‘re-
negotiate’ their relationships to their bodies in order to “construct a different sense of 
self” (Davis, 1995:27).  In reversing the relationship identified by feminists between 
beauty and objectification, Davis constitutes women’s engagement in beauty practices 
as an active choice to “avoid the entrapment of objectification” - to become “an 
embodied subject rather than an objectified body” (Ibid:113). To some extent, this 
resonates with Frost’s later and more materialist study of young women and body- 
hatred in which she found that being able to produce an appropriately feminine 
appearance allowed a sense of “feeling good about your looks which might give you the 
space to ignore it for a while” (Frost, 2001:147). However, her participants were only 
able to make the space to experience themselves as subjects if they felt able to conform 
“to the successful production of feminine identity” (Ibid:146). This strategy was therefore 
predicated on remaining “constantly visible as an object of the male gaze” (Ibid: 146).  
To claim, as Davis does, that beauty practices are “first and foremost….about taking 
one’s life into one’s own hands” (Davis, 1995:157) is to underplay the role of the 
discourses and practices of beauty in producing objectification and insecurity about 
appearance in the first place.  Nevertheless, the emphasis on choice, pleasure and self-
production is common in writing on beauty from the 1990s onwards. Debra Gimlin 
(2002), in her study of a New York hair salon, also refutes the idea that women’s 
engagement with appearance practices can be explained primarily as a product of 
oppressive power relations.  In response to ‘older’ feminist views of beauty, she asserts 
that it is “implausible that millions of women who engage in body work blindly submit to 
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such control or choose to make their bodies physical manifestations of their own 
subordination” (Gimlin, 2002:2).  
 
On one level, this view suggests a mis-reading of materialist feminist work. The 
meanings that women give to beauty practices, including those tied up with pleasure, 
anxiety and identity, and the ambivalence they experience in relation to them, are often 
central in feminist theory which stresses social or cultural constraints on women’s 
choices (Bartky, 1990, Bordo, 2003). The difference is in the way these perspectives 
emphasize the relationship between subjective experience and structural power 
relations.   The theoretical tensions between the two approaches are informed both by 
methodological issues and fundamental differences in conceptions of agency. With the 
exception of Chapkis (1983) and Morgan (1991) there was little empirical research 
specifically on beauty practices before Davis and Gimlin’s studies. Indeed, one of the 
criticisms of feminist theorizations of beauty is that because they are not ‘grounded’ in 
everyday experience, women’s “active and lived relationship to their bodies seems to 
disappear” (Davis, 1991: 29).  
 
Davis’ and Gimlin’s ethnographic studies have attempted to ‘re-ground’ understandings 
of beauty by privileging the individual experiences of research subjects over theoretical 
models. However, in trying avoid treating women as  ‘cultural dopes’, they resort to 
voluntaristic conceptions of agency.  As Davis herself admits, such an approach “runs 
the risk of suspending attention from the systemic or structured patterns of women’s 
involvement in the cultural beauty system”(Davis, 1995:180).  However, her argument 
suggests that it is not possible to ‘have it both ways’.  She was, in her terms, able to 
“elicit extensive and open-hearted personal stories from women who have had cosmetic 
surgery” (Davis, 1995:161) only by avoiding ‘contamination’ by politically invested 
feminist theory.  This antagonistic polarization of materialist feminism and embodied 
experience is a restatement of the structure -agency dualism embedded in much social 
theory. In particular it is a reflection of what Craig (2006) calls the ‘domination versus 
pleasure dichotomy’ in feminist debates on beauty. On one side are perspectives that 
position women’s engagement with beauty as a response to power bearing down on 
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them, and on the other are those “who view bodily transformation as an expression of 
free will” (Ibid:165).  However, by definition it would be difficult to find examples of 
feminist work on beauty which treats women merely as automatons. Nor do voluntaristic 
perspectives completely discount structural power relations.   Whilst Craig’s dichotomy 
obscures some of the nuances and overlaps in feminist approaches, it is also useful in 
thinking about the problems involved both in underplaying women’s affective 
relationship to appearance practices and in relegating power to the margins of analysis.  
Neither position allows us to grasp the relationship between feelings of pleasure and 
empowerment, or of anxiety and bodily shame, and the re-production dominant power 
relations through beauty practices.   
 
Some feminist accounts are extremely useful in suggesting ways to bridge the 
domination/pleasure divide. Both Iris Marion Young (1989) and Sandra Bartky (1990) 
position women as both subject to structural power relations and as taking an active 
part in their reproduction. Young shows how a girl might come to take up and embody 
femininity (her sexual difference from males) through a process which involves a learnt 
relationship to her body based on a tension between patriarchal definitions of woman as 
‘mere body’, an object of another’s gaze, and her knowledge of herself as an embodied 
subject, “a living manifestation of action and intention” (Ibid :66)24. Through this, she 
develops “habits of feminine body deportment.. [and]…a bodily timidity that increases 
with age (Ibid: 66).  For Young, the contradiction inherent in being a woman has its 
roots in the “structures and conditions which delimit the typical situation of being a 
woman in a particular society” (Ibid,1989:54).  However, how women live this situation is 
central to the production and reproduction of femininity. To the extent that a woman 
experiences herself as objectified, she also “actively takes up her body as a mere thing. 
She gazes at it in the mirror, prunes it, shapes it, molds and decorates it” (Ibid, 1989: 
66).  
 
                                                
24 In her essay ‘Throwing Like a Girl’,  Young draws on the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and 
existentialism of De Beauvoir, the latter informed by the notion that all human action is motivated by the 





Susan Bartky (1990) takes up the theme of women’s active engagement in femininity.   
Drawing on the Marxist concept of alienation and Foucault’s notion of disciplinary 
power, discussed in chapter four, she illuminates how women might ‘interiorize’ 
structures of dominance and subordination in the context of modernity in which the 
exercise of formal sanctions or physical force may accompany, but are not necessary, 
to the reproduction of sexual difference and inequality.   Her analysis centers on sexual 
objectification as part of the material and cultural condition of women who are over-
identified with the body in a culture which regards it as “intrinsically less valuable, 
indeed less inherently human, than mind or personality” (Bartky, 1990:35). This 
condition, she argues, “is the epitome of alienation” (Ibid: 35). Self-alienation 
encourages women not only to regard their bodies/selves from the perspective of the 
Other, but also to internalize this ‘gaze’, becoming “at once seer and seen, appraiser 
and thing appraised” (Young, cited in Bartky,1990: 36).  
 
Liz Frost’s study suggests that the notion of disciplinary power and the tension between 
objectification and subjectification may have real purchase on the experiences of 
women in contemporary Western society. On the basis of interviews with young women 
and some young men, Frost argues that as girls grow into adolescence they become 
increasingly aware of themselves as being watched and increasingly estranged from 
their own bodies: 
 
Self-consciousness is…inherent in girls newly acquired position as ‘the object 
of the gaze….woman is ‘to be looked at’ and eroticized. This surveillance leads 
to constant self-surveillance…in relation to appearance, but also in relation to the 
whole project of femininity: posture, gesture and appearance(Frost, 2001:195). 
 
Frost, like Bartky (1990), argues that being constantly visible is a precondition of shame, 
a form of “serious identity damage” (ibid: 136) which, in Goffman’s terms,  is “the 
subjectively experienced dimension of being stigmatized” (Ibid: 136), in this case, 
experiencing  the body through the gaze of others as flawed and inadequate.  Tseelon, 
however, suggests that women are stigmatized not just for being ‘unattractive’, but “by 
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the very expectation to be beautiful” (Tseelon, 1992:299); by the fact that they 
“constantly exist on display “ (Ibid:300) and in a state of self-consciousness,  and 
because : 
 
..uncertainty is built into the construction of beauty as defining social and self 
worth, followed by permanent insecurity of becoming ugliness unless rigorous 
discipline is exercised (Tseelon,1992: 301). 
 
Tseelon argues that beauty can be seen as a ‘stigma symbol’ for women, rather than a 
‘prestige symbol’, even though some performances will attract more social approval, or 
in Bourdieu’s terms, carry more ‘corporeal capital’, than others.  The production of 
beauty may also be a rewarding experience for many women, because  ““the beauty 
system” is naturalized by the ideology of sexual differences and is made to feel 
essential to femininity” (Tseelon, 1992:302).  This reveals the political nature of stigma 
which, rather than being an attribute of a person as psychological perspectives define it, 
is an ideological construction which reproduces domination. In Tseelon’s view, the 
stigma of beauty is “inscribed into the construction of the women” (Ibid: 304) through a 
series of paradoxes. The rejection of femininity has been associated in medicalized 
discourses with ‘gender identity disorders’, but embracing it too overtly carries the risk of 
being seen as narcissistic.  When a woman “embraces the fantasy of timeless beauty 
she is a fake” (Ibid:304), but embracing a ‘natural look’ can  involve the same continual 
effort of self-production. If a women refuses the disciplines of beauty or is unable to 
conform to idealized standards “she is devalued.  However, if she succeeds she 
underlines how her value is legitimated through appearance, her non-identity” (Ibid:304) 
. In this sense, appearance becomes a ‘master status’ for women, arguably the premise 
on which the beauty industry relies in both producing and then promising to alleviate the 
experience of living in an ‘inferiorized body’ (Bartky, 1990). 
 
Crucially, the importance of the body as locus of pleasure (Craig, 2006) as well as 
emotional pain is taken into account by perspectives which stress domination. Bartky 
(1990), for example, emphasizes the “delights of a narcissistic kind that go along with 
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the status of “sex object” (Ibid: 28), and the pleasure and ‘empowerment’ experienced in 
acquiring the skills and knowledge necessary to produce bodily femininity.  However, 
narcissism is predicated on being “too closely identified” with the body (Ibid:35) and is 
continually ‘shattered’ in inevitable comparisons between the self and idealized images 
of female beauty.  And though beauty skills may produce “a sense of mastery” (Ibid:77) 
they are used to work on bodies which are socially positioned as “deficient to begin with 
[and] forever in need of plucking or painting, of slimming down or fattening up, or firming 
or flattening” (Ibid:29).  Likewise, Bordo draws on the idea of disciplinary power to argue 
that exercise and dieting are technologies of the self which can enhance a sense of 
“personal comfort and power” (Bordo, 2001:31) whilst simultaneously producing ‘docile 
bodies’.  Furthermore, she argues that women can diet or exercise with the conscious 
and ‘rational’ aim of increasing their sense of value and their chances of success at 
work or in relationships. They are clearly not ‘cultural dopes’, but their practices are still 
actively compliant with dominant power relations. 
 
These perspectives point to the possibility that agency and structure, pleasure and 
power, do not cancel each other out.  However, this does not mean that power can be 
acknowledged and then “bracketed off” from women’s lived experiences of beauty 
(Davis, 1995:160), as Davis and Gimlin suggest.  In Bordo’s terms, pleasure is 
consistent with the disciplinary regimes of femininity and may be the product of power 
relations whose shape may be very different” (Bordo, 2003:27).  
Class, ‘race’ and the historical specificity of beauty 
 
The idea that materialist feminist theory has presented a disembodied account of 
women’s relationship to beauty practices is taken up by Craig (2006) who argues that in 
centering their analysis on a female subject who is “a racially unmarked, implicitly 
heterosexual woman of an unspecified class”, feminists have often failed to theorize the 
embeddedness of beauty in class, race and other dimensions of inequality.  However, 
those on the ‘pleasure’ side of the dichotomy have also failed to recognize the ways in 
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which women’s engagement with beauty is mediated through classed and racialized 
positions.  For instance, Gimlin’s (2002) suggestion that middle class white women who 
refuse the advice of stylists to adopt a particular hair style are resisting dominant beauty 
standards sidesteps, according to Craig, the evidence of her own fieldwork that 
women’s decisions are informed by a desire to express social status through their 
bodies. Craig argues that what is ‘resisted’ in such cases are “forms of 
femininity…associated with poor women and women of colour” (Craig, 2006:166) in 
favour of “alternatives…associated with the dominant class and race” (Ibid: 166) 
 
Claims of resistance, therefore, need to be assessed in relation to how different and 
competing standards of appearance articulate with dominant definitions of femininity.  
Skeggs argues that “the sign of femininity is always classed” (Skeggs, 1997:98). 
Contemporary constructions have their roots in eighteenth century upper class notions 
of the ‘lady’ “which equated conduct with appearance” (Ibid:99), and in nineteenth 
century bourgeois domestic ideology which counterposed the idealized dependence, 
physical ‘frailty’, and moral ‘purity’ of  middle class women against the physically ‘robust’ 
and potentially morally and ‘sexually dangerous’ working class woman.  Whilst white 
middle class women could use bodily femininity to distinguish themselves as 
‘respectable’,  working class Black and White women, “coded as the sexual and deviant 
other against which femininity was defined” (Ibid:99), were positioned at a distance from 
this construct both ideologically and materially and so were unable to claim femininity as 
a given .  These distinctions reverberate into contemporary intersections of gender, 
class and race and provide the context in which women “negotiate a sense of self 
through beauty work…as socially located women positioning themselves In relation to 
socially located beauty standards” (Craig, 2006:166). For example, Skeggs shows how 
the working class care students in her study invested in their appearance in order to 
‘look respectable’,  but were also aware that overt displays of femininity could make 
them vulnerable to the sexualized stigmas associated with working class women.  
Similarly, Craig discusses how, prior to the civil rights movement,  middle class Black 
women in the US used practices such as hair straightening to signify value and 
respectability defined against dominant racist constructions of the ‘hypersexual’ or 
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servile Black woman.  Brumberg also documents the way in which Black women in the 
1930s to 1950s used bleaching products to lighten “dark and unlovely” skin (Brumberg 
1997:78).   In these cases, the ‘corporeal capital’ that marginalized women attempt to 
accrue in order to assert dignity is precarious and bound up in structures of inequality.  
As both Skeggs and Craig show, women’s attempts to use appearance practices to 
make themselves respectable also  positions them in competition with each other in 
“local hierarchies of corporal capital” (Skeggs, 1997:104) which leave the stigmatized 
position of marginalized women unchanged (Craig, 2006). Even when women have 
most obviously used appearance as a tool of political resistance, their practices can 
become defined in terms of new beauty norms.  Craig points to Black women in the Civil 
Rights and Black Power movements in the 1960s refusing the practice of hair 
straightening and adopting the afro both as a sign of politicized racial identity and to 
conform to the standards of feminine beauty held by men in the movement.  In spite of 
women’s active participation in political struggle, beauty practices arguably marked 
women as symbolic ‘objects of exchange between men’ (Lovell, 2000), rather than 
subjects of that struggle. 
 
Definitions and practices of beauty exist “at a congested crossroads of forces” (Craig, 
2006:160) and are also historically specific.  Both Lois Banner (1983) and Joan 
Brumberg (1997) show how beauty standards in America changed from the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries to the late modern era.  Brumberg’s study of the diaries of girls 
from Victorian times to the 1990s charts the changing significance of the body in the 
lives of young women and  the shaping of this through religious and medical discourses, 
the rise of consumer capitalism and discourses of individual and sexual freedom.  
Though it is predominantly a study of white middle and upper class experience,  it points 
to some key shifts in dominant discourses of femininity and the body.  Brumberg (1997) 
argues that at the end of the nineteenth century the ideal feminine body was defined in 
terms of its smallness and ‘frailty’.  Girls’ diaries of this era suggest that their struggles 
for personal identity revolved around concerns with morality, ‘internal character’, and 
‘dignity’.  Underscoring the association of beauty with race, a “smooth white complexion 
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signified the genteel lady” (Black, 2004: 22) and her lack of physical labour and was 
often produced through home- made creams and complexion lighteners.   
 
Different concerns were reflected in diaries of the 1920s and ‘30s, written against a 
backdrop of burgeoning cosmetics and movie industries in the US, and medicalized 
discourses which linked hygiene to skin and hair beauty.  Young women began to talk 
about their identities and anxieties in terms of ‘image’ and about their attempts to 
produce ‘attractiveness’ through dieting and skin care.    In the US and UK during and 
after the second world war, The notion of cosmetics as a tool for enhancing ‘natural 
assets’ became “part of a culture of femininity” ( Black, 2004:35) displacing (at least 
partially) their earlier association with the ‘dangerous artifice’ of sexually immoral and 
prostituted women (Black, 2004)25.   Brumberg links the intensification of girls concern 
with their appearance in the following decades to the power of consumer capitalism in 
creating the conditions under which girls began to see their bodies as ‘projects’ of self-
production.  By the 1950s and early 1960s a whole pedagogical machinery was in place 
in the US involving physicians, entrepreneurs, the culture, media, fashion and beauty 
industries, and mothers and young women themselves in ‘figure control’, ‘breast 
management’ and other technologies which conflated ‘health’, beauty and sexual allure.  
Whilst middle class women in the UK and US, retrenched in suburban homes after the 
war, suffered the psychosocial consequences of the oppressive conditions of their lives 
(Friedan, 1963; Gavron, 1966), “cosmetics companies were selling the ideals of fantasy 
and escapism …sexuality became part of this…and advertisements began to engage 
with female sexuality as a marketing tool” (Black, 2004: 36) 
 
What Brumberg calls the ‘disappearance of virginity’ in the 1960 and 1970s provided a 
putative freedom from older forms of bodily and sexual regulation but, as many feminist 
have argued, the so called ‘sexual revolution’ has given rise to other regulatory 
discourses and practices.   Some accounts locate contemporary regimes of femininity at 
                                                
25 Black suggests that threats to the gender order posed by women working in male occupations during 
the war was behind attempts to retrench normative gender power relations, and thus male ‘morale’,  by 





the intersection between the individualizing logics of neo-liberal capitalism and 
patriarchal gender relations.  Angela McRobbie, for example, suggests that the 
apparently paradoxical construction of young women as freely choosing individuals who 
are also ‘reassuringly feminine’ is partly the product of a backlash against the gains of 
feminism.   In this context, the fashion, beauty and media industries become channels 
for the symbolic retrenchment of normative gender relations.   McRobbie and others 
argue that “post-feminist femininity” (Ringrose & Renold, 2008:336) should be 
understood in the context of the kinds of governmentality characteristic of late modernity 
(Frost, 2001, Giddens, 1991) in which concerns with the self and its wellbeing, and with 
the body and its appearance, become increasingly important in the production of 
individualized subjects and consumers.  In this context, the construction of gendered, 
classed and racialized identities is bound up in the “general aestheticization of everyday 
life” (Hennessy, 1995, cited in Adkins, 2002) in which “the surface representation of 
things, their appearance and visual icon… [are] valorized in a society concerned 
primarily with the attractiveness of commodities” (Frosh, 1991, cited in Frost, 2001:37). 
 
Consumer culture latches on to the…. body encouraging individuals 
to…combat deterioration and decay…and combines it with the notion that the 
body is a vehicle of pleasure and self-expression (Featherstone, 1991, Cited in 
Frost, 2001:29). 
 
Post-modern conceptions of the body’s endless plasticity (Bordo, 2003) adhere in these 
conceptions and provide the ideological framework in which young women are not only 
concerned with the size and shape of their bodies, but are obliged to constantly monitor 
and perfect them through dieting, ‘body management’, cosmetics and even surgery26 if 
they are to produce themselves as modern feminine subjects (McRobbie, 2009).  
However, as Frost points out, people’s ability to operate as reflexive producers of 
                                                
26  According to a 2011 survey,  half of all young women aged 16-21 would consider cosmetic surgery and 





themselves are constrained in number of ways.  Firstly, they are constrained by classed 
limits on access to the resources (time and money) needed to produce an idealized 
body or ‘lifestyle’.  Those who are unable to ‘consume themselves into being’ 
(Walkerdine, 2003) are also excluded from “comfortably inhabiting an idealized feminine 
position” (Gonick, 2006: 17).  Secondly, the assumption that appearance practices are 
acts of creative self-production is belied by increasingly narrow definitions of feminine 
attractiveness.  The youthful, thin body is currently a hegemonic standard.  
Contemporary ideals are implicitly racialized in a context “where white skin and 
European ethnic features” (Frost, 2001:138) are the norm against which bodies are 
valued or stigmatized.  Thirdly, the idealized body is illusory, ultimately unattainable 
and, because of the centrality of ‘youthfulness’,   always temporary, although the notion 
that aging can be combated is one of the most powerful discourses circulated by the 
beauty industry (McRobbie, 2009).  
 
In this context, the production of sexual difference is particularly complex given that 
young men are also subject to consumer culture through the discourses of advertising 
and other cultural media, are now “stimulated to look at themselves-and other men-as 
objects of consumer desire” (Mort, 1988, cited in Frost, 2001:174). It could be argued 
that the traditional terms of sexual difference are being broken down; even that teenage 
culture is becoming more gender homogenous (Frost, 2001:175) or ‘feminised’ (Mac an 
Ghaill, 1994). Some theorists have argued that masculinity is culturally understood to 
proceed from the male body as much as femininity proceeds from the female body 
(Connell, 1995).  However, Frost echoes Young and Bartky in her argument that the 
merging of young women’s identities with the body, and their simultaneous dissociation 
from it, produces a very different subjectivity to that of young men who experience their 
bodies, or who are at least expected to experience them, in terms of their capacities for 
action and achievement; their capacity to transcend the body’s immanence 
(Young,1989).   
 
This is reflected in the ubiquitous advertising image of the sportsman as “ a potent 
symbol of power” and “the grail of the consumer capitalist zeitgeist” (Frost, 2001:178).  
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Whilst young women are constructed as the “body of the mind/body dualism” (and suffer 
varying degrees of ‘identity damage’ as a result), young men, have a “range of ways of 
being, from which healthier and more confident subjectivities can be constructed. They 
are the rational, privileged subjects of the mind/body duality” (Ibid, 176).  
 
These differences, Frost argues, explain why young women are more likely to suffer 
from ‘body-hatred’ and to express it through eating ‘disorders’, deliberate self –harm or 
obsession with appearance27.   Whilst most studies have tended to suggest that young, 
middle class white women are most vulnerable to these ‘conditions’, more recent 
research has challenged this by connecting self -harm to patterns of classed and 
racialized social inequality, suggesting that socially marginalized and disadvantaged 
women may be particularly at risk (Borill et al, 2003).  But if Bulimia, anorexia and self-
harm are expressions of body –hatred, what about the everyday, normalized practices 
of beauty?  Whilst Bartky (1990) suggests that they reflect and play a central role in 
reproducing women’s sense of bodily alienation and shame, Shaw (2002), makes a 
direct connection between self-harm and normalized appearance practices suggesting 
that they can be understood as expressions of women’s suffering in the face of social 
disadvantage and sexual objectification (Shaw 2002). I discuss this idea further in 
chapter five.  
 
The increasingly sexualized nature of contemporary consumer culture has also been 
identified as a major factor in shaping women’s appearance practices.  Coy (2011) 
suggests that popular culture circulates discourses which glamorize commercial sex,  
“mainstreaming the idea that women exist as sex objects” (Coy, 2011:443) and inciting 
them to adopt sexualized high street fashion, or so called ‘ho chic’.  Mainstream beauty 
practices may also be shaped by the sex industry.  Jeffreys (2005) argues that the 
‘domestication of pornography’ may in part account for the increased demand since the 
early 1990s for breast augmentation and surgical procedures to ‘neaten’ the labia or 
tighten the vagina.  She argues that this has been produced both by men pressurizing 
female partners into conformity with pornographic representations (see also Shaw, 
                                                
27
 In medicalized terms this is labelled ‘body dysmorphic disorder’ (Frost, 2001).   
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1999) and by women becoming more aware of the appearance of their genitals in 
comparison with these.  In terms of beauty salon practices, the popularity of ‘Brazilian 
waxing’  (complete removal of pubic hair) seems to have coincided with a “trend 
towards hairlessness”  (Castleman, cited in Ibid: 79) in pornography from the 1980s. 
 
Rosalind Gill also suggests that more intensely sexualized representations of women 
are being circulated through advertising, and particularly through the marketing of 
fashion and beauty.  In this context, femininity is increasingly framed as a “bodily 
property rather than a social ….or psychological one [and ]……… the possession of a 
‘sexy body’ … is presented as a key source of identity ” (Gill, 2008: 42).  
 
 A particularly salient characteristic of contemporary representations is that they employ 
a “pronounced discourse of choice and autonomy” (Ibid: 41)28.  The emphasis  on 
female ‘empowerment’ in advertising reflects what McRobbie has understood as a 
broader “post feminist gender settlement” being imposed on women by government and 
other institutions in which the appropriation of liberal feminist principles of equality 
functions to obscure and retrench continuing structural power relations (McRobbie, 
2009). The idealized appearance which women are required to produce “come[s] 
straight out of the most predictable templates of male sexual fantasy, yet… must also 
be understood as authentically owned by the women who enact them”(Gill, 2008 :45).   
 
It is in this context that, as Attwood (2005) argues, the beauty and fashion industries 
‘sell sex’ to women, producing new forms of sexual subjectivity in which the objectifying 
male gaze appears to recede into the background, “replaced  instead with a new 
horizon of self-imposed feminine cultural norms…. against which women must endlessly 
and repeatedly measure themselves” (McRobbie, 2009:63). 
 
                                                
28
 Fashion lingerie advertising, for example, uses the imagery of pornography juxtaposed with texts 
which appear to validate feminist values and emphasize female sexual pleasure and autonomy. The language 
of beauty product advertising circulates a similar discourse in exhorting the female consumer to “empower 
your eyes” (Shiseido mascara advertisement, cited in Gill, 2007a) or to “Discover the power of femininity” 
(Unisense Slimming Company Campaign, cited in Lazar, 2007: 157).    
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These norms also inform the “violent heterosexualized politics within which girls are 
incited to compete” (Ringrose, 2008: 34). Recent research points to the way in which 
pre-pubescent and teenage girls act as “employees of the “male gaze”” (Renold & Allen, 
2006: 426), with girls friendship groups playing a key role in defining, performing and 
regulating normative femininity.   This, however, takes place through contradictory 
discourses which incite girls to sexualized displays of femininity whilst subjecting them 
to ’older’ but still powerful notions of ‘good girls’ and ‘bad girls’ (Gill, 2009).  In 
Ringrose’s (2008) study, girls who resisted the pressure to hyper-sexualized 
performances of heterofemininity also “enacted highly regulative, classed discourses 
around feminine sexuality, positioning others as “sluts”, “horrible” and ‘Mean” (Ibid:53). 
As she suggests, given the entrenched association of sexualized display with working 
class femininity, economically and culturally marginalized girls may well have a 
particular investment in distancing themselves from these discourses and in projecting 
this image onto others.  At the same, however, they may have a particular stake in 
investing in their appearance in the absence of other forms of capital (educational and 
economic) through which to assert self- value. 
Beauty therapy, emotional and aesthetic labour and ‘professionalism’ 
 
Black argues that the beauty salon is “a site par excellence, where attainment of 
femininity and its definition are negotiated” (Black, 2004:40). The contemporary beauty 
industry operates against the backdrop of historical changes in women’s relationship to 
their bodies and the aestheticization and commercialization of everyday life in 
contemporary society.  Beauty therapy itself involves a collection of practices aimed at 
improving the appearance and emotional and physical ‘wellbeing’ of clients. It is situated 
within a vast multinational industry which includes cosmetics, hair and skin care 
products, cosmetic surgery and the diet industry, beauty treatments and massage in 
hair or beauty salons, spas, gyms, hair and on cruise ships, and the advertising industry 
which promotes products and activities (Black, 2004).  In the last two decades, 
hairdressing and beauty therapy has been one of the fastest growing UK industries, 
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worth £4 billion in 2002 and 5.25 billion in 2008 (HABIA, 2012). In 2005, the beauty 
therapy industry alone (including treatments delivered in spas, health clubs and salons) 
had a annual turnover  of £904 million and employed  39, 500 staff of whom 98 percent 
were  women earning an average gross weekly wage of £205 and an average hourly 
wage of £6.98 (HABIA, 2007). These figures may well exclude many self-employed 
workers running their own micro-business as ‘mobile’ beauty therapists.  Evidence 
presented by HABIA, the government appointed sector skills body for the hairdressing 
and beauty industries, suggests that demand for suitably skilled beauty therapists has 
outstripped the supply of staff with employers experiencing difficulties in filling posts 
(HABIA, 2007).  This is in stark contrast to a more recent report by the Local 
Government Association which suggests that whilst 57,000 16 to 18 year olds attained 
qualifications in hair and beauty in 2010/11, there were only 18,000 new jobs in the 
sector (Gardiner & Wilson, 2012).  This discrepancy may be partly due to the  much 
wider scope of the LGA’s research in comparison with the size of HABIA’s research 
sample.  In addition, the effects of recession may well have had a  bearing on the size 
of the UK beauty therapy industry since 2008  although there is little empirical evidence 
to support this and the notion that the beauty industry is ‘recession proof’ is still widely 
circulated29 
 
What is also unclear from the available data is who the clients are30.  The proliferation of 
beauty salons in inner city, suburban and rural areas, some micro-businesses, others 
franchises of larger companies, suggests that women across class and race divides are 
using ‘professional’ beauty services.  However, Black (2004) suggests that there are 
class differences in the kinds of ‘treatments’ engaged by clients and that the treatments 
                                                
29   The idea that  demand for beauty products and services typically rises during economic recessions has 
been widely circulated by the marketing industry and is reflected in some consumer psychology research ( 
Hill et al, 2012)   The ‘Lipstick Effect’ suggests that women use beauty practices to ‘boost morale’ during ‘hard 
times’ (Mintel, 2008), although the Guild of Beauty Therapists suggests that the “increasing pressure to look 
good” may be behind this and account for why women also continue to visit beauty salons.   However, the 
‘continuing growth’ in the industry is also attributed to increased numbers of men using salon services.  
However,  Mintel (2009) now refutes the idea of the lipstick effect,  suggesting that in the current  recession it 
has been replaced by 'Austerity Chic'.  
 
30 Whilst HABIA (2007) research suggests that in 2006 average expenditure per UK household on 
hairdressing and beauty treatments was £161, this is not aggregated by socio-economic status or gender and  
obscures the size of separate spend on beauty as opposed to hairdressing treatments.  
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offered in salons reflect the class composition of the locality.  In her study, one salon in 
particular targeted working class women and mainly provided ‘looking treatments’; 
‘routine grooming’ and ‘corrective’ practices involving removal of facial and body hair 
through waxing or electrolysis, and  manicures, pedicures and facials. Though the 
discourse of ‘pleasure’ was not inconsistent with these treatments, they were mainly 
perceived in instrumental terms as ‘necessities’.  Whilst salons in middle class areas 
offered the same ‘looking treatments’, although with less of an emphasis on painful 
practices such as hair removal, there was also a focus on what Black calls ‘feeling 
treatments’, various forms of massage, facial treatments and other holistic therapies 
understood to alleviate symptoms of ill health or to contribute to a sense of ‘wellbeing’ 
as part of living a ‘healthy lifestyle’.  In these contexts, the discourse of ‘pampering’, 
self-indulgence and ‘taking time for myself’ was more evident.  Treatments were 
generally more expensive in these salons and there was more of an emphasis on 
creating a welcoming and relaxing ‘ambience’ in order to make the client ‘feel special’.    
 
The inclusion of ‘health’ and ‘wellbeing’ practices such as massage and aromatherapy 
under the rubric of beauty suggests the way in which the beauty therapy industry has 
diversified in the last three decades, producing a discourse which conflates a feminine 
appearance with a ‘holistic’ conception of health.   This, argues Black, has coincided 
with an intensification of neo-liberal, free market discourses and the shifting of 
responsibility for welfare from social provision onto individuals who are expected to 
maintain their own health through ‘lifestyle choices’, calling on ‘experts’ to assist where 
necessary.  It is, however, mainly middle class women who are able to position 
themselves as subjects within this discourse. Citing Bourdieu, Black and Sharma 
suggest that differential access to economic resources may become manifest in classed 
dispositions which give “the working class… an instrumental relationship to their bodies 
[whilst the middle class] sees the body as an end in itself” (Black & Sharma 2001: 112).  
Whilst salon use may cut across class boundaries, at least where there is sufficient 
disposable income to make it possible, “once in the salon the habitus of the woman 
leads to different activities” (Ibid: 112).   In this sense, differential access to both 
economic and cultural capital may determine the kinds of salons, treatments and 
56 
 
discourses of beauty to which women have access.    For women, however, “the body 
‘always, already’ acts as a vital form of capital. Work on the body is necessary for the 
achievement of an ‘appropriate’ femininity” (Ibid: 163), even though ‘appropriateness’, 
like ‘respectability’ (Skeggs, 1997), is always mediated by class, ‘race’ and other social 
positions.   This is the basis of Gimlin’s assertion that “beauty is not an end in itself 
(Gimlin, 2002:48), and of Black’s argument that “[w]e are not really ever judged 
according to aesthetics, but rather aesthetic symbols become signifiers of other 
categories” (Black, 2004:190).  In her view, the significance of ‘beauty’ is its connection 
to appropriately classed, racialized and sexualized performances of self.  Whilst this 
appears to sidestep the intense concerns some women have about being or not being 
‘beautiful’, it does point to the complexities in women’s relationship to beauty practices 
and also to how these are reflected in the work of the beauty therapist.  
 
Central to the work of beauty therapists is the production of feelings of wellbeing and 
self-confidence in clients, whether through ‘improving’ their appearance,  or through 
making them feel ‘special’ and ‘pampered’, or both (Gimlin, 2002; Black, 2004; Black & 
Sharma, 2001). This demands a great deal of emotional management on the part of 
workers, as well as attention to their bodily self-presentation.  The concepts of 
emotional labour, and more latterly aesthetic labour, have been used by sociologists in 
exploring gendered and classed inequalities in the workplace where the nature of 
employment has shifted from traditionally male dominated manufacturing jobs to more 
flexible, low-paid, often part-time work in service industries in which women are 
increasingly concentrated in front line customer service roles (Noon & Blyton, 2002). 
 
Hochschild (1983) argues that work in late capitalist societies is characterized by a shift 
from exploitation of the physical body to exploitation in more psychological, emotional 
terms. Her concept of emotional labour names a type of work process in which the 
emotional style of delivery is consumed as part of the service itself. Workers are 
“required to manage their own feelings in order to create and control the reaction of the 




…in processing people the product is a state of mind… [It] requires one to 
induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that 
     produces the proper state of mind in others. (Hochschild, 1983: 6-7) 
 
Emotional labour “draws on a source of self that we honor as deep and integral to our 
individuality” (Ibid: 7) and whilst it is potentially a site of human connection, when it is 
commercialized and subject to external prescription and control it becomes a source of 
alienation “from an aspect of self-either body or the margins of the soul-that is used to 
do the work” (Ibid: 7). This can lead to a sense of dissonance between a worker’s ‘real’ 
feelings and those she is expected to perform. It can also give rise to a compromised 
‘sense of self’ and emotional ‘burn out’ where the ‘deep’ rather than ‘surface acting’ of 
emotions involves ‘self-deception’ as well as the deception of others.   Crucially, 
emotional labour is deeply gendered, not just because women are over-represented in 
service jobs but because employers often regard women as innately possessing the 
kinds of characteristics suited to customer service work (Finch & Groves,1983).  For 
instance, Taylor & Tyler (2000) found that telesales staff were recruited on the basis of 
such assumptions with mangers believing that women have a ‘natural ability’ to build a 
‘rapport’ with customers. This naturalizing discourse points to one of the key 
characteristics of emotional labour:  that it is often invisible or unacknowledged so that 
whilst it may be a key attribute of many service roles, it is typically not formally 
recognized as involving particular ‘skills’.  Rather, its association with immanent 
femininity and its concomitant devaluing (Bartky, 1990), means that employers are 
essentially able to avoid paying for emotional labour. However, the gendering of service 
work is not only accomplished through recruitment practices. If these gendered 
expectations shape the kinds of dispositions brought to the labour market, women may 
also ‘select’ themselves for emotional laboring jobs and deselect themselves form work 
less tied to femininity (Bourdieu, 2001).  
 
In debates about the nature and implications of emotional labour some writers have 
taken issue with Hochshild’s Marxist formulation on the grounds that it ignores ‘agency’ 
and the benefits and pleasures derived from emotional work by both workers and 
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recipients of their labour.  Price (2001), for instance, argues that the mobilization of 
emotions in caring work can be intrinsically rewarding and can act as a moral safeguard 
against “an instrumental stance towards the other or indeed towards aspects of the self” 
(Price, 2001, cited in Colley, 2006: 16). In the context of beauty work, both Black (2004) 
and Gimlin (2002) point to the relative autonomy of beauty therapists working in small 
salons31 to mobilize their own ‘emotional styles’ in acting as ‘counsellors’ or “intimate yet 
detached listener[s]” (Black, 2004: 117) for clients who bring their life problems as well 
as their appearance related insecurities to the salon.  Unlike other forms of 
commercialized emotional labour in which workers are subject to more intense 
organizational surveillance and standardization, beauty therapists’ relative freedom to 
deliver client satisfaction ‘in their own way’, and their sense that they are playing an 
important,  even ‘socially necessary’ role in ‘helping’ them ‘feel better about 
themselves’,   can lead to a strong sense of job satisfaction, self-value and pride even 
when the work is experienced as emotionally draining.  This may suggest, as Wharton 
(1993, cited in Black, 2004) argues, that the conditions under which emotional labour 
takes place are as important as the emotional components of the work in assessing its 
psychosocial costs. However, just as the pleasures women derive from beauty practices 
can obscure and even reproduce its harms, the subjective sense of job satisfaction can 
hide the costs of emotional labour and its construction within power relations, even 
when it is conducted under conditions of relative worker autonomy. As Hochschild 
(1883) suggests, the most alienated labour may be that experienced as most satisfying 
by ‘happy workers’ because its reliance on ‘deep acting’ means that “it is farthest 
beyond workers’ conscious control” (Cohen, 2010: 198). 
 
                                                
31
  Cohen argues that employment relations shape the way in which emotional work can operates within 
or outside of an organization’s ‘feeling rules’ and thus the capitalist labour process. Her focus is on the way in 
which in which self-employed hairdressers may be able to ‘gift’ emotion work to clients because neither their 
work nor profits are controlled by an employer.  In this sense, their emotion work may not be emotional 
labour in Hochschild’s terms. However, she argues that the necessity of deep- acting for both self-employed 
and waged workers depend on maintaining boundaries between themselves and clients.  Because of this, 





Some feminists have argued that the naturalization of women’s aesthetic and emotional 
labour has contributed to the routine de-skilling and low pay associated with women’s 
care –related work’ care-related work (England, 2005).  In the case of beauty therapy, 
where ninety-eight percent of all workers are women (HABIA, 2007), most aspects of 
the work including care of clients,  technical beauty skills and the physical self-
presentation expected of beauty therapists, are defined in terms of naturalized feminine 
concerns and dispositions and this may have a significant impact on therapists’ ability to 
position themselves as valuable workers and to defend themselves against the low 
public esteem in which beauty therapy is generally held (Black, 2004).  Black  (2004). 
Sharma & Black (2001), and Gimlin (2002) discuss the way in which the discourse of 
‘professionalism’ on which beauty workers draw to emphasize their skills and 
knowledge can simultaneously undermine their claims to ‘professional’ status.  In 
Black’s (2004) study, workers compared their roles to those of recognized health 
professionals, particularly nurses and counsellors, on the grounds that in processing 
bodies and feelings they help to enhance the emotional and physical health of their 
clients. Whilst an emphasis on doing “good work” is often “the starting point for defining 
professionalism” (Schinkel & Noordegraaf, 2011: 68), they saw the abilities involved in 
this labour as emanating from everyday experience or ‘personality’ rather than from 
formally learnt specialist skills or knowledge, also a key element in dominant definitions 
of what constitutes a profession (Allsop & Saks, 2002, cited in Black, 2004). Although 
beauty workers may try to position themselves as professionals;  
 
…they do not…have the income or education associated with professional 
positions [and]…do not wield enormous power with their clients, in part because 
their emotional labour undermines their claims to professionalism (Gimlin, 
2002:36). 
 
The accounts of Black’s respondents indicated that the discourse of emotional labour as 
an imminent feminine ability is reinforced in the training of beauty therapists where  
interpersonal or emotional skills are addressed only implicitly in the context of technical 
instruction (Ibid:121).  As in other areas such as nursing (Smith, 1992), emotional labour 
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is central to the labour process but often invisible or unacknowledged (Hochschild, 
1988). However, trying to gain recognition and legitimacy on the basis of emotional 
work, is, she argues, a ‘risky strategy’ given that “emotional work is based on the skills 
which most women automatically acquire through life experience” (Black, 2004:130). 
 
The way in which emotional labour can reproduce class hierarchies is also an issue in 
more traditional areas of caring labour.  As Colley points out,  because working class 
nursery nurses provide childcare for middle class women they may  “face a particularly 
strong imperative to be – and to appear to be – ‘nice girls’” (Colley, 2006:19), an idea 
loaded with classed notions of moral propriety contained in dominant discourses in 
which  working class women are positioned  “either as posing a threat of…moral 
pollution, or as a civilizing social force – depending on the degree to which they take 
responsibility for the moral welfare of others” (Ibid:19). Caring thus becomes a sign of 
‘respectability’, (Skeggs, 1997), an idea that may well be implicated in beauty therapists’ 
emphasis on their ‘emotional obligation’  to prioritize  clients’ ‘happiness’ over their own 
judgments and feelings,  regardless of how complaining, rude or demanding those 
clients are (Gimlin, 2002).  In Hochschild’s terms, this necessitates the ‘deep acting’ of 
emotion because of the difficulty of feigning care in such contexts. Consequently, 
“behind the mask [workers] listen to their own feelings at low volume” (Hochschild, 
1983; 189). Skeggs points to the way in which the ‘caring self’ is produced in the 
intersection between gender and class:  
 
The caring self is…..is generated through both self-production and self-denial. 
The selflessness required to be a caring self is a gendered disposition… [C]are 
of the self…is the prerogative of someone who does not have to care for others 
to be seen as worthy of respect (Skeggs, 1997: 64).  
 
The enactment of altruistic caring may allow emotional labourers to ‘feel good’ about 
themselves, and even to “position themselves as morally superior caring subjects” 
(Skeggs, 1997:62). In Gimlin’s study, beauty workers tried to nullify status differences 
between themselves and their middle class clients by “conceptualizing an alternative 
61 
 
hierarchy….not based on education, occupation or income, but rather on appearance” 
(Gimlin, 2002:29), or on “special knowledge of gendered areas including…fashion, 
beauty and style” (Ibid:27). Whilst their self-positioning as ‘experts’ and emotional 
confidantes served to “strengthen [workers] commitments to their role in beauty culture” 
(Ibid:31) their service role and their financial dependence on customers means that they 
must ultimately defer to clients’ wishes regardless of their own judgments in ways that 
are incompatible with the professional status they seek.   
 
Emotional labour does not just reproduce gendered and classed power relations, but is 
also dependent on them.  Colley’s research suggests that “predispositions related to 
gender, family background and specific locations within the working class” (Colley et al, 
2003:471) are necessary (though not sufficient by themselves) both for “effective 
learning” and as a basis for filtering and screening care students well before they apply 
for courses, with the result that the vast majority of students in her study already had 
experience of doing unpaid family care (Colley, 2006). In this sense, the kinds of 
‘vocational habitus’ produced through their training was already a ‘choosable identity’32.   
 
The kinds of caring performances demanded of students in Colley’s study were also 
bound up with appearance, specifically with clothing and demeanor which signaled 
‘modesty’ and conformity to the subordinate status of the trainee nursery nurse.  The 
importance of bodily appearance in signifying status (Bourdieu, 2010), respectability 
(Skeggs, 1997) and moral and vocational dispositions indicates that, far from displacing 
exploitation of the physical body as Hochschild suggest, emotional labour includes 
“somatic or corporeal dimensions” (Witz, 2003:35)33  . A number of theorists have used 
the concept of ‘aesthetic labour’ or ‘body work’ to address the way in which the 
mobilization of emotion in the work place involves the management and deployment of 
                                                
32 The importance of gendered and classed pre-dispositions is also evident in Bates’ (1990) study of 
students on YTS programmes in elderly care.  Those girls most likely to be recruited and then to adapt to the 
vocational culture were “ [t]hose… from families in the most disadvantaged fractions of the working class: 
girls who had already had to care for elders or siblings, and had learned in particular to engage in self-denial 
rather than resistance to fulfill this role” (Colley, 2006:18). 
 
33 Walkowitz argues that these are played down in Hochschild’s work with the result that workers are 
often represented as disembodied (Wolkowitz, 2006). 
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“the body’s aesthetic qualities including deportment, style, accent, voice and sexual 
desirability” (Wolkowitz, 2006: 86). This may include the deliberate or tacit molding of 
workers’ physicality and appearance in non-commercial work, as in the studies 
described above, or in commercial service organizations.  According to Witz et al, 
corporations are not only concerned with the manufacture of feeling, rather: 
 
 The labour of aesthetics is….a vital element in the…materialization of the 
aesthetics of a service organization and particularly of the ‘style’ of service 
experienced or consumed by customers (Witz et al, 2003:34) 
 
Witz et al’s case study of ‘Elba Hotels’, for instance,  shows how workers are recruited 
on the basis of their potential to embody the ‘company ethos’ and how the induction 
process involves training in appropriate ‘emotional skills’, hairstyles and  make-up. 
Employers “mobilize, develop and commodify… embodied dispositions….transforming 
them into skills which are geared towards producing a ‘style’ of customer service 
encounter that appeals to the customer (Witz et al, 2003:37) 
 
In other contexts such as fashion retail, workers’ ‘look’ plays an important role in 
communicating brand image.  Nickson et al (2001) argue that at the ‘top-end’ of this 
market, the deployment of aesthetic styles is creating  a ‘labour aristocracy’ as 
employers recruit young middle class men and women (often students seeking part time 
work) because the social, economic, cultural and corporeal capitals (see chapter four) 
they bring with them are more easily moldable into the kinds of dispositions required to 
communicate with affluent and aspirational customers.  Whilst working class and older 
people may be able to learn the relevant dispositions, they are nevertheless 
disadvantaged.  This resonates with Walkerdine’s (2003) claim that for working class 
people, particularly women, competing in the labour market increasingly relies on 
investing in their appearance in order to look ‘more middle class’.   
 
However, the sidelining of gender in Nickson et al’s analysis, on the grounds that both 
men and women perform the same work roles and are subjected to the same forms of 
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regulation, may well conceal how classed capitals are mobilized and rewarded in 
gendered ways.  As Wolkowitz argues, “to say that work is not confined to either men or 
women is not to say that it is not gendered” (Wolkowitz, 2006:88).  
 
In Adkin’s (1995) study of the tourist industry, the recruitment criteria for jobs in a leisure 
park were based on gendered expectations. Whilst strength or height were 
requirements for jobs seen as male, all women workers were subject to a set of 
gendered appearance criteria regardless of the occupation, and being heterosexually 
‘attractive’ was deemed a necessity for women’s recruitment to jobs involving face-to-
face work with male customers.  Here, the boundaries between emotional, aesthetic 
and sexualized labour become particularly blurred (Warhurst et al, 2009) as they do in 
Pettinger’s (2005) study, in which female retail assistants were required to emphasize 
heterosexual femininity through make-up, hairstyle and demeanor, and in Taylor and 
Tyler’s (2000) research which found that female call centre operatives were required to 
respond politely to insulting and sexualized comments from male customers. These 
studies emphasize that the gendered performances required and reproduced in 
emotional/aesthetic labour are specifically heterogendered and, for women, 
(hetero)sexualized in ways that resonate with the materialist feminist stress on the 
appropriation of women’s sexuality by men in both the private and public spheres 
(Delphy,1993; Wittig, 2005).  
  
Other studies have suggested that men in service occupations are also increasingly 
expected to perform in aestheticized ways.  McDowell, for example, argues that male 
workers in the financial services sector are required to display a ‘sexy’ appearance 
suggesting, in her view, that men are now doing “gender in ways that parallel the social 
construction of femininity” (McDowell, 1997: 182).  This notion resonates with the 
argument that the shift to an economy based on service industries and consumption has 
opened the way for a new ‘cultural feminization’ of the labour market.  As Adkins points 
out, those that hold this view often see men’s aesthetic work as part of a broader ‘de-
traditionalization’ of gender relations. However, the commodification and 
aestheticization of men’s bodies does not necessarily equate to the dismantling of 
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gender roles. Rather, Adkins (1995) and Adkins and Lury (1999) suggest that gender 
inequalities are retrenched through the way in which the performance of aestheticized 
and emotionalized workplace identities by men and women are differentially recognized 
and rewarded.  Because these performances are understood as an expression of 
naturalized femininity, women are constrained against claiming it as a form of capital to 
be exchanged for a wage or status34.  As Black puts it: 
 
Young men in particular are becoming increasingly aware of the rewards to 
be derived from achieving this workplace identity. In contrast, when women 
invest significant amounts of time, effort and economic outlay in achieving a 
similar performance their labour is seen as less of a skill to be rewarded, and 
more an imminent feminine characteristic (Black, 2004:135). 
 
Whilst women may not reap the ‘rewards’ of aesthetic labour, they may be subject to 
sanctions of if they do not invest in their bodies and produce appropriately feminine 
aesthetic performances (Black, 2004). The studies by Delinger & Williams (1997)  and 
Puwar (2004), discussed earlier, support this proposition as does Walkerdine’s (2003) 
argument that working class women are increasingly obliged to manage their 
appearance in line with a middle class aesthetic in order to compete in a job market that 
in reality may offer them relatively few rewards and little chance of upward mobility.  
 
In the context of the increasingly aestheticized nature of work and social life beauty 
therapy may play a particularly significant role.  Black raises the possibility that as 
working class women move into putatively middle class jobs in the service sector they 
may increasingly make use of beauty therapy for maintaining an appropriately feminine 
and classed appearance. In this sense, beauty therapy “may be seen as service 
industry servicing the service industry in that it offers treatments which are required to 
                                                
34 34 Men, on the other hand are “not assumed to have an already fixed or naturalized relationship 
between self and identity..... unlike women workers....men...were able to claim their workplace identity as 
their own property....which they were able to contract out and exchange...as culturally individualized workers, 




either avoid sanctions or to gain reward in the workplace” (Black, 2004:136). The latter 
may partly explain why men are increasingly using beauty salons35.  
 
Black argues that beauty therapy can be placed alongside other services such as 
‘image consultancy’ used by employers to ‘restructure bodies’ and produce ‘confidence 
and expertise’ amongst professional and service workers (Wellington & Bryson, 2001, 
cited in Black, 2004).  This highlights the significance of beauty therapists as aesthetic, 
or ‘body’ workers in two senses- as performing work on their own bodies and directly on 
the bodies of clients (Wolkowitz, 2006). In this sense, their work involves both ‘care of 
the self’, in the sense of producing workplace subjectivities signified by particular 
expressions of bodily femininity, and ‘care of others’.  As workers on the bodies of 
others they perform a range of ‘looking’ treatments on clients whose needs are informed 
by an increasingly (hetero)sexualized and aestheticized culture and economy which has 
further entrenched the position of women as objects of the gaze.  However, empirical 
studies suggest that beauty therapists construct their work in ways that efface its 
association with sexuality and appearance (Wolkowitz, 2006).  Black’s (2004) 
respondents, whilst keen to stress the importance of technical beauty skills,  
consistently emphasized the emotional components of their work;  making people ‘feel 
better about themselves’ or ‘giving happiness’.  The proliferation of ‘feeling treatments’ 
allows beauty therapists to position their work as more akin to that of non-commercial 
health professionals36.  Wolkowitz interprets this construction of beauty work as one 
based on the idea of  the ‘deficit body’- a body lacking not in beauty but one “deficient in 
the self –love and confidence that workers see themselves as helping to restore” 
(Wolkowitz, 2006: 152).  Such discourses appear to be central to the 
‘professionalization project’ within beauty therapy in as much as they allow workers to 
                                                
35 Beauty Industry organizations have been keen to point out the ‘new male market’ for beauty products 
and services. The Guild of Beauty Therapists, attribute to this demand to the influence of the culture and 
media industries:  “With reality television programs like The Only Way is Essex, Desperate Scousewives…and 
Made in Chelsea showing impeccably groomed men… it is becoming more and more acceptable for men to 
take pride in their appearance….Men taking care of themselves can only be seen as a good thing (Guild of 




 As does the deployment of beauty therapists by the National Health service to work in hospitals with 
female patients recovering from surgery or with ‘disfiguring conditions’ (Sharma & Black, 2001) 
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dissociate their practice from ‘feminine vanity’, ‘superficiality’ and sexual attractiveness.  
This may partly account for the way in which sexuality in women’s relationship to beauty 
is an “an absent present” (Black, 2004:98) in the narratives of Black’s beauty workers. 
Nevertheless, this absence is always underpinned by tacit references to normative 
heterosexuality as a “default position, presumed and uncommented upon” (Ibid: 98). 
Sexuality was ‘outed’  only in cases where heterosexuality was breached by male 
clients assumed to be gay or transsexual, or where workers feared that it might be 
enacted by male clients expecting a sexualized service.   
 
Whilst the empirical work on beauty has tended to focus on emotional rather than 
aesthetic labour, Black gives some space to kinds of appearance expected of beauty 
therapists.  The generic ‘look’ mirrors that required of many other female workers in low 
status, low paid jobs which include contact with the public- neat, clean, and attractive in 
normative heterosexual terms (Adkins, 1995).  The precise appearance code will vary 
depending on the type of establishment but Black’s account suggest that it is likely to 
mirror the tensions implicit in the concept and practices of beauty therapy.   A ‘clinicized’ 
appearance (for example, a white overall) signifying a therapeutic role is often blended 
with an aesthetic that emphasizes femininity with subtle make up and well-groomed 
hair.  However, “there are dangers in travelling too far in the direction of sexualization” 
(Black, 2004:123). Given the increased numbers of male clients, Black argues, this 
would run the risk of associating beauty therapy with “the sordid connotations of the 
massage parlour” (Ibid:123).  Clearly this is an important gender violence issue, and 
one which has received little attention in the literature on beauty work. However, 
workers responses to this threat might also be shaped by concerns with emphasizing 
the ‘respectability’  of beauty therapy through an appearance code that reflects a middle 
class-inflected feminine aesthetic, disavowing the overt sexual display associated with 
working class femininity.   
 
Black’s argument that beauty therapy is ‘gendered but not sexualized’ work appears to 
be based on this regulation of appearance and on what seems to be a less than critical 
acceptance of her participants’ perspectives on their work as being about ‘feelings’ 
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rather than ‘looks’.  It also misses the way in which gender is always caught up in 
sexuality and is itself a heterosexual construct (Wittig, 2005; Jackson, 2001).  If 
sexuality is an ‘absent present’ in their narratives, then it may also be a hidden aspect of 
the labour they perform on their own and others’ bodies.  An understated performance 
of feminine (hetero)sexuality is a sexual performance none the less, and one that is 
commodified to embody the  ‘ethos’ of beauty culture as played out in particular beauty 
salons, even if it is not meant to appeal ‘erotically’ to the senses of female salon users 
or to be consumed as an ‘eroticized’ service in the way that male customers might 
consume the sexualized performances expected of female leisure workers or 
waitresses (Adkins, 1995; Hall, 1993). Rather, it could be argued that (at least some) 
female salon users are purchasing heterosexual attractiveness which will be ‘consumed’ 
by men outside the salon, at work or at home.  In this sense, the possibility that beauty 
therapy constitutes a form of sexualized labour may be a question worth pursuing.  
Conclusion 
 
Appearance practices in a broad sense play a key role in the cultural reproduction of 
(hetero)sexual difference and hierarchy.  However, feminist perspectives which 
emphasize the feminine body as a material effect of power and a site of social 
constraint have been criticized for representing women as ‘cultural dopes’. This 
tendency to set the ‘choices’ women make against systematic power relations obscures 
the way in which investments in beauty practices and  subjective experiences of 
pleasure or ‘empowerment'  may be caught up in gendered, classed and racialized 
inequalities and may be essential in the production of women both as ‘desiring subjects’ 
and objects of the gaze.  Voluntaristic models of agency undercut the idea that beauty 
practices and the discourses that support them are harmful to women, and may 
constitute forms of violence. However, to ignore these possibilities is to collude in the 
dominant and potentially imperialist assumption that cultural practices in liberal Western 
democracies are engaged in ‘freely’, and to fail to grasp the more subtle ways in which 
domination, and indeed violence, may work under conditions of modernity. The 
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connections between power, agency and subjectivity are examined further in chapter 
four whilst its implications for understanding the operation of violence are discussed in 
chapter five.   
 
Feminist work on both sides of the pleasure/domination divide has often underplayed or 
ignored the way in which women’s appearance practices are shaped by their social 
locations in relation to class, ‘race’ and other axes of inequality. Work specifically 
addressing this has shown how white women from dominant groups have at various 
points in history used their bodies to signal status and to position themselves against 
marginalized women. In the context of late modernity, middle class women’s greater 
access to material and cultural resources may mean that they are more able to use 
beauty practices as tools of reflexive self- production.  However, because the body is 
vital as a form of capital for women, those with less material or cultural resources may 
also invest in appearance to produce ‘respectable’ or ‘appropriate’ performances, as a 
way of dis-identifying with working class or other marginalized femininities (Skeggs, 
1997), in order to signal a political resistance to dominant norms, or in an attempt to 
gain advantage or to avoid sanctions in the workplace.  Beauty practices are historically 
specific and exist “at a congested crossroads of forces” (Craig, 2006:160) which makes 
it impossible to disentangle them from structures of classed and racialized inequalities.  
However, there is also evidence to suggest that appearance constitutes a master status 
for women across class and racialized divides and that the body is increasingly 














Theorizing the Body, Subjectivity and Domination in late 
Modernity: materialist feminist critiques and appropriations 




This chapter discusses the key concepts and theories informing this study. It introduces 
some materialist feminist critiques and appropriations of two key theoretical frameworks 
for understanding the production of subjectivity, agency and embodied experience and 
relations of domination: Foucault’s theories of disciplinary power and the reflexive 
subject and Bourdieu’s theory of social reproduction.  Both have been widely used to 
understand the significance accorded to the body as a key source and marker of 
identity/subjectivity in the context of the late 20th and early 21st Century.  The purpose 
of this chapter is to identify elements of these frameworks which may be useful for 
understanding the issues at the centre of this research.  
 
Part one defines the concept of materialist feminism as I use it in this thesis as the basis 
of my theoretical framework. Part two briefly addresses the way in which feminism has 
politicized the body and outlines some of the tensions between materialist approaches 
and later post-structuralist understandings of the embodied subject and its relationship 
to power. In part three I turn to Foucault’s understanding of power and subjectification 
and draw on feminist readings of this to argue that whilst it is also extremely useful in 
explaining the significance of feminine beauty and other social practices in terms of how 
modern power operates through disciplinary regimes, it is problematic in a number of 
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ways, not least in relation to the voluntarism implied in ‘reflexive subject’ of Foucault’s 
later work.  In part five I return to Bourdieu’s theory of practice, introduced in chapter 
two.  Again, I draw on feminist critiques of this framework to identify ways in which the 
concepts of habitus, field and capital can be used to understand how young women 
may come to embrace or resist gendered and classed ‘destinies’.  Bourdieu’s 
understanding of the connection between power, the construction of agency and the 
reproduction of gender and class also provides a springboard for thinking about how 
social practices, including those associated with beauty and education, might be 
embedded in different forms of violence, the subject of chapter five.  
Materialist feminism: debates and tensions 
 
Although I make considerable use of theory from outside of feminism, my analysis of 
interviews and observations with beauty therapy students and their tutors is 
underpinned by a materialist feminist theoretical framework. I use the term ‘materialist 
feminism’ to name perspectives which understand gendered/sexed power relations as 
predominantly rooted in the material and structural rather than the cultural and 
discursive, though not reducible to any single cause (Jackson, 2001).  In the early work 
of Marxist feminists such as Michele Barratt and Mary McIntosh (1979), the material is 
understood in largely economic terms, with the economic as being essentially reducible 
to capitalism (Jackson, 2001)37.  Other feminists challenged both the economic 
determinism of this approach and its “limited understanding of what constitutes the 
economic domain” (Adkins & Leonard, 2005:8).  Most notably, French radical materialist 
feminism extended the definition of the economic and material beyond the class 
relations involved in the production of goods and services to include a range of social 
practices organized on the basis of sex.  In this context, sexuality, violence, the body, 
motherhood, work and language have been understood not simply as cultural or 
                                                
37 This tendency held that all forms of oppression under capitalism, including those connected to gender, 
proceeded from the contradictions between labour and capital. From this perspective, women’s unpaid 
domestic labour and exploitation in paid work serves the interests of capitalism, with gender itself being 




ideological phenomena, but as social-political practices of gendered production.  The 
idea that patriarchy constitutes a specific set of exploitative material relations based on 
the contradictions between the categories ‘man’ and ‘woman’ derives from the argument 
that far from being a natural, biological reality, ‘sex’ is ‘a sign’ which marks the social 
division between men and women (Delphy, 1993) or “a political category that founds 
society as heterosexual” (Wittig, 2005:20).  As such, it is a product rather than a 
precursor of oppression.  On this view, ‘gender’ as a set of culturally prescribed roles, 
precedes and constructs the categories of sex - an inversion of the assumptions of sex 
role theorists such as Margaret Mead and Ann Oakley, as well as  Marxist feminists.  In 
this theoretical context, the ideological is not separated from the material realm as an 
“autonomous empirical category” (Guillaumin, 2005:75).  Rather the category of sex is 
the “mental form taken by certain determined social relationships” (Ibid:75). In this 
sense, radical materialist feminism challenges the dualisms between objective and 
subjective structures, and between idealism and materialism in a way that resonates 
with Bourdieu’s theory of practice.38  
 
Whilst the emergence, in the late 1980s, of post-modern and post-structuralist feminist 
critiques of the stable subject and ‘grand’ structural theory have been extremely 
problematic for materialist analyses, it is also arguably the case that much of the critique 
of stable gender categories was already a central feature of materialist feminism.  
Consequently, Jackson (2001) suggests, these tensions have created the intellectual 
space for a more nuanced and eclectic materialist feminism. This includes an increased 
sensitivity towards everyday social practices and interactions in the production of 
gender in intersection with other dimensions of inequality, the localised material 
                                                
38 Adkins and Leonard (2005) argue that whilst the later work of some Marxist feminists, for instance 
Cockburn (1991), have attempted to address the inadequacies of an economic reductionist model, their 
continued separation of gender from the economic and material resulted in analyses which loses sight of 
material.  In some cases, early second wave Marxist feminists not only “abandoned the search for a material 
analysis of gender, they have also articulated a full scale critique of materialism in feminism, and beyond” 
(Adkins & Leonard, 2005:9). In the context of this ‘turn to culture’ in which the material was displaced by an 
emphasis on the cultural and discursive, criticisms of materialist feminism  ironically focused on the 
economic reductionism originally defended by Barratt and others and the on the essentialism of the sex/ 
gender distinction (Butler, 1990; 1992).  French radical materialist feminism became subsumed in this 
definition of materialism and so its critics have often overlooked the radically anti -essentialist and anti-
reductionist direction of their work (Adkins & Leonard, 2005; Jackson, 2001).   
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conditions of women’s lives,  questions of  agency and subjectivity, and a recognition 
that “social structures are themselves perpetuated through human practices” (Jackson 
2001:287).  Whilst recognizing the problems involved in imposing categories on the 
diversity of feminist theory, I nevertheless take Jackson’s understanding of what 
constitutes the social as a working definition of the concerns of materialist feminism and 
as a basis for theorizing the ‘choices’, experiences and identities of participants and the 
practices and discourses of beauty therapy courses: 
 
…the social encompasses all aspects of social life, from structural inequalities 
to everyday interaction. It is concerned with meaning, both at the level of our 
wider culture and as it informs our everyday social life. It includes subjectivity 
because our sense of who we are in relation to others constantly guides our 
actions and interactions and, conversely, who we are is in part a consequence of 
our location within gendered, class, racial and other divisions, and of the social 
and cultural milieu. (Ibid: 284) 
Feminism, domination and the body 
 
Interest in ‘the body’ has been a central theme in feminist thought since the late      
1960s. Bordo credits early second wave (North American) feminism with pioneering the 
challenge to traditional naturalistic conceptualizations of the body within Western 
thought and resituating it on the terrain of the social: as a “politically inscribed 
entity…shaped by histories and practices of containment and control” (Bordo, 2003:21).  
This has made it possible to theorize a range of gendered practices, including forms of 
male violence against women, compulsory heterosexuality and practices associated 
with feminine ‘beautification’, not as manifestations of women’s or men’s essential 
‘natures’, or as voluntary behaviours, but as instances of social power relations in which 
the female body provides the territory on which male dominance and female submission 
is established.  Bordo sees this conceptual shift as a “crucial historical moment in the… 
articulation of a new understanding of sexual politics of the body” (Ibid:23) which has 
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facilitated not only an understanding of how power is directed at gendered bodies but 
how it produces gendered, classed and racialized subjects.  As McNay has argued, the 
concept of embodiment in feminist thought has been so centrally important because it 
challenges both the Cartesian dualism between mind and body, and the still tenacious 
dichotomy between determinism and voluntarism (McNay, 1999). 
 
One of the key characteristics of early ‘second wave’ feminism is its focus on the 
‘material body’ constructed through institutionalized, structural power relations and 
cultural practices, including those associated with beauty, appearance and sexuality. 
Through this we learn what Bordo calls “the practices and habits of everyday life” 
(Bordo, 2003:16). Though this ‘material’ body continues to figure in feminist work, it 
came under a sustained attack by post-structuralist and post-modern influenced feminist 
perspectives because of its alleged essentialism, its ‘top down’ conception of power, 
and its supposed lack of attention to agency, diversity, and inequalities between 
women. These perspectives have tended to eschew readings which stress hegemonic, 
structural power relations and systematic patterns in women’s experiences of inequality 
and instead have understood the body and subjectivity primarily as productions of 
cultural texts and discourses, analyzing gender in terms of localised, fluid readings of 
the gendered body.  
 
In keeping with this, much contemporary feminist scholarship references non-feminist 
post-structuralist writers, particularly Foucault, as the main theoretical inspirations in 
sociological and cultural analyses of the body (Grimshaw & Arthurs, 1999; Walkowitz, 
2006).  Whilst these have arguably been crucial  in understanding the construction of 
the gendered body/self and women’s investment in bodily femininity, they are not, 
according to Bordo, as foundational to the politicization of the body as we are now led to 
believe. The idea of the body as “the focal point for struggles over the shape of power” 
(Johnson, cited in Bordo, 2003:17) “was discovered by feminism, and long before it 




For some materialist feminists, this theoretical ‘marriage’ has “emptied the concept of 
gender of its social import as a hierarchical division between men and women” 
(Jackson, 2001). However, Jackson argues that during the 1990s many feminists began 
to problematize the ‘cultural turn’ (Ibid: 286) developing approaches which combined a 
critique of extreme anti-materialist positions with a ‘re-visioning’ of structural analyses, 
acknowledging that material and social relations cannot be understood solely in terms of 
structure. On the basis of this, materialist feminists have criticized and appropriated 
theoretical tools from outside of feminism (Moi, 1991).  The result has been a diverse 
body of work addressing the complex workings of structural power relations at micro-
levels in the production of gendered and classed subjectivity, agency and embodied 
experience. In the following discussion, I consider how feminist appropriations of two of 
these perspectives might provide useful tools for understanding how the ‘choices’, 
identities and trajectories of the young women in this study are produced.  
Feminist readings of Foucault  
 
One aspect of Foucault’s work which has particular relevance for exploring women’s  
relationship to the body, femininity and beauty is the concept of disciplinary power.  
According to Foucault, this is a specifically modern form of power which relies less on 
direct and visible forms of physical control or material constraints - modes of domination 
characteristic of earlier forms of feudal and ‘sovereign’ power (Foucault, 1995).  Firstly, 
disciplinary power is exercised through surveillance. Foucault visualizes modern 
institutions as regulating and normalizing individual behavior and desire, and producing 
“subjected and practiced bodies, ‘docile’ bodies” (Ibid, 1995:138) through systems of 
supervision in which individuals and their activities are constantly under observation.  
Whilst the surveillant might be a factory supervisor, a prison warder, teacher or 
psychiatrist , individuals, knowing they will be observed but not knowing, at any given 
moment, if they are under the supervisory gaze, put themselves under surveillance. 
This self-surveillance is a consequence of what Foucault terms ‘the unequal gaze’ 
which produces “a state of a conscious and permanent visibility that assures the 
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automatic functioning of power” (Foucault, 1995: 201).   As discussed in chapter three, 
the idea has been applied by a number of feminist social theorists to what appears to be 
an increasingly intense concern amongst women with bodily appearance (Frost, 2001; 
Bordo, 2003; Bartky, 1990) .  From these perspectives, the narcissistic relationship to 
the body encouraged by disciplinary power is conducted “against a background of a 
pervasive sense of bodily deficiency” which “accounts for what is often [the] compulsive 
or even ritualistic character” (Bartky, 1990:72) of women’s use of beauty practices.   
 
Secondly, disciplinary power is productive. The technologies and discourses which 
target the bodies of individuals (for instance, those connected with sexuality, health and, 
in this context, feminine beautification) produce “the very subjectivity of the subject” 
(Bartky, 1990: 79), selves/bodies which generate their “own governance… transferring 
power from direct repression” (Skeggs, 2004a: 78).  Foucault displaces a negative 
conception of power with one that emphasizes how modern power works through the 
construction of 'new' capacities and modes of activity rather than by limiting or 
repressing pre-existing ones (Sarup, 1993).  So, for instance, the activities associated 
with beauty do not repress or disguise ‘natural’ femaleness but instead are part of what 
produces the historically specific gendered self/body and its pleasures and desires 
which do not exist prior to the discourses which produce it.  A feminist reading of 
Foucault allows us to conceive of beauty as a technology of feminine self-surveillance 
which women exercise ‘over and against themselves’ in the production of ‘docile 
bodies’.  Whilst some feminist analyses have tended to emphasize external constraints 
coercing conformity with beauty standards and practices, using  Foucauldian tools 
allows us to address the question of how social and cultural forces ‘get inside’ 
consciousness to create a female subjectivity “which disempowers us even as it 
seduces us” (Bartky, 1990:2). This approach, then, reveals how the ‘truths’ of sexual 
difference and heterosexuality have been historically constructed and have real and 
material effects on lived and embodied experience (Holland et al., 1998).   
 
Feminist readings of Foucault such as Bartky’s and Frost’s retain a materialist analysis 
of power in which the micro-level production of embodied femininity takes place within a 
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wider context of male dominance, female submission and the power relations of 
capitalism.   Foucault, however, would have us adopt a different analysis: disciplinary 
power is “dispersed and anonymous; there are no individuals formerly empowered to 
wield it; it is...invested in everyone and in no one in particular (Bartky, 1990:79).  This 
perspective allows us to see how, in the absence of direct coercion, the female body 
becomes subject to ‘a machinery of power’ which regulates its “size and contours, its 
appetite, posture, gestures, and general comportment in space and the appearance of 
each of its visible parts” (Ibid, 1990:80). It is also useful in understanding the way in 
which beauty therapy students are positioned as both subject to forms of power 
exercised over them (as young, mostly working class women, and as trainees in a low 
status and low paid industry), and as apprentices of techniques and discourses which 
will allow them to exercise certain forms of disciplinary power over other women.  
Arguably, however, the idea that power is located everywhere makes it difficult to 
identify the systematic relations involved in maintaining women’s investments in 
femininity and in producing the conditions under which some women are more likely to 
become workers who service other women’s desire for bodily femininity.   Nancy Fraser 
argues that Foucault’s approach to power as adhering in all social relations is 
“normatively neutral” (Fraser, 1989:28) and, as such, it fails to provide the tools 
necessary for criticizing power structures.  Similarly, Nancy Hartsock points to the 
contradictory nature of Foucault’s understanding which both claims “that individuals are 
constituted by power relations, but [argues] against their constitution by relations such 
as the domination of one group by another” (Hartsock, 1990:169). In this sense, 
Foucault’s account “makes room only for abstract individuals, not women, men, or 
workers (Ibid:169).  The same tension is evident in Bordo’s suggestion that we should 
use Foucault’s framework to understand how power “produces and normalizes bodies 
to serve prevailing relations of dominance and subordination” (Bordo, 2003:17) whilst 
simultaneously ceasing “to imagine ‘power’ as the possession of individuals or groups” 
(Ibid, 2003:26).   Indeed, her own acknowledgement that this model has limited use for 
understanding direct forms of male violence against women suggests that unless we 
take different manifestations of power into account our understanding of it remains 




A major criticism of Foucault’s work is that in defining the subject simply as an effect of 
power, it fails to account for the possibility of a liberatory subjectivity (Fraser, 1989). 
Foucault’s claim that the operation of power which produces ‘docile bodies’ is also the 
genesis of resistance is, according to Fraser, incoherent.   McNay suggests that this 
problem of agency springs from Foucault’s failure to theorize the materiality of the body 
with the result that it is largely conceived of as a “blank surface upon which power 
relations are inscribed” (McNay, 1999:96).  However, some theorists argue that his later 
work, in which the focus shifts away from discipline and technologies of power to the 
‘care’ and production of the self (Foucault, 1985), represents a “radical break with his 
previous conceptions of subjectivization”…[and] a tantalizing sense of the possibility of 
freedom” (Starky & Hatchuel, 2002:647).  This is because the question of primary 
interest to Foucault in this work is how individuals come to experience themselves as 
‘desiring subjects’ through ‘technologies of the self’; self-conscious, reflexive practices 
which regulate and construct individuality through bodies, thoughts and conduct, and 
which “create new modes of being distinct from those imposed by the workings of power 
regimes” (Ibid: 642):   
 
Individuals are no longer conceived of as docile bodies in the grip of an 
inexorable disciplinary power, but as self-determining subjects who are capable 
of challenging and resisting structures of domination in modern society (McNay, 
1992:4) 
 
Within this framework, practices of the self are envisaged as taking place “in contexts 
stripped, as far as any context can be, of the dysfunctional aspects of power relations” 
(Starky & Hatchuel, 2002:643) and the exercise of freedom through these practices 
“involves enhancement of the ability to experience pleasure” (Ibid: 642). This is 
particularly relevant to the domination/pleasure debate on beauty, discussed in chapter 
three.  If beauty practices are considered as technologies aimed at the self -production 
of identity, pleasure and wellbeing, then they can be seen as constituting practices of 
freedom and resistance, as Davis (1995) and Gimlin (2002) suggest.  However, given 
78 
 
that beauty practices are inseparable from relations of gender and class, as these 
theorists would agree, it would be extremely difficult to argue that they could ever take 
place outside of power relations.  McNay (1999) argues that rather than being a radical 
departure from his early theories of power, the ‘reflexive subject ‘of Foucault’s later work 
remains mired in the same lack of attention to embodiment which, in this case, results in 
a radically voluntaristic notion of agency which gives the impression that “identity.....is 
fully amenable to a process of self-stylization” (McNay, 1999:3).  In this sense 
Foucault’s conception of power is caught in the same kind of dilemma as much feminist 
theorizing of agency, exemplified by the domination/pleasure dichotomy:   
 
…either we limn the structural constraints of gender so well that we deny 
women any agency or we portray women’s agency so glowingly that the power of 
subordination evaporates (Fraser, 1992:17).   
 
The voluntarism in Foucault’s work resonates with the theories of individualization put 
forward by Giddens (1991), Beck (1992), Beck-Gernsheim (2002), Bauman, (2002) and 
others.  They have pointed to the way in which human identity in late modern society “is 
being transformed from a ‘given’ into a ‘task’” (Bauman, 2002:xv) involving the kinds of 
reflexive self-production discussed in chapter two in relation to neo-liberal models of 
education, and in chapter three in relation to the aestheticization of social life . However, 
the individualization thesis has tended to uphold the notion that these process, to 
greater or lesser extents, have the potential to transform traditional power relations 
through an “enlargement of freedom and choice” (McRobbie, 2004: 260) as individuals 
are supposedly released from constraints of class and gender as traditional social 
structures and community ties are eroded39.    
 
                                                
39 Walkerdine argues that the economic restructuring underlying these shifts,  the decline of state 
welfare provision and the bolstering of a neo-liberal economic model has led to  “the complete collapse of civil 
society” (Walkerdine, 2003:241) and has been normalized by governmental discourses aimed at producing 
social subjects who embody “the Robinson Crusoe economic man of liberalism (even if that man is now 
female)... who can cope without strong community roots...[and who is]...responsible for their own lives 




Feminist critiques of Foucault’s reflexive self are echoed in those levelled at these 
theorists of individualization.  As Walkerdine (2003) suggests, the ssubject of neo-liberal 
choice “is an impossible fiction”, not least because the ideology of individual freedom 
and meritocratic upward mobility on which it is premised is belied by evidence of the 
entrenched nature of income and wealth inequality and low levels of vertical social 
mobility in the UK (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010).  However, “it is a fiction constantly held 
up as possible” (Walkerdine, 2003:241) so that the incitements to become an 
‘entrepreneur of oneself’ (du Gay, 1996, cited in Walkerdine, 2003: 240), a ‘free’, 
upwardly mobile consumer who transcends the traditional boundaries of gender, class 
and race, inevitably produce failure which is lived as personal inadequacy, particularly 
for those in socially disadvantaged positions.  It is these incitements, together with the 
pathologization of failure, which in large part account for what some feminists have 
identified as the “distress experienced by working class women in their bid for upward 
mobility, or even simple respectability” (Ibid, 2003:242; Skeggs, 1997; McRobbie, 2004; 
2009; Baker, 2009; Gonick, 2007). As Lash argues, whilst reflexivity might produce 
‘winners’, it also produces ‘losers’ (Lash, 1994, cited in Adkins, 2002). 
Bourdieu and the reproduction of domination 
 
In response to the way that theories of the reflexive self have ignored or underplayed 
the embodiment of structural power relations or, in the case of Foucault’s disciplinary 
power, presented the subject as simply an effect of discourse, some feminists have 
drawn on the work of Pierre Bourdieu.  This, McNay (1999; 2004) argues, has important 
implications for feminist theory because it allows us to conceptualize the gendered and 
classed subject as neither fully determined by social forces nor self-constructed but 
rather the product of dynamic relations between embodiment of the social world and 
social practices.  Of particular relevance to a materialist feminist understanding of the 
body/self is the way in which Bourdieu conceptualizes subjectivity as a product of “the 
subtle inculcation power relations upon the bodies and dispositions of individuals” 
(McNay, 1999:5). Through this incorporation of “the social into the corporeal” (Ibid, 
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1999:5) ‘objective’ structures, including gender and class, are reproduced through the 
actions of individuals.  It is this focus on social reproduction at micro levels which 
accounts for the difficulties involved in social change and this, in McNay’s (Ibid, 1999) 
terms, is one of the key strengths of Bourdieu’s theory of practice. Whilst Foucault asks 
how power works in society, the key questions for Bourdieu concern social 
reproduction, who has power, and how they maintain it. These questions are addressed 
through the concepts of ‘habitus’, ‘capital’, ‘field’ and, as I discuss in chapter five, 
‘symbolic violence’. 
 
Habitus and the gendered and classed body  
 
The concept of habitus, discussed in chapter two in relation to educational decision 
making, offers conceptual tools for transcending the oppositions, deeply rooted in much 
social theory, between subjectivism and objectivism, body and mind, and agency and 
structure.   In essence, it creates a conceptual bridge between these opposing terms.   
The dialectic between habitus and social structure means that individuals are neither 
fully determined in any mechanistic sense, structuralist sense, nor free, in the sense 
assumed by theories which presuppose the rationality of action (Hatcher, 1998; Adams, 
2003). This clearly has implications for the choice versus oppression debate in relation 
to beauty practices, as discussed in chapter three, as it does for understanding 
educational decision making.  However, the improvisatory nature of habitus can 
engender an illusion of freedom together with an illusion of necessity, a subjective 
understanding of social practices and the power relations on which they are based, as 
natural or inevitable universals rather than arbitrary impositions. In this sense, habitus 
entails a ‘forgetfulness’ of the social origins of practices and schemas and so, in 
Bourdieu’s terms, is ‘history turned into nature’ or “genesis amnesia” which, for 
Bourdieu, defines the unconscious nature of habitus (Bourdieu, 1977:79) 
 
Bourdieu suggests that the sexual division and hierarchy between men and women 
provide a limiting case of this ‘amnesia’. Gender is the ‘labour of dehistoricization’ which 
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produces the “objective and subjective structures of masculine domination” (Bourdieu, 
2001:82-83).  It is “only after a formidable collective labour of diffuse and continuous 
socialization that the distinctive identities instituted by the cultural arbitrary are 
embodied in habitus” (Ibid, 2001:23).40 Where femininity is concerned, contemporary 
beauty and appearance practices in late capitalist societies appear to mirror Bourdieu’s 
reading of Kabylian cultural41 practices in which the ‘inscription of dispositions’ on the 
body involves an ‘apprenticeship’ in the “female ‘art of living’…inseparably corporeal 
and moral” (Ibid, 2001:27). 
  
This apprenticeship is all the more effective because it remains essentially 
tacit: femininity is imposed for the most part through an unremitting discipline that 
concerns every part of the body and is continuously recalled through the 
constraints of clothing or hairstyle. (Ibid, 2001:27) 
 
Here, Bourdieu reads very much like Foucault on the effects of disciplinary power in 
“gaining access to individuals...to their bodies, their gestures and all their daily actions” 
(Foucault, 1977:151-152).  However, although he scarcely acknowledges the feminist 
heritage of such ideas, Bourdieu’s arguments also resonate particularly with the work of 
the French radical materialist feminists.  Wittig, for example, understands the workings 
of power in terms of how it produces and naturalizes social subjects in correspondence 
with the objective structures of heterosexual patriarchy arguing that women’s “bodies as 
well as our minds are the product of this manipulation” (Wittig, 1988b: 440).  As this 
suggests, one of the premises that Bourdieu’s work shares with materialist feminism is 
that social relations ‘take hold’ of people at the level of embodiment.  Habitus neither 
functions primarily at a conscious or explicit level nor is simply inscribed on the surface 
of bodies through discourse.  Rather dispositions and generative schemas are 
embodied in a deeper ways which are pre-reflexive and practical (Jenkins, 1992). 
                                                
40 This has resonances with the idea proposed by Juliette Mitchell and other feminists using 
psychoanalytic theories that patriarchy is a structure of the unconscious (Mitchell, 1974). 
 
41 In Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977), Bourdieu discusses his study of the culture of the Kabylian 
peoples of Algeria and the Bearnaise region of France. This study also forms the basis of his analysis of sexual 




Habitus is ‘in the heads’ of agents but it also exists in practical interaction with the world 
through language, bodily deportment, productive activities and so on.  
 
It is through these processes that the social divisions attain what Bourdieu calls ‘doxa’:  
the character of fundamental, deeply embedded and unconscious beliefs, which 
“structure and underpin the different social fields, and hence inform how embodiment 
takes place” (Skeggs, 2004a: 22).  For Bourdieu, doxic beliefs are turned into ‘bodily 
hexis’, a concept which emphasizes the way in which habitus works to internalize 
unconsciously learned practical characteristics: deportment, gestures, emotions,  
‘tastes’, ‘styles of the flesh’ (behaviours or bodily appearances which may signify class 
as well as, or together with, gender) which are rooted in an agent’s position in social 
structures but also allows those relations to take on “the appearance of a law of nature” 
(Bourdieu, 2001:23).  The concepts of habitus and ‘body hexis’ have also been used to 
theorize the ways in which emotions such as shame (Bourdieu, 2001; Probyn, 2004; 
McRobbie, 2004) and feelings of self-depreciation (Bourdieu & Passerson, 1994) are 
produced through relations of gender and class and embodied as such. To this, we 
could add women’s experiences of the ‘pleasures and pains’ connected to beauty 
practices and the ways in which these might function to reproduce normative 
femininity42. 
 
It is partly this focus on the way in which social structure produces and, in a sense, 
becomes the lived body which makes Bourdieu’s framework potentially invaluable for 
investigating the role of beauty practices, and the social spaces in which they are 
learned or enacted, in producing gendered and classed subjectivities.  However, it is 
also arguably problematic in that in its emphasis on the reproduction of the social world 
through the bodies of agents it “fails to provide us with a conceptualization of 
subjectivity that, ultimately, would allow for critical agency” (Mottier, 202:354). Indeed, 
some feminists have argued that Bourdieu ignores the complexity of contemporary 
                                                
42 However, emotions may function in different ways as forms of resistance to the dominant symbolic and 
to habitus.  Skeggs (2004) points to the anger of working class and marginalized people as a response to 
oppressive social conditions and Probyn (2004) argues that shame of can function to prompt the privileged to 
critique the dominant order and their position within it. 
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western gender relations and the diverse forms of resistance to them (Moi, 1991). 
Whilst I agree this is the case, his theory of sexual difference does seem to have some 
purchase on the question of why, even in the context of feminist activism and 
scholarship, as well as in everyday instances of women’s resistance or refusal to see 
themselves through the eyes of the dominant (Skeggs, 2004a), the idea of a 
fundamental dichotomous (hetero)sexual difference remains a given, or is treated as so 
deeply ingrained as to be beyond remedy or willed control, at least beyond Queer 
parodic performance (Butler, 1990)43 This is, of course, precisely Bourdieu’s point, 
though one which is also debatable, as I discuss in chapter five. 
 
The dialectic of subjective and objective structures: habitus and field 
 
In Bourdieu’s view, social space is composed of  ‘fields’, structured social arenas in 
which individuals and institutions are engaged in struggles over access to specific 
social, cultural and material resources or capitals (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). 
Principally, for Bourdieu, these are the economic, political, cultural and academic 
arenas of social production but the notion of field can also be applied to occupational or 
professional arenas (McCall, 1992; Bourdieu, 2010), and to the family which Bourdieu 
sees as site in which “economic, cultural and symbolic privileges” (Bourdieu, 1996, cited 
in Chambers, 2005) are transmitted44.  As discussed in chapter three,  the ‘fashion–
beauty complex’  which directly targets the female body has also been seen as a 
                                                
43 Judith Butler’s understanding of political agency proposes that individuals can resist structures of 
power by participating in them in ‘subversive’ ways, for instance through the ‘gender –parodying’ practices of 
drag (Butler 1990). This has resonances with Bourdieu’s notion of ‘regulated liberties’- “actions that arise in 
the context of the existing social order, but which subvert or resignify it in some way” (Chambers, 2005: 338). 
The idea also resonates with Foucault’s notion of ‘reverse discourse’ (Foucault, 1990). However, in Bourdieu’s 
view, the emancipatory potential of such practices is limited by the fact that “they take place from within the 
dominant context and corresponding habitus” (Chambers, 2005:339). 
 
44
  However, although he sees the sexual division of labour in the home as significant in the inculcation of 
gender in childhood (Bourdieu, 1990), elsewhere, and in contrast to some feminists (for instance, Okin, 1989; 
Delphy & Lennard, 1992), he focuses on the reproductive role of the domestic sphere in relation to class 
rather than gender, the production of which he attributes to “agencies such as the school or the state where 
principles of domination that go on to be exercised within even the most private universe are developed and 




dominant force in the reproduction of femininity (Bartky, 1990) and the symbolic  
retrenchment of class relations through women’s bodies (McRobbie, 2009) and so could 
be understood as a significant social field in this respect. 
 
The logics and structures of a field are “both the product and producer of the habitus 
which is both specific and appropriate to that field” (Jenkins, 1992:84) and limit action 
on the basis of the volume and type of capital which an individual is able bring to and 
accrue within it, and so their ability to ‘play the game’ according to the dominant 
meanings generated within the field.  Embedded in habitus,  these ‘objective limits’ 
become a subjective ‘sense of limits’ in terms of lived experiences and capacities within 
a field.  For instance, an individual’s position in relation to others in the field of education 
will have a profound effect on their ability, or even desire, to ‘get on’ at school and to 
gain the dispositions (a ‘feel for the game’) and qualifications which would guarantee 
further social and economic ‘success’.  Although Bourdieu sees fields as having varying 
degrees of autonomy with their own schemes of domination and legitimized values 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), they are also interconnected and cross-cut horizontally 
by what he refers to as the dominant ‘field of power’ in which the state, economy, 
education and elite cultural reproduction are embedded. It is these sites in which the 
material social divisions and the symbolic principles of gendered and classed power 
relations which structure all other fields are produced (Cohen, 2011).   
 
Beauty therapy courses can be understood as situated in the intersections of several 
overlapping fields or sub-fields.  Further education, as a sub-field of education, in which 
the two FE colleges are embedded is in turn shaped by government economic, 
education and employment policies impacting on the colleges and on aspects of the 
beauty courses from management structure and resources to curriculum and 
accreditation to pedagogical practice and the dispositions and expectations of students 
and tutors.  Intersecting with the FE field is the beauty industry, part of the wider 
‘fashion-beauty complex’ (Bartky, 1990), as the employment field targeted by the 
courses.  However, whilst the dispositions of the participants in this study may be 
produced through their courses, they are also shaped in social spaces outside them: in 
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the family, schooling, and friendship networks, and through their engagement with 
various types of media and consumption of cultural goods, for instance fashion and 
beauty products, which position them as classed and gendered subjects/agents.  
 
In Bourdieu’s terms, gender, like class, does not constitute a “‘pure’ field in its own right” 
(Moi, 1991:1035).  Rather, it can be understood as part of the general ‘field of power’ 
which operates differently and carries variable amounts of symbolic capital (legitimate 
status and power) in different fields. There is, therefore, “no such thing as pure “gender 
capital”45.  Chambers (2005) develops this idea to argue that:  
 
…each field contains and enforces a set of gender rules...[which may be]… 
common to many other fields….or they may be specific to that….some fields may 
be more autonomous from gender rules than others, but… all fields embody 
some gender rules, and some gender rules apply in all fields (Ibid, 2005:333). 
 
In the terms of this argument, the raison d’être of the ‘fashion-beauty complex’ may be 
the production of a normatively feminine habitus whilst the field of health and social 
care, for example, may be profoundly shaped by, but not as fundamentally reliant on or 
productive of gender in a way that would invalidate its existence if sexual difference as a 
basis for social organization did not exist. I realize that this is a contentious argument 
given the feminist insights into the deeply entrenched gendering (Cockburn, 1985; 
Glucksmann, 1990) or heterogendering (Adkins, 1995;; Adkins;  Adkins & Lury, 1999) of 
work.  However, my purpose in making such distinctions is to differentiate between the 
kinds of post-16 education and training options available to young women in terms of 
their potential to transform “the aspirations of…students into something less tightly 
bound by classed and gendered values and stereotypes” (Bloomer at al., 2002:16).  As 
discussed in chapter two, there is some evidence that whilst particular types of 
                                                
45
  Moi argues that the idea of gender as a socially variable category across different social fields 
differentiates feminist appropriations of Bourdieu from other forms of materialist feminism.  However, even 
we accept this position, we can nevertheless assume that “under current social conditions and in most 





vocational training, such as health care, are historically constructed through gendered, 
classed and racialized discourse and policy (Skeggs, 1997), reflexive and critical 
pedagogies can encourage self-reflection and a broadening of ‘horizons for action’ 
which may potentially challenge rather than simply reproduce dominant power relations. 
It is far less clear how such transformations could take place in the context of beauty 
therapy given its role in providing labour for an industry which is much more 
emphatically premised on the production and regulation of femininity.  
 
Gender, class and consciousness: the operation of capitals 
 
For Bourdieu, individuals’ life chances are connected to the amount and type of ‘capital’ 
that they are able to accumulate.  The resources referred to by the notion of capital are 
not just material since Bourdieu rejects the idea that social hierarchy and competition 
are based only on economic interests (Bourdieu, 1990; Topper, 2001)46. Economic 
capital refers to the amount of income and wealth possessed by individuals and groups 
whilst social capital refers to the resources available to people based on their social 
connections, networks and group memberships. Cultural capital exists in relation to 
these two forms, each of which can be converted into cultural capital, whilst cultural 
capital can be transformed into both economic and social capital.   
 
According to Bourdieu’s tripartite model, cultural capital exists firstly in an embodied 
state as durable bodily and cognitive dispositions47.  Embodied cultural capital takes on 
                                                
46  The significance of habitus here is that it embodies “the accumulation (or not) of different forms of 
capital (economic, social, cultural, symbolic), displayed as dispositions” (Skeggs, 2004:85). These structure 
social fields through the “distribution of their properties…which are capable of conferring strength, power 
and consequently profit on their holder” (Skeggs, 1997:8) 
 
47  Whilst he tends to emphasize the way in which ‘properties of the self’ are ‘passively inherited’, for 
instance through early socialization, they may also be acquired in more conscious ways (Bourdieu, 2010), for 
example through intentionally adopting a particular style of dress, speech or bodily deportment to conform to 
the dominant norms of a field.  However, the conscious acquisition of these properties does not necessarily 






an appearance of nature. Secondly, it exists “in the objectified state, in the form of 
cultural goods” (Skeggs, 1997:8) including owned physical objects which may include 
art works, clothing or other personal accoutrements which can have symbolic 
significance, for instance, in terms of class position, or in relation to fashionability, style 
or sexual attractiveness.  Thirdly, cultural capital includes educational qualifications 
(Skeggs: 1997) and other holdings which gain institutional recognition and are relevant 
to an individual’s ability to compete in the labour market. This form of capital has a 
particular significance in terms of its ability to be converted directly into economic capital 
(Bourdieu, 1986).  
 
In essence, then, cultural capital, like social and economic capital, is a resource in 
power relations which enables those with “high holdings [to] exercise power over those 
with less” (Lovell, 2004:51) and provides “some defense, however circumscribed, 
against domination” (Ibid, 2004:51). However, for cultural capital to be used as a form of 
power or privilege, it must first be transformed into symbolic capital “before it can be 
capitalized on” (Skeggs, 1997:8).  Skeggs argues that masculinity and femininity carry 
different amounts of symbolic capital. Whilst masculinity and Whiteness are valued 
forms that can be ‘traded’ in various contexts to gain power, ‘feminine cultural capital’, 
which may include ‘attractiveness’ (corporeal capital) or dispositions toward caring and 
interpersonal relationships (emotional capital),  typically yields fewer profits when 
traded, for instance, on the job market (Ibid, 1997).  Reay (2000) and Colley (2006) 
draw on Nowotny’s (1981) notion of emotional capital as a form of feminine capital and 
an asset “which can be exchanged for other forms of capital within a particular field” 
(Colley, 2006: 27), for instance in paid childcare work. However, women’s oppression in 
patriarchal capitalist societies means that such resources cannot easily be deployed as 
capital “since women are generally positioned as subordinate players in all fields” (Ibid: 
27).  As Colley argues, this may have implications for understanding the role of 
vocational education in developing dispositions to emotional labour which can generally 
only be exchanged “ for very low wages; or for more cultural capital, but only for 
vocational courses and at institutions that are relatively low-status” (Ibid: 28). 
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Crucially, gendered forms of capital are also classed. For example, what counts as 
feminine ‘attractiveness’ may be defined in middle or upper class terms (McRobbie, 
2004).   Bourdieu (2010) suggests that corporeal capital is a class privilege since the 
ways in which the body is used in work or leisure, together with food ‘preferences’ and 
differential access to the time, money and inclination to engage in practices of self-
presentation all determine the shape and bearing of an individual’s body and thus “the 
chances of material or symbolic profit they can reasonably expect from it” (Ibid:201).  
 
The symbolic value of gendered capital also depends on the relationship between 
sexed bodies and their gendered dispositions.   McCall argues that a woman working in 
a ‘man’s job’ may acquire masculine dispositions, but because she continues to be sex-
stereotyped and vulnerable to social sanctions for ‘acting like a man’ it is questionable 
whether those dispositions, “can…unequivocally function as profitable capital” (Ibid, 
1992:846). Echoing this, Dennisson (2010) argues that in the context of male-
dominated work environments, the incongruity between women’s assumed gender 
dispositions and the masculinized nature of the job creates a double bind in which 
neither the performance of masculine nor feminine dispositions are unambiguously 
validated.   This scenario, McCall suggests, cannot be gender-neutralized since sex is 
not a symmetrical category. For example whilst the ‘aestheticization’ and 
‘emotionalization’ of work has been associated with the ‘feminization’ of the workplace, 
some feminists have suggested that men are much more likely to be rewarded for their 
investments in corporal “presentation of self-identity” than women whose efforts are 
perceived as the enactment of a normalized or naturalized femininity (McDowell, 1997; 
Adkins, 1995; Adkins & Lury, 1999).  Similarly, Cross and Bagilhole (2002) discuss the 
ways in which male privilege is maintained when men enter occupational areas 
traditionally ‘dominated’ by women.  The ‘refashioning’ of masculinity to incorporate 
hitherto feminized characteristics has allowed men “to remain the dominant sex” (Segal, 
1999, cited in Cross & Bagilhole, 2002 :223) and to capitalize on what Connell (1995) 
terms the ‘patriarchal dividend’ which shores up masculine privilege against potential 
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threats accompanying changes in gender relations48.  The capital accumulating 
strategies available to men through different, and seemingly gender transgressive 
performances of masculinity may mean, as Bourdieu argues, that social changes in 
relation to gender may conceal more entrenched inequalities in the relative positions of 
men and women (Bourdieu, 2001). It is, as Jackson suggests, “the degree of difference 
and the forms of difference that are changing, not the idea that there is a difference” 
(Jackson, 2006:113), or that that difference is hierarchical.   
 
Arguably, women do not just internalize femininity (as Bourdieu assumes) but rather the 
gender opposition itself (Emily Martin, 1987; Jackson, 2001). This may explain why not 
all girls “acquire the stigmata of femininity” (Lovell, 2000:17) as thoroughly as Bourdieu 
suggests.   She discusses examples of women successfully ‘passing as men’ or 
participating ‘as women with masculine dispositions’ in male arenas to argue that there 
is not always a ‘glove-like fit’ between habitus and social position and that masculine 
dispositions have be used as profitable capital by women, even (occasionally) gaining  
social approval.   However, the example of pre-pubescent girls positioning themselves 
as ‘tomboys’ against notions of normative femininity suggests just how double-edged 
such transgression can be when what allows the concept of tomboy to act as a “marker 
of respect”, and as profitable capital, is the perceived superiority of maleness within an 
asymmetrical (hetero)gender binary49 
 
For Skeggs, one of the most troubling aspects of Bourdieu’s work is the ‘model of self’ 
on which the logic of practice rests:  an “explicit model of accumulation, based on [tacit] 
                                                
48 Indeed men’s entry into areas such as nursing or teaching may well be responsible for bolstering the 
status associated with them, at least for those at the top of these professions where men are 
disproportionately represented (Evans, 1996). 
 
49 Not only is this category “temporally bound in middle childhood [becoming] an increasingly repudiated 
category as girls grow older” (Renold, 2005, cited in Griffin et al., 2006:11), but, like the notion of ‘girly-girl’, it 
is located against masculinity as the unmarked norm (Griffin at al., 2006).  Diane Reay’s research on gendered 
identities in primary schools suggests that whilst self-defined ‘tomboys’ might be rejecting femininity and 
signaling a recognition of gender hierarchy, they are doing so in ways that ultimately acquiesce to the 
dominant gender order, particularly in disparaging other girls for their feminine behavior and attributing 
positive qualities of “ fairness, honesty, integrity and strength”( Fine & Macphereson, 1992, cited in Reay, 





knowledge of the game and how to play it” and a habitus which is always inclined to the 
accumulation of value although the stakes may be “non-material and not easily 
quantified” (Bourdieu, 1977, cited in Skeggs, 2004b:85). In this respect, Skeggs argues, 
Bourdieu’s agent has similarities to the ‘exchange-value self’ of possessive 
individualism and rational action. This model implicitly refers to middle class subjects 
and their strategies in social space. In contrast, Bourdieu  positions the working class 
habitus as “shaped by necessity and resignation” they are represented, Skeggs argues 
as  “…lack, beyond value, without value, resigned and adjusted to their conditions, 
unable to accrue value to themselves” (Skeggs, 2004b:87).  In her view, whilst this 
model may tell us a lot about how middle class advantage reproduces itself, it does not 
provide the tools to analyze working class struggles or expressions of frustration, anger 
and dissent which may point to value systems outside of the dominant symbolic and 
which are illegible within its terms.  Just as Foucault sees all social subjects as being 
locked into networks of power, so Bourdieu’s model does not allow dominated groups to 
experience anomie, to recognize social exclusion and to respond to this.  For example, 
it has no purchase on the apparent disinterest in post-16 education which some young 
working class people exhibit (Ball et al, 2001), beyond the idea that they are simply 
resigned to ‘failure’.  The idea that the dominated make a ‘virtue of necessity’ may help 
us to understand why some young women may relinquish former aspirations and 
instead embrace low status, highly gendered training and employment, but it does not 
really help in understanding why some may express frustration and resentment at their 
situation and resist the attempts to instill in them an ‘appropriate habitus for the job’.     
 
In addition, Skeggs argues that Bourdieu’s framework is inadequate for understanding 
why the working class women in her study invested in their appearance. Femininity, she 
suggests, was not primarily a matter of identification or internalized dispositions but, to 
some extent, a conscious performance aimed not at accumulating profit but at “flooring 
their circumstances” (Skeggs, 1997:102). In comparison with the limited opportunities 
available for accruing other forms of value “femininity may be able to accrue relatively 
high profit in some arenas (the institution of marriage and heterosexuality) whilst being 
simultaneously devalued in others’”(Ibid:102).  However, as Skeggs suggests, in trading 
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appearance women are caught up in the paradox of femininity in which they are 




Women as social subjects and objects of exchange 
 
In Distinction (2010), Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977) and Masculine Domination 
(2001) Bourdieu defines women not primarily as subjects of capital exchange but:  
 
...as social objects, repositories of value and of capital, who circulate between 
men and who serve certain important functions in the capital accumulation 
strategies of families and kinship groups (Lovell, 2000:20)50 
 
He argues that women display this capital through their own bodily appearance, through 
managing the ‘public image’ of family members (children and husbands), and through 
their role in looking after “the decor of everyday life, the house and its presentation” 
(Bourdieu, 2001: 100).  It is partly through this sexual division of labour in marriage that 
the symbolic economy of sexual difference is constructed and transported into the 
public sphere.  The “generally subordinate” (ibid, 2010: 101) positions they tend to take 
up and the disadvantages they face in the labour market are logical extensions of their 
roles in the domestic space of symbolic reproduction51.   
                                                
50
  Though he argues that  men’s capital accumulation through the exchange of women in marriage may 
have a more central significance in “the least differentiated societies” (Bourdieu, 2001:98), Bourdieu 
nevertheless maintains that women in contemporary western economies continue to perform a decisive 
function in converting economic capital into forms of symbolic capital through the display of cultural taste, or 
‘respectability’ (Skeggs), at least where a family’s economic capital places it at a “sufficient distance from 
necessity to participate in the struggle for symbolic capital” (Lovell, 2000:23). 
 
51  In this sense, Bourdieu perceives women, like the working class in general, in terms of lack:  
“Women have in common the fact that they are separated from men by a negative symbolic coefficient 
which, like skin colour for blacks, or any other sign of membership of a stigmatized group, negatively affects 





However, some feminists have argued that in relying on abstract dichotomies, Bourdieu 
fails to take proper account of the different ways in which women actually engage in 
capital accumulating strategies in the labour market and in other social fields 52.  But 
though women may constitute themselves as subjects with value, when they enter 
spaces in which they are effectively ‘outsiders within’ (hooks, 2000) their positions can 
remain ambiguous and precarious, obliging them to acquire a habitus which “may be 
‘cleaved’ or ‘torn’, ”bearing the mark of the contradictions which produced [it]” (Bourdieu, 
1997, cited in Hillier & Rooksby, 2005:13).   
 
Although a key objection to Bourdieu’s understanding of gender is that it sidesteps 
these kinds of ambivalences (Skeggs, 2004a), there is a sense in which his 
understanding of the social position of women is founded on the recognition of a 
fundamental ambiguity.  Bourdieu does not argue that women cannot act as capital 
accumulating subjects. Indeed, he acknowledges the “substantive transformations...in 
the condition of women” (Bourdieu, 2001:88) including increased access to education 
and paid work, and “a degree of distance from domestic tasks (Ibid:88-89). However, 
where the labour market is concerned, he suggests that they continue to be 
concentrated in positions which are either quasi-extensions of their domestic roles 
(welfare, personal care, education) or located in the “domains of symbolic production” 
(media, journalism, artistic fields). In Bourdieu’s terms, these are all areas in which “the 
logic of the economy of symbolic goods” (Bourdieu, 2001:94), in which women are 
constituted as (Ibid:63) “body-for-others”,  is reproduced.   Because of this, women’s 
                                                
52
  Skeggs (2004b) points to two examples of feminist work in which the dominated, though deprived of a 
sense of entitlement, are able to position themselves as subjects in fields structured in the interests of the 
dominant.  Lovell’s (2000) discussion of the “cross-gender habitus”  of the female soldier focuses on 
historically and culturally specific examples of women who either ‘passed’ as men or who were able to 
acquire a masculine habitus ‘as women’ sufficiently well to be recognized as ‘legitimate’ or ‘honorary’ 
participants’  in male-only spaces.  Secondly, Diane Reay (1997) indicates the ways in which classed 
processes have a differential impact on women’s access to social, cultural and economic resources for helping 
their children make educational ‘choices’.  Her interviewees from working class backgrounds who had 
‘achieved’ some degree of upward mobility through education still lacked the “self-certainty of the middle 
class habitus” ( displayed unequivocally by the always middle class participants). However, they also refused 
to position themselves in ways that could have implied their inferiority, and did not display a habitus based 




access to symbolic capital is always compromised by their position in the symbolic 
economy of sexual difference: 
 
The social world functions....as a market in symbolic goods, dominated by the 
masculine vision:  for women...to be is to be perceived, and perceived by the 
male eye or by an eye informed by masculine categories....to say of a woman in 
a position of power that she is ‘very feminine’ is just a particularly subtle way of 
denying her right to the specifically masculine attribute of power (Bourdieu, 2001: 
99). 
 
Rather than focusing on Bourdieu’s denial of women’s subject status, it might be more 
helpful to  examine the way in which women, in acting as subjects of exchange, are 
obliged to continually negotiate the relative constancy (though not inevitability) of a 
symbolic order organized through the principles of (hetero)sexual difference and female 
objectification.  This would bring Bourdieu closer to a materialist feminist understanding 
of the way in which many women live their bodies/selves as a contradiction between 
subjectivity and objectification and the way in which this contradiction functions as a 
mechanism of domination enacted at a psychosocial level. In Bartky’s words; 
 
....to be psychologically oppressed is to be caught in the double bind of a 
society which both affirms my human status and at the same time bars me from 
the exercise of many of those typically human functions that bestow that status 
(Bartky, 1990:31). 
 
Collete Guillaumin suggests that expressions of masculine domination, from the 
mundane practices of sexualized interaction and harassment  to the linguistic 
positioning of woman as the marked term (woman doctor, female athlete), to the direct 
physical appropriation of  women’s time, labour and sexual obligation, are underpinned 
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by women’s positioning as  ‘natural objects’53 in relation to male ‘social subjects’. The 
material implications of this go well beyond the domestic and ‘private’ to women’s ability 
to act as subjects in the public domain.  
 
A…. contradiction takes place between the appropriation of women, whether 
it be collective or private, and their reappropriation by themselves, their objective 
existence as social subjects—in other words, the possibility of their selling, on 
their own authority, their labour power on the classical open market” (Guillaumin, 
2005: 83) 
 
Guillaumin is referring here to the ideology of the male breadwinner/female homemaker, 
(Pateman, 1988) which is generally seen as having been progressively eroded by the 
demands of neo-liberal capitalism, women’s increased labour market participation and 
equalities legislation (Chong, 2005).   However, others have suggested that in spite of 
these changes, the legacy of this model continues to inform the domestic division of 
labour and the vertical and horizontal segregation of the labour market (Cambell et al, 
2009), and so to undermine women’s ability to constitute themselves as workers in the 
same way as men (Pateman, 1988). As discussed in chapter two, the deeply gendered 
and embodied nature of labour is also underscored by work on the heterosexualization, 
aestheticization and emotionalization of women’s paid work where the display of 
femininity is required as ‘part of the job’ but is also constituted as a natural expression of 
femaleness rather than a source of capital. In this context, women’s labour often 
continues to be appropriated rather than exchanged  (Adkins & Lury 1999) because 
their embodied capital is unrecognized as capital and only  “recognized as legitimate 
(inherited) competence” (Bourdieu, 1983 cited in McCall, 1992; 843).   In the light of 
this, Bourdieu’s reference to the expansion of female occupations based on ‘charm and 
beauty’  and the way in which this may have brought about  “a legitimate market in 
physical properties....[and] a whole set of changes in ethics and a redefinition of the 
legitimate image of femininity” (Bourdieu, 2010: 149) can be interpreted as implying that 
                                                
53  Discourses which place women and racially dominated groups in relation to ‘nature’ and so as ‘things’ 
to be used by others, whilst (white) men are positioned in relation culture and so constituted as subjects who 
can own and appropriate others as ‘natural objects’ (Guillaumin, 2005). 
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the growth in women’s opportunities to become capital accumulating subjects is 
simultaneously a retrenchment of their universalized and naturalized position as objects 
of exchange . Beauty therapy is a case in point and Bourdieu’s analysis points to the 
tensions, discussed in chapter two, between beauty therapists’ position as aesthetic 
service workers and their self-positioning as ‘professionals’.  
 
Lovell (2000) suggests that in defining women principally as objects, Bourdieu 
disregards how, in actively engaging in hierarchies of class and race, women are 
separated  ”from each other in social space” (Ibid:21). The way in which these divisions 
undercut feminist ideals of solidarity between women is underscored by McRobbie’s 
(2004) proposition that social/economic divisions, once understood in terms of 
masculine hierarchies, are being reinvented in “more autonomously feminized ways” 
(Ibid: 101) with women being incited to produce their bodies as expressions of 
individualized subjecthood marking new forms of classed and racialized distinctions.  
 
Female individualization is....a social process bringing into being new social 
divisions through the denigration of poor and disadvantaged women...What 
emerges is a new regime of more sharply polarized class positions, shabby 
failure or well-groomed success (Ibid: 101). 
 
On this view, the capital accumulating strategies that women are incited to employ are 
bound up with the value placed on their bodies. Whilst these hierarchies of feminine 
corporeal capital may produce new forms of classed antagonisms between women 
positioned as autonomous subjects in the ‘new economy’, they are built on already 
deeply embedded heteronormative assumptions in which women are positioned as 
objects of an external or internalized male gaze (Bartky, 1990; Holland et al, 1997) and 
incited to compete with and value each other on these terms (Ringrose, 2008; Currie et 
al, 2007).  The way in which women are then obliged to navigate between the positions 
of social subject and sexual object (Currie, et al, 2007) has parallels with Gill’s (2009; 
2008) argument, discussed in chapter three, that the shift from commercialized 
representations of women as sexual objects to sexual subjects who “understand their 
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own objectification as pleasurable and self-chosen” (Gill, 2009: 107) represents a new 
disciplinary regime and “a more ‘advanced’ or pernicious form of exploitation” (Ibid:107).  
Lovell (2000) argues that “[t]he idea of ‘producing oneself as an object’ is paradoxical 
within a language which links identity with subjectivity and therefore with positioning as 
a subject” (Ibid: 21). However, McRobbie and Gill’s work suggests the possibility that 
under neo-liberal regimes of femininity women are being increasingly incited to produce 
themselves  simultaneously as objects and subjects, or possibly as ‘objectified 
subjects’.  Whilst it is clearly the case that the incitement to take up a position and 
actually embracing it as identity are different things, we need, as Gill (2008) argues, to 
investigate empirically how women experience these discourses.  Recent studies 
suggest that objectifying and sexualizing practices from cosmetic surgery to forms of 
‘sex work’ are increasingly regarded as legitimate and ‘empowering’ practices by young 
women (Walter, 2010; Banyard, 2010).  At the same time, however, these practices are 
being questioned by others in the context of a ‘new wave’ of feminist activism since the 
mid-2000s (Aune & Redfern, 2008).  Clearly women do not “universally and exclusively 
position themselves as objects” (Lovell, 2000:21), in part because it is not “possible to 
do so unequivocally” (Ibid:21). However, this leaves open the question of how the 
imposition of objectification, regardless of whether it is embraced or resisted, affects 
women’s ability to act as social and capital accumulating subjects (Lovell, 2000) and 
how this is related to other dimensions of inequality.    
Conclusion 
 
Materialist feminist critiques of the theories discussed in this chapter have opened out a 
range of possibilities for thinking about the relationship between subjectivity, agency 
and structural power relations. In chapters seven, eight, nine and ten I draw on these 
insights to examine the ways in which beauty therapy courses, and beauty therapy 
students and their tutors, are caught up in disciplinary regimes and the extent to which 
these are shaped by the practices and discourses of neo-liberal individualism.  In 
addition, I investigate the extent to which the notion of the reflexivity and its pre-
eminence in contemporary discourses of self-making shape students’ accounts of their 
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decisions and trajectories, and their relationship to beauty practices and beauty therapy 
training.  However, because of its explanatory power in relation to the reproduction of 
gendered and classed domination, I draw to a much greater extent on Bourdieu’s 
theories of habitus, capitals and fields, and feminist readings of these.  Nevertheless, 
whilst some feminists locate the strength of Bourdieu’s work in its emphasis on the 
difficulty of social change, others have pointed to its apparent closure on questions of 
resistance and conscious action as its major weakness.  As Mottier argues, even 
though his project aims to undermine the agency/structure dualism, there is “too much 
structure and not enough agency in Bourdieu’s theory of practice” (Motiier, 2002:354). 
As this chapter suggests, within Bourdieu’s terms “the scope of human freedom is not 
large” (Bourdieu & Waquant, 1992, cited in Lovell, 2000:18). However, it cannot be 
entirely absent.  Some of the empirical research discussed here suggests that though 
women act within conditions of constraint they are often engaged in more conscious 
types of ‘negotiation’ with power than Bourdieu’s theories allow room for.  In addition, 
the way in which women can ‘take on’ a ‘masculine’ habitus in certain contexts clearly 
indicates that women do not inevitably or straightforwardly acquire femininity in the way 
Bourdieu suggests.  The ambivalences in women’s experience raise a number of 
questions. Do young women, like the ones in this study, simply ‘follow the leanings of 
habitus’ in making educational or other life decisions? Even if the dialectic between 
habitus and objective structures plays a large part in the construction of ‘choices’, do 
people necessarily make a ‘virtue of necessity’ or, as Skeggs suggests, do the 
dominated also respond to their situations with anger, frustration and forms of (often 
misrecognized) resistance?  The ambivalence in women’s experiences also raises 
questions about female objectification.  Whilst women may be positioned as objects of 
exchange, this does not mean that they always position themselves as such. In spite of 
the reproductive emphasis of his work, Bourdieu acknowledges that people do resist 
dominant power relations (Lovell, 2000).  What we need to do, however, is “to examine 
under what conditions these [resistant] dispositions are socially constituted, effectively 
triggered, and rendered politically efficient” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, cited in ibid, 
2000). If the beauty industry plays a key role in reproducing objectified femininity, what 
room is there on beauty therapy courses for students to challenge this and how does 
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this social and symbolic positioning, regardless of whether or not  it is ‘taken as identity’,  
shape the ways in which they are able to constitute themselves as social subjects?  
 
The next chapter addresses the issues of resistance and consciousness via an 
exploration of Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic violence, its role as a key mechanism of 




























Networks of violence in social life: Symbolic, structural and 
direct violence and the possibility of resistance 
 
In this chapter, I take as my starting point the idea that when social injustices lead to 
suffering they are transformed into expressions of violence (Menjivar, 2008).  I begin my 
discussion with Bourdieu’s critique of domination which allows us to consider practices 
which are commonly understood through the rhetoric of individual choice, inclination or 
ability as produced by and producing covert, symbolic forms of violence. Drawing on a 
range of feminist and non-feminist work, I explore how symbolic violence may provide 
the conditions in which other forms of violence (physical violence and the violence of 
unjust and unequal socio-economic structures) can flourish and, conversely, how these 
forms of violence reinforce the operation of symbolic violence in sustaining relations of 
domination.  In exploring these issues, I focus on how gendered and classed symbolic 
violence works in general terms and across the seemingly disparate contexts of intimate 
partner violence, the sex industry, beauty practices and education.  I also consider how, 
paradoxically, symbolic violence might point to possibilities for resistance and social 
change in particular circumstances.  
 
Bourdieu conceptualizes the wielding of symbolic power by groups or institutions as a 
form of violence that pervades social life, is embedded in everyday action, but which 
goes largely unnoticed or is misrecognized, both by those who impose it by virtue of 
their symbolic capital, and by its victims.  Wacquant argues that the entirety of 
Bourdieu’s work; 
 
Can be read as a quest to explicate the specificity and potency of symbolic 
power, that is, the capacity that systems of meaning and signification have of 
shielding, and thereby strengthening, relations of oppression and exploitation by 
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hiding them under a cloak of nature, benevolence, meritocracy....his sociology of 
‘culture’...reveals itself for what it is in truth: a political economy of symbolic 
violence (Wacquant, 1993:1). 
 
At its heart, the concept of symbolic violence is an attempt to account for how social 
practices which lead to conformity with dominant norms are imposed on groups and 
individuals at micro levels through mundane,  every day practices which produce and 
reproduce forms of macro-level domination (Colagouri, 2010).  Bourdieu shows, for 
example, how cultural classifications of neo-liberal social life based on bodily 
presentation, forms of objectified cultural capital (what one owns and consumes), or 
‘lifestyle choices’,  reinforce new forms of class inequality by hiding the power dynamics 
which produce them behind notions of individual inclination or ‘taste’.  However, in 
Bourdieu’s terms this is not simply a matter of ideological obfuscation or manipulation, 
but rather of subjectification. The power of symbolic violence “lies in the fact that it is 
embedded in the forms of subjectivity that serve to maintain the social order” (Ibid: 395):    
 
Symbolic force is a form of power that is exerted on bodies, directly and as if 
by magic, without any physical constraint; but this magic works only on the basis 
of dispositions deposited, like springs, at the deepest level of the body (Bourdieu, 
2001: 38). 
 
Subjectification also reveals the violence of symbolic violence in the way that it 
inculcates complicity or ‘voluntary submission’ to relations of domination and thus 
incites the dominated to act, often unwittingly, in ways that reproduce those relations 
and, in that sense, against their own interests.  In relation to social class, Bourdieu 
argues that indicators of taste, and thus the social structures which give rise to them, 
become embodied as dispositions of the habitus, functioning “ as a sort of social 
orientation, a ‘sense of one’s place’” (Bourdieu, 2010: 469). 
  
It is through the workings of symbolic violence that ‘objective limits’ (those imposed by 
one’s social situation in relation to economic, social and cultural capital) become a 
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subjective ‘sense of limits’ which ultimately lead the dominated to accept their 
constrained access to resources and power as normal or natural.   For Bourdieu, the 
objective divisions of the social world are internalized as perceptual schemas based on 
a  network of oppositions, expressed as “antagonistic adjectives commonly used to 
classify and qualify persons or objects in the most varied areas of practice” (Bourdieu, 
2010:470). In relation to social class the ultimate source of these dualisms  is “the 
opposition between the ‘elite’ of the dominant and the ‘mass’ of the dominated, a 
contingent, disorganized multiplicity, interchangeable and innumerable, existing only 
statistically” (Ibid: 471)54. The violence of these ‘moral binaries’ (Bourgois, 2002) is 
contained both in the humanity denying stereotypes on which they feed and in their 
internalization which persuades the dominated “that their actions are the cause of their 
own predicament and that their subordination is the logical outcome of the natural order 
of things” (Ibid: 223). Through internalization, symbolic violence can also spawn a sense 
of shame, or recriminations and hostility between members of dominated groups 
(Bourgois, 2001:3).   
 
Such ‘practical taxonomies’ are also significant in terms of Bourdieu’s understanding of 
the somatization of the social relations of sexual domination (Bourdieu, 2001). He 
argues that the arbitrary opposition between male and female “receives its objective and 
subjective necessity from its insertion into a system of homologous oppositions”: 
public/private, culture/nature, mind/body, brains/beauty, strength/weakness, rationality/ 
emotion, and so on.  Thus through “the inexhaustible play of practical transfers and 
metaphors” (Ibid:11) sexual difference is mapped onto and embedded in other socially 
constructed  binaries which in turn reinforce the ‘naturalness’ and inevitability of sex 
through “ a relationship of circular causality which confines thought within the self-
evidence of relations of domination” (Ibid, 2001: 11) .  It is the perceived biological basis 
of sexual difference which makes gender, in Bourdieu’s terms, a paradigmatic case of 
symbolic violence in producing sexed bodies and dispositions which look and are 
                                                
54 For instance, such oppositions are ubiquitous in current media representations of the ‘deserving’ 
versus the ‘undeserving’ poor, the latter constructed, especially in the tabloid media,  through images of 
‘illegal immigrants’ as “undifferentiated hordes”  (Bourdieu, 2010:471), or the unemployed as  ‘feckless 
benefit cheats’.   
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experienced as natural rather than products of history. In this sense, sex/gender is also 
a limiting case of the amnesia of social origins.  Moreover, If we embody social power 
relations it makes little sense to talk about our ‘choices’ in relation to bodily presentation 
(or anything else) as if they are outside or in opposition to external social forces. 
Understanding sexual difference involves moving beyond the categories of “constraint 
(by forces) and consent (to reasons), between mechanical coercion and voluntary, free, 
deliberate, even calculated submission” (Bourdieu, 2001:37).  
 
This understanding of sexual difference shares with French radical materialist feminism 
an emphasis on the hidden social production and naturalization of the categories of sex 
as the underpinning of the “economic, political, ideological order” of male supremacy 
(Wittig, 2005:20). The question is how ideology operates at a micro-level to produce 
conformity to the norms of sexual difference.  Contrary to some readings of materialist 
feminism (for instance Davis, 2002), Wittig’s analysis does not simply represent 
ideology as ‘bearing down’ on individuals.  Her concept of ‘the straight mind’ (Wittig, 
1988), constituted through a language which signifies persons in terms of sex/gender 
could be seen as analogous to the schemas and dispositions of habitus and, as 
indicated earlier, it is at a bodily as well as cognitive level that Wittig sees the ideology 
of sexual difference working to create subjects who actively acquiesce to their 
domination.  At the same time, however, Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic violence makes 
revealing and resisting domination appear to be a near impossibility:  
 
Because their dispositions are the product of embodiment…women cannot 
but constantly confirm this prejudice…It follows that their acts of cognition are 
acts of practical recognition, doxic acceptance….which in a sense ‘makes the 
symbolic violence which it undergoes (Bourdieu, 2001:32-34). 
 
In contrast, Wittig’s analysis rests on the idea of a much more critical and reflexive 
subject.  Whilst accepting that the ‘heterosexual unconscious’  acts as a mechanism of 
domination, she rejects the idea that sexed subjectivity is so deeply and unconsciously 
embedded in bodies as to be practically beyond any kind of conscious apprehension, 
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much less refusal (Wittig, 1988a).  Rather, the “violent reality of the oppositions [of sex]” 
is maintained through censorship- the drowning out of oppositional discourses:  
 
These discourses of heterosexuality oppress us in the sense that they 
prevent us from speaking unless we speak in their terms. Everything which puts 
them into question is at once disregarded (Wittig, 1988a:433). 
 
Unlike, Bourdieu, Wittig leaves open the possibility that subjects can uncover the 
contradictions sustaining domination. This allows her to conceive of a subject capable of 
standing ‘outside the categories of sex’ through oppositional practices and analyses55.  
Indeed, for Wittig, becoming a subject rather than object of oppression is premised upon 
the development of a critical consciousness of the nature of oppression (Wittig, 2005).  
Other feminists have also contested the idea that gender is only produced and 
maintained at an unconscious level.  Whilst Bourdieu argues that the operation of 
gendered symbolic violence dispenses with need for overt forms of justification 
(Bourdieu, 2001),  Skeggs points to the way in which femininity is constantly and 
everywhere reinforced as an indication that “it cannot be purely… pre-reflexive or 
unconscious” (Skeggs, 2004:25).  
 
This, however, does not mean that that the concept of symbolic violence is not a useful 
and productive one for feminism or that it cannot be used without accepting Bourdieu’s 
“at times bleakly pessimistic” (Lovell, 2000:27) model.  For instance, Chambers (2005) 
points to Catherine MacKinnon’s understandings of feminist consciousness 
raising56which allows us to think about symbolic violence as both a mechanism of 
domination and, paradoxically, as a necessary precondition of social change:   
 
Whereas Bourdieu’s account of symbolic violence casts doubt on the 
possibility of female emancipation…..MacKinnon’s account asserts that is 
                                                
  55  In Wittig’s terms, lesbianism is the practice and materialist feminism the analysis which makes it possible 
to take up a standpoint ‘stand outside’ the categories of sex (Wittig, 1988b). 
56
 MacKinnon understands feminist consciousness raising in standpoint terms as the enquiry by women 
into the minutiae of lived experience and practice. In her terms, it is the method by which women can reveal 
the duality of male power as both ‘delusional and real’ (Mackinnon, 1997). 
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precisely because women’s consciousnesses are formed by patriarchal social 
structures that women have access to and can understand the nature of 
patriarchy (Ibid, 2005:335) 
 
Since habitus embeds social structure into the lived experiences and perceptions of 
individuals it can be seen as a site of possibility for understanding those structures by 
“looking inwards” at our ‘selves’ (Ibid: 335).  This is both what MacKinnon means by 
consciousness raising and, in spite of his dismissal of CR as a mistaken understanding 
of consciousness -as “dispositions attuned to the structure of domination”  
misunderstood as  “mystified consciousness” (Bourdieu, 2001:43)-  it is also what 
Bourdieu means by ‘reflexivity’.  Both involve an analysis of the workings of symbolic 
violence through “the systematic exploration of the “unthought categories of thought 
which delimit the unthinkable and predetermine the thought”  (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992, cited in Chambers, 2005:336). However, both concepts appear to tacitly assume 
that a break with doxa can only occur in certain rarified circumstances- reflexivity in the 
practices of academics, and conscious raising in CR groups or within feminist activism. 
This raises the question of whether and how those outside these fields can become 
subjects rather than objects of oppression (Wittig, 1988b).  Are young working class 
women, like those in this study, “’condemned to participate in the symbolic violence of 
gender” (Chambers, 2005:333) and class?  One possible answer is provided by 
Bourdieu’s understanding of the relationship between habitus and field.   
 
Symbolic violence “works when subjective structures-the habitus-and objective 
structures are in accord with each other” (Kraiss, 1993:172).  If habitus is constructed or 
reinforced by a field so that it is in harmony with its structures and norms, it follows that 
a normative change within a field or a move into a different field in which “an individual 
encounters circumstances that are incompatible with her habitus” (Chambers, 
2005:340) might bring about a change in habitus.  This idea has been used by feminists 
to think about the conditions under which a change in consciousness might come about.  
McNay suggests that the “effects of the gendered habitus may be attenuated by the 
movement of individuals across fields” ((McNay, 2000: 53) and points particularly to the 
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entry of women into male dominated areas of employment though, as Chambers 
argues, a number of factors may undercut such effects, including the durability of 
habitus and the constancy of the symbolic principles of masculine domination even in 
the face of significant changes in gender relations.  For instance, Dryburgh’s (1999, 
cited in Chambers, 2005) study of women in engineering suggests that women’s 
response to entering male dominated occupations may well involve alterations in 
habitus but often in ways that remain acquiescent to the gender norms of the field.  As 
Bourdieu argues “ [c]risis is a necessary condition for the questioning of doxa but it is 
not in itself a sufficient condition for the production of a critical discourse”  (Bourdieu, 
1977:169). However, a minority of Dryburgh’s respondents were critical of the gender 
normative behavior of male colleagues and its effects on women. Whilst this may have 
been partly due to dispositions they brought to the field, it may also suggest that being 
an ‘outsider within’ can intensify the “experience of exclusion from male privilege [which] 
accords women a certain critical insight” (McNay, 2000:53):  
 
..this dissonance may lead to a greater  awareness – what Bourdieu calls the 
‘lucidity of the excluded’ ….The questioning of conventional notions of femininity 
does not arise just from exposure to and identification with a greater array of 
alternative images of femininity, but from tensions inherent in the concrete 
negotiation of increasingly conflictual female roles” (McNay 2000: 69). 
 
 
McCall (1992) suggests that it is precisely because women are “continually entering and 
struggling in environments that are “not for the likes of them””  that they are always 
aware, on some level, of exclusionary practices and of the falsity of oppositions which 
do not capture the ambiguities of their experiences. This suggests that women’s 
consciousness may often be predicated not just on the unconscious workings of 
habitus, but on “a self-consciousness [which] is acquired…from taking a gendered 
disposition into a position that does not fit it” (McCall, 1992: 849).  However, she 
suggests that because gender operates across all fields so that “the entire social space 
[can be considered as] a single field of male domination” (Ibid:  846) all sites are 
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potential producers of a critical gender consciousness capable of curtailing the 
operation of symbolic violence.  What implications does this argument have for the 
development of women’s consciousness in sites like beauty therapy which are 
predominantly female spaces and in which women are ostensibly engaged in 
pleasurable feminine practices in the absence of a direct male gaze? It seems likely that 
this situation would obscure rather than accentuate the contradictions of gendered 
power relations and that the logic of habitus would reinforce the fit between the norms of 
the field and the gendered dispositions of women within it.  However, even if this is the 
case, contradictions may arise in relation to other dimensions of inequality.   As 
discussed in chapter three, the expectations of bodily femininity are fragmented by class 
and race (Craig 2006; Black, 2004; Skeggs, 1997). This means that whilst women in 
beauty salons (as clients, workers or students) may generally subscribe to the 
importance of a feminine appearance, classed and racialized conflicts over what this 
entails may result in a sense of dissonance where, for instance, a middle class client’s 
notions of an ‘appropriate look’ are at odds with those of her beauty therapist (Gimlin, 
2002). Craig argues that far from implying a resistance to dominant norms, as Gimlin 
suggests, rejecting certain practices or types of appearance is more likely to signal an 
active submission “to racialized class norms, defined in opposition to the marginalized 
femininities of poorer women and women of colour” (Craig, 2005: 166). This raises the 
question of what happens when working class or Black women are subject to white, 
middle class appearance norms.  McRobbie (2004) argues that where this dynamic is 
played out in television makeover shows, working class or lower middle class women 
become victims of symbolic violence enacted through the ‘guidance’ of middle class 
‘experts’ on the basis of a “habitus already inclined to submit to social authority” (Ibid, 
2004: 104). Even where marginalized women experience a profound sense of 
dissonance in performing  femininity defined in white, middle class terms, their 
investments in producing their own versions of ‘bodily respectability’ (Skeggs, 1997)  
are ‘too embedded within structures of inequality to be characterized as acts of 




These arguments would tend to suggest that whilst dissonance and ambivalence may 
characterize women’s engagements in beauty practices, the operation of symbolic 
violence in the context of beauty therapy is unlikely to come up against any challenge 
significant enough to engender a critical consciousness of the role that beauty plays in 
sustaining gendered and classed power relations. 57 
Networks of violence 
 
Beauty practices provide an example of how symbolic violence works at a micro- 
level to secure acquiescence which is both voluntary and coerced. However, as 
Colaguori (2010) argues, symbolic violence also plays a role in institutional structures 
from agencies of the state to religious and educational organizations “in securing the 
consent of subjects in accord with the dictates of operational practices” (Ibid:389). The 
scope of symbolic violence, operating horizontally across fields and vertically from micro 
to macro - levels underscores its significance as part of the way in which “social 
regulation is achieved through consistently coercive means” (ibid: 389). If violence “is 
everywhere in social practice” (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgios, 2004:21) this implies that 
symbolic violence cannot be understood in isolation from other expressions of violence:  
that it may play a key role in normalizing and legitimizing other forms of violence from 
‘everyday’ interpersonal violence (Scheper-Hughes, 1996) to economic and structural 
violence (Bourgois, 2001; 2002; Galtung, 1975), and, conversely, that these forms of 
violence may spawn symbolic violence. Understood in this way, the concept of symbolic 
violence can help to address what Jackman calls “the gaping holes and inconsistencies” 
in sociological understandings of violence” (Jackman, 2001:388).  
 
Colaguori argues that whilst there appears to be “a general consensus that the “problem 
of violence is becoming more pronounced….in both local and global contexts” 
                                                
57 This does not mean that women who use beauty salons are necessarily uncritical of beauty norms, just 
that beauty therapy and beauty practices are unlikely to give rise to a critical consciousness unless they are 
subjected to a feminist analysis. For example, women’s experience of beauty has been used to develop a 




(Colaguori, 2010:388), this has not lead to a radical questioning of how violence is 
normatively understood.  He suggests that this may be due to the  difficulties involved in 
making sense of the complexities of violence and the multiple forms it takes from sexual 
and domestic violence to murder,  to organized and state sanctioned war or genocide, 
to the kinds of practices which are commonly understood through the psychologizing 
language of  aggression.  As Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004) argue, violence “is 
a slippery concept” (Ibid:1) which refuses any easy categorization and extends well 
beyond commonsense notions of the interpersonal use of force in the direct infliction of 
suffering. It is:  
 
…non-linear, productive, destructive, and reproductive”… [it] can never be 
understood solely in terms of its physicality-force, assault, or the infliction of pain-
alone. Violence also includes assaults on the personhood, dignity, sense of self 
worth or value of the victim (Ibid: 1). 
 
This perspective, however, has not been generally reflected in mainstream scholarly 
understandings.  Jackman (2002), suggests that within sociology, disparate and 
specialized bodies of research have been informed by social and policy demands which 
have generally assumed an unproblematized consensus about the meaning of violence.  
In her view, the two key assumptions underlying this research are that violence involves 
the “willful intent to cause harm” (ibid:388) and that it involves behavior which deviates 
from ’mainstream’, everyday interaction in legal, social and moral terms. Whilst some 
researchers have incorporated varying criteria according to the “demands of their 
subject matter” (ibid:388), understandings of violence have often been shaped by a 
number of issues which resonate with legalistic or commonsense definitions of violence. 
Firstly, studies have tended to focus on actions resulting in physical harm. Though 
some research points to psychological injuries, this is often mediated by the idea that 
they count only if they are “so severe as to warrant being called violence” (Holmes, 
1990, cited in Ibid:391), or where they are understood as being a prelude to physical 
injuries. Secondly, definitions of violence are typically limited to physical behaviours, 
although verbal and written actions have sometimes been included.  Thirdly, 
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mainstream definitions of violence have led to ambiguity in relation to the issue of victim 
complicity58.  Definitions of violence rarely stretch to include circumstances in which, for 
instance, individuals voluntarily undergo cosmetic surgery or in which women’s 
involvement in the sex industry is understood as ‘freely chosen’  rather than ‘coerced’ 
(Jeffreys, 1997). Lastly, scholars have tended to emphasize interpersonal violence 
where there are “identifiable agents and victims and immediate and certain outcomes” 
(Jackman, 2002:388).  In contrast:  
 
…injurious actions with fragmented or corporate agency, amorphous or 
anonymous victims, and delayed or probabilistic injuries are included 
intermittently in research on violence (Ibid: 388) 
 
Consequently, the material, social and psychological injuries inflicted on social groups 
or communities through non-direct means, for instance through unequal distribution of 
resources/capitals, and through symbolic domination, are excluded from dominant 
definitions of violence. The doxic status of these definitions may partly explain why 
Bourdieusian scholars have tended to treat symbolic violence as a concept which 
describes how domination works, rather than theorizing it as a ‘real’ form of violence in 
itself.  However, more recently there have been a number of attempts to place it more 
centrally in theoretical and empirical investigations of how violence in general operates 
to reproduce domination.   
 
In an effort to explicate the embeddedness of violence in social life,  Phillipe Bourgois 
(2001) differentiates between four strands of  interacting and mutually supporting 
violence: the ‘direct political violence’ imposed by official regimes (and sometimes by 
those opposing them) through physical means and through psychological terror, the 
‘structural violence’59of economic oppression and local and global systematic 
                                                
58 For instance, Jackman (2002) suggests that although domestic and sexual abuse is now usually 
accepted within the rubric of violence,  there is still diffidence in non-feminist contexts about individual cases 
where women stay in abusive relationships or ‘fail’ to report sexual harassment. 
59 The concept of structural violence was brought into academic debate by Johan Galtung to name the 




inequalities (gender, class, race), and the symbolic violence of  “internalized 
humiliations and legitimizations of inequality and hierarchy ranging from sexism and 
racism to intimate expressions of class power” (Ibid:426), and the ‘everyday violence’  
taking place on a; 
 
….micro-interactional level: interpersonal, domestic and delinquent…. 
individual lived experience that normalizes petty brutalities and terror at the 
community level and creates a common sense ethos of violence (Ibid: 426).  
 
In an analysis of his ethnographic work with revolutionary peasants in early 1980s El 
Salvador, and with poor communities in late 1980s East Harlem, New York, Bourgois 
shows how social, economic and physical suffering occasioned by brutal state 
repression and military violence in the former case, and by the social segregation and 
poverty produced by neo-liberal capitalism in the latter, gives rise to ‘everyday’ forms of 
interpersonal and symbolic violence in subjugated communities including types of 
violence which involve the ‘complicity’ which is excluded from dominant definitions:  
 
[e]xtreme segregation, social inequality, and material misery express 
themselves at ground level in interpersonal conflicts that the socially vulnerable 
inflict mainly onto themselves…onto their kin and friends (through domestic 
violence and adolescent gang rape) and onto their neighbors and community 
…More subtly, it …allows symbolic violence to prevail: blaming the poor-and 
getting the poor to blame themselves for their poverty (Ibid:427).  
 
Bourgois (2002) suggests that structural violence has a central and originary status in 
the workings of violence.  On this view, symbolic violence as the internalization of 
entrenched structural violence results in ‘everyday’ expressions of direct violence. In the 
above statement the structural is seen primarily in narrow economic terms with the 
result that the male violence of rape is assumed to proceed from class injustice rather 
than the structural relations of gender and heterosexuality.  However, his arguments are 
useful in that they emphasize the way in which structural violence “is experienced by its 
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victims through its various interfaces with other forms of violence-symbolic, everyday 
and political” (Bourgois, 2002:222). In mediating social experience, symbolic violence 
shapes individuals’ understandings of social processes, legitimizing or obscuring 
dominant power relations and the forms of violence which they rely on and produce.  
 
Maddy Coy’s (2011) recent work on the relationship between symbolic violence and 
prostitution demonstrates how this might work.  She argues that the ‘dynamics of 
prostitution’-  the structural relations of the sex industry in which women become sexual 
objects of exchange in a global marketplace, and the (hetero)gendered ideologies which 
sustain this trade– are increasingly promoted and normalized through contemporary 
globalized popular culture as a paradigm for normative (hetero)gender relations and 
identities.    Symbolic violence through style trends such as ‘pimp and ho chic’ 
glamorize prostitution and effectively obscure and trivialize “the harms women 
experience in the sex industry:  violence, coercion and exploitation as well as 
dehumanization of the body as commodity”.  Secondly,  the way in which the globalized 
media tacitly or explicitly  promote assumptions of ‘male sex right’ and the inevitability of 
prostitution60 dehistoricizes and naturalizes the sex industry.  Thirdly,  the 
mainstreaming of the language of prostitution, including the terms ‘ho’, ‘whore’, ‘slut’, 
imposes object status on all women as well as inciting them to embrace 
‘hypersexualized’ styles and identities.  As discussed in chapter three, the targeted 
marketing of sex to women, and indeed to young girls (Jeffreys, 2005), through the 
fashion and beauty industries may be key to understanding how sexualized femininity 
“within conventional patriarchal frames of reference” (Attwood, 2005:401) is promoted 
as source of identity for women.  Moreover, some research suggests that these 
practices may be implicated in women’s involvement in the sex industry. For instance, in 
her research on ‘exotic dancers’, Wesley suggests that through the processes of 
sexualization from childhood onwards “women are forced to see themselves as objects” 
(Wesley, 2002: 1183), a sense which, she argues, contributed (along with material 
deprivation) to her respondents’ ‘choice’ of exotic dancing and which was reinforced in 
their interactions with male ‘customers’.  In this sense, Coy suggests, symbolic violence 
                                                
60
 For example in the ubiquitous notion of prostitution as the ‘oldest profession’ (see Jeffreys, 1997) 
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both produces women’s “complicity and engagement in these dynamics” (Ibid: 442) and 
works as a “conceptual justification for [direct, sexual] violence” (ibid:443).   In addition, 
belying the individualized rhetoric of choice and empowerment, the language of 
prostitution continues to function in relation to discourses of sexual reputation. Whilst 
women across class divides may be required to negotiate the sexual divide between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ femininities, it is poor, working class women and those in the sex 
industry for whom the stigma of prostitution has a particularly “acute meaning” (Ibid:443; 
see also Ringrose, 2008; Skeggs, 1997;2005). Not only does the symbolic violence 
contained in the denigration of women in prostitution reproduce classed divisions 
between women, it has also served as a justification for extreme violence and murder 
(Salfati &Ferguson, 2008, cited in Coy, 2011:443). 
 
Coy’s demonstration of the interconnections between forms of violence operating at 
“physical, sexual, material and psychosocial [symbolic]” levels (Coy, 2011:443) 
highlights the way in which “[o]ne type of injury spills out into another” (Jackman, 2002 
:394) so that it becomes impossible to “neatly separate” categories of violence 
(Bourgois, 2002:223).  Because of this, Bourgois suggests that violence should be 
understood as a continuum in order to “prevent an either/ or understanding of the social 
processes whereby one form of violence neatly covers for or replaces another” 
(Bourgois, 2002: 223). This idea, however, has unacknowledged precursors in feminist 
theory.  For instance, Liz Kelly’s (1988) concept of a ‘continuum of sexual violence’ 
broadened out normative definitions to show how ‘typical’ (everyday types of sexual 
harassment, pressurized sex) and ’aberrant’ (assault, rape, incest) “shade into one 
another” (Kelly, 1988:75).  However, Kelly does not include objectifying practices which 
women engage in ‘voluntarily’. In part, this is because the continuum is based on 
interviewees experiences of direct violation and intimidation, and in part because her 
definition of violence is rooted firmly in interpersonal behaviours so that “[t]he basic 
common character underlying the many different types of violence is the abuse, 
intimidation, coercion, intrusion, threat and force men use to control women” (Ibid: 76). 
Although this continuum stretches the definition of violence to emphasize its 
embeddedness in everyday gendered interaction,  it is not stretched far enough to 
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include the mundane symbolic practices which normalize male dominance and which 
are productive of women’s subjectivity and ‘choices’ as well as being a destructive force 
in their lives.  However, I would argue that if such expressions of symbolic violence 
were understood as part of the continuum of sexual violence then practices connected 
to bodily femininity and appearance could be legitimately included on it.  
 
Kelly insists that the notion of a continuum should not “be interpreted as a statement 
about the relative seriousness of different forms of sexual violence” (Ibid:76). 
Nevertheless, it does carry implications of a ‘more or less’ relationship between 
behaviours plotted along it. Kelly herself makes use of this aspect in terms of greater or 
lesser degrees of ‘prevalence’ of particular forms of violence, but other feminists have 
employed the concept to rank behaviours from the least to most physically violent 
(Quina, 1997, Jeffrey, 2005).  On this model, symbolic violence would be positioned as 
less serious or ‘real’ than other forms (Colagouri, 2010). As Bourdieu argues, 
“[u]nderstanding ‘symbolic’ as the opposite of ‘real’, ‘actual’, people suppose that 
symbolic violence is a purely ‘spiritual’ violence with no real effects” (Bourdieu, 
2001:34).  But as Lovell points out,  “if Bourdieu establishes anything it is the deep 
power of symbolic violence to inflict harm, pain, injury” (Lovell, 2004:50-51). 
 
The real/less real dichotomy is challenged by Morgan and Bjorkert’s (2010) research on 
women’s experience of male violence in which they analyze the ways in which symbolic 
violence, working through psychological abuse and institutional narratives which 
position women as responsible for their own safety, and discourses of romantic love and 
feminine self-sacrifice, has effects on women’s lives which are often perceived by them 
as ultimately more devastating than direct physical abuse. Whilst Morgan & Bjorkert do 
not underestimate the huge impact of physical violence, they make an extremely 
important point about the danger of underestimating the significance of symbolic 
violence as an “elementary mode of domination” (Krais, 1993:172).  Citing Bourdieu’s 
argument that the more direct domination is disapproved of, the more disguised forms 
will mobilized in order to exercise domination (Bourdieu, 1991, cited in Morgan & 
Bjorkert: 445), they point out the paradoxical possibility that “the more feminists fight 
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against direct violence, the more it is subverted and takes the form of symbolic violence” 
(Morgan & Bjorkert, 2006:396). This implies that we should be paying attention not only 
to forms of symbolic violence that directly “accompany or precede physical violence” 
(Ibid: 441) but also to forms that are currently much easier to confuse with freedom, 
choice and autonomous pleasure. Beauty practices are a key example of this because 
the effectiveness of their role in the production of naturalized (hetero)sexual difference 
and domination relies on their being seen as freely chosen and felt as pleasurable or at 
least as a necessary expression of identity.   
Violence and beauty practices 
 
As discussed in chapter three, some feminists have noted the way in which beauty 
practices are predicated on and cause social and personal suffering for women. 
However, in most of these accounts the social forces which produce this suffering have 
generally not been explicitly theorized in terms of violence.  When the idea of violence is 
directly invoked it is often in relation to the physical harms done by particular ‘extreme’ 
forms of beauty practice.  The notion of symbolic violence, however, might contribute to 
our understanding of western beauty practices as forms of ‘harmful cultural/traditional 
practice’ (Jeffreys, 2002; 2005).  Whilst Jeffreys is uncompromising in her view that 
women are incited to ‘choose’ and enjoy beauty practices because of symbolic 
manipulation operating through channels such as advertising and women’s magazines 
creating “ the guise of free-will and choice’ (Callghan, 1994, cited in Jeffreys, 2005: 27), 
there are inconsistencies in her argument which, paradoxically, lead her to 
underestimate the power of violence operating at a symbolic level to inflict harms 
potentially as serious as those inflicted through physical means.  Though she 
acknowledges that pleasure in beauty practices is “not inconsistent with their role in the 
subordination of women” she does not analyze the mechanisms through which it might 
be constructed at a deep, subjective level and thus underplays the way in which the 
process of construction might constitute a form of violence in itself. This leads her to 
conceptualize violence as  imposed on bodies rather than working through bodies, as 
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suggested in her argument that beauty practices operate on a continuum defined in 
terms of the severity of physical harm  “from lipstick at one end to invasive cosmetic 
surgery at the other” (Ibid:28).  Whilst she argues that everyday beauty practices 
reproduce sexual difference and gender stereotypes which affect women as a group 
she positions them as less harmful than practices which physically injure the bodies of 
individual women.  In this sense, Jeffreys’ analysis does not quite shake off the 
assumptions embedded in normative individualistic and interpersonal definitions of 
violence.  Without a concept of how symbolic power works at an embodied level to 
produce ‘choice’, pleasure and subjectivity it is difficult to argue convincingly that beauty 
practices at the ‘least physically harmful end of the continuum’, constitute violence in 
themselves.  I would argue that in (understandably) refusing postmodern and 
Foucauldian conceptions of power and agency she sidesteps an analysis of the subject 
as at least partly an effect of power and so in spite of her acknowledgement of pleasure 
as compatible with domination, her analysis remains hampered by the 
pleasure/domination distinction: by the idea that beauty practices are either a choice or 
an imposition.  
 
Other perspectives, however, may help to broaden out the idea of beauty as a harmful 
traditional practice by including its embodied and subjectivized dimensions.   Cecilia 
Menjivar (2008) argues that understanding how gendered violence works means paying 
attention to how it is experienced by women (and others) at a corporeal level.  Her 
analysis of interviews with Ladina women in Guatemala suggests that intertwined forms 
of structural/economic violence (unequal access to food and health care), direct 
violence (domestic abuse and control of women’s sexuality and fertility) and symbolic 
violence (the naturalized view as women as self-sacrificial carers) are manifested in 
various forms of distress, demoralization and poor physical health. This, she argues, 
illustrates “how structures of violence translate into everyday suffering and become 
embodied… routinized and…misrecognized” (Ibid: 15).  Sarah Naomi Shaw’s work on 
the discourses of self-harm is useful in thinking about how this model might be applied 
to everyday appearance practices. She argues that both normalized beauty practices 
and self- injury regarded as abnormal in medicalized terms, are predicated on “ 
116 
 
women’s experiences of relational and cultural violations, silencing and objectification” 
(Ibid: 192), and that both may be understood as “bodily idioms through which women 
express their psychological distress” as a response to this (Ibid: 192).  This perspective 
points to the possibility that forms of structural, direct and symbolic violence are 
inscribed on women’s bodies through the aesthetic practices of femininity.  Moreover, 
the concept of symbolic violence allows us to consider how these forms of violence, 
which are always both gendered and classed, are not just written on the body but also 
incorporated in subjectivity.  In this analysis, beauty practices across Jeffreys’ 
continuum can be seen as an integral part of the networks of violence in which women’s 
lives and identities are embedded and as one explicit manifestation of how “violence 
and suffering are embodied”  (Menjivar, 2008:12).  
Violence in education 
 
For Bourdieu, modes of pedagogic action, including those operating in everyday social 
interaction, in the family and  within educational institutions,  are a mainstay of symbolic 
violence (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990; Jenkins, 1992) in that the values and meanings 
held by those with ‘pedagogic authority’ are generally accepted as legitimate both by 
members of dominant and dominated groups.  Through symbolic violence, education, 
particularly in formal schooling, reproduces both culture and structural power relations 
because it allows “dominant groups in society [to] make their own particular form of 
cultural capital appear to be the natural way of being in the world” (Herr & Anderson, 
2003:417), whilst excluding or censoring other contrary meanings or values (Jenkins, 
1992).  In Bourdieu’s terms, the micro-level process of the classroom and the meso-
level institutional practices of the school contribute to outcomes at a macro-level 
through “the reproduction of the relations between groups or classes” (Bourdieu & 
Passeron, 1990, cited in Herr & Anderson, 2003: 419). 
 
A key element of Bourdieu’s theory is the idea that the ‘failure’ of subordinate groups in 
dominant educational terms is built into the education system through the incongruence  
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between their own primary habitus-embedded cultural capital derived from informal 
education in the family, and the cultural capital implicitly valued in formal education. 
Conversely, those from dominant groups are likely to succeed in relative terms because 
the habitus they bring to their schooling already incorporates forms of cultural capital 
congruent with those implicitly valued by the school and reflected in the habitus of 
teachers.  It is through this process that the abilities of those from dominated groups are 
misrecognized, leading them to become alienated from education as something that is 
‘not for the likes of them’.  Recalling Willis’ (1977) work on how education channels 
working class children into working class jobs, victims’ responses to this symbolic 
violence help to produce their own subjective ‘sense of limits’, in effect, their acceptance 
of ‘failure’61 .   
 
In Bourdieu’s terms, working class students and those from other subordinated groups 
are likely to misrecognize their ‘failure’ as the outcome of personal inadequacy rather 
than an effect of systematic power relations.  In part, this is because inequitable 
outcomes through academic exams and qualifications, are masked by the ideology of 
meritocracy which “inspire[s] universal recognition of the legitimacy of academic verdicts 
and of the social hierarchies they legitimate” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990:162).  In this 
way, the education system is able to reproduce inequality without “resorting to external 
repression or, in particular, physical coercion” (Ibid, 1990:36). However, this does not 
mean that other forms of violence are not a feature of formal education. Herr and 
Anderson point to Bourdieu’s so called ‘law of the conservation of violence’62as a tool 
for “understanding the continuum – from symbolic to physical forms-of violence that 
                                                
61 As Meier puts it, “[w]hat the most successful students had going for them was that……[s]tarting on day 
one, certain forms of knowledge and skill- the stuff they’ve eagerly brought with them from home- was 
confirmed and honoured, thus increasing their self-confidence….But many other students never found a 
replacement for a school and teacher who didn’t recognize their genius, who responded with a shrug or look 
of incomprehension as they offered their equally eager home truths. They…soon learned that in school all 
they could show off was their ignorance. Better to be bad, or uninterested, or just to silently withdraw (Meier, 
2002, cited in Herr & Anderson, 2003:418). 
 
62  “You cannot cheat with the law of the conservation of violence: all violence is paid for, and for 
example, the structural violence exerted by the financial markets, in the form of layoffs, loss of security, etc. is 
matched sooner or later in the form of suicides, crime, delinquency, drug addiction, alcoholism,  a whole host 




exists in schools” (Herr & Anderson, 2003:415), and how the symbolic violence endemic 
in schools both reproduces structural violence and generates “local incidences of 
emotional and physical violence”: 
 
Acknowledging the hidden and misrecognized nature of symbolic violence, and thus the 
difficulties of studying it, Herr and Anderson (2003) use a ‘critical incidence approach’ 
(see chapter six) in their study of a US inner city school with a largely low income, 
minority ethnic intake in order to explore the operation of symbolic violence in the 
classroom interactions between male students and their teachers as a consequence of 
the lack of congruence between the habitus of teachers (a product of their classed 
background and /or institutional values) and the habitus of students. They show how 
this produces a learning environment in which teachers often misrecognize or belittle 
students’ abilities in a way that denigrates their sense of self.  Students respond to this 
by ‘taking themselves out’ of the situation by the only means at the their disposal; 
dozing with the heads on desks,  ignoring the continual stream of disciplinary 
instructions from the teacher to behave ‘respectfully’,  and looking out of the windows  at  
a police car that has arrived to take away a pupil from another class, an incident which 
Herr & Anderson which Herr & Anderson see as “an all too ready metaphor for the end 
results of this kind of education” (Ibid:426). The authors draw attention to a ‘hidden 
curriculum’ of taken-for -granted expectations about ‘proper behaviour’ which tacitly 
reproduce hierarchies of class, race, gender and age and which  result in the labeling 
and exclusion of students who do not or cannot conform to these requirements.  
Incidents of physical violence are, they suggest, an outcome of the symbolic violence 
which is embedded in everyday classroom interaction and which breeds low-self 
esteem, alienation and frustration. For students like those in Herr & Anderson’s study, 
this may also have much longer term consequences including low-waged work and the 
juvenile justice system.  
 
This does not necessarily mean that symbolic violence cannot be challenged by 
teachers who encourage critical thought.  However, good and well meaning teachers 




….a caring attitude can function as a velvet glove that serves to obscure the 
exercise of symbolic violence or even collude in making the dominant habitus 
seem more universal and natural (Herr & Anderson, 2003: 419)  
 
However, although they do not explicitly say so, one of the issues that Herr & 
Anderson’s research raises is that whilst symbolic violence may produce a range of 
harms at a personal and social level, the forms of ‘resistance’ engaged in by students in 
the classroom suggests that symbolic violence is not always completely effective in 
producing consent to domination. Indeed, what it underscores is that symbolic violence 
can never act alone. It is, as Krais suggests, a “complimentary mode of domination” with 
other forms of violence (Krais, 1993:172). It’s power may lie in instilling in the dominated 
a sense of the inevitability of their situations, even a sense of the legitimacy of hierarchy 
in general (and in terms of gender, a tacit acceptance of sexual difference), but this 
does not mean it always produces complete capitulation to all expressions of 
domination. This is suggested in Herr and Anderson’s description of students’ 
enthusiasm for the critical, potentially consciousness raising discussions encouraged by 
one teacher which implies, as McCall (1992) argues, that we need to pay attention to 
the conscious as well as the unconscious workings of habitus and acknowledge the way 
in which the consciousness of dominated groups may be formed through “a practical 
consideration of their lack of opportunity to join in the cultural and economic life of the 
dominant groups” (Ibid:849).  However, in Bourdieu’s terms, even the “most radical 
critique always has the limits that are assigned to it by the objective conditions” 
(Bourdieu, 2010: 169).  In the case of Herr & Anderson’s participants, the 
structural/economic violence  which produces ‘objective limits’ on their trajectories 
means that their futures are likely to be narrowed to the “violent options [of] 
incarceration or the military” (Ibid:432) because, as Skeggs’ says of women who stay 
with violent men, “they see no alternative” (Skeggs, 2004a: 26).  
 
Although gender is clearly a factor in the operation of symbolic and other forms of 
violence in the boys-only classrooms they investigate, Herr & Anderson do not analyze 
120 
 
how violence “follows the fault lines of gender” (Bourgois, 2002:224) or the way in which 
girls may experience violence in the context of education in specific ways. Other 
research, however, has addressed this question, though not necessarily in Bourdieusian 
terms.  For instance, Osler (2006) focuses on formal and informal exclusion from school  
as an expression of contemporary school violence which, she argues, is intimately 
bound up  with the contradictions in education policy since 199763.  This, she argues, 
has lead to “a growth in informal, unrecorded exclusion” (Osler 2000, cited in Osler, 
2006: .573). Girls are particularly vulnerable to these types of hidden exclusion for two 
main reasons. Firstly, the discourse of ‘successful girls’ and ‘underachieving boys’ 
conceals the experience of the thirty eight percent of girls in the UK who do not achieve 
five or more GCSEs at A* to C (DfE, 2012a). Whilst boys become ‘hyper-visible’ in 
schools and thus command most of the resources allocated to addressing ‘disaffection’, 
underachieving girls and those experiencing ‘problems’ are invisiblized.   This discourse 
is part of what Osler sees as the systemic violence leading to girls’ withdrawal from 
learning or self-exclusion from school.  It is also a form of symbolic violence in its 
legitimization of institutionalized exclusionary practices. It obscures gendered and 
classed inequalities in a similar way to the discourses underlying the second reason for 
girls’ vulnerability to self-exclusion suggested by Osler.  
 
The greater vulnerability of boys to disciplinary exclusion rests partly on the narrow and 
gendered definitions of disruptive or violent behavior. Whilst boys are more likely to 
engage in and be victims of more visible and overt forms of physical aggression 
normatively understood as violence, girls are more likely to engage in and be victims of 
“verbal abuse and psychological violence” (Ibid,:577) .  Where this is noticed at all, it is 
seen by teachers as less disruptive in the classroom and is also naturalized through 
discourses of normative femininity which, as Ringrose points out, constitute overt 
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 New Labour educational policies have on the one hand required schools to minimize disciplinary 
exclusion and ‘truanting’ and on the other have imposed an obligation to demonstrate continual improvement 
in test and examination results, encouraging schools to allow low achieving students to self-exclude  from 
examinations (Osler, 2006). This resonates with Hayden’s view that exclusion “occurs in a complete set of 
interacting circumstances of which quasi-markets in education are an important feature” (Hayden, 1997, 




aggression as a “violation of feminine codes of niceness and nurturing” (Ringrose, 
2008:46) but covert aggression and sexualized regulation (‘manipulation’ and 
 ‘meanness’) as natural, though pathologized, expressions of teenage femininity.  Whilst 
the symbolic violence of such discourses may make forms of violence between girls 
largely invisible (Currie et al, 2007), or relatively benign in the perceptions of teachers, 
they “may represent to the victim a considerable burden” (Osler, 2006: 578). This is 
supported by research which suggests that the experience of being isolated from peers 
or being subjected to hostility or bullying can have extremely negative impacts on 
engagement with learning and future life chances (McGrath & Nobel, 2010). Some 
recent research also points to the psychosocial effects of appearance related bullying 
on self-consciousness and low self esteem (Mangin et al, 2008; Lovegrove & Rumsey, 
2005), particularly relevant in girls regulation of each others’ performances of 
heterofemininity.  
 
However, the currently dominant focus on ‘anti-social behavior’ or ‘disaffection’ in 
academic and policy discourses identifies the problem of violence as rooted the in 
individual behavior and deficits of pupils rather than in schooling itself or in wider social 
processes (Osler, 2006). The term ‘school violence’ is rarely used in UK policy 
documents. Instead the focus has been on the prevention of ‘bullying’, largely taken to 
refer to “repeated behavior over time that intentionally hurts another individual or group 
physically or emotionally” (DfE, 2012b). However, there is still a perception that physical 
violence is the most serious expression of bullying in schools (Toomey et al, 2011). In 
addition, although recent policy highlights the way in which bullying may be “motivated 
by prejudice on the grounds of race, religion, gender or sexual orientation” (DfE, 
2012b:3) there is no official recognition that these social inequalities may be reflected in 
and reproduced in schools through:  
 
 …institutional or systemic violence, where the policies, customs and 
practices of the school may lead to insecurity….. amongst either staff or students 





On this view, ‘bullying’ cannot be separated from the everyday ‘micro-violence’ 
experienced by both girls and boys, including poor teacher -pupil relationships in which 
students may feel disrespected and humiliated .  It is, Osler suggests, “this climate of 
incivilities which enable us to understand the origins and nature of other expressions of 
violence in schools” (Ibid: 578). In addition, structural inequalities may be reproduced 
through institutionalized symbolic violence, dispensing with the need for any overt or 
interpersonal hostility or intentionally discriminatory behavior. For instance, some  UK 
school-based research suggests that ‘institutional racialization’ (Rattsani, 2005 cited in 
Philips, 2011) operating at a micro- level through teachers’ tacit judgments about 
students may result in lower recorded levels of achievement for Black pupils and over-
allocation to low- ability tiers (Philips, 2011). In relation to gender, the inclusion of 
courses such as beauty therapy in schools as an ‘enrichment’ or assessed curriculum 
option is, like other vocational provision, justified as a way of engaging ‘disaffected’ 
students (West & Steedman, 2003),  but is also powerfully informed by naturalizing 
assumptions about the interests and abilities of working class girls. The increasingly 
ubiquitous ‘school prom’ also provides an example of how gendered symbolic violence 
is embedded in school cultures.  Since the mid 2000s, this “iconic event in American 
culture” (Best, 2005: 195) has become a ‘tradition’ in many UK schools to mark the end 
of compulsory education and, more recently, ‘graduation’ from primary schools, and is 
sometimes supported by organizing committees of teachers, parents and students in 
conjunction with a highly commercialized industry which has grown up to service it 
(McVeigh, 2012). Limousine hire, prom fashion, salon hair and beauty  treatments and 
pre-prom exercise regimes or ‘girls’ shape-up plans’ (proms-uk, 2012)  are all promoted 
to young women through UK based websites which provide a marketplace for 
businesses to advertize to young people (Myschoolproms.co.uk).  Best suggests that 
the prom is a key example of the role schools play in drawing “young women and men 
into [the] discursive relations… of heterosexual dominance and the reproduction of 
gender identities and inequalities” (Best, 2005: 195). In addition, the normalization of 
such practices through discourses of heterosexual ‘romance’ mean that its connections 
with other daily forms of violence including  heterosexualized competition and bullying 
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between girls (Ringrose, 2008; Currie et al, 2007), the sexual harassment of girls and 
women in and outside of educational institutions  (Gadin, 2012; Shute et al, 2008), and 
the structural and economic violence involved in women’s lack of access to male 
dominated careers and equal pay, are rendered largely invisible.  
 
There is very little research pointing directly to violence in the context of further 
education.  However, the operation of symbolic, structural, and direct interpersonal 
forms of violence is likely to be as relevant in this context. For instance, the 
maintenance of the academic/vocational divide in FE colleges, discussed in chapter 
two, is bound up with educational filtering processes legitimized through discourses of 
merit, individual preference or inclination which obscure its classed nature and the 
symbolic and structural violence involved in shaping students’ sense of limits and thus 
their ‘choices’ to follow one or other route. Equally, the gender segregated nature of 
vocational courses is maintained through the gendering of their cultures within and 
outside of colleges. For girls, the threat of sexual or sexualized harassment (Eardley & 
Manvell, 2006) may prevent them from entering the “scarey….non-girl territory” 
(Bloomer et al, 2002) of mechanics, building construction and welding courses. 
However even in the absence of any conscious fear of direct violence a gendered sense 
of limits may lead them to exclude themselves from areas in which they are anyway 
excluded (Bourdieu, 2010). 
 
As discussed in chapter two, the discourses of skills, professionalism and learning 
styles in further education are implicated in concealing the gendered and classed 
disadvantages of students on vocational courses.  As such, they too can be seen as 
forms of symbolic violence even as they are discursively bound up with promoting the 









Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence is an invaluable tool for illuminating how 
domination and coercion can disguise themselves as nature and necessity by producing 
subjects/agents as effects of power. In this sense, symbolic violence is no less harmful 
than direct forms of violence, and arguably more insidious and damaging because of its 
relative invisibility. In challenging the dichotomies that pose voluntarism against 
determinism, it allows us to conceive of violence as embedded in seemingly disparate 
practices such as prostitution, beauty and education.  Whilst materialist feminists have 
long disputed the idea that direct violence is an abnormal expression of power, the 
notion of symbolic violence broadens this understanding to show how interpersonal and 
structural violence is legitimized by the symbolic ordering of power relations as a form of 
violence in itself.  Importantly, Bourdieu’s theories point to the way in which the violence 
of symbolic power operates in the context of other forms of violence.  Gendered, 
classed and racialized symbolic violence can compliment, reinforce, and reproduce 
direct interpersonal, institutional, and structural and economic forms of violence. 
Conversely, these forms of violence can “reverberate into the symbolic violence of self 
blame and shame” (Bourgois, 2002:233) or other expressions of internalized inequality.  
On this view, if symbolic violence is part of a continuum of violence, then arguably 
everyday beauty practices should be included on a continuum of violence against 
women.  However, because it is difficult to extricate the notion of continuum from the 
idea of greater or lesser harm, it may not be the best metaphor for thinking about 
symbolic violence in relation to violence in general.  With this in mind, the notion of 
‘network’ may be of more use in stressing interconnections whilst avoiding the 
implication that some forms of violence are necessarily more harmful than others.  This 
is a powerful idea and one that has been incorporated into even the most radical 
conceptions of the harms inflicted by beauty culture.  However, the idea that beauty 
practices can be thought of as concrete manifestations of multiple forms of violence 
inscribed on women’s bodies and embedded in subjectivity provides a possible way 




One of the most pressing problems with Bourdieu’s theories is the way in which they 
appear to close down the possibility of conscious awareness of and resistance to 
domination.  Some of the empirical and theoretical work discussed in this chapter 
suggests that the power of symbolic violence is not absolute and that people can think 
and act in ways that disrupt the exercise of power and even, in some circumstances, 
reveal symbolic violence for what it is. Materialist feminist analyses point the way to 
thinking about the conditions under which domination can be questioned and resisted.   
 
The issues raised in the chapter provide a springboard for thinking about how symbolic 
and other forms of violence may be implicated in the ‘choices’ and trajectories of beauty 
therapy students, and in the pedagogies and practices of their courses. It also suggests 
ways of understanding their conformity with or resistance to the discourses and 
practices which shape their experiences of being young women and beauty therapy 




















 Methodology and Methods: Researching  
Beauty Therapy Courses  
Introduction 
 
In this chapter I outline the aims of the project and set out and discuss how the research 
questions have arisen from the three main bodies of literature informing my work:  
firstly, research and theory which has illuminated the significance of beauty practices in 
relation to  gendered inequality, subjectivity and agency (see chapters three and four); 
secondly, research into the learning cultures of vocational education and training and 
the production of gendered and classed vocational identities (see chapter two); and 
thirdly, theoretical and empirical work on the operation and interconnectedness of 
different expressions of violence in social life at macro and micro-levels (see chapter 
five). 
 
I also discuss how the research is positioned in relation to feminist political and 
epistemological concerns with the status of experience and knowledge, and how the 
processes and decisions involved in sampling, data collection, analysis and 
interpretation were shaped by these concerns.  Throughout the chapter I reflect on the 
research process in order to emphasize my role in the production of knowledge, which 
is inevitably fallible and partial, and my efforts to produce credible and valid feminist 






Aims of the research 
 
The project has three interrelated aims. Firstly, to investigate the complex matrix of 
social, cultural and dispositional factors influencing young women’s decisions to enroll 
on beauty therapy courses in further education colleges.  Secondly, it seeks to 
understand how young women’s gendered and classed dispositions are reinforced, 
modified or changed by their experiences on these courses. Thirdly, it is concerned with 
how the processes involved in shaping beauty therapy students’ trajectories might be 
embedded in different forms of violence connected to beauty practices, interpersonal 
relationships, and social and economic injustice. The research therefore aims to 
investigate how symbolic violence as a hidden form of domination works in interaction 
with other forms of violence in and outside the classroom/ training salon to reproduce 
gendered and classed identities and inequalities.   The following research questions 
were designed as springboards for exploring these issues. 
The research questions and rationale 
 
Question 1 
How do young women account for their decision to enrol on beauty therapy courses? 
How and to what extent are their decisions to study beauty therapy in two further 
education colleges associated with gendering, (hetero)sexualizing and classed 
processes operating in different social and cultural fields e.g. social networks, schooling, 
employment,  and what kind of predispositions do these processes give rise to? 
 
Research Question 1 is designed as a springboard for exploring how students’ 
decisions to enrol on  therapy courses have been influenced by structural constraints 
related to gender and class and by subjective dispositions shaped by their experiences 
of these conditions.  Students’ interview accounts of why they ‘chose’ beauty therapy 
over other possible options, their perceptions of themselves as young women, learners 
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and future workers, their previous experience of education, and their family and 
friendship networks were a key source of data for addressing this question.  Data from 
focus groups conducted at the beginning of the academic year were also useful in 
addressing students’ perceptions of beauty practices and why beauty therapy courses 
are popular with young women.  Tutor interview schedules were also designed to yield 
information about their views on why young women are attracted to beauty therapy and 
their perceptions of who these young women are.   
 
As discussed in chapter two, there is large body of literature from competing 
perspectives on educational decision-making, with more recent Bourdieusian and 
feminist approaches focusing on the interplay between structural, cultural and 
dispositional factors in shaping educational ‘choices’, ‘learning identities’ and 
trajectories. This literature tends towards the view that whilst the idealized rational, 
strategic and reflexive ‘chooser’ is a fictional notion, it is also a subject position most 
likely to be approximated by young people from middle class backgrounds. However, 
some research indicates that the extremely powerful discourse of individual choice is 
also mobilized in the narratives of young people who have less access to the cultural, 
economic and social capital necessary to construct the kinds of future oriented ‘choice 
biographies’ associated with more privileged young people.  Research question 1, 
therefore, is designed to open up an exploration of the discourses drawn on by the 
beauty therapy students to account for their decisions to enrol on their courses and how 
far these reflect different notions of rationality, reflexivity or external constraints.  If 
students do see themselves as having ‘freely chosen’ their courses, this research 
question allows for a consideration of how far this is also due to their own gendered 
dispositions towards appearance practices and the assumption, discussed in chapter 
three,  that these are voluntarily engaged in or reflect natural feminine inclinations.  
 
There is a great deal of research on why young people tend to follow gender-typical 
academic and vocational pathways.  Bourdieusian feminist work,  for instance that of 
Colley (2003;2006) and Skeggs (1997), is concerned with how gendered and classed 
identifications or predispositions help to guide young working class women to low paid, 
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low status training and jobs in the care sector in which emotional labour relies on and 
reproduces a femininity constructed around ‘the caring self’.   However, the growth in 
commercialized personal service work and the increasing aestheticization of labour and 
social life, as discussed in chapter three, are arguably producing feminine subjectivities 
organized more emphatically around the possession of a heterosexually attractive body 
(Gill, 2009). This raises the question of how far the predispositions which shape girls 
vocational ‘choices’ are being constructed in relation to contemporary gendered 
incitements towards the ‘care of the self’ as much as, or more than, the incitement to 
care for others. Beauty therapy training, which has received little or no attention in the 
literature on vocational education and training, is an ideal context in which to investigate 
this question since  beauty work is premised on the production of femininity through 
aesthetic labour (on workers own bodies and the bodies of others) as well as emotional 
labour (Black, 2004).  Assuming that the types of training young people gravitate 
towards are already ‘choosable identities’ long before formal selection and filtering 
processes for specific vocational courses occur (Colley et al, 2003), research question 1 
is designed to address the types of predispositions which may have been involved in 
guiding students towards their beauty therapy courses.   
 
Research Question 2 
To what extent do the curriculum, pedagogy and culture of beauty therapy courses in 
the two FE colleges produce specific forms of gendered, (hetero)sexualized and 
classed subjectivities and vocational identities? To what extent are beauty therapy 
students able to resist or negotiate the identities promoted by the courses? 
 
As chapter three demonstrates, research focused on the beauty industry suggests that 
beauty workers may be more immersed in ‘beauty culture’ than most other women 
(Gimlin, 2001) but construct their vocational identities largely in terms of emotional 
labour (Ibid, 2001, Black 2004). Drawing on the research into learning identities and 
habitus change, discussed in chapter two, research question 1 allows for an exploration 
of the extent to which beauty therapy courses may help to produce an intensified 
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attachment to beauty practices as well as a vocational orientation towards the ‘care of 
others’.  Research emphasizing the  potential of vocational learning cultures to 
challenge as well as reproduce gender and class stereotypes (Bloomer at al 2002) 
raises issues about the kinds of transformations which may take place on beauty 
therapy courses given the embeddedness of beauty therapy in femininity and its 
association with producing classed and racialized identities, as discussed in chapter 
three.  Research Question 2 is designed to explore the extent to which beauty therapy 
courses open up or close down the possibility of critical reflection and the extent to 
which students are able to resist the dominant discourses and dispositions promoted on 
the courses. It also opens up an exploration of critical insight and resistance as 
dependent on a sense of dissonance between habitus and situation, as proposed by 
Bourdieu’s field theory (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; McCall,1992; Chambers, 2005).  
In this sense, exploring the question of resistance involves attending to how students 
experience a sense of fit or dissonance between how they see themselves and the 
dominant habitus of their courses.  
 
For this research question, interviews with tutors elicited data on their perceptions of the 
dispositions, skills, and knowledge required for ‘success’ on a beauty therapy course, 
the kinds of subject positions which tutors make available to students, and the 
gendered, classed and racialized meanings that adhere in them. They also yielded data 
on the disciplinary practices through which dispositions to beauty work are produced.  
Interviews with students at the beginning and towards the end of the academic year 
used schedules designed to  elicit accounts of their experiences on, and feelings about, 
their courses, and how they felt the course had changed (or not) their view of 
themselves and others.  Focus group interviews were also useful in raising issues of 
importance to students in relation to their courses which I then pursued in interviews. 
Another key source of data were observations conducted during classroom and salon 
training sessions. Through these, I was able to gather information about how 
dispositions were discursively produced in interactions between staff and students, and 




Research Question 3 
To what extent can symbolic violence in and outside the classroom be said to operate in 
shaping the experiences and gendered and classed identities of beauty therapy 
students? How does this form of violence relate to other forms and expressions violence 
experienced by students (e.g. appearance related bullying, social/economic inequality). 
 
As discussed in chapter three, materialist feminist accounts have understood beauty 
practices as produced by and producing heterogendered power relations and as 
causing social, psychological and physical harms.  However, the issue of violence is 
often consigned to the margins of analysis.  When it is directly addressed it is often in 
relation to the objectification of women as a precondition of physical/sexual violence. 
Even attempts to broaden the definition of violence to include ‘self-inflicted’ harm have 
struggled to move beyond the idea that beauty practices and ideologies are only ‘really’ 
violent when they can be seen as involving a direct physical assault on the body, as in 
the case of cosmetic surgery (Jackman, 2002; Jeffreys, 2005). However, Bourdieu’s 
notion of symbolic violence as “as internalized humiliations and legitimations of 
inequality and hierarchy” (Bourgois, 2001:3)  allows us to consider all feminine 
appearance practices as  implicated in the playing out of power relations on women’s 
bodies and in the production of subjects who embody their objectification.  The link 
between beauty culture and symbolic violence has been acknowledged by Black (2004). 
However, she does not extend this into analysis of how beauty practices might be 
implicated in broader questions about gendered violence.   
 
Beauty therapy courses are arguably an ideal site to investigate the symbolic violence 
“inflicted on women by virtue of their sexed identity” (Lovell, 2004: 51).  Research 
question 3 provides the basis for an exploration of how symbolic violence operates 
through students’ engagement in appearance practices prior to and on their courses 
and how this might produce gendered and hetero(sexualized) identities and vocational 
dispositions.  However, beauty practices are always connected to other dimensions of 
inequality. Hence this research question encompasses an exploration of how symbolic 
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violence operates through the discourses of beauty mobilized by students and their 
tutors to produce particular classed and racialized subjectivities.  
 
If “violence insinuates itself into virtually every sphere of social life” (Colaguori, 2010: 
391) we need to pay attention to how symbolic violence operates in a range of different 
contexts.  Research question 3, therefore, directs attention to how symbolic violence 
might be implicated in students’ prior experiences of schooling, their sense of 
themselves as learners, their post-16 choices and their learning experiences on beauty 
therapy courses. Beyond this,  the empirical and theoretical work discussed in chapter 
five, from across the disciplines of education (Herr & Anderson,2003) social psychology 
(James et al, 2003), anthropology  (Bourgois, 2001) and gender violence studies (Coy, 
2011),  suggests that in order to understand how violence works to maintain domination, 
we need to investigate the connections between its different manifestations: symbolic, 
structural, economic, direct physical and psychological violence, and intrapersonal 
violence.  Research question 3 provides a basis for exploring how gendered and 
classed symbolic violence might work in a dynamic relationship with the violence of 
structural and economic inequality, as well as forms of direct violence, for instance 
school-based bullying, to shape students’  trajectories and identities.  
 
However, this research question throws up a number of epistemological and ontological 
questions.  Whilst it is possible to ask people about economic constraints on their lives, 
their experiences of school bullying, or how they feel about the self or other-inflicted 
pain involved in some beauty practices, it is not possible to ask direct questions about 
symbolic violence.  By its nature, symbolic violence is effective because it is hidden, 
buried in subjectivity and discourse, and premised on the voluntary submission of its 
victims.   It is a “speculation on consciousness” and therefore “it often escapes the 
quantifiable realm of the empirical” (Colagouri, 2010: 369). However, qualitative 
methods allow for the investigation of processes which cannot be easily operationalized 
or quantified in ways demanded by positivist epistemologies.  In addition, there is a 
sense in which the problems of researching symbolic violence are similar to those 
involved in any investigation of how power relations are reproduced at a micro-level.  A 
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critical realist ontology/epistemology maintains that the existence and nature of 
objective social structures can only be known through the consciousness of individuals 
who, to varying degrees, may be unaware of the power relations through which they are 
constructed.  Bourdieu’s theory of practice has an affinity with this view.  In his terms, 
reflexive sociology involves an account of the limits of awareness (mis-recognition and 
non-recognition) involved in lived experience (Calhoun, 1999). The role of the reflexive 
social researcher is to unmask the operation of symbolic violence hidden behind 
commonsense discourses and understandings of the world, a view that resonates with 
the commitment to critical reflexivity in feminist methodologies. However, this raises 
questions about how researchers, also subject to the unconscious workings of habitus, 
can know symbolic violence for what it is and make it visible.  Bourdieu’s method is 
based on the necessity of making a break with familiar and taken for granted 
conceptions of the world (Jenkins, 1992). Just as the possibility of a critical 
consciousness may be occasioned by the experience of dissonance between 
dispositions and dominant habitus within a field (McCall, 1992), some writers following 
Bourdieu have suggested that symbolic violence becomes visible when “tiny cracks 
appear in the legitimacy of institutional authority” (Herr & Anderson, 2003: 422). Herr & 
Anderson argue that examining critical incidents- “surprises”, “problematic situations” 
(Schon, 1983 cited in Ibid: 422) or “highly charged moments” (Tripp, 1993, cited in ibid: 
422) can reveal the normative assumptions at work in a situation and thus provide a 
way of “studying the invisibility of the phenomenon and interrupting its redefinition as a 
non-issue” (Herr & Anderson, 2003:422).  I would argue that what characterizes critical 
incidents is contradiction and paradox. Though I did not set out to undertake a critical 
incident study, during the process of interpretation I became aware that the situations 
and narratives in which symbolic violence seemed most apparent were ones that 
highlighted contradictions- between the perspectives of participants (most notably 
between students and tutors) and within their accounts.  Participants were sometimes 
aware of these contradictions and other times they were not.  For instance, in chapter 
eight and nine I discuss the way in which tutors position themselves as caring for the 
welfare and longer term interests of their students at the same time as mobilizing 
gendered and classed discourses which consign most of them to an inevitable future of 
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low- paid, part-time work, marriage and motherhood.  In this example, the discourse of 
care may act as symbolic violence obscuring, even from tutors themselves, the 
reproduction of inequality, and legitimizing economic and structural violence.  
Contradiction, paradox and violence are themes that weave through my interpretation of 
all the data from interviews, focus groups and observations.  
 
The methodological/epistemological framework 
 
Positioning myself as a researcher in the “contested and shifting locations [of feminism] 
that lie between the unacceptable rock of extreme positivism and the unacceptable hard 
place of extreme relativism” (Ramazanoglu & Holland, 1999) was not an easy task.  On 
the one hand, my study seeks to excavate the ‘realities’ underneath experience and to 
make visible the structural relations of oppression obscured by dominant ideologies and 
the workings of symbolic violence.  However, this raises a number of important 
questions at the heart of feminist debates about the production of knowledge and about 
the status of experience in producing valid and useful feminist research. 
 
One defining characteristic of feminist approaches to research is the importance placed 
on the legitimacy of women’s self-understandings and on ‘giving voice’ to those who 
have been traditionally marginalized in the process of knowledge production (Skinner et 
al, 2005:12; Maynard and Purvis, 1995:23).  This position is one that has influenced my 
research, partly because participants’ experiences and the self-understandings that 
grow out of these are what moves them to acquiesce with or resist dominant power 
relations (Ramazanoglu & Holland, 1999).  However, Gorelick (1991) points out that 
whilst this view represents a significant moment in the feminist critique of positivistic 
science, subjectivist research using purely inductive methods is unable to move beyond 
descriptive accounts of experience to an understanding of the social relations beneath 
or constitutive of that experience and thus to the production of feminist knowledge as a 
basis for social transformation.  This points to a major contradiction in feminist 




If social relations occur ‘behind the backs of the actors’, how can the 
researcher know them, unless she claims a source of knowledge and 
understanding beyond that of her respondents? If she makes that claim, doesn’t 
she run the risk of elitism? But if she does not attempt to uncover social relations 
and structures of oppression that may be hidden from her respondents’ view, is 
she not limiting her contribution to them and to  feminist science and political 
practice?”(Ibid, 1991: 466). 
 
This dilemma is evident in some of the research on women’s use of beauty practices. 
For instance, in her ethnographic work on women’s decisions to have cosmetic surgery, 
Davis acknowledges that the emphasis on “the particularities of individual women’s 
experiences…“runs the risk of suspending attention from the systemic or structured 
patterns of women’s involvement in the cultural beauty system” (Davis, 1995:180).  As 
Black (2004) argues, ethnographic approaches, including those that have set out to 
“bridge the gap” between empirical and theoretical interpretations, as is the case with 
Davis’s work, are vulnerable to allowing “natural empathy…[to]…negate a critical 
understanding of the practices involved” (Ibid:186). 
 
The status of experience and the question of how and what we can know has been 
problematized by post-stucturalist and post-modernist theorists for whom the issue is 
not simply about whose interpretations of experience should be privileged but whether 
experience is a valid basis for producing knowledge in the first place.  The argument 
rests on a number of assumptions. Firstly, that experience is never transparent and is 
always mediated through discourse. In this sense, there is no ‘real’ world hidden behind 
experience and waiting to be uncovered.  Secondly, individuals are constituted as social 
subjects through historically variable and unstable discourses. Because of this, there 
can be no fixed or authentic essence to subjectivity that would allow us to treat women 
(or, any other subjects) and their experience as the basis for critical enquiry and social 
transformation.  From this view, social researchers should be asking not how subjects 
come to understand and collude with or transform oppressive conditions but rather how 
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social subjects are constructed through discourses and “how power is exercised, how 
conformity works, how we come to be the sort of …. selves we are” (Holland et al, 
1998:21).  
 
Ramazanoglu and Holland have argued that ignoring these critiques  “can undermine 
the validity of knowledge produced within feminist assumptions” (Ramazanoglu & 
Holland 1999: 382).  In refusing to engage with these insights we risk “claiming some 
epistemological privilege which gives feminism special access to experience as data” 
(Ibid, 1999:381).  However, they are clear that abandoning the ‘knowing feminist 
subject’ has serious political implications for feminism. Whilst subjectivity may be 
produced through discourse,  it is also rooted in experience which is social, economic 
and embodied.  As such, the material factors manifested through experience must be 
part of an analysis of the operation and consequences of gendered social practices. We 
need to know how institutionalized power relations “actually impinge on people’s lives”  
and this necessitates treating “experience as a source of knowledge” (Ibid, 1999: 382).  
Whilst we may reject the idea that any absolute truth about the world exists outside of 
how we construct it through language, the construction itself relates to “something that 
matters” (Ibid, 1999:388); material circumstance,  barriers to education or employment, 
institutionalized gender power relations. 
 
In light of these arguments, I am claiming a methodological position which is rooted in 
the political and emancipatory concerns of materialist feminism, but also draws on the 
insights of post-structuralist theory.  Firstly, I assume there are ‘real’ material factors, or 
in Bourdieu’s terms, objective social conditions, at work in shaping the experiences of 
the young women in this study. I focus particularly on the effects of gender and class in 
mediating their access to post-16 education, their future access to the labour market 
and the significance of beauty practices in their lives.   Where my data allow, I also 
consider how racialization operates in these processes.  This is not the foundationalist 
position of positivism in which truth is assumed to exist independently of ‘knowers’. 
Rather, I draw on Guba and Lincoln’s understanding of critical theory in which the 
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foundations of truth and knowledge are located “in the specific historical, 
economic….and social infrastructures of oppression” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005:204). 
 
Secondly, I assume that experience provides a way of accessing and understanding the 
operation of power whilst holding that it is not a ‘window on to reality’ but always already 
an interpretation expressed through language or some other means of symbolic 
representation (Ramazanoglu & Holland, 1999;386).  Making sense of experience in 
order to “work out the politics of its construction” (Scott, 1992, cited in ibid: 387) requires 
re-interpreting those interpretations and this process is always open to contestation and 
“always therefore political” (Scott, 1992, cited in ibid, 2008:54).  What this view reflects 
is an attempt to bring together post-structural epistemologies with feminist standpoint 
theory. The latter is useful here because of its claim that all knowledge is socially 
situated and partial. In a research context, this is the case for both the subject of 
knowledge (the researcher and her epistemic community) and the object (the 
researched and the social conditions of her life). On this view, the validity of knowledge 
relies not on empiricist standards of impartiality or neutrality- the ‘view from nowhere’- 
but on the conditions of its production being subjected to interrogation so that it 
becomes an object of research as much as the ‘substantive’ issues being investigated. 
The central importance given to reflexivity in feminist and other epistemological 
approaches requires researchers/authors to:    
 
…position themselves in relation to their objects of study so that one may 
assess researchers’ knowledge claims in terms of situated aspects of their social 
selves and reveal their (often hidden) doxic values and assumptions (Maton, 
2003: 54) 
 
In this way, subjects and objects of knowledge are effectively “placed on the same 
critical plane” (Harding, 1993:69). The aim of minimizing inequality in knowledge 
production and, by implication, the objectification of participants, is ideally promoted by 
the use of methods which bring participants into the research process in a direct and 
collaborative way. However, whilst Harding and others maintain that “starting off  
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research from women’s lives will generate less partial and distorted accounts…..of the 
whole social order.”  (Ibid: 1993:56), the production of critical, emancipatory knowledge  
relies on the interpretation of experience by a situated knower with a critical and 
theoretically informed awareness of the power structures shaping those lives. Without 
this, research collapses into relativism (Ibid:1993).  If the job of the feminist researcher 
is to “disclose for women how their…everyday world is organized…by social processes 
which are not knowable through ordinary means” (Smith, 1987:6), avoiding 
objectification altogether becomes an impossibility.  
 
I have tried to ensure that the participants’ interpretations of their experiences  are 
represented by placing their ‘voices’  at centre stage whilst trying to make my own 
position/s as clear as possible,  and the differences between their interpretations and 
mine as explicit as possible.  What the participants contributed is, of course, 
foundational to this study.  They contributed with their time, their stories and their 
insights, and by allowing me in to their classrooms. I am not the same ‘situated knower’ 
as when I started the research because of their accounts.  My understanding is now 
more nuanced and more attuned to the interplay of different social forces in women’s 
lives and in the production of subjectivity.  However, the study is not meant to be an 
exercise in ‘individualistic reflexivity’ (Maton, 2003). These changes are important 
because they have helped to produce what I hope is valid and potentially useful 
research.   Nevertheless, it was my decisions which ultimately determined every stage 
of the process from inception to research design to interpretation and representation. 
Even though participants’ voices are audible, I decided what parts of their accounts 
should be included and the analytical frameworks in which they should be understood 
(see Skeggs, 1997:29).  This exercise of power was in turn shaped by my 
institutionalized position in an academic context. Whilst the research was motivated by 
my politics and commitment to feminism it was also motivated by my interests in 
attaining a PhD.  This was dramatized by my sense of urgency or irritation when 
students did not turn up for interviews or when rooms booked for these were 
commandeered by staff for other purposes. In such cases, it was often an effort to ‘step 
back’, consider other options (Corcoran, 2005: 133) and to see these events as part of 
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the ethnographic process.  I had to acknowledge that my investment in the research 




My strategy for undertaking this project is a collective case study (Punch, 1998; 
Cresswell, 1998) of accredited beauty therapy courses in two further education 
colleges, one in a semi-rural area and one in an urban area in the south west of 
England.  There were three main reasons for selecting two colleges rather than focusing 
on one site. Firstly, having worked in further education colleges for a number of years, I 
was aware of how difficult it is for over-stretched tutors to find the time to engage with 
projects outside their teaching roles. The constantly changing demands made of FE 
teachers mean that whilst they may be open to supporting a research project on their 
curriculum area, it will inevitably be placed fairly low down on their list of priorities. My 
rationale was that if one college withdrew from the study or was unable to facilitate my 
access to participants because of these pressures I could continue my fieldwork in the 
other.   It also seemed appropriate to use multiple sites as a way of gaining a broader 
insight into beauty therapy training. Given the time limitations on the study, it was not 
feasible to select more than two colleges and these were chosen for the similarity in 
their beauty programmes (both ran NVQ courses).  At the time, I imagined that a further 
benefit of this approach, and one more in line with the usual reason for collective case 
studies, would be to make comparisons between sites.  For this reason the opportunity 
to study one college in a semi-rural area of South West England, and one in an urban 
area, seemed to provide a sound basis for analyzing my findings in terms of the 
different locations and demographics of the colleges.  In practice, I have not focused on 
these issues although this would no doubt have thrown up interesting and important 
information about how young women’s post-16 choices and future expectations are 
produced, particularly in light of work that points to the importance of location in shaping 
learning and vocational identities (Ball, 2000).  Though its omission can be seen as 
weakness of the study, I chose to focus on the sites as one instrumental case study 
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(Stake, 1994 cited in Punch, 1998) in the sense that I wanted to accomplish more than 
just an understanding of a particular case, and to use beauty therapy courses as an 
ideal site for investigating broader issues.  It seemed appropriate, then, to use multiple 
sites as a way for exploring the significance of beauty practices and other gendered and 
classed process in shaping the identities and trajectories of young women.  Whilst 
generalizability is not the aim of qualitative research (Fielding 1993),  investigating NVQ 
beauty therapy courses across two sites has possibly strengthened my claims to some 
level of analytical, as opposed to statistical, generalization (Yin, 1999).  
 
The research involved a longitudinal and ethnographic approach to investigating the 
perspectives and experiences of students and teaching staff in both colleges over one 
academic year from September 2009 to July 2010.  I chose a longitudinal approach in 
order to investigate how students’ subjectivities and their perceptions might change over 
the year and might be shaped by their experiences on the course (as well as by their 
experience of other social fields including families, friendship networks and prior 
education).  Having undertaken pilot research for my Masters dissertation, I was aware 
that studying beauty courses over a short period and collecting data through a small 
number of focus groups limited the type and quality of data obtainable and was 
therefore not an adequate approach to addressing complex questions about 
subjectivity, agency, consent and resistance.  I needed an approach that would allow 
me to investigate the relationship between structural inequalities and social/cultural 
practice (i.e. between gender, class and beauty practices within the context of formal 
vocational training). I needed, therefore, to ‘get close’ to the ways in which young 
women experienced social structure, the cultural practices and discourses of beauty 
and the institutionalization of these in further education.  My reading of Skeggs (1997), 
and later of Willis (1977), together with encouragement from my supervisors, suggested 
that my research should take the form of an ethnography. Willis defines this form of 
research as being concerned with how: 
 
the cultural viewpoint of the oppressed, their ‘hidden knowledges’ and 
resistances as well as the basis on which their entrapping ‘decisions’ are taken in 
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some sense of liberty, but which nevertheless help to produce structure (Willis, 
1981:201). 
 
There are, however, some important senses in which my research could be seen as 
less ethnographical than the studies that inspired my approach.  Skeggs suggests that 
ethnography, at least in its modernist form as understood by Marcus (1992,cited in 
Skeggs,1997), is defined by its intensity, longevity and its access to multiple aspects of 
respondents’ lives, researched through a range of different methods (one of the most 
important being participant observation).  Her own research with care students was 
conducted over twelve years, including three years of in-the-field participant observation 
combined with other methods of data collection including interviews and informal 
meetings with college tutors, family, partners and friends. On a three year ESRC 
studentship this kind of immersion in the field was impossible.  
 
In practice my study can be best characterized as an ethnography using a ‘selective, 
intermittent time mode’ (Jeffrey & Troman, 2004). I took a flexible and opportunistic 
approach to site visits, doing interviews, focus groups and observations around student 
and staff timetables or whether individual tutors felt it ‘appropriate’ for me to sit in on 
particular teaching sessions or activities.  However, although on any one occasion I 
might visit a college on for an agreed purpose (e.g. to undertake interviews or observe a 
practical session) I also used the opportunity to ‘hang around’ afterwards (always on the 
basis of agreement with staff). This often meant that I could talk to students and tutors 
informally, and sometimes people outside the core research group including learning 
support staff who worked with ‘less able’ students during teaching sessions.  I found 
that staff were often interested in the research and were keen to suggest avenues of 
enquiry. These conversations sometimes resulted in invitations to sit in on teaching 
sessions and other activities, for instance open days and taster sessions.  Many of the 
research activities were therefore opportunistic.  In these conversations, tutors were 
often very open about institutional issues and how these affected their teaching and 
their ability to make autonomous decisions, for instance about the recruitment and 
selection process. They also talked to me about students- ‘good’ ones and ‘difficult’ 
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ones,  and about the problems of ‘getting them through’ their courses and meeting their 
retention and achievement ‘benchmarks’ as they were required, at all costs, to do. This 
provided some useful background information which I was sometimes able to pursue 
further in interviews.  
 
My research involved two main groups of participants; the beauty students themselves 
and a number of tutors/course managers. Initially, I had imagined it might be possible to 
draw other significant actors into the research, particularly people from the students’ 
own social and family networks. However, given my time and workload constraints, this 
was never really feasible. Hence my understanding of students’ lives outside college is 
drawn solely from my interpretations of their own accounts.   Perhaps more feasibly, I 
had hoped to gain access to the students outside of college, for instance, through 
informal meetings in social settings. However, this also proved too problematic to 
pursue as a strategy. The vast majority of the students who agreed to be interviewed 
were happy to do so as long as these took place in college time. For some, paid work, 
family commitments or social life were a barrier to any participation beyond mid- 
afternoon on college days.  However, as with tutors I was able to meet and talk with 
students informally (see my comments on informal meetings below) 
 
My own participation in the day-to-day college activities of the students was more 
limited than I would have wanted from a methodological perspective.  A few colleagues 
were curious about why I was not intending to participate in the salon teaching sessions 
by volunteering as a ‘client’.  The idea that this would have allowed me to get closer to 
the everyday practices on the course and to gain a better understanding of their 
meaning in students’ lives, is founded on sound methodological reasoning and the 
central tenets of ethnographic participant observation (Van Maanen, 1988).  However, 
the assumption that it should be easy or even enjoyable for me as a woman to engage 
in facials, make-up or eyebrow shaping  naturalizes the connection between women 
and beauty practices and ignores the political importance for many lesbian, and indeed 
heterosexual, feminists of refusing  to produce a normative feminine appearance.  This 
raises a number of methodological and ethical issues. Firstly, it highlights the 
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impossibility of keeping oneself as a researcher out of the research, contrary to the 
claims of researcher neutrality central to positivist science (Harding, 1993).  This 
decision, along with very many others, was informed by my own social and political 
position.   My refusal to engage directly with students in the activities at the centre of 
this research could be read as positioning myself as an aloof observer imposing an 
objectifying gaze on research subjects who ‘know no better’.  This kind of dilemma is 
addressed in Kelly et al who raise:  
 
the troubling issue of what we do when our understandings and 
interpretations of women’s accounts [and practices] would either not be shared 
by some of them, and/or represent a form of challenge or threat to their 
perceptions, choices and coping strategies” (Kelly et al, 1994:37). 
 
The problematic nature of ‘empathy’, which is sometimes understood to arise from a 
shared gender position between researcher and researched, is evident in some of the 
research on women’s use of beauty practices. For instance, in Davis’ ethnographic 
study of cosmetic surgery, she acknowledges that the emphasis on “the particularities of 
individual women’s experiences….. “runs the risk of suspending attention from the 
systemic or structured patterns of women’s involvement in the cultural beauty system” 
(Davis, 1995:180).  As Black (2004) argues, such approaches are vulnerable to allowing 
“natural empathy…[to]..negate a critical understanding of the practices involved” 
(Ibid:186). 
 
Whilst I cannot claim that acting as a ‘client’ during salon teaching sessions would 
necessarily have stopped me from thinking critically, non-engagement may sometimes 
be a useful strategy in maintaining a critical distance from the social practices being 
researched.  Being a feminist lesbian who does not engage in feminine appearance 
practices in the same way as participants did not mean that it was easy to think outside 
normative conceptions of these practices.  For instance, it was only after observing the 
activities in training salons for six or seven months that I began to realize the 
significance of the repetitive scrutiny, maintenance and presentation of particular parts 
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of the body in producing or reproducing subjects who objectify themselves and other 
women and (often) experience this as pleasurable and ‘empowering’.  This had not 
been obvious to me in spite of my critical stance because it is a normalized part of 
contemporary femininity and because few of us, lesbian or straight, escape the 
imperative of bodily self-surveillance (Chapkis, 1986).  
 
One of the strengths of being an outsider in the field , as standpoint theories assert,  is 
that the sense of dissonance generated by a marginalized position may offer a 
particular epistemic privilege,  “a certain critical insight”  (McNay, 2000:53, Bourdieu, 
2001, Skeggs, 1997), as I discuss in chapter five.  However, my lack of cultural capital 
in the field of beauty practices contrasted sharply with other differences between myself 
and the participants. The power dynamics in this relationship were particularly 
emphasized in the case of students as young, mostly working class women (McCarry, 
2005).  They were differences informed by my privilege and power as a middle class 
researcher connected to an elite institution.  
 
The research groups 
 
The students: 
Though the NVQ Beauty Therapy programmes in both colleges comprised of courses at 
Levels 1, 2 and 3, only level 1 and 2 students took part in the research. Because I 
wanted to explore how the courses shaped student’s identities over time it made sense 
to select those in the earlier stages of their programmes.  A total of 35 students between 
the ages of 16 and 20 from across both colleges (17 in college A and 18 in college B) 
participated in focus groups and/or interviews.  Fourteen of these (8 from College A, 6 
from college B) were interviewed in the first three months of their course and 13 were 
interviewed again in the last two months (one student at College A was unavailable for a 
second interview).  I refer to these 14 students as the core group because I had most 
contact with them over the year and because their accounts have provided most of the 
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data for exploring the research questions,  particularly for thinking about how students’ 
identities were shaped by their course experiences over the year.  The table below is a 
summary profile for this group. I have used the information in the last four columns as 
indicative of students’ class and ethnic backgrounds and their access to cultural and 















































Anna 1 A 16 0 GCSE*** YES Admin(M), 
Driver (F) 
White British 
Jenna 1 A 19 0GCSEs YES Care worker (M) White British 
Natalie 1 A 16 2GCSEs YES Catering (M) White British 
Louisa 1 B 16 0 GCSE NO Cafe manager (M) White British 
Alex 1 B 17 Level 2 
Diploma 
YES Admin (M) 
Electrician (F) 
White British 
Amber 1 B 16 0 GCSE YES Cleaner (M) White British 
Jaime 2 A 16 2GCSEs NO Childminder (M) White British 
^Leila 2 A 17 1 GCSE, NVQ 
L1 Beauty 
therapy 
YES Unemployed (M 
and F) 
Black British 
Tania 2 A 17 Level 2 
Diploma 
YES Unemployed (M) White British 
Abigail 2 A 20 Level 3 
Diploma 
NO Retail assistant 
(M) 
White British 
^Chelsea 2 A 17 4GCSEsNVQ 
L1 Beauty 
therapy 
YES Childminder (M) Dual heritage White 
and Black Caribbean 
^Kelly 2 B 17 0 GCSE, NVQ 
L1 Beauty 
therapy 
YES Cleaner (M) 
Plumber (F) 
White British 
Emma 2 B 17 4 A/S Levels YES Childminder (M) 
Head teacher (F) 
White British 





*Age at beginning of academic year 
** Education Maintenance Allowance was introduced in  2004/5 to encourage post-16 participation 
amongst young people from low income households.  Payments were means-tested and made directly to 
students.  It was scrapped, in the face of concerted protest from students and teachers, and activists by 
the coalition government in 2011. 
*** Attainment of GCSE defined as grade C or above.  
^These students had completed a Level 1 beauty therapy NVQ the previous year. 
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The tutors:  
Seven tutors, one of whom was also a curriculum manager, were interviewed for this 
study.  
 
Figure 2: Tutors 
Tutor College 
Carol College B 




Anne College B 
Sharon College A 
Marina College A 
Karen College A 
 
The research schedule:  
 
Figure 3: the research schedule College A 
Activity Participants 
Focus group  9 NVQ level 1 students 
Focus group 9 NVQ level 2 students  
Initial one- to-one interviews   4 NVQ level 1 students 
Initial one- to-one interviews  5 NVQ level 2 students 
One-one –interviews 3 tutors 
Follow-up interviews  3 NVQ level 1 students 
Follow-up interviews  5 NVQ level 2 students` 
End of year focus group 5 level 1 students 
Observations throughout the year in classrooms, 
training salons and ‘taster sessions’ 
Tutors, support workers, students 




Figure 4: The research schedule: College B 
Activity Participants 
Focus group   9 NVQ level 1 students 
Focus group  8 NVQ level 2 students  
Initial one- to-one interviews   3 NVQ level 1 students 
Initial one- to-one interviews  3 NVQ level 2 students 
One-one –interviews 4 tutors 
Follow-up interviews  3 NVQ level 1 students 
Follow-up interviews  3 NVQ level 2 students` 
End of year focus group 5 level 1 students 
Observations throughout the year in classrooms, 
training salons and ‘taster sessions’ 
Tutors, support workers, students 




Gathering the data through multiple methods: strategies and issues 
 
Observations 
The classroom and training salon observations were a crucial means of understanding 
the culture, pedagogies and discourses informing NVQ beauty therapy courses. Beyond 
this, they were also a way in to the world of ‘professional’ beauty practices and the 
technologies of femininity which inform it.  I began the observations at the beginning of 
the academic year as I needed to understand the setting in which students learn (or not) 
to be beauty therapists. Initially, I treated my visits to the training salons as a way of 
sensitizing myself to the symbolic and sensory dimensions of the spaces- to the décor, 
visual imagery, smells and sounds, interactions and activities which were part of it.  The 
first few visits were also, in a sense, desensitizing in that my initial feeling of otherness- 
of being an outsider in an oppressive environment - began to dissipate. No doubt this 
was an unconscious survival strategy on my part, but one that lead to a paradoxical 
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sense of dissociation and increasing familiarity.  With hindsight, this may partly explain 
my anxiety about whether I could be ‘immersed’ enough to gain any meaningful insights 
into perspectives of the ‘researched’, or ‘detached’ enough to gain any critical insight 
into their worlds. This dilemma articulates with the well documented tensions in 
ethnographic research between the idea of ‘going native’ and the impossibility of 
observing from a ‘neutral’ position (Mason,  2002). Though it is impossible to take up 
any stable and uncomplicated position on the ‘observer-participant continuum’, the 
tensions propelled me into a continuous reflexivity about the kinds of positions and 
identities I was taking up and the possible effects of this on the participants (Coffey, 
1999). For instance, although I often joined small groups of students whilst they were 
being shown how to perform an eyebrow tint or a manicure, and interacted with 
students whilst they were practicing techniques on each other, I also spent a 
considerable amount of time observing at a distance from the activity.  I was aware that 
spending too much time talking to students or staff might be felt as intrusive, but by 
positioning myself in the corner of a salon away from the activity I risked be seen as an 
equally intrusive or threatening presence.  Before I began observations two tutors were 
particularly concerned about whether I was going to be scrutinizing their performance. I 
tried to assure them that the point of the observations was to find out about students’ 
experiences on their courses and that I was not there to ‘inspect’ the quality of teaching 
and learning.  With hindsight this was perhaps an obfuscation since I did make 
judgments related to this (see my discussion about the teaching of anatomy and 
physiology in chapter ten).  Very often, tutors would approach me after the session 
when students were clearing up to find out what my impressions had been.  I interpreted 
this partly as a reflection of their perception of me, because of my connection to a 
university, as an “official representative of legitimate knowledge” (Skeggs, 1997:37), 
and one who had the power to informally validate or invalidate their expertise as 
teachers. In order to detract from this idea, I often talked about my own experience of 
the difficulties of being an FE teacher and this seemed to establish some rapport 
between us.  However, a possible downside of these conversations was that they may 
have aligned me in students’ eyes with the authority structures of the college, or 
reinforced this alignment given that the tutors were always the main gatekeepers and 
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‘key informants’ (Mason, 2002; Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995) with regard to my 
access to the field.  In this respect, it may have compromised the rapport I was then 
able to establish with students.   
 
I did not use a formal observation schedule and felt that doing so would distract 
attention from unexpected events and interactions. In this sense, my approach was 
close to the ‘unsystematic naturalistic observation’ used by Goffman (Punch, 1998:184).  
Initially, however, this led to a sense that the impressions I was forming were vague and 
arbitrary (Mason, 2002).  As time went on, I began to prepare for sessions with brief 
notes about the themes that were beginning to ‘emerge’ from the interviews and from 
previous observations. This helped to ‘sharpen’ my focus and sensitize me to the way in 
which particular discourses were being used or particular paradoxes played out.  For 
example, during salon sessions, especially when external clients were due to arrive, 
students were continually told to behave ‘professionally’, a concept that was ubiquitous 
in interview accounts, particularly those of tutors. The observations allowed me to see 
how this idea was mobilized in practice to regulate students’ behaviour and appearance 
in ways that are incongruent with dominant notions of professionalism.  I was also able 
to pick up on non-verbal elements of interaction in the salons and to make more sense 
of the embodied nature of practices, for instance the infliction of pain and its 
normalization through the quasi-rituals of leg, eyebrow and bikini waxing.  
 
In an effort to minimize intrusion I tried to keep note taking as inconspicuous as possible 
whilst recording enough information to make more detailed notes as soon as possible 
afterwards. This allowed me to concentrate more on the moment. However, where I felt 
that exchanges between participants were particularly significant I tried to record these 
verbatim.  I also recorded my interpretations. However, regardless of my efforts to 
minimize intrusion, the presence of a researcher will always affect behaviour and be 
actively interpreted by participants in some way (Mason, 2002: 92). For each 






The rationale for conducting focus groups at the beginning of the year was to get to 
know the students, for them to get to know me, and to begin exploring questions about 
their reasons for enrolling on the course, and their perceptions of their course in its early 
stages.  I also introduced the issue of gender and gendered careers by asking 
participants to respond to photographs of women engaged in various gender- typical 
and a-typical activities. The groups were useful not just in generating preliminary data, 
but also in helping me to gauge the ‘needs’ of individuals, the level at which they were 
willing or able to discuss issues and the kinds of techniques that I might use in order to 
elicit information in the interviews.  For instance, in both colleges, level 2 students 
appeared more engaged and able or willing to participate in the discussions than the 
Level 1 students. In response to this, I tailored interviews and activities in the end of 
year focus groups accordingly. 
 
Since I was interested in the shared meanings held by these young women in relation to 
beauty therapy and gender, focus groups seemed to be an appropriate method for 
maximizing interaction between them (May, T, 2001; Finch, H& Lewis, J, 2003) and  
encouraging spontaneity and disclosure (Punch, K, 1998). In addition, focus groups 
have the potential to encourage communication and critical reflection amongst 
participants in the exchange and validation of experiences (Clough, P & Nutbrown, C, 
2002) and for this reason can be particularly useful for feminists and other critical 
researchers.  
 
All focus groups were organized through tutors and took place in classrooms during 
timetabled teaching sessions so all participants were attending the same class.  For the 
initial focus groups, tutors agreed to allow one hour during which time they and any 
student who did not wish to participate left the classroom. In each case I asked for a 
maximum of ten volunteers. I explained what the research was about and what the 
focus group would entail and then distributed and explained the consent form (Appendix 
3), the ethics guiding the research, including the need for confidentiality about what was 
said in the sessions, and their right to withdraw from the group at any point.  I also 
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explained how any information I used would be anonymized. For all sessions, only two 
students left the groups at this point.  Once the forms had been signed I asked students 
to agree ground rules and these were written on a flip chart or whiteboard.  All students 
agreed to the sessions being recorded. I used a digital tape recorder for this purpose 
although my omni-directional microphone sometimes proved inadequate for picking up 
conversation on the margins of the group when participants spoke particularly quietly.  I 
chose not to use a video recorder because I would have been unable to set up the 
equipment before the session and because I felt this would have been inappropriate on 
what was effectively my first in- depth interaction with the students and could deter 
further participation.  I made notes where possible as an aide- memoire for matching 
names of participants to conversation which seemed particularly important.  However, 
when participants talked over each other, it was often not possible to identify individual 
speakers. 
 
In each focus group I used a schedule of open-ended prompt questions to introduce 
discussion (see Appendix 9.)  Following Spradley (1979, cited in May, T, 2001), I began 
with descriptive questions about their course and its content and then asked them to 
address more evaluative questions including what they liked and disliked about their 
course, why they had chosen it and what or who had influenced their choices.  Through 
the experience of conducting focus groups as part of my Masters research I was aware 
that simply asking questions would probably not stimulate interaction between all 
members of the group, particularly because of participants’ lack of familiarity with me 
and with the situation (Finch & Lewis, 2003).   I therefore used other methods in an 
effort to encourage confidence and engagement.  Firstly, I used photographs (shown as 
PowerPoint slides) of women engaged in various activities, for instance in gender 
typical and a-typical work roles and sports. Photographs or other visual imagery are 
often used in sociological and ethnological research to elicit personal narratives and to 
gain access to shared or conflicting meanings (Schwartz,1989) particularly where it may 
be otherwise difficult to engage participants’ interest in a particular issue or where direct 
conventional interview techniques alone might struggle to access people’s perceptions 
in relation to sensitive issues or complex areas such as identity or appearance (Harper, 
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2002, Frost, 2001). The emotional immediacy of photographs can allow participants to  
respond  “without hesitation [because by] providing informants with a task similar to 
viewing a family album, the strangeness of the interview situation is averted” (Shwartz, 
1989: 151-152).  Some of the photographs portrayed non-normative images of women 
(e.g. rugby teams and a women body-builder). Their often powerful and immediate 
responses to these allowed me to gain an initial insight into how participants 
constructed femininity (or at least how femininity was constructed discursively within the 
groups) and how they positioned themselves in relation to it. 
 
Secondly, I used a small group exercise in which I asked participants to work in pairs or 
groups of three to write down two reasons why, in their opinions, young women were 
attracted to beauty therapy. These responses were then written on a flip chart and used 
as a basis for a whole group discussion in which participants raised issues about 
choice, subject preferences, appearance and cultural pressures.  
 
On the whole,  these exercises proved useful in engaging most of the participants in 
discussions which uncovered both consensus and disagreement about what was and 
was not appropriate for women to do and to look like and why beauty therapy might be 
a preferred option.  Participants in the Level 2 groups were generally more reflective 
and able/willing to discuss the issues and listen to others’ opinions. The Level 1 groups, 
in comparison, were noisy and less focused. There was a clear divide between those 
who talked and those who did not. Although this could be interpreted in process terms 
as a characteristic of early stage ‘group development’ (Finch & Lewis, 2003), it may also 
have reflected the kinds of group dynamics that were already developing amongst 
students. Some feminists have argued that focus groups can mitigate the power 
relations between participants and researcher by diminishing the researcher’s influence 
on the discussion (Kitzinger, 1995). Others have suggested the same kind of potential 
for reducing power dynamics between young people in focus groups (see McCarry, 
2005). However, as McCarry argues, it is “an oversimplification to argue that a group of 




I also conducted an end of year focus groups with level 1 students in each college. The 
aims of these were to gather data on issues that I felt had not been adequately covered 
in interviews, including information on students’ perceptions of beauty practices in 
relation to the ‘sexualization’ of culture.  In these sessions I used some simple data from 
attitude surveys (Girlguiding uk, 2009, American Psychological Association, 2007) to 
elicit responses to findings that a large proportion of young women in the UK and US 
would consider cosmetic surgery or becoming a ‘glamour model’.  These groups also 
provided an additional opportunity for participants to review their courses and discuss 
their experiences over the year. 
 
The interviews- students 
First-stage interviews with students used a semi -structured schedule with open 
questions designed to cover the topics of interest to me as well as to allow, as far as 
possible, respondents to raise issues independently and therefore to maximize 
“qualitative depth” (May, 2001:124). The main topics included reasons for choosing a 
beauty therapy course, influences and experiences of school, family and friendship 
networks, perceptions of ‘beauty’ and early perceptions of the course (see appendix 6).  
They also included questions designed to elicit perceptions of disadvantage or 
advantage in their own lives.  Both first-stage and follow-up interviews lasted between 
40 minutes and one hour.  
 
Follow- up interviews towards the end of the year, also using a semi-structured 
schedule, were  individually adapted on the basis of initial interviews to draw out data on 
changes in perceptions of themselves and the course over the year (see appendix 7).  
However, a main topic of these interviews was the students’ perception of their own and 
others’ appearance.  Because this was likely to be a sensitive issue I used  photographs 
taken by the interviewees as a focus for discussion and to limit the amount of direct 
questioning from me.  ‘Auto-driven photo-elicitation’  (Frith & Harcourt, 2007) has been 
widely used in ethnography and anthropology to allow participants to capture rich and 
complex information about their lives and is founded on the idea that “ [s]ome emotions, 
155 
 
thoughts, feelings and experiences are more easily or variously expressed in a visual 
rather than verbal form” (Ibid: 1342). In addition, questions of appearance, the body and 
self-identity are ideal sites for the use of this technique (Harper, 2002). My intention, 
however,  was not to use the photographs as a forms of data in themselves but rather 
as tools for eliciting narratives about how  participants understood their own lives and 
identities.  This helped to alleviate anxieties (expressed by some participants) about 
lack of control over the images. I made it clear that the photographs would be their 
property, would not be reproduced, and that I would not be making or keeping any 
copies.  
 
After the initial interviews, I offered each respondent a disposable camera and asked 
them to take photographs of or about themselves and their daily lives and then to return 
it to me. Some participants opted to use their own cameras or mobile phones instead 
and one student emailed me a set of photographs which I deleted after printing.  I 
explained that the photographs might be a good way of talking about their own ‘self-
image’ and any other issues of importance to them.  Six of the 13 interviewees 
produced photographs between the first and second interviews and in the main these 
proved an extremely powerful way of encouraging the production of biographical 
narratives and reflection on their feelings about appearance.  Where photographs were 
not available, questions on this topic were couched in third-person terms and, drawing 
on questions used by Frost (2001) in her work on body-hatred, asked respondents to 
talk about ‘what kinds of people’ might feel happy/unhappy with the way they look. 
Subsequent questions then asked how doing a beauty therapy course might affect how 
people feel about themselves.  Most students were keen to talk about these issues but 
interviews in which students talked at length about the their negative ‘self-image’ and 
the pain involved in this  raised a number of uncomfortable issues about the extent to 
which ‘speaking out’ is necessarily an ‘empowering’ process.   My interpretation is that 
some students used the interviews as a form of ‘therapeutic confessional’.  Lister’s 
(2003) use of Foucault to discuss research on sexual abuse survivors  is useful here in 
highlighting the power dynamics involved in the ‘incitement to speak’ and in the way in 
which that speech is vulnerable to being inscribed “into hegemonic structures, thereby 
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producing docile subjects who submit themselves to the judgement of experts” (Ibid: 
47).  As a researcher, it was not my job to direct participants’ interpretations of their 
experiences, but as a feminist, and one who had incited this speech in the first place, I 
felt I had a responsibility to validate any insights they had into the social causes of their 
experiences and to encourage conversation about this. However, the extent to which a 
single interview can become a consciousness raising experience is limited. There is no 
room and no ethical justification in this context for challenging a participant’s belief that 
beauty practices are essential to her self-esteem and in this sense the interviews could 
be seen as a confessional space in which such ‘truths’ were (unintentionally) 
legitimated.  
 
 A number of other issues arose from student interviews.   As discussed earlier, I 
allowed students to talk about issues of importance to them, even when these did not 
coincide with my schedule. Sometimes these issues dominated the interview. However, 
although this meant I was sometimes unable to cover all topics, in several cases 
interviewees raised unexpected issues, for instance about abuse or harassment which 
allowed me to consider how I might investigate connections between different forms of 
violence. 
 
A second issue was the ‘problem’ of silence.  Two Level 1 interviewees were particularly 
reluctant to respond to questions or engage in conversation in any depth.  In both 
cases, they saw themselves as marginal participants on their courses who ‘kept 
themselves to themselves’, had one or two friends but had little social engagement with 
most other students.  Both had also been very quiet in the initial focus groups.  It is 
possible that these silences can be explained by the pressure that some students may 
have felt to participate (see my discussion of consent below) but it may also raise a 
number of other issues.  However I couched my questions, I was asking participants to 
‘account for themselves’.  However, such invitations need to take account the context of 
contemporary neo-liberal forms of regulation which demand the production of 
autonomous, knowing selves (Gonick, 2006) with coherent ‘choice biographies’ (Du 
Bois- Raymond, 1998). In this context, silence may be one response used by those 
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without the resources to construct their identities in these terms. However,  Marnina 
Gonick (2006), citing Spivak’s (1988) question “Can the Subaltern Speak?”, suggests 
that “speaking out of difference” in a way that is “both intelligible and yet not re-inscribed 
into the very normative frameworks that constitute the difference is the (impossible)task 
of the subaltern” (Gonick, 2006:448). The most ‘silent’ interviewees were both 
positioned as other in the predominantly White, heterosexual context of their beauty 
therapy courses.  Leila was one of only two Black students on her course and Alex was 
othered by her non-feminine appearance and her relative lack of interest in conventional 
beauty practices (by her distance from normative heterofemininity).  However, there 
may well have been other reasons why these students used silence or withdrawal in the 
context of their courses as a strategy, whether conscious or unconscious, of self-
protection.  There was possibly even more reason for these young women to ‘use’ 
silence in an interview situation with an adult stranger. What this might point to is the 
necessity of finding other ways to allow young women to be heard. For instance, 
Gonick’s (Ibid, 2006) work on feminist pedagogies suggests that methods which allow 
for the exteriorization of different concepts of the self such as story telling or other ways 
of constructing fantasy identifications may be more effective than asking girls to talk 
directly about themselves. It may also be the case that more informal engagement with 
students would have established closer and more reciprocal relationships (Skeggs, 
1997). 
 
The interviews- tutors 
These took place after the first round student interviews so that I could use student 
responses to help shape the tutor/manager interview schedule Seven beauty therapy 
tutors were interviewed across the two colleges. The schedules were more structured 
than those for the students (appendix 8).  Although uncovering meanings was an 
important consideration, I intended to use these interviews primarily to explore specific 
issues raised in focus groups, student interviews and observations. The schedule 
covered questions on perceptions of students, ‘success’ and ‘failure’ on the course, 
skills and knowledge, and the nature of beauty therapy as a job. There were also 
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questions designed to elicit critical views about the curriculum and beauty industry. 
Several tutors expressed concern about talking too openly about institutional issues. I 
emphasized the anonymity of participants and colleges and made it clear that they were 
under no obligation to talk about these or any other issues and that they could withdraw 
their accounts at any time (see appendix 5).  
 
The main problem with the tutor interview schedule was that it was too long and in 
several cases, not all the questions were covered. Some tutors were particularly keen to 
talk about specific topics, particularly in relation to institutional pressures.  I had not 
anticipated this, partly because I had not been able to pilot the tutor interview schedules 
because no tutors were available for interviews during the pilot stage.  Nevertheless, as 
May (2001) suggests, the possibility that participants might raise issues which appear to 
diverge from the intended topic is a potential strength rather than a limitation when the 
intention is to uncover meanings of significance to participants in relation to complex 
areas of social experience. These  interviews generated some rich data which allowed 
me to understand the kinds of classed and gendered discourses underpinning beauty 
therapy courses and the ways in which these are shaped in the intersections between 
the ‘fields’ of further education and the beauty therapy industry, and the dispositions of 
tutors and students.   
 
Informal meetings 
I classify all contact with participants outside of the formal data collection methods as 
‘informal meetings’.  These took place in a number of ways including having lunch or 
coffee with students, talking in corridors and attending tutor meetings. In the main, these 
events were recorded in my field notes as soon as possible after these meetings, 
although where the occurred between interviews or observations where time was limited 





Participation and Reciprocity  
In wanting to address inequality in the research process and produce knowledge which 
is relevant to those whose lives are being studied, some feminists have advocated 
bringing participants into research in a direct and collaborative way. For instance, they 
have suggested participation in research design or asking participants to comment on 
transcripts or be involved directly in analysis and interpretation (Reinharz, 1992).  My 
research could not be described as participatory in any of these senses.  However, 
participation in research is not necessarily empowering or helpful for participants (Kelly 
et al, 1994).  For a start, for participants to play active roles in design or analysis would 
have required me to be more explicit about my political/theoretical position and research 
aims than I actually was. If this had not deterred participation from the outset, which 
seems likely given the non- or even anti-feminist context of beauty courses, it would 
certainly have meant students engaging with ideas and concepts antagonistic to the 
values and assumptions underpinning their ‘choice’ of training.  Whilst it was sometimes 
tempting to imagine that a more participatory approach might have encouraged 
students to reconsider their options, the stark reality was that for many of them there 
were few alternative training options and limited financial resources to make alternative 
and potentially ‘risky’ choices even if they had wanted to.  Imagining that a 
‘consciousness raising’, participatory approach would have been an ‘empowering’ 
experience for the students (or staff) would have been naive given the absence of 
“corresponding channels for action” (Maynard, 1994:17). In addition, asking students 
and staff to be involved in methodological work, even commenting on my transcriptions 
of their accounts, would have been impractical given their commitments and workloads 
and would arguably, in the case of analysis and interpretation at least, have masked my 
power and responsibility as a researcher (Kelly et al, 1994:37) and my privileged 
position with regard to time, and “academic and experiential” resources (Letherby, 2003: 
77; Millan,1997). It would also have been a tokenistic gesture given that I intended a 
feminist interpretation and would not have been prepared to compromise this.  
 
One of the characteristics often associated with feminist research is the existence of 
reciprocity between researcher and researched (Skeggs,1994,1997; Holland et al, 
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1998). As I discuss above, the type of reciprocity in which participants are involved in 
the research as ‘partners’ is not a feature of this study. The participants gave their time 
and often very personal, sometimes painful, information about their lives. In comparison, 
what I chose, or was able, to give back made the exchange extremely one-sided. 
However, there were a number of ways in which I tried to reciprocate. Firstly, whilst I 
used semi-structured interview schedules with the aim of ensuring that key questions 
were addressed, I also allowed students to raise issues of importance to them. In 
several cases, these dominated the interview but I decided that allowing them to identify 
and speak about issues of importance to them, even if this meant not covering all the 
topics on the interview schedule, should be a priority and would give me data about 
issues I had not thought about. For the students, being able to talk about their lives and 
feeling that what they had to say was important and interesting is arguably valuable in 
itself and challenges that idea that research participants are simply objects of study 
(Skeggs, 1994). However, as I have argued, there are important caveats here with 
regard to the politics of speech and silence.  
 
I had prepared for student interviews by researching sources of information and support 
to offer to participants should they indicate a need for this. This included information on 
educational and career pathways and here my own background in further education 
was occasionally a useful resource.  I was able to suggest possible options for two 
students who had thought about higher education but had little idea of how to access it. 
In these cases, I was careful to stress that the potential difficulties, including the 
financial costs, involved.  
 
An obvious aspect of reciprocity is the feedback given to participants at the end of the 
research. At the time of writing I have not yet contacted the colleges to arrange this. The 
dilemma facing me is what kind of feedback to give and how to tread the difficult path 
between offering feedback that is relevant to them and revealing aspects of the findings 
which could be seen as personally undermining (see for example, my discussion of 
tutors’ approach to teaching anatomy and physiology in chapter ten).  Although clearly 
the thesis will be available to any participant who wants to read it, my intention is to offer 
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separate feedback to students and staff.  For students, this is likely to be a summary of 
key themes regarding their experiences on their course and their reasons for enrolling 
but I also want to present this in critical terms drawing attention to the possible social 
and cultural factors shaping these. Feedback to tutors is likely to me more problematic. 
Throughout the fieldwork they were consistently interested in what I was finding and 
how it might help them improve curriculum delivery and support to students. Clearly, 
these issues are not central concerns of the research. However, it will probably be 
possible draw out implications in relation to these issues. For instance, potentially useful 
comments could be offered in relation to the teaching of A &P and the assumptions 
about learners as ‘practical’ rather than ‘academic’ (see chapter ten).  
 
The Politics of Access and Consent 
Access to participants in both colleges was initially negotiated with heads of department 
and then with the curriculum managers for hairdressing and beauty courses. Letters 
outlining the research and requesting participation were sent to heads of department for 
each college (see appendix 2) who referred me to curriculum managers.  In March 
2009, I met with staff at each college to explain my aims and negotiate a proposed 
schedule of pilot interviews with students (carried out between April and June 2009) and 
later, a schedule for the main fieldwork (carried out between September 2009 and July 
2010). Before beginning the pilot research, and again before the research proper, I 
visited classrooms to meet students, explain my research and ask for volunteers. On my 
initial classroom visits in September 2009 I explained that participation was voluntary 
and emphasized issues of confidentiality, anonymity and their right to withdraw from the 
research.  All of the students who took part in the focus groups and interviews had 
agreed to participate verbally and in writing (see appendix 3 and 4). However, the issue 
of consent was, as in most research, complicated and problematic and bound up with 
forms of power (McCarry, 2005; Mason, 2002).  
  
Firstly, because I contacted students through tutors, or by visiting their classrooms 
when tutors were present, it was not always clear whether their decision to participate 
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was spontaneous or the outcome of ‘encouragement’, even small amounts of pressure, 
from the tutors who were often pleased that students, particularly ones seen as 
‘disruptive’, would be absent from their classrooms for short periods. As Mason points 
out, it is essential to acknowledge “the persuasive influences which operate on people” 
(Mason, 2002: 80) and how these are connected to institutionalized process and 
interests.  It may well be that some students found it difficult  to refuse and that, 
consequently,  consent was given ‘by proxy’ through the tutors. This was certainly not 
my intention, but is arguably one of the dangers inherent in research with young people 
which relies on gatekeepers who agree to the project before potential participants are 
consulted (McCarry, 2005).  It was also probably the case that some students agreed to 
take part in order to have time away from teaching sessions, in which case ‘consent’ 
was shaped by factors other than an interest in participating in the research.  
 
I made sure that I had explained the research to all potential participants before 
individuals were asked to participate. However, the issue of informed consent is always 
a complex one and hinges on questions of how much it is possible to tell participants 
and how to frame the explanation in ways that are accessible or meaningful.  For 
instance, in Anne Pheonix’s (1994)  study of young mothers participants were given 
verbal and written information before interviews, but a follow up study revealed that 
some had not understood what the research was about or why they had been 
interviewed.  When I met students for the first time I explained the study in what I 
thought was a reasonably direct way-  “ I want to find out about why you decided to do 
beauty therapy and what you think and feel about the course”.  I also stressed 
confidentially, explained how all contributions would be anonymous,  and  invited 
students to ask questions, which some did.  It is, however, a weakness of the research 
that I did not check the efficacy of this approach by asking them about their 
understanding, or indeed their experience of the research, at the end of the process.  
 
The explanation given to students, to heads of department and teaching staff,  focused 
on the broad aims and interests of the intended research and omitted any indication of 
its theoretical and political concerns. Indeed, it made no mention of feminist concerns 
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regarding beauty practices.  Mason (1996:58) argues that there are limits to how much 
information participants can be given about a research project.   This might be 
particularly relevant for feminist research where the aims and intentions of the 
researcher may be at odds with the values of participants and where explicit information 
might deter participation.  Millan suggests that one way of addressing the issue of 
feminist research with participants who may be hostile to feminism is to ask whether all 
methodological characteristics considered to be feminist necessarily always advance 
feminist agendas. Given that feminist research does not specify method but rather sets 
parameters for “a politicized framework for the understanding of knowledge”, it may be 
justifiable to “define feminist research in terms of the values it might uphold rather than 
the techniques it might use” (Millan, 1997:1). This might well include, in some 
circumstances, privileging access to data in order to produce feminist knowledge over 
making the political implications of the research explicit. However, if it is acceptable to 
undertake research which relies on an element of deception, the importance of 
protecting confidentiality and anonymity is all the more pressing. As Punch suggests, it 
may be the case that:  
 
Some measure of deception is acceptable in some areas where the benefits 
of knowledge outweigh the harms and where the harms have been minimized by 
following convention on confidentiality and identity” (Punch, 1986, cited in 
Holland and Ramazanoglu,1994:142) 
 
Confidentiality and Anonymity 
All participants have been given pseudonyms and I have deliberately left out any details 
about the colleges which could easily identify them. In some cases, I have also 
deliberately omitted ‘sensitive’  biographical details about participants for the same 
reason. Personal details and all transcriptions were kept on one computer with 
password restricted access. Written details, field notes or other documents which 
contained personal information were kept in a locked filing cabinet in my home. Once 
my analysis and interpretation were completed the recorded interviews and focus 
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groups were deleted.  During meetings with potential participants and again before 
interviews and focus groups I emphasized that I would be using these procedures.  
Before each interview or focus group participants were given a written statement (which 
I read out and explained) outlining the ethics guiding the research, including the need 
for confidentiality about what was said in the sessions, and their right to withdraw from 
the research at any time (see appendix 3). 
 
Analysis and interpretation 
 
I wanted an approach that would allow me to pay attention to how the students 
experienced the social and cultural conditions of their lives within and outside of their 
courses. I also wanted to reflect on the data as a discursive construction, paying 
attention to the way in which research subjects drew on wider patterns of discourse to 
interpret experience and produce meaning (Silverman, 2001).  I could not imagine 
dealing with data from different sources without organizing it into thematic clusters. 
However, my original attempts at this produced so many themes, sub-themes and sub-
sub themes that I was unable to establish an analytical focus. In the end I decided to 
retain these multi-level clusters for reference and retrieval using NVivo, but to use the 
themes which most seemed most clearly relevant to the research aims or which 
suggested interesting departures from my original expectations to begin an analysis of 
discourse. Appendix 10 shows the identification of one of these themes in an excerpt 
from an interview transcript. Rather than adopting any single approach, therefore, I 
ended up borrowing strategically from two analytical traditions- thematic analysis and 
critical discourse analysis. 
 
Thematic analysis, as Braun and Clarke (2006) have argued, is a flexible method which 
can be used within a range of theoretical frameworks and is also broad enough to 
encompass approaches which draw on discursive traditions. Braun and Clarke refer to 
‘thematic DA’ as a range of analytical methods including those which identify discursive 
themes in data “and: theorize language as constitutive of meaning and meaning as 
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social” (Ibid, 2006:81). There is very little literature on the use of this method, although 
Singer and Hunter’s thematic discourse analysis of the experience of premature 
menopause (Singer & Hunter, 1999) indicates something of the way in which it might be 
used to relate patterns in accounts of experience to wider discursive practices.  Whilst 
they drew on post-structuralist analysis, I have drawn on critical discourse analysis as 
an approach which begins from “social issues and social problems” (Fairclough, 2001: 
229) and which acknowledges the material, as well as the discursive in the construction 
of social ‘reality’ (Sunderland, 2006).  Within this framework, attention is focused on the 
interplay between three levels of analysis- the text (the spoken/written account), the 
discourses which have produced it, and the social and historical context which shape 
both. Its aim is to reveal the relations of domination and inequality enacted or re-
enacted through texts produced in social and political contexts (van Dijk, 2001). As 
such, it is ideally suited to excavating the operation of symbolic violence in discourse.  
 
My strategy was to analyze abstracted quotations, conversations and comments from 
interviews, focus groups, observation and field notes  grouped under  themes by first 
identifying key assumptions, concepts, common threads, differences,  contradictions 
and silences (what is not said) and the ways in which these appeared to articulate with 
structural power relations and normative discourses (see Mills, 2007).  For example, 
texts grouped under the discursive sub- theme of ‘gender differences in job choice’ 
revealed apparent contradictions between  participants’ use of discourses of equality 
and rights, and assumptions of (hetero)sexual difference.  Identifying such paradoxes, 
or moments of interdiscursivity (Sunderland, 2006), allowed me both to consider the 
way in which “contradictions are held together on a daily basis” (Skeggs, 1997:32) and 
how apparently benign or even emancipatory discourses can obscure the workings of 
power and act as forms of symbolic violence.  However, such interpretations emerged 
through writing about analytical insights and this was an iterative process which 
involved moving backwards and forwards between the thematized data, the literature, 
my theoretical and political framework and the research questions.  This process forced 
a level of reflexivity which made me consider and change my interpretations. For 
instance, once I had identified expressions of symbolic violence as endemic in 
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participants’ accounts I began to interpret their experiences as if this was the only social 
force shaping their decisions and identities.  This was clearly at odds with my materialist 
feminist perspective and it came as something of a shock that I was using a critical 
concept in a way that discounted participants’ conscious ‘negotiations’ with the 
structural forces shaping their perspectives and trajectories. I was, in effect, using the 
concept of symbolic violence (wrongly) to impose an epistemic violence on their 
accounts.  I interpret my own lack of reflexivity in this instance as reflecting a fear of the 
complexity of the data, and a result of an overriding desire to impose order on “the 
many disparate and contradictory experiences” (Skeggs, 1997:31) reflected in 
participants accounts.  The potential for epistemic violence is also inherent in the 
process of thematizing data, what Kvale calls the ‘butchery’ involved in fragmenting “the 
original live, face-to face conversation” (Kvale, 1996, cited in Holland et al, 1998: 223).  I 
followed the example of Holland et al in returning to original interview and focus group 
transcripts, and sometimes to the digital recordings, to get a sense of the coherence 
and contradiction within accounts and to check that I was not wrongly ascribing views to 
particular participants. I also tried to avoid decontextualizing quotations by using NVivo 
to code them with a fairly large amount of surrounding text.  Nvivo also made it relatively 
easy to contextualize abstracted data by the age, course level and prior educational 
qualifications of student participants. Thus I was able to explore differences and 
similarities between these groupings within and between themes.  
 
In my analysis and interpretation of data I have again followed Holland et al by trying to 
make explicit three levels of meaning; the language and interpretations of participants, 
my own interpretations and the theoretical and political commitments shaping them, and 
the differences between these. I recognize that my interpretation of the data involved 
situated judgments about the themes worthy of study and about the interpretation of 
discourse within them. My interpretation is one of many possible interpretations, and it is 
often at odds with those of participants. I also recognize that other researchers with 
different political investments and theoretical positions may well have come to different 
conclusions.  Although my feminist interpretation is not necessarily ‘truer’ than other 
possible interpretations, I justify it on the grounds that a feminist perspective which 
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recognizes the interconnectedness of agency and structure offers “a distinct vantage 
point from which to clarify the…. organization, institutionalization, discourses, 




This chapter has explained how the research questions articulate with existing bodies of 
work on beauty practices, further education and violence. I have indicted how my study 
aims to contribute to these areas and the knowledge gaps it is designed to address.  My 
methodological stance is one that stresses the importance of experience and ‘voice’ as 
basis for understanding the social and material conditions of women’s lives. However, 
my approach is neither subjectivist nor objectivist.  At its centre is the acknowledgement 
that experience is never transparent and is always an interpretation mediated by 
discourse and social positioning.  This is the case for both the participants in this study 
and for myself as the researcher.  An awareness of the partial and fallible nature of 
knowledge has informed my approach to collecting, analyzing and interpreting the data 
from interviews, focus groups, observations and informal discussions. Nevertheless, the 
research attempts to uncover systematic patterns in the data which relate to objective 
structural inequalities, particularly in terms of gender, (hetero)sexuality and class.  The 
constant reflexivity entailed in situating the research in these epistemological tensions, 
and the desire for interpretative rigour and clarity which this has inspired has led to what 
I think is a convincing account of the issues. In this sense I claim a validity for the 
research.  I recognize that this judgment is partly contingent on my political and 
theoretical position and that other interpretations of the data could have been made. 
However, I also reject the relativism implied in the idea that research is only ever valid 
on its own terms. What I have aimed to produce is materialist feminist knowledge based 
on the contention that women’s experiences of gendered and classed practices and 
power relations are not simply relative and that an account based on this premise has 
more explanatory power than one that sidelines or ignores the operation of power at 
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micro-levels. This is not to discount the weakness of the research.  Whilst this chapter 
has pointed to one example of my failure to listen to what participants were saying 
because of my eagerness to impose theoretical coherence on their accounts, the reader 
will no doubt identify other omissions and un- theorized biases in my analysis.  There 
were also themes and issues which ‘emerged’ from the data but which I have not 
included in this thesis. Their omission was based on judgments about what would fit or 
not fit into the overall structure and narrative, or on what appeared relevant and 
important at the time. The analyses discussed in the following chapters are products of 
the complex factors discussed here. However, I have tried to present them in a way that 























Chapter Seven                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Becoming a Beauty Girl: ‘Choice’ and Constraint  
in Post-16 Decision Making 
 
This chapter explores participants’ accounts of their decisions to enroll on a beauty 
therapy course.  It addresses the complex matrix of social, cultural and dispositional 
factors which have shaped that decision. On the one hand, the chapter is concerned 
with the idea that ‘choice’, rather than being a precondition of ‘liberatory agency’ as is 
suggested by individualization theorists (Adams, 2003), is one mechanism through 
which gender and class differentiation is reproduced in education (Hatcher, 1998; 
Jonsson,1999) and more generally in the construction of subjectivities and social 
relations . On the other hand, Bourdieu’s theory of cultural reproduction, in which 
habitus is a central concept, has been criticized for being ‘incomplete’ in its refusal to 
acknowledge some sort of rationality as an element of ‘self-selection’ (Hatcher, 1998).   
 
There are, of course, problems with the idea that when young women exercise ‘choice’ 
they are inevitably engaged in reinforcing their own inequality. This is one of the issues 
at the heart of debates about beauty culture with theorists such as Davis (1995) and 
Gimlin ( 2002 ) suggesting that in emphasizing oppression over agency feminists have 
treated women as ‘cultural dupes’.  Whilst I want to avoid denying the agency of 
participants, I also want to avoid imposing a voluntaristic notion of agency on their 
accounts. I agree with Modleski’s that insofar as we “exist inside ideology…we are all 
victims…of political and cultural domination” (Modleski, 1991:45), a position that 
resonates with Bourdieu’s understanding of agency as an expression of habitus which 
tends towards conformity to the terms of the dominant social order and which operates 
through a ‘feel for the game’ rather than through “the conscious positing of ends”  




The ‘rational subject’ has been criticized as a deeply gendered and classed concept 
(Skeggs, 2004a; Adkins, 2002).  In addition, parallels have been drawn between the 
traditional enlightenment ‘rational actor’, reflected in rational action theories, and the 
post-traditional ‘reflexive self’ promoted by the individualization thesis (Adams, 2003).  
Both versions posit an entrepreneurial, knowledgeable and calculating subject, 
assessing its own potential and making strategic decisions in pursuit of economic or 
social goals (Hatcher, 1998; Skeggs, 2004a). In addition, both conceal the gender, class 
and race privilege underpinning such subjectivity (Adkins, 2002), and both are based on 
an illusory subject detached from or counterposed to culture and social structure 
(Adams, 2003; Hatcher, 1998). 
 
Nevertheless, Hatcher suggests that the concept of ‘rational choice’ can be useful once 
it is released from the “exclusionary definition” imposed by economistic rational action 
theories (Ibid:16) and understood in terms of the social and cultural contexts of 
individuals’ lives  and as one aspect in the complexity of social action in relation to 
educational decision-making (Hodkinson, 1998).  Thus various types of rationality, as 
outlined in chapter two, can be seen as possible elements in shaping ‘choice’.  In many 
cases, the participants’ accounts suggest that there is some sort of ‘rational’ basis for 
the decision to enroll on a beauty therapy course, but often in ways that stretch the 
concept of rationality well beyond the limits imposed by rational action theories. 
However, even when rationality is released from rigid instrumentalism, it can still imply a 
“centered subject…overseeing a purposeful future trajectory” (Adams, 2003:224) and 
this risks dislocating the subject from the cultural and historical contexts in which 
different forms of rationality and reflexivity are discursively produced (ibid, 2003).  It is 
therefore important to ask how far the ‘rationality’ suggested in the accounts is a product 
of contemporary neo-liberal discourses of individualism and ‘choice’ which encourage 
young people to position themselves as autonomous and self –determining subjects 
and to ignore the gendered and classed constraints on their post-16 decisions (Brennen 
& Nilsen, 2005; Rich, 2005; Furlong & Cartmel, 1997).  It is also possible, particularly 
because the accounts are retrospective, that some participants may have responded to 
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the assumed demands of the interview situation for a coherent narrative based on 
cultural expectations of rational and reflexive behavior. 
 
One of the key elements of the decision for most participants is an attachment to beauty 
practices and in this respect their ‘choice’ of beauty therapy is bound up with questions 
about  what shapes women’s affective relationships to beauty.  As discussed in chapter 
three, much of the materialist and radical feminist thinking on beauty has been based on 
the idea that this is at least partly a ‘rational’ response to the demands of a 
heteropatriarchal society in which conformity to historically specific standards of beauty 
“can be essential to a woman’s chances for power, respect and attention” 
(Chapkis,1986:14) . In this sense, the ‘choice’ to engage in beauty practices may be in 
the immediate interests of individual women. It is clearly a ‘choice’ made under 
conditions of constraint and one which reproduces the dominant gender order, but 
women also internalize ideologies of feminine beauty so that it becomes a central 
aspect of identity (Bartky,1990) or in Bourdieusian terms, a disposition of the feminine 
habitus.  So whilst it might be ‘rational’ to want to produce a feminine appearance, 
conscious decision making might not necessarily be the only or main driver.  
 
Understanding women’s relationship to beauty practices, as well as the more specific 
question addressed in this chapter therefore requires attention to ‘rationality’ and 
reflexive individualism in terms of the actual practices reported in the narratives and in 
terms of the discourses drawn on, as well as to mechanisms of cultural reproduction. I 
proceed on the basis that women exercise agency and that part of this includes 
conscious calculations which are made within conditions of constraint. These 
constraints are not  just repressive but also productive in the construction of gendered 
and classed subjects. I therefore use the notion of habitus as a mediating concept 
between agency and structure to explore how gendered and classed dispositions, 
together with discourses of rationality and individual autonomy, might guide participants 




I begin with a brief discussion of the post-16 vocational training and education options 
offered by the two colleges in order to indicate something of the institutional context in 
which participants made their decisions.  I also outline some of the patterns in the 
options students had considered.  I then move on to explore participants’ accounts of 
why they enrolled on their courses. This section focuses firstly on participants who see 
themselves as having made a positive choice to enroll on a beauty therapy course. 
Secondly, I consider the way in which some frame their decision through narratives of 
indecision, drift and external constraints. Lastly, I explore the extent to which decisions 
are informed by participants’ feelings about themselves and their appearance.   
Throughout this section I draw attention to the ways in which participants employed 
different types of rationality in making their ‘choices’, at least as they are presented in 
their accounts, and to the ways in which discourses of individualism and choice are 
mobilized to account for or legitimize decisions.   Finally, I consider the implications of 
participants’ use of individual choice discourses in terms of the way they obscure and 
reproduce systematic structural inequalities of gender and class. 
 
Post 16 Options 
 
The decision to enroll on a beauty therapy course must be understood against the 
backdrop of post-16 selection and filtering mechanisms and the paucity of options 
available to young women who leave school with few or no qualifications (see figure 1, 
chapter six). The only pathways available to most students were low level vocational 
ones.   To greater or lesser extents, most students had considered other options which 
they may have been eligible for, although these generally fell within a narrow range of 
vocational courses in which girls traditionally outnumber boys.  Childcare or health and 
social care were the most ‘popular’ options and had been considered by nearly half of 
the research group.  As feminist studies have shown, the post-16 transitions of working 
class girls very often involve entry to training and jobs involving the care of others and 
this usually means low paid and low status work (Colley, 2002;2006). In addition, the 
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filtering process for these begins long before formal selection for courses or jobs in the 
predispositions produced in the context of family and early socialization. (Colley, 2003; 
Bloomer et al, 2002, Skeggs, 1997). Many students talked about caring for younger 
siblings or other family members and several had mothers who either worked outside 
the home in the care sector or who were child minders.  Their ‘choice’ of beauty therapy 
might signal a desire to escape the limited options available to their mothers and a life 
organized around the care of others. For example, Chelsea, whose foster carer mother 
had wanted her to do a childcare course, decided on beauty therapy because; 
 
…there's more to it.  And….if I did Childcare I would end up being like a 
Foster Carer or something but I could see myself more in a beauty salon 
(Chelsea, Level 2, College A). 
 
For students like Chelsea, the beauty salon seemed to represent a glamorous 
alternative to caring work. This is in part because students often saw beauty therapy in 
terms of self production and had little idea of the emotional, caring labour involved. 
Arguably, both forms of labour require workers to adopt the ‘quasi-therapeutic role’ 
associated with domestic femininity and the care of children and men in the family 
(Bourdieu, 2001:77; Reay, 2004:59).  However, It is possible that for some students the 
choice between care work and beauty is one between different versions of femininity: 
one associated with traditional feminine roles in the domestic sphere, and one that 
centers on the body and ‘care of the self’ in the sense of producing a self more in line 
with contemporary, body-centered definitions of young womanhood (McRobbie, 2009, 
Frost, 2001). If rejecting conventional care work represents a resistance to 
domesticated femininity, it is arguably one contained by the temporally shifting terms of 
gender, or in Skeggs’ terms, by the transmogrifications produced by gender as a form of 
symbolic violence (Skeggs, 2004a: 25).  
 
A  number of participants had considered hairdressing but had seen beauty therapy as 
more closely related to skills they already had  and therefore as an option with fewer 
risks attached- something at which they were less likely to fail (Skeggs, 1997).  Other 
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options mentioned, and which were available to ‘low-achieving’ students, were small 
animal care, catering/hospitality, dance , and outdoor leisure (usually delivered in the 
context of travel and tourism).  Three students said they had considered entering 
traditionally male areas; the army, mechanics/engineering, plastering, and painting and 
decorating (delivered under the rubric of construction trades at both colleges).  One 
student was put off doing catering because of the large number of boys on the course.  
The reasons why such options were not taken up is discussed in more depth in chapter 
ten.  Other pathways offered at both colleges from level 1 included environmental/land-
based programmes and sport, though none of the students mentioned these. One 
college B student was interested in art and design.  Although programmes at this 
college were offered at level 1 upwards, her low GCSE grades meant she was not 
eligible for the Level 3 specialist fashion and photography pathways she had wanted.  
 
A significant element of the filtering process is the provision of advice and guidance in 
schools and through the Connexions service (see chapter two) which operated in 
regional partnerships in the areas of both colleges. Most students’ accounts suggest 
that they received very limited input from teachers and that this mainly involved ‘looking 
through’ FE college prospectus and other materials (possibly produced by Connexions) 
and selecting and then applying for the courses they ‘found interesting’. It was unclear 
how far Connexions was involved in their decision making, though some students said 
that advisors had visited their classes to tell them about what was available locally and 
how to apply.  Only one student received one-to-one help after she had self-excluded 
from school, and this was only because of a chance meeting with a Connexions advisor.  
It appears that none of the students received on-going ‘holistic’ support with thinking 
about their futures (Hoggarth et al, 2004) and that the information and ‘advice’ they 
received simply guided them towards ‘choices’ based on already established 
dispositions.  Thinly spread resources and inadequate cooperation between services 
and schools (Ibid, 2004) may have shaped their experiences.  However, improvements 
in services in these respects cannot, in themselves, address the ‘objective limits’ 
curtailing young people’s options. In addition, as Colley argues, careers advice 
provision as it is currently delivered does not provide girls with the opportunities to 
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understand “why they desire the destinies they pursue” (Colley, 2006: 27) and is 
therefore unable to address the ‘subjective limits’  which typically guide them to 
gendered and classed pathways. 
‘Choice’, Constraint and Drift 
 
Whilst all but one of the students said they routinely engaged in and enjoyed beauty 
practices before they started the course, the extent to which they saw themselves as 
making a positive decision to pursue these interests as a training and vocational option 
varied considerably. A significant minority of participants framed their decision as a 
more or less ‘positive choice’ made on the basis of an interest in appearance and, 
sometimes, holistic therapy practices and a desire to develop their beauty skills and 
pursue a beauty related career.  Others framed their decision as a default position in the 
absence of other attainable options or refer to external constraints as influencing their 
decisions. However, this division is not intended to downplay the ambivalence in many 
of the accounts which confounds any easy categorization. Participants might mobilize 
an individualized discourse of choice alongside a narrative about severely limited post-
16 options, or alongside an account which suggests a gradual erosion of self-worth and 
bodily confidence through bullying or the requirement to conform an impossibly 
idealized feminine appearance.  However, few of the participants seemed immune to 
the idea that decisions about education and work are, or should be, a matter of free 
choice and independent life-planning. The ‘should’ is important here since only a 
minority of participants felt able to plan their lives and futures in the way demanded by 
the social and cultural processes of individualization (Ball et al, 2000) and yet not being 
able to plan a life trajectory was often a cause of considerable anxiety and a sense of 
inadequacy.   
 
“Everything I do is what I choose”: beauty therapy as a positive ‘choice’. 
Both Emma and Abigail are untypical of the group as a whole in that they had 
previously embarked on or gained, in Abigail’s case, Level 3 qualifications.  Their 
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accounts suggest more positive ‘learner identities’ (Ball et al, 2000:147) than most other 
students and much more reflexive ‘choice biographies’ ( Du Bois Raymond, 1998) 
based on research into training  and employment opportunities and an assessment of 
their own skills and dispositions. Moreover, they talk about their decisions in terms of 
expected utility of their ‘choice’ as an investment in themselves and their future life 
chances. 
 
Yeah, definitely, definitely. I want to… leave college and do a bit of mobile 
work, and…working in a salon and then over the years get my degree and own 
my own place (Emma, Level 2, College B). 
 
I’m going to do Level 3…[and] … in about ten years time I ….see myself 
having my own shop.  Because also I’ve done administration and business so I 
know… how to do things like that… So I do see myself… being successful...  A 
beauty girl (Abigail, Level 2, College A) 
 
Whilst these narratives are suggestive of the instrumental rationality proposed by 
rational action theories, their decisions had also been informed by emotional responses 
to previous experiences; of being extremely unhappy as an A level student, in Emma’s 
case, and of an unhappy experience of working as a legal secretary, in Abigail’s case. 
That their decisions have been shaped as much by affective factors as by cognitive 
ones is also suggested in the way in which an emotional attachment to beauty practices 
is invoked as a defining feature of their identities and as the basis of a dispositional fit 
with beauty therapy. 
  
Beauty was something that I've always done….like, I always knew about it 
because I enjoyed knowing about it, it's just something that I, I really like.   
     Um, but I was never really encouraged to do it over A levels. (Emma, Level 2,  




I’d always loved doing makeup on people….and my friend just suggested to 
me…why don’t you just go to college and do….So I think that’s why I decided to 
do it (Abigail, Level 2, College A). 
 
Although both young women appear to have had a relatively broad range of options 
open to them, their decision to do beauty therapy is based on known, familiar and 
therefore ‘safe’ territory to which, in comparison to their other options, they have a 
deeply affective attachment.  In this sense, they have made what Hodkinson & Sparkes 
(1993) call a ‘restrictedly pragmatic’ decision rather than the kind of utilitarian rational 
decision predicted by sociological rational choice theories in which safeguarding against 
economic or social downward mobility would be the defining feature ( Hatcher, 1998).  
Indeed, in retreating from the ‘higher status’ options available to them in order do 
something they ‘love’, both young women are arguably at risk of downward mobility.  
 
One way of understanding how an affective attachment to beauty practices might 
undermine other options is suggested by Probyn’s (2004) reading of the idea of emotion 
in Bourdieu’s work. Whilst habitus works to tailor aspirations to the ‘objective realities’ of 
an agent’s situation, emotions might work to reduce or amplify the tendencies of her 
habitus in ways that shape aspirations and perceptions of ‘objective limits’ (Bourdieu, 
1984).  Whilst both Emma and Abigail had other options, their accounts suggest that 
they judged beauty therapy, regardless of its associations with low status and pay, as 
the most authentic expression of self in comparison with other possibilities. 
 
In both accounts there is an emphasis on self-production and individual choice. Both 
participants saw  themselves as having resisted external pressures in order to do 
beauty therapy- in Emma’s case, the pressure of her father’s expectations that she 
should  complete her A Levels and go to university, and in Abigail’s,  pressure from her 
mother and friends not to give up the financial security and status of  her legal secretary 
job.  It is interesting to speculate on the extent to which this sense of struggle might 
have reinforced their individualized identities and sense that they are making 




… everything I do is what I choose.. My mum wasn’t happy with it..and she 
was like, …you can’t give up a good job just to go back to college”. And there 
was quite a lot of people that were like that...but once… I’ve got something in my 
mind then I’ve gotta do it… I’m happy… I’ve done this now because I could still 
be sat in my job being really unhappy in what I was doing.  
 
Both young women have exercised agency in refusing, in their terms, to be subjugated 
to the wills of others in their immediate networks and have used the resources at their 
disposal to do what makes them ‘happy’. And yet in following their predispositions to 
feminine appearance practices they have reproduced the terms of their own gendered 
domination whilst experiencing themselves as authors of their own destinies. 
 
Other participants also talk about their decision in terms of authentic choice to do 
beauty therapy. Their accounts, however, suggest much less confident ‘learner 
identities’ and more limited cultural capital and ‘horizons for action’, (Hodkinson,1997).  
Louisa, Anna, Chelsea, Jenna, Leila and Natalie all initially entered  level 1 beauty 
courses from school without full level 2 qualifications (5 GCES grades A* - C).   
Although their post-16 education options were severely limited, none of the girls 
foreground this as a reason for choosing beauty therapy. Instead, they respond to 
questions about why they enrolled on their beauty course by focusing primarily on their 
interest in beauty related practices and identities bound up, to greater or lesser extents, 
with ‘girly’ activities connected to appearance.  
  
Anna’s account, for instance, does not suggest the kind of secure vocational 
identification (Bloomer et al, 2002) or developed ‘choice biography’ displayed by Emma 
and Abigail. Although her only ambition in year 11 was to enroll on a beauty therapy 
course, her stated reasons for this are vague and connected to a concern with her own 





What was it that interested you about beauty? 
 
I don’t know. I just like going out to get my hair done.  I like making people 
feel good about themselves…making them feel confident and stuff.  It’s like, nice. 
(Anna, Level 1, College A). 
 
In this sense, she comes close to the definition of the ‘typical’ beauty student often used 
by tutors.  
 
They think ‘oh I'm just going to put some make up on someone and do their 
nails and you know, maybe do a facial ...’, it sounds nice, it sounds glamorous.  
Make people look pretty.  (Helen, Tutor, College A).  
 
In contract, Louisa’s account suggests that she had considered beauty therapy in more 
vocational terms. This may be largely because she had some knowledge of what it 
might be like as a job through her contact with her mother’s mobile beauty therapist who 
had offered to help her with resources to set up her own business.  But whilst her 
decision might be shaped by relationships within family networks and by access to a 
certain amount of social capital through them, it was also constructed in interaction with 
broader structural constraints including those associated with the education system, 
specifically her objective chances of having a range of post-16 options to ‘choose’ from.  
Her account suggests that she was unable to pursue her original interests and goals 
because of poor grades (possibly related to her dyslexia), and it is at this point that we 
can see the feminine disposition towards beauty practices being used as a fall-back or 
default position. 
  
Did you think about any other options at school when you were choosing your 
options? 
 
Photography and art but I wasn’t, in art I didn’t get on too well...  So I probably 
would have wanted to do, like, fashion or photography but then I chose beauty 
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because it’s the main thing I do and, like, yeah, spend hours doing the make up! 
So [laughs]…(Louisa, Level 1, College B). 
 
Louisa’s account seems to indicate a resigned withdrawal from the world that she had 
imagined she might inhabit as a designer or photographer and a sense of loss together 
with a denial of that loss suggested in the statement, “but then I chose beauty”.  This is 
unsurprising given the contemporary burden on individuals to be responsible for  their 
own biographies.  To express loss in relation to her original goals would be blame 
herself for making the ‘wrong choices’ or for not being in control of her own biography.  
On one level, Louisa’s use of a ‘choice’ narrative could be understood as a 
pragmatically rational strategy to protect herself against loss of face. Equally, as 
Brannen and Nilsen (2005) suggest, the ideological power of individualism to shape 
perspectives means that the role of external forces in determining opportunities is easily 
ignored. Looking at this from a Bourdieusian perspective, if habitus makes a ‘virtue of 
necessity’ -an “adaptation to and consequently acceptance of the necessary” 
(Bourdieu,1984 :373)- under any regime of power, then in the context of  an 
individualistic society in which structural constraints become increasingly invisible this 
action of the habitus may become more effective.  
 
“Just any reason, really”: Indecision, drift and constraint 
Five of the thirteen participants (Kelly, Amber, Tania, Lindsey and Jaime), all of 
whom entered their course with few or no qualifications, talked about their decision 
primarily in terms of beauty therapy as a fall- back position when other options were 
unobtainable, as something they drifted into because of lack of interest in other possible 
training options, or because of the perceived need to gain qualifications in order to ‘get 
anywhere’ in life.  Whilst they all talked about being interested in beauty practices, 
taking a vocational beauty course was often seen at best as a second choice, at worst, 
a ‘last resort’.  In these accounts, the eventual decision to do beauty therapy has what 
Du Bois-Reymond describes as the “temporary or even arbitrary character” (Du Bois-
Reymond, 1998:69) associated with the “undecided” and with what Ball et al 
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characterize as young people with “narrowly set” horizons for action (Ball et al, 
2001:116).  However, the accounts of these participants suggest that the ‘choice’ of 
beauty therapy is possibly less random than Du Bois-Reymond suggests and that 
‘durable’ gendered dispositions at least make it a ‘choosable identity’ (Colley et al, 
2003).  Whilst it is the case that these students ‘lacked’ the purposeful sense of career 
strategy employed by Emma and Abigail there is a danger, as Ball et al ( Ibid, 2001) 
point out, of pathologizing young people who do not approximate to the idealized 
subject of a neo-liberal ‘learning society’.   This may be a particularly important point in 
relation to courses which are as thoroughly gendered as beauty therapy.  The fact that 
these young women appear to hold their ‘choice’ at a distance, in some cases 
representing it as a stop gap or in instrumental terms as a future investment to ‘fall back 
on’ if needed, suggests the possibility of some resistance to, or distance from, the 
discourses of beauty culture.  Indeed, whilst the “scope and space” or “horizons for 
action” within which these girls have made their decisions may be limited by the 
intersections of class and gender, their accounts sometimes (though not always) 
suggest a more critical understanding of the external pressures within which their 
‘choices’ have been made than those of students who are less ambivalent about their 
decision. 
 
Amber’s account is one of the most fragmented and contradictory and is characterized 
by a sense of detachment and fatalism.  Although she had vaguely considered a 
number of other vocational training options, her post-16 decision was eventually 
restricted to a choice between childcare and beauty therapy.  In response to a direct 
question about why she decided to do beauty therapy, she represents her decision as 
an essentially arbitrary one swayed, in the last instance, by a chance event- a possibly 
‘critical moment’ that Amber interprets both in terms of fate and as a moment of agency: 
 
Just any reason really. My mum wanted me to go to college (laughs) so… it 
was out of two courses.  And, when I looked round this bit and I liked it and I just 
filled out a application form for Beauty and  Child Care,  and I rung up on the day 
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of the Child Care [open day] and it had been cancelled and I would rather do 
Beauty..so. That was it (Amber, Level 1, College B). 
 
The experience of making a life decision may feel arbitrary to a young woman whose 
options have been restricted to the point where any developed sense of volition is no 
longer possible.  As Ball et al argue in response to Giddens’ assumption that young 
people are now able to choose from a ‘diversity of options’, reflexivity is not a readily 
available resource for young people leaving school without qualifications (Ball, 
2001:22).  However, there is also a sense in which Amber’s apparent lack of investment 
in the labour market can be seen as a ‘rational’ response to limited options available to 
her and to her experience and expectation of educational ‘failure’ (Reay & Ball, 1997).   
 
Kelly and Lindsey, both of whom had progressed from NVQ Level 1 to their current level 
2 course, also left school with no A-C grade GCSEs.  For both participants beauty 
therapy was a default position when other cherished ambitions or preferred options 
seemed unattainable. Kelly had planned to become a chef whilst Lindsey had wanted to 
join the army as a paramedic or to be a painter and decorator. What is of interest here is 
why beauty therapy was seen as an alternative. There was a very real sense in both 
accounts that this decision was the fall -out from a process in which disappointment and 
‘failure’ obliged them to look for an alternative and to locate this in activities which they 
already know and understand. The accounts suggest that beauty practices already 
played a central part in the way most of the participants produced themselves as 
feminine before enrolling on their courses. They are also important practices within 
family or friendship networks.  As is suggested in some of the above accounts, the 
importance of the family as a field of gender reproduction appears to contradict 
Bourdieu’s claim that the domestic sphere is relatively unimportant in this respect 
(Bourdieu, 2001, Chambers, 2005).  As Kelly says, “it’s common knowledge about 
beauty..” and although she is clear that she “didn’t even want to be a beauty therapist, I 
wanted to be a chef”, when this dream is no longer feasible (for reasons discussed in 




… when I was thinking about what I wanted to do, I like doing my own nails 
and things and I used to do my mum’s make-up and all that and I used to just 
think, ‘oh I wouldn’t mind doing that for a living’.  Because…. my cousin, she’s … 
like mentally challenged and I just love doing her nails and stuff and it makes you 
feel really happy… I just like doing it on my family (Kelly, Level 2, College B)   
 
Lindsey also identified beauty therapy as ‘something to do’ because; 
 
I’m always at home doing my nails and they never really go right, so … it’s 
just to give me a bit more knowledge about beauty and obviously if I want to do it 
in the future…. I’d obviously be qualified in it (Lindsey, Level 2, College B) 
 
In Bourdieu’s terms, their decisions can be seen as a ‘choice of necessity’ determined 
by limited educational capital and an already established ‘practical sense’ of ‘doing 
beauty’.  However, Lindsey’s focus on beauty therapy as an investment for the future 
suggests a more instrumental and considered approach. Although this may well be a 
post-hoc rationalization on her part, it seems that her parents may have had an 
influence on her decision to do ‘something’ with her life that appears to guarantee some 
level of security and respectability. 
 
…they’re [parents] … proud of me … for actually doing something with my 
life, instead of just sitting around and being a bum….they know I don’t really 
particularly want to do it.  But, it’s something just in case- I’ve got something to 
fall back on that I’m going to be qualified in (Lindsey, Level 2, College B). 
 
The prospect of attaining a qualification in beauty therapy allowed her to position herself 
as respectable, distinguishing herself from the figure of the ‘workless benefit claimant’ 
which haunts several of the students’ accounts.  Like the care students in Skeggs's 
(1997) study,  a qualification, even one that has a limited capacity to inspire and, 
whether it is recognized or not, limited value as economic or cultural capital, may 
represent a way of “putting a floor on…economic and cultural circumstances” (Ibid, 
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1997:58).  Although Lindsey’s concern with guarding against downward mobility has 
some resonance with the model of choice proposed by rational action theories, the way 
in which she imagines the future does not. Her ‘plans’ to be “in a nice warm country, sat 
on a beach with a beer in my hand…I’d have my own pub or restaurant behind me on 
the beachfront”,   has the quality of “fantasy life of future possibilities” (Ball et al, 2000: 
112). Nevertheless, her account suggests a need to position herself as someone who is 
in control of her life, someone who is engaged, as Giddens (1991) sees it, in a ‘project 
of the self’. Whilst the resources she brings to this ‘project’ are too limited to construct 
confidently reflexive choice biography like Abigail and Emma, like them she appears to 
have a very strong investment in positioning herself within a narrative of personal 
choice,  pushing aside any suggestion that structural inequalities and collective 
differences have shaped her life chances.  It is not just the middle class, as Strathern 
(1992, cited in Skeggs, 2005: 974) suggests who have ‘no choice but to choose’ .  
 
Do you think that being a girl, growing up a girl has had an effect on your life 
and your choices and… things that you’ve done? 
 
No, I’ve made all the right choices I think.  There’s nothing … I really 
regret.…if you regret something, you obviously didn’t want it to happen at the 
time (Lindsey, Level 2, College B). 
 
In contrast, a minority of participants focus on the ways in which external constraints of 
some sort have led them to ‘fall back’ on beauty therapy. Kelly’s account, for example, 
invokes family conflict and the male dominated nature of the college’s catering course 
as factors which had hampered her ability to realize her goal of becoming a chef.   
Jaime, meanwhile, was critical of an education system which prevents young people 
from making ‘informed choices’ about their futures.  
 
…when it comes to … doing Beauty and Hair and Childcare it all sounds 
good, but you don’t know what happens in it because you don’t do it in your life, 
so I don’t see how you can…properly want to do it … And because you don’t 
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really know… you just jump in and think, “yeah”, you want to do it, because 
nothing else stands out. Like you’ve only done it because I don’t know what else 
to do (Jaime, Level 2, College A). 
 
Jaime’s refusal to make a ‘virtue of necessity’ (Bourdieu, 1990) was a result of her 
critical understanding of  how young people are made powerless. However, it may be a 
measure of the dearth of available discourses which would sustain and develop this 
insight, as well as the power of the neo-liberal discourse of choice, that she later 
attributes her situation to a personal failure to exercise responsibility for planning a 
successful future:    
 
I should be… planning ahead, but I don’t know where to start because I don’t 
know what I want to do (Jaime, Level 2, College A). 
 
In the following narrative, Jaime imagines an alternative future of almost limitless 
possibilities and upward mobility- if only she had ‘got in gear’ at school.  
 
… if I had better grades… I could do….anything I wanted to.  I could be a … I 
don’t know – a Judge.   Like I could be like something, like, major, whereas now 
I’m sat doing Level 2…I just feel like if I’d got better GCSEs then I could make 
more of my life.  But then, I’ve only to blame myself.   I could have… got in-gear 
in school…but I just don’t have the willpower that says, “I’ll stick with that” (Jaime, 
Level 2, College A). 
 
Recalling Lehmann’s (2009) study of working class university students, when 
participants recognize external constraints on their post-16 decisions they are often 
individualized as particular to their own circumstances (as in Kelly’s narrative about 
rebelling against family pressure to ‘do well’ at school)  or as exacerbating difficulties 
which are, at root, of their own making (as in Jaime’s narratives above). Such 
understandings are arguably produced by symbolic violence working through ideologies 
promoted by the education system in combination with discourses of neo-liberal 
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individualization, giving the illusion that positions and rewards are distributed on merit. 
As Bourdieu argues, “[a]symbolic violence is perpetuated towards the ordinary child 
creating the irremovable feeling of their own individual failure” (Bourdieu, 1984, cited in 
Susen & Turner, 2011: 43).  
 
Jaime’s account, like those of other participants, also suggests a very keen awareness 
of the low status of beauty therapy.  This may explain some of the ambivalence that 
even those who see themselves as making a ‘free choice’ hold towards being ‘marked’ 
as a ‘beauty girl’. 
 
“I wanted to… take care of myself and everything else”:  beauty therapy as a solution to 
‘personal problems’. 
 
Two participants, Jenna and Kelly, explicitly identify dissatisfaction with appearance and 
low self -worth as one reason for their attraction to beauty therapy. For Kelly, anxiety 
about appearance is a recurrent theme in her interviews:  
 
I feel very .. conscious of the way I look…. I used to go to the gym, but I just 
look around and there’s all these like pretty girls and I’m just like, “oh my God… I 
just can’t explain it…..I think that’s why I went on this course as well, to like boost 
my confidence a bit (Kelly, Level 1, College B). 
 
Feelings about appearance are also central in Jenna’s account and are bound up with a 
history of depression, abuse (including childhood sexual abuse), school bullying and 
family conflict. Her self-loathing is most often expressed in terms of feeling ashamed of 
her ‘looks’ and in the positioning of herself as someone whose care for others is either 
exploited or unreciprocated. Her “ambition for people to recognize me” is intimately 
bound up with the idea of looking attractive and with a construction of caring as 




….because I grew up with my granddad suffering from arthritis… I had little 
fingers so I always used to get in between his fingers and snap the little 
bones …and then he’d be all, “Yeah, that feels lush”.  And I think it’s because, 
where I’m such a caring person. (Jenna, Level 1, College A) 
 
This appears to be the basis of a rudimentary vocational identification in which caring 
for others is equated with making them ‘feel good’ which, in turn, is bound up with 
making them, and herself, ‘look good’:  
 
I enjoy doing a treatment on somebody and then seeing … that they’re 
happy…I want do massage and… I’m doing a beauty course because I wanted 
to try and make myself beautiful, I wanted to try and feel that I was a bit more 
prettier and that I could take care of myself and everything else.. because you 
look at beauticians and you see this perfect… girl, with her eyebrows and her 
hair up and her makeup looking beautiful (Jenna, 19, NVQ 2, College A). 
 
Several other participants also talked about performing non-appearance –related 
‘treatments’ on family members with health problems as one reason for being interested 
in the course. The NVQ curriculum,  which includes various types of massage and 
reflexology as well as ‘looking  treatments’ (Black, 2004),  reflects the way in which the 
contemporary beauty therapy industry has incorporated treatments associated with a 
broad, ‘holistic’ definition of ‘health and wellbeing’ rather than just appearance (Ibid, 
2004). Arguably,  incorporating  ‘health treatments’ under the rubric of beauty therapy 
reflects and helps to produce a ‘body project’ (Ibid, 2004; Frost, 2001;2005) and a 
‘project of the self’ in which the distinctions between ‘health’ and appearance- between 
feeling good (physically and emotionally) and looking good –are increasingly blurred, 
drawing women in to a concern with appearance as a signifier of the health and self- 
management required of neo-liberal subjects (Black, 2004; Giddens, 1991; Ray, 2005).  
 
For prospective beauty therapy students this has a number of possible implications. 
Firstly, for young women like Jenna, whose attraction to beauty therapy seems to have 
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had more to do with ‘personal’ needs rather than vocational identification, beauty 
therapy may appear to offer a therapeutic solution to ‘emotional problems’  connected to 
appearance, identity and relationships. This points to the possibility that for some 
women in personal service jobs including  beauty therapy,  emotional labour may not 
just be a source of ‘job satisfaction’ through the successful management of clients’ 
wellbeing (Black, 2004) but may also be valued by workers as a means of addressing 
their own emotional needs or problems.  Secondly, whilst (particularly older) middle 
class women may be more able to invest in salon practices as a ‘set of complementary 
therapies’ (Ibid, 2004), young working class women, for whom feminine bodily 
appearance is arguably a more important, albeit less valuable, resource (Skeggs, 
1997), may be more likely  to see beauty therapy (as clients and prospective 
practitioners) in terms of its promises of an attractive appearance which, in itself, 
represents a solution to other ‘problems’.  This is certainly suggested in tutors’ 
understandings of why beauty therapy is an attractive proposition for some young 
women:  
 
I think it’s a lot to do with their own personal image…..we get such young girls 
who are not always thinking about this as a career. It sounds fun for a start doing 
make up, and they want to often learn how to look after themselves or make the 
most of themselves or …..make themselves feel better about themselves 
(Marina, Tutor, College B).  
 
None of the other students explicitly identify concerns about appearance as a reason for 
joining the course. However, in many cases dissatisfaction with appearance, sometimes 
intensely so, is part of the backdrop against which ‘choices’ are constructed and 
decisions are made. For instance, Louisa talks about “getting into exercise and beauty 
stuff” as a way of avoiding bullying at school and to deal with her painfully low self-
confidence. For Emma, learning how to ‘look after’ her skin has alleviated her eczema 
so she “wouldn’t leave this course if someone paid me to”.  Amber diets and binges to 




 I hate how big I am…..  there’s people on my course who are like tiny and I 
just want to be like them”. (Amber, 19, NVQ 1, College B). 
 
But its significance as a key factor shaping young women’s lives may be almost 
invisible.  McRobbie suggests that young women’s intense concern with  feminine 
appearance, and the various ‘disorders’ which may be expressions of this, are now 
culturally positioned as “healthy signs of unhealthy femininity”  (McRobbie, 2009: 96).  
Whilst for many of the students there is “a hell of a lot of hurt around not being attractive 
enough” (Hollway, 1984:240),  the normalization of feminine identities predicated on 
dissatisfaction (Frost, 2001) operates as symbolic violence, obscuring not only the harm 
it causes and its origins in social forces and relationships, but also its role in shaping 
‘choices’ and trajectories.  In general, students’ accounts support the idea that 
appearance and physical attractiveness is a ‘master status’  Whether a woman inhabits 
an acceptably ‘attractive’ or an ‘unattractive’ body it is still, as Tseelon argues, a 
stigmatized body because it is constantly on display, constantly monitored, constantly in 
need of work. Female being, as Bourdieu suggests, is often defined and experienced as 
“being –perceived” (Bourdieu, 2001:63).  That ‘attractiveness’ is always precarious and 
temporary (Tseelon, 1992:300-301) is something the contemporary beauty industry 
relies on.  As Bartky suggests, it both promises to alleviate feelings of inadequacy or 
shame arising from stigmatization, at the same time as helping to create them.  It seems 
unlikely that this is irrelevant in the decisions of the young women to enroll on a beauty 
course, even where it is not explicitly given as a reason.   Whilst body-dissatisfaction 
and the stigma of attractiveness are likely to be as significant for girls who ‘choose’ 
other vocational or educational pathways, the lure of beauty makes beauty therapy 
courses a default position, particularly, though not exclusively, for girls with limited 







Choice and the disappearance of structure 
The tendency of choice discourse to eclipse power so that it can be in effect 
simultaneously recognized and disavowed in a way that recalls McRobbie’s (2009) 
analysis of the disarticulation of feminism,  is also evident in the way in which attraction 
to beauty practices and vocational beauty therapy is talked about.  A number of 
participants express an awareness of the cultural pressures on girls to conform to 
normative standards of feminine appearance and in a minority of cases this is 
understood as being unfair and detrimental to them. However, this critical understanding 
is never applied explicitly to participants own ‘choice’ of beauty therapy.  As discussed 
above, even participants for whom a beauty therapy course was most clearly a default 
position, foreground their strong interest in beauty practices and represent this as a 
personal preference or natural feminine inclination. 
 
It’s just like nails, tanning, make-up – it’s, like, what every girl likes; what I like 
(Jaime, Level 2, College B) 
 
Aside from the powerful influence of the ideology of sexual difference, we can 
understand this in terms of the difficulty people might experience in comprehending and 
talking about the social forces which shape life chances and identities (Brennen and 
Nilsen, 2005). The relative ease with which we conceptualize ourselves as free agents 
may be partly due to the ways in which social structures in late modernity have “become 
more obscure as collectivist traditions”  (Furlong and Cartmel, 1997 :5). In Bernstein’s 
(2000) terms, the problem is more about an ‘implicit model’ of the self-regulating, 
competent subject embedded in the social structures and institutions of late modernity, 
a model which emphasizes agency and disavows structure. It is difficult for participants, 
even those who are most ambivalent about their ‘choices’, to understand their 
trajectories in terms of structural and cultural constraints when this model obliges them 
to understand it in individualized or psychologized terms (Walkerdine, 2003; McRobbie, 
2004; 2009; Baker, 2009). The Neo-liberal discourse of obligatory self-production 




However, in keeping with other studies of youth transitions (Baker,2005; Ball et al,2000; 
Brannen and Nilsen, 2005), those most skilled in mobilizing discourses of choice and 
self -production were those who were able to bring the most educational capital and 
other resources from family and social networks to their decisions. Of all participants, it 
is Abigail and Emma who were most able to sustain a narrative of identity (Giddens, 
1991) based on ‘autonomous choice’. The “capacity to keep a particular narrative going” 
(Ibid, 1991:54), as Giddens argues, relies on being able to integrate it with ‘real’ 
experience and material or symbolic resources. In the case of these two participants 
this includes the capital derived from educational or, in Abigail’s case, occupational 
background. In Emma’s case, it also includes the cultural capital that she is very likely to 
have derived from her family, or more specifically, from her upwardly mobile father who 
returned to education when she was a child and is now a head teacher.  For others with 
less resources of this type, the narrative of personal choice is more often interrupted by 
oblique references to constraints or by a vague account of why beauty therapy was a 
preferred option and how this could be capitalized on for future employment.   
 
Those participants who are most ambivalent about their decision to enroll on a beauty 
therapy course are also those least able to sustain a narrative of self as ‘autonomous 
chooser’.  Whilst their post-16 decisions are, like those of other participants, “subjected 
to individualizing logics” (Baker, 2009: 13), their accounts suggest much more 
fragmented identities and by implication a greater distance from the self-actualizing 
individualism of neo-liberal discourse.   Walkerdine et al, (2001) McRobbie (2009) and 
Gonick (2007) point to the emotional and psychic costs for young women of ‘failing’ to 
live up to the now ubiquitous discourses of the ‘successful girl’.  A sense of low self-
worth pervades many of the accounts and although this cannot be wholly attributed to 
the experience of being marginalized by these discourses I would argue that they play a 
significant part in producing the frustration,  fatalism, loss, disappointment and self-
blame that some participants express in relation to their post-16 decisions.  As Brannen 
& Nilsen (2005) suggest, the rhetoric of choice may worsen the situation of less 
privileged young people and “create a pessimistic outlook on life” (Ibid: 423) since within 
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its terms they only have themselves to blame for ‘failure’ to achieve or make the ‘right 
choices’.  
 
Paradoxically, it may also be implicated in the ambitions held by some of the 
participants which reflect a fantasy-like “optimism against the odds” (Baker, 2009:6). For 
instance, Tania and Leila, who entered their courses with few GCSEs and who both 
struggle with written work , imagined themselves studying, respectively, osteopathy and 
Spanish at university. Whilst such optimism, as Baker (Ibid, 2009) suggests, allows a 
‘better future’ to be imagined,  there is no suggestion in their accounts of reflexive, 
pragmatic planning or of any awareness of progression routes or the barriers they would 
have deal with in order to achieve these aspirations.  However, there is a sense in 
which this disjuncture between ambitions and ‘objective probabilities’, most clearly 
expressed by those participants who are most ambivalent about their decision,  might 
signal a germ of resistance to the limits imposed on them. In Bourdieusian terms, where 
there is a dissonance between the subjective structures of habitus and objective 
structures, “increased possibilities may arise for critical reflection” (Adkins, 2004:197) or 
what Bourdieu calls an “awaking of consciousness” ( Bourdieu, 1977, cited in ibid, 
2004:197). However, insofar as ambitions are consistent with the neoliberal discourse of 
self improvement (Baker, 2009) any potential for resistance can also be contained 
within its terms.  Self –blame rather than critical awareness appears to be the most 
likely resolution when participants confront discrepancies between aspirations and their 
current realities.  
 
I would also suggest that for some of those participants who are less able to sustain a 
narrative of choice the importance of a heterosexually attractive feminine appearance 
might fill the vacuum left by the absence of a conventional ‘success biography’.  Whilst 
most participants routinely invoke appearance as a resource that can be capitalized on 
for success in gaining male and other forms of social approval, it is also sometimes 
explicitly understood as a form of economic capital. This is expressed most forcefully by 




More people care about their looks and doing well I think.   Because you 
see…pictures of celebrities in magazines….  She’s [Paris Hilton] done so well for 
herself.  Everyone just thought she just was a dumb blonde, but she’s actually 
really smart.  She’s made millions out of herself, she’s, like, a business woman.  I 
think she’s a very good role model on girls (Anna, 17, NVQ 1).  
 
This narrative suggests how the obligation to produce a success-biography, coupled 
with the sexualization of female success promoted through ‘celebrity culture’, and more 
broadly through the processes of female individualization, might work as a form of 
symbolic violence against young women, particularly those with limited access to 
cultural and economic capital. The idea of the objectified body as a lucrative resource, 
as a form of ‘erotic capital’ (Hakim, 2010), not only normalizes the objectification and 
commodification of women but also promotes the belief that with effort any young 
women can be successful.  It is unlikely that Anna is unaware of Paris Hilton’s extremely 
privileged background but in this identificatory fantasy it is either ignored or not seen as 
relevant. 
Conclusion: choice, dispositions and the reproduction of inequality 
 
The ability to produce a choice biography, together with access to the resources 
underpinning it, might well give relatively privileged participants the best chance of 
capitalizing on their beauty therapy courses through subsequent training/education and 
entrepreneurialism. However, this does not mean that their ‘choices’ are any less 
problematic than those of other participants. As Brennen & Nilsen argue, on the basis of 
their own and others’ research: 
 
There is ample indication that the positive rhetoric of choice has more appeal 
to, and relevance for, young people whose social background and education 
provide the resources necessary to think they are creators of their own destinies 




In this sense, reflexive individualism may be as much about an ability to construct a 
discourse of rational choice as it is a reflection of any ‘real control of a life-trajectory 
(Kidd, 1998). However, whether enrolling on a beauty therapy course has involved 
some level of reflexive decision making or is the result of few realistic alternatives, it 
also relies, in the vast majority of cases, on already established feminine dispositions 
towards self-presentation (Bourdieu, 2001). These are produced through  prior 
experiences of beauty practices which are entangled in pleasure, bodily dissatisfaction 
and shame and it is arguably these complex affective relationships which determine the  
centrality of appearance in participants’ lives as an internalized master status and which 
makes beauty therapy a ‘choosable identity’. Insofar as participants have ‘chosen’ to do 
beauty, it is a choice that is not only heavily constrained by gender in interaction with 
class but is also one that reproduces these power relations. This position supports 
Bourdieu’s understanding of ‘choice’ as the mastery of practices which “reproduce.. 
original objective conditions” (Harker et al, 1990).  However, the idea that individuals 
simply “follow the leanings of their habitus” (Bourdieu, 2010:220) is clearly not the whole 
story. Some students are aware of external forces involved in their decision making. In 
addition, they were sometimes critical of the inequity involved in the cultural pressures 
on girls to conform to particular ideals of feminine appearance.  However, that they did 
not  apply this to their own ‘choices’ may suggest both the power of habitus and the lack 
of opportunity to ask critical questions about how their ‘choices’ are shaped by  social 
and cultural forces.  Arguably, girls are deprived of this possibility partly because of the 
preeminence of individualized choice discourses which interrupt whatever critical 
understanding they have and effectively reassert doxic assumptions (Moi, 1990) about 
‘what girls like’.  Alongside this particular expression of symbolic violence, however, we 
should consider Colley’s (2006) argument about the ‘rationality’ in girls’ training and 
career decisions.  Just as girls might “resist male dominated occupations because of the 
discrimination and harassment they may face” (Colley, 2006: 27), the  centrality of the 
body and  appearance as emblematic of female self-possession (Attwood, 2005), 
success and upward mobility (Walkerdine, 2003; McRobbie, 2004;2009), together with a 
severely limited range of other options, provide the objective conditions in which 
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enrolling on a beauty course can be seen as  a ‘rational’  decision to capitalize on 
gendered dispositions or, perhaps, to limit any further depreciation of status and self- 
value (Skeggs, 1997).   However, the capital to be gained from embodied femininity in 
relation to appearance and vocational beauty therapy is a limited capital which also 
reproduces structural inequalities and reinforces the positioning of women as objects of 
exchange and the male gaze.  In addition, some students entered their courses with a 
desire to ‘help other people feel better about themselves’ or, from experience with family 
members or friends, at least felt a connection between the caring self and beauty 
therapy practices. It is possibly significant that nearly half of the participants had 
considered but rejected childcare or other traditional forms of care work. This may be 
indicative of the continuities and tensions between the expressions of femininity 
required in care work and beauty therapy, and the tensions between ‘care of the self’ 
and ‘care of others’.   
  
In the next chapter, I explore some of these issues in the context of tutors’ 
understandings of what makes a successful ‘beauty girl’ and the value of beauty therapy 




















‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Students: Hidden Curricula and 
Discourses of Success and Failure 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter I focus on tutors’ notions of what constitutes ‘successful’ or ‘deficient’ 
students and the gendered, classed and racialized meanings that adhere in these 
constructions.   I discuss how these notions are mobilized in the process of recruitment, 
in the placement of students at different levels within the beauty programmes, and in 
tutors’ understandings of the kinds of skills, knowledge and dispositions which are 
necessary for successful progression to jobs in the beauty industry.  The chapter  
addresses how tutors’ representations of students and their attempts to position 
themselves as gatekeepers for the industry are informed by their own concerns with 
defending  beauty therapy as a ‘serious’ and ‘professional’ occupation in the face of its 
generally low public esteem and its denigratory associations with ‘vanity’ and ‘feminine 
superficiality’.  However, whilst tutors emphasize the theoretical knowledge and 
technical skills involved in beauty therapy their accounts also reveal the ways in which 
success or failure on the course is defined primarily in terms of the gendered and 
classed dispositions embodied by students. Thus this chapter begins the discussion, 
continued in chapters nine and ten, of the ways in which the discourses of knowledge, 
skills and ‘professionalism’ operate as forms of symbolic violence against both students 
and tutors, concealing the (hetero)gendered and classed power relations in which 
beauty therapy is enmeshed.  As well as exploring the ‘hidden curricula’ contained in 
these discourses, I also address those bound up in tutors’ assumptions about the future 
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job/career prospects and life chances of students;  assumptions based on 
heteronormative and classed notions of women’s relationship to the labour market. 
“We try to take everybody”: tensions in recruitment and selection 
 
In Chapter seven I discussed how beauty therapy was at least a ‘choosable identity’ 
(Colley at , 2003) for the participants and one which informs the process of self-
selection. However, in order to obtain a place on an NVQ beauty therapy course at 
colleges A and B applicants must go through a formal processes of attending an 
interview and an open day at which they are required to participate in a taster session 
which involves learning to do a treatment such as pedicure. Tutors see this as a way of 
‘dismantling’ applicants’ perception of beauty therapy as a ‘glamorous’ or ‘easy’ option.  
It is expected that many of them will find dealing with ‘intimate’ areas of a stranger’s 
body, including ‘bikini lines’ and  feet,  difficult or even ‘disgusting’ so this exercise is 
seen as an early induction into the learning culture of the course and the emotional 
labour which in part defines beauty therapy. This induction acts potentially as an 
inducement to self-de-selection by applicants deemed ‘unsuited’ to this work.  In theory 
it is understood as a way of identifying the potential not only to suppress feelings of 
revulsion but to replace them with feelings which are more empathetic with the needs of 
clients (Hochschild, 1988).  
 
Assessing ‘ability’ and ‘suitability’ against institutional pressures 
 
The surveillance of candidates at this stage serves to distinguish those most and least 
likely to succeed on the course or to enter the industry. The pressures of funding, 
management directives and college policies on ‘inclusion’ mean that very few applicants 
are rejected:   
 
…it’s not easy to reject really, these days.  It’s an inclusive college, we try to 
take… everybody…[and]… to select a few who are more able to cope for 
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NVQ2…. we’ve actually worked quite hard at raising the qualifications required to 
get onto the [Level 2]course (Sally, Tutor, College B). 
In College A, a literacy test taken during the open day is sometimes used as the basis 
of rejecting candidates whose results show literacy skills below Entry 3 Level on the 
basis that “they just wouldn’t cope” (Karen, College A).  Aside from this, an assessment 
of ‘behaviour’ and ‘attitude’ is the main basis on which tutors feel legitimately able to 
refuse applicants. 
 
… the only way we are allowed to reject them, is if they have behaviour 
issues… if they are going to behave badly on that [taster] day you know 
that….they’re not going to be…. acceptable in a learning environment (Marina, 
College A). 
 
Marina and other tutors focus on how well an applicant’s behavior  is perceived as likely 
to fit into and not ‘disrupt’ a learning environment which, in the training salons, is 
physically set up to reproduce the ‘calm’ and ‘caring’ ambiance of a commercial salon 
and to suggest the kind of interactions and behaviours expected of actors in this 
context. In this sense, judgments about appropriate and inappropriate behavior 
coalesce around shared ideas about the vocational dispositions appropriate for the 
face-to-face and bodily intimate service work (Black, 2004). 
 
…there was one girl recently…and she had a face like a smacked backside 
the whole [taster] day… didn’t say one word, didn’t smile, didn’t comment when I 
asked her any questions, didn’t answer…she just wasn’t selling herself.  [At] the 
interview… we explain it’s their chance to shine…to prove to us that they’re going 
to be worthy of the course and she just didn’t …(Karen, College A). 
 
In spite of the institutional pressures to accept applicants, the importance of tutors’ 
judgments about students’ ability to acquire and inhabit an appropriate vocational 
habitus is demonstrated in decisions about the course level on which individual 
applicants should be placed.  In some cases, there is an apparent discrepancy between 
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formal entry requirements and the placement of students. Some students with the 
required number of GCSEs or even a full level 2 qualification were nevertheless placed 
on level 1 courses. Whilst I was not able to access information on the reasons behind 
decisions about particular individuals in the research group, it is interesting to speculate 
about why some students were not placed on courses according to the stated academic 
criteria.  
 
Chelsea (College A), a level 2 student, was originally placed on the level 1 course in 
spite of having four grade C GCSE passes including English Language and English 
Literature. When I met her at the end of her level 1 year and again to interview her at 
the beginning of her level 2 course it was easy to see how she may have been 
perceived as particularly shy and ‘childlike’ in her conduct and relationships with others 
and how this might signal a significant distance from the ‘maturity’ and confidence 
perceived by tutors as necessary for client-centered emotional labour and body work 
requiring;       
 
…somebody who’s a good chatter, not… loud… but someone that’s just 
interested in people…they do need to have that caring side …because they have 
to know that some people feel embarrassed coming in….  They also need to 
have a certain level of maturity which often they don’t have (Sally, Tutor, College 
B).   
 
It may also be significant that Chelsea is one of only two Black (African-Caribbean) or 
dual heritage students on the Level 2 course at College A.  As indicated in chapter five, 
there is certainly evidence from UK school-based research suggesting that institutional 
racialization may shape teachers’ judgments about pupil ability resulting in the over-
representation of Black students in low ability tiers (Philips, 2011).  Her apparent ‘mis-
placement’ may also raise questions about how far tutors’ judgments about the 
suitability of applicants for beauty therapy work are shaped by the historical equation of 
the feminine “art and glamour” of beauty culture (Bordo, 2003; 63; Craig, 2006) with 
Whiteness.  This does not have to imply any consciously racist intent on the part of 
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tutors but rather suggests that discursive constructions of ‘deficient’ and ‘ideal’ 
applicants might be  informed by normative notions of beauty and beauty practices 
which “locate women in specific valued or devalued positions” (Craig, 2006:164).  In this 
sense, the process through which Chelsea is effectively demoted to a level below her 
school achievement illustrates how symbolic violence intersects with and reproduces 
structural inequalities and violence. 
 
The way in which racialized meanings in intersection with gendered and classed ones 
are mobilized in the selection process is also suggested in Karen’s narrative about 
placing a white applicant ‘with potential’ but no GCSEs and a low literacy level on a 
level 2 course.  
 
….this year there was a girl…she came up E3 for literacy and…we put her on 
level two.  We knew that she’d struggle so we put her in 2C, which is …my 
group, with Mavis [Learning Support worker] …but she was a… lovely, lovely girl.  
Very placid, she’s a pretty girl, I mean pretty as in very well made up, she’s such 
a lovely temperament, she’s very well mannered, she’s smiley, the perfect model 
student. (Karen, Tutor, College A). 
 
This perception of what makes a  ‘model student’ contains a construction of femininity 
which resonates strongly with the “pure and proper femininity” (Skeggs, 1997:122) 
historically ascribed to White, middle class, heterosexual women, a category, as Skeggs 
points out, “designed to ‘other’ working class” women as well as  Black women and 
lesbians  (Ibid, 1997, 122). Though in both colleges most beauty therapy students are 
from White, working class backgrounds, this classed and racialized construction of 
femininity is part of the vocational habitus to which students are required to aspire or at 
least approximate. 
 
Tacit understandings of what makes an’ ideal’ or ‘deficient’ beauty student are also 
suggested in the case of Alex, who was placed on a Level1 course despite having a full 
Level 2 qualification in Health and Social Care.  Her ambition was to work in holistic 
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therapies but she was encouraged by teachers to apply for beauty therapy as a route to 
this kind of employment. Her allocation to a Level 1course not only discounted her 
previous academic achievement but, at eighteen, had put her at a disadvantage in 
terms of accessing free 16-19 educational provision. Whilst  Alex, as described by her 
tutor, is “painfully, painfully shy”, she is also seen in other ways as having a habitus at 
odds with the kind of  feminine dispositions normatively associated with beauty 
therapists.  
 
She's not really a beauty therapist… I think [it’s] her personal 
presentation….she doesn’t make the most of herself.  She always turns up in 
trainers and jeans…there isn't anything really that I can put my finger on but 
she's never looked smart whereas beauty therapists generally are very aware of 
their own personal presentation (Carol, Tutor, College B). 
 
The fact that Carol feels unable to ‘put her finger’ on exactly what it is about Alex which 
makes her the ‘wrong’ sort of student underscores the tacit, partly unconscious nature 
of the heteronormative assumptions which distinguishes those with and without a ‘feel 
for the game’ of beauty therapy.  She is, however, able to point to the embodied 
dispositions which symbolize the kind of femininity required of beauty students.  It 
seems unlikely that this would not have contributed to the judgments made about her at 
interview. This may be especially so given the tutors’ expectation that most applicants 
will already be immersed in rituals of feminine self-presentation. 
 
 ..generally they…look after their appearance…have make up on and their 
nails done and things like that [laughing]. Not very academic but quite well 







Gate Keeping: defending the ‘status’ of the beauty therapist 
 
That they are seldom able to reject applicants is a source of concern to all the tutors in 
the research group. In part this is because of the difficulties of getting students of ‘low 
academic ability’ or without the ‘appropriate’ dispositions, through the course. For some 
tutors, this is clearly an ethical issue: 
 
If they wanted to come we had to accept them….I personally think that that’s 
morally wrong (Carol, Tutor, College B). 
 
However, their concern with not being able to reject applicants is also bound up with  
the fragile status of beauty therapy as a training programme and an occupation. Many 
of the accounts mirror the concerns of beauty therapists in Black’s (2004) study about 
the desire for ‘professional’ status in the face of low pay, job insecurity, and discourses 
which counterpose ‘beauty’ against ‘brains’.  These issues are understood to contribute 
to the positioning of beauty therapy as service work rather than a ‘professional’ 
occupation. Like Black’s beauty therapists, the tutors are engaged in a struggle for 
recognition and public esteem. However, in this case the struggle is conducted not in 
the industry itself but in sites which are vital for the industry and in which future workers 
are produced. Tutors see themselves as having a central and privileged role in gate-
keeping and ‘improving’ industry ‘standards’ and status.  
 
…this is why I got into teaching….  It sounds a bit idealistic but I thought 
standards seem to be dropping and …it’s such a shame, I’d like to get in there 
and put something back and try and sort of let, raise the standards” (Sally, Tutor, 
College B). 
 
The idea of ‘falling standards’ is often discussed in relation to the types of qualifications 
which are now standard for entry to the industry and to the ‘types’ of students being 
recruited to beauty therapy courses.  Like the majority of beauty therapists in Black’s 
study, most of the tutors regarded the shift from HNCs/HNDs and City and Guilds Craft 
203 
 
qualifications as a significant part of this perceived decline.  Anne, a tutor at College B, 
contrasted the BTEC National Diploma in Beauty Science (recently disbanded at the 
college because of its perceived difficulty for ‘low achievers’ and thus its low retention 
and success rates) with NVQs: 
 
I think that the BTEC… is a very good qualification, and it has…particularly 
high levels. It makes the therapists more informed of the whole body… the NVQ 
system is almost…. just ticking boxes, to a certain extent (Anne, College B). 
 
 
The majority of tutors also made comparisons between the NVQ curriculum and the 
demands of their own training: 
 
..we had lots of assignments, lots of assessments and our tests were a lot 
harder and a lot more scientific…We had to do go into microbiology..pathology, 
we did lots of chemistry… we did a load more. (Karen, Tutor, College A). 
 
The way in which tutors talk about NVQ beauty therapy as a ‘box-ticking’ exercise 
reflects a specifically British model of VET since the mid- 1980s which privileges the 
“mastery of  narrow range of tasks” (Brockman et al, 2008:551) over theoretical 
knowledge and a general education. For tutors, qualifications which produce workers 
without the kinds of knowledge that can be pointed to as evidence of beauty therapy as 
a ‘serious’ industry exacerbate its already low status.  Moreover, if the NVQ system has 
stripped out of much of the more formal, theoretical or ‘scientific’ knowledge from the 
curriculum, as discussed in chapter two, it also exposes its association with the ‘beauty’ 
side of the “brains/beauty split against which women are evaluated” (Black & Sharma, 
2001:105) as persons, and in this case, as workers:  
 
Well they’re not particularly academic.... The majority of them are what I call 
girly- girls… I think people still perceive the beauty industry as very girly… not a 
serious industry….people say “well what do you do now” and I say “a beauty 
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therapist” … you can see some people sort of going “oh yeah” (Philippa, 
Manager/Tutor, College B). 
 
Whilst they are clearly critical of what they see as a ‘dumbing down’ of the qualification 
structure, most tutors tend to focus on the perceived deficits of applicants and students 
as a reason for the introduction of NVQs: 
 
The girls that apply wouldn’t cope with the courses that I did….The NVQs are 
designed for the ones that can’t really… have struggled at school and they’re a 
lot more practical.  So yes, they’ve still got the theory but they’ve designed it so 
that… it’s a lot easier (Karen, Tutor, College A). 
 
There is a kind of symbolic violence at work here which has the effect of re-framing neo-
liberal education policies as a benign response to the ‘needs’ of ‘less able’ students.   
An orientation to ‘practical’ skills rather than formal knowledge becomes naturalized as 
an attribute of working class girls rather than an outcome of policies informed by a 
“largely unspoken assumption that understanding was beyond the capabilities of those 
likely to take [NVQ] qualifications” (Young, 2011:277).  In addition, the naturalized 
association of practical skills with working class femininity (being a girly-girl) in part 
define the discursive boundaries within which students are positioned by tutors. Whilst 
tutors are themselves subject to these gendered and classed discourses, they also 
distance themselves from them, not only by stressing the relative academic difficulty, 
and therefore value, of their own training but also, in some cases, by representing 
applicants and students in extremely denigratory ways. Karen is probably the most 
outspoken in this respect: 
 
Probably eighty percent of the students we get are, I’d say, if I was being un-
PC, they’re the thick ones, quite frankly (Karen, Tutor, College A) 
 
Such statements represent an extreme expression of the deficit model of students 
which all tutors, to greater or lesser extents, employ. Whilst being victims of the 
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symbolic violence contained in discourses which position ‘brains’ against ‘beauty’ they 
also enact the same violence against students whose dispositions appear to threaten 
the  ‘respectability’ of beauty therapy as an occupation and thus their own sense of 
themselves as  skilled or even ‘professional’ workers. 
Success and failure: skills, knowledge and dispositions 
 
Tutors concerns  about recruiting ‘inappropriate’ applicants is strongly related to their 
anxieties about the institutional pressures to pass ‘substandard’ work and sign off 
students for the award of their NVQ qualification.  However, several tutors legitimized  
acting against their professional judgments on the grounds that ‘incompetent’ students 
would be unlikely to find work as beauty therapists. 
 
…there’s girls going through that shouldn’t be getting a qualification 
really…we get told…we have to pass them. The only thing that gives me a little 
bit of peace of mind is often those students that are pushed through don’t go to 
work in industry anyway (Marina, Tutor, College A) 
 
I think that's why sometimes it doesn’t bother me that you have to get them 
through because I know that they are not going to work in industry (Sharon, 
Tutor, College A). 
 
Tutors expect a high percentage of those recruited to level 1 or 2 courses and those 
who progress from level 2 to 3 courses (the standard for qualified entry to the industry) 
will never be beauty therapists or will leave beauty therapy employment after a short 
time. Whilst there is a general agreement that many students, at least at levels 1 and 2, 
have little vocational interest in beauty therapy, tutors also focused on several other 
factors influencing the low rates of progression to the industry. Some pointed to the 
possible demand -side effects of recession, particularly on small local salon businesses, 
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although one tutor appeared to regard the beauty industry as ‘recession-proof’ and, in 
spite of the low wages even ‘top beauticians’ can expect, as lucrative employment: 
 
It’s a booming industry and, so there’s a lot of money to be made… and the 
ones that have got a head on their shoulders know that (Karen, Tutor,  
      College A).  
 
Other external factors alluded to include the hard physical work involved in being ‘on 
your feet all day’, and the typically long hours and low pay which may act as a deterrent 
to entering or staying in the industry.   One tutor pointed to the difficulty of ‘getting your 
foot in the door’ when recruitment to small salons is done informally through local 
networks in an industry where ‘everyone knows everyone else’.  Most tutors also 
identify a widespread suspicion of NVQs (see chapter two) amongst employers as a key 
factor in the difficulty student’s face in finding work: 
 
I know people in industry from General Logica and places like that who say 
that NVQ stands for Not Very Qualified! (Sharon, Tutor, College A). 
 
Those students who do find work, either with small salons or larger spa or cruise 
companies, are routinely ‘re-trained’ in techniques and the use of specific beauty 
products.  The increased numbers of students looking for work and consequently the 
heightened competition for beauty therapy jobs was also seen as an issue. Indeed, 
although the most up to date industry research points to vacancies and skills shortages 
(HABIA, 2007), the possibility that there are simply not enough jobs for the numbers of 
beauty therapy students emerging from FE colleges is supported by recent research 
indicating that for every five students attaining a beauty therapy or hairdressing 
qualification in England in 2010-2011 there was one job vacancy (Gardiner & Wilson, 
2012).  According to this survey, the pattern in the South West is the same as that for 
the whole of England.  Nevertheless, tutors’ accounts suggest that they perceive low 
progression rates as being as much a function of the individual dispositions of students 
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as an outcome of external social and economic factors, and as being as much, if not 
more, about dispositional factors as technical skills or theoretical knowledge.  
 
There is a general agreement about the kinds of students who are most likely to be 
‘successful’ in the industry. The characteristics identified with such students in part 
mirror those associated with the future oriented, self-actualizing subjects of neo-liberal 
discourse, able to take risks, be geographically mobile when local opportunities are in 
short supply and, in one tutor’s words,  to “show-case” themselves: 
 
…if you want it….you go out and get it..and you make yourself 
available...you've got to be bold enough, brave enough... Because if you can't 
find anything in the local vicinity, you go…… to where the work is, don't you? 
(Anne, Tutor, College B) 
 
… we’ve got a girl who’s the Head Therapist [at a local spa] now, and she only 
graduated two years ago…she did a placement, she stuck with it….. If this is 
your dream, what will you do for your dreams? (Marina, Tutor, College A) 
 
At the same time, tutors see ‘successful’ progression as being dependent on feminine 
dispositions towards both the care of others and self-presentation. In relation to the 
former, Carol talks about one of her ‘best’ students: 
 
....she’s been offered every job she goes for... you can just tell by looking at 
her.  She’s got this calm manner about her.  She focuses on her clients. She’s 
tremendous empathy with her client (Carol, Tutor, College B). 
 
However, tutors’ perceptions of the source of these dispositions is often at odds with the 
focus on formally transmitted skills/competences at the heart of the NVQ system as well 




.. you've got to have a feel for giving the treatments; you've got to have an 
empathy with your client and some of these qualities you either have or you 
don't.  Some students can acquire them but quite often it’s an innate thing which 
some people have (Carol, Tutor, College B). 
 
Carol’s account resonates with Black’s (2004) finding that whilst beauty therapists tend 
to see ‘emotional skills’ as central to Beauty therapy they are perceived to derive from a 
combination of experience and ‘personality’ rather than from formal training.  They are 
skills women are “supposed to have by virtue of ‘having lived their lives as women’” 
(Davis &Rosser cited in Black, 2004:122) or simply by virtue of ‘being women’. From a 
Bourdieusian perspective, Carol is able to naturalize these ‘skills’ because, as socially 
inculcated dispositions, they come to be taken for granted as immanent characteristics. 
The ‘ideal’ beauty therapist is understood to be one who is better able to perform these 
aspects of femininity.  ‘Successful’ students are those who have more thoroughly 
embodied these dispositions both through ‘life experience’ prior to the course, 
something that school leavers are likely to have less of than older students, and through 
their training. However, in keeping with the often invisible and unacknowledged nature 
of emotional labour (Hochschild, 1983), interpersonal skills are only minimally 
addressed by the formal NVQ curriculum and are better understood as a ‘hidden 
curriculum’ (Colley, 2003).    
 
A similar argument can be applied to tutors’ perceptions of the importance of self-
presentation. However, the assumption of immanent feminine inclinations to ‘doing 
looks’ is not, in itself, sufficient for ‘success’ which requires an ability to present the self 
as attractive but ‘respectable’ in a way that specifically disavows dominant notions of 
working class femininity (Skeggs, 1997).   In the following account, the ability to get a 
job in the beauty industry is understood to require the modification of class and age 
related dispositions towards self-presentation: 
 
…you've got to look the part….which means that you look professional.. your 
hair and make-up and your uniform… they [employers] don’t like tattoos….So, if 
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you've got a visible one… you won't get the job…piercings as well. They won't 
accept that.  And then you get the girls that maybe don't try as hard… [a] bit 
slovenly in their appearance.  Maybe their language is a bit… colourful 
sometimes…. they are going to be the ones that people hesitate over (Anne, 
Tutor, College B) 
 
Although tutors talk about the importance of transmitting the  skills to perform eye -lash 
tinting, waxing, make-up and so on this is rarely seen as problematic in the way that 
getting students to behave ‘professionally’ or present themselves ‘appropriately’ is. 
Sally’s account highlights this distinction.  
 
……they often grasp the makeup quite well and the painting of the nails.  And 
they’re often better at painting nails than I am to be honest because they do it 
quite a lot on themselves… What we have to assess them on is that they have 
their correct uniform… their hair up… one pair of earrings only ….. no facial 
piercings…… and that actually can be, you think, quite simple…… but gosh, 
what hard work we have to get them to get their hair up, take their facial piercings 
out… (Sally, Tutor, College B) 
 
What these tutors’ narratives about success and failure suggest is that the technical 
skills which are formally the basis of beauty therapy courses, along with the (now 
restricted) theoretical knowledge associated with them, are less instrumental in 
producing workers than the dominant discourses of vocational training would have us 
believe.  It would seem that the rhetoric of skills acquisition conceals the largely 
dispositional work on emotions and bodies involved in beauty therapy training and, 
consequently, the gendered and classed nature of this ‘hidden curriculum’.  In this 
sense, the discourse of technical skills and qualifications awarded on the basis of these 
acts as a form of symbolic violence, inculcating a misrecognition on the part of both 




Colley at al (2003), who arrive at a similar conclusion with regard to childcare, 
healthcare and engineering courses, argue that the notion of vocational habitus 
“renders visible aspects of the hidden curriculum of these learning sites, and in 
particular the role of class and gender in socially reproductive processes” (Ibid, 2003: 
17?). Like Colley at al, like other theorists of VET, place an emphasis on excavating the 
power relations shaping vocational education sites in order to change them into cultures 
which are able to transform “the aspirations of…students into something less tightly 
bound by classed and gendered values and stereotypes” (Bloomer et al, 2002). Though 
these theorists acknowledge “that attempts to change learning cultures in VET may..be 
difficult to effect” (Colley et al, 2003:18), the assumption is that currently highly 
gendered vocational areas could be otherwise and, as discussed in chapter two, 
sometimes do bring about ‘positive’ dispositional changes.  For example training for 
healthcare , which has been historically constructed through gendered, classed and 
racialized discourse and policy (Skeggs, 1997) can encourage self-reflection and a 
broadening of ‘horizons for action’ by introducing students  to social science subjects 
(Bloomer et al, 2002). This in turn might inspire thinking about how the practice of care 
could challenge rather than reproduce dominant power relations.  But it is far less clear 
how such transformations could take place in the context of beauty therapy training 
given that the beauty industry is much more emphatically premised on the production 
and regulation of femininity. If the misrecognition of power relations is foundational to 
beauty therapy then revealing the operation of symbolic violence in its discourses and 
practices would simply invalidate rather than transform the culture of beauty therapy 
courses. 
Tutors imagining students’ futures: The longer term meaning of ‘success’ and 
‘failure’ 
 
   Aside from the difficulties of obtaining paid employment in beauty therapy, one of the 
key themes in tutors’ narratives about students’ transitions from training to work is the 
assumption that they will very often have a precarious and interrupted future 
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relationship to employment. Whilst these assumptions may be well founded given the 
structural inequalities in the labour market and heterosexual households and the low 
wages and insecurity of work in the beauty industry, the discourses mobilized by tutors 
are ones that naturalize these conditions or obscure them by appealing to individual 
preference.  Supposedly outmoded notions of women as secondary earners with a 
primary commitment to the domestic sphere are reflected in narratives about the 
trajectories of students who enter employment in beauty therapy: 
 
They see it more as something that they can possibly do alongside running a 
family.  It’s something they can do…either as a mobile or in their own home.  And 
I think they see it as a way of supplementing an income (Phillipa, Tutor and 
Programme Manager, College B) 
 
…if they have children they can still do it, part time, flexible, around childcare, 
the husband comes home and they can go and do a couple of hours of waxing 
and still get a little bit of money…all you need is a wax pot and a few products 
and then you’re away (Karen, Tutor, College A). 
 
In the above account, Karen represents the acquisition of beauty therapy skills as an 
anticipatory investment for future motherhood, invoking a traditional breadwinner- 
homemaker family in which there is a happy ‘complementarity’ of gendered roles 
‘allowing’ women to do home-based or self-employed work on a ‘flexible’ basis.  
‘Flexibility’ is seen here as being in women’s own best interests rather than as necessity 
which is both produced by, and may reproduce, gendered and classed power relations 
(Bradley, 2009)64.  It is positioned as something which those with “a head on their 
shoulders” would ‘choose’.  But as feminist labour market theorists have argued, this 
functionalist model of the relationship between the private and public spheres obscures 
                                                
64
 Bradley highlights the conflicting understandings of ‘flexibility’ in post-Fordist economies and how 
these reflect the different interests of employers, unions and young workers. She argues that flexibility is a 
multifaceted concept and is neither ‘all bad or all good’.  However,  her empirical evidence suggests that 
whilst ‘internalized flexibility’ (Bradley & Davadsen, 2008) might reflect the immediate interests of young 
working women with children it also has potentially extremely negative consequences on earnings, working 




the way in which women’s unpaid and paid labour is organized through asymmetrical 
heterogendered relations which devalue and marginalize their paid work (Delphy 
&Leonard, 1992). The idea that beauty therapy skills are a basis for earning a 
‘supplementary income’ underscores both the economic power relations of the 
heterosexual household and the limited cultural and economic capital yielded by beauty 
therapy qualifications and work in the industry. The discourses employed by tutors 
position students primarily as future “capital assets” for others (Lovell, 2000) –husbands 
and households- and thus as ‘objects of exchange’, a position that limits their abilities to 
maximize even the limited cultural and economic capital that could be extracted from 
being a beauty therapist. 
 
Even where motherhood and marriage are not specifically mentioned, tutors expect that 
many students are likely to use their beauty skills to supplement income from other low 
paid, routine jobs or to make them better workers in those jobs: 
  
They want to have a little Nissan Micra and sit with their couch in the back 
and their wax pot in the boot and they want to drive to their clients..… do a half 
leg wax and then go off to Tesco’s to work (Karen, Tutor, College A). 
 
Quite a few of them end up selling in places like Superdrug… if their interest 
is makeup then…it’s a good idea to have a bit of knowledge about what you’re 
selling (Carol, Tutor, College B). 
 
There is also an expectation that other low paid jobs will simply prove more attractive 
than beauty therapy because students can earn the same or better wages without the 
long hours and physically (and possibly emotionally) demanding work associated with 
beauty therapy:   
 
…they find out they can get the same amount working at Asda.. and not have 
to do the…physically demanding work… they could be sitting…on a chair in Asda 




The discourse of ‘professionalism’ with which tutors try to elevate the status of beauty 
therapy training, together with official rhetoric of skills for employment, is belied by these 
low expectations and the low objective probability that beauty therapy qualifications by 
themselves will, for most students, yield success in dominant terms, or even a living 
wage. Whilst many students see running their own businesses as the pinnacle of 
success this is, as Karen suggests, an unrealistic expectation for most students: 
 
You’ve got to be a special person to manage a business let alone be the sole 
manager….and…there’s not many girls that I see each year that are…cut out, 
having the right temperament or the right discipline (Karen, Tutor, College A) 
 
Here, Karen individualizes dispositions to entrepreneurialism obscuring the kinds of 
class based cultural and economic resources that are likely to make success more 
possible. That girls without such resources are effectively barred from using their 
qualifications in this way may owe something to the lack of business related training on 
the NVQ beauty courses65.  It seems likely that those students who do end up running 
their own businesses (as distinct from informal self-employment) are those who already 
have the confidence, skills and knowledge or the economic and social capitals to pursue 








                                                
65 Neither college delivered business training at level 1 or 2 and only very sparse provision was made 







The accounts of tutors suggests that they are caught up in contradictions between their 
role as gatekeepers for the beauty therapy industry and their remit as caring educational 
professionals who want ‘the best’ for all their students.  Resolving the sense of 
dissonance that this gives rise to often means justifying students’ success or failure to 
become beauty therapists on the grounds of pre-existing or naturalized bodily and 
emotional dispositions. Not only does this call into question the importance of learned 
skills and knowledge, and therefore their own desired status as ‘professional’ beauty 
therapists, but it also arguably undercuts their status and efficacy as professional 
educators.  In addition, the naturalizing and normalizing discourses they employ in 
placing students at different levels of the programmes and in their expectations of 
students’ future trajectories obscures their own unwitting roles in reproducing 
inequalities. This chapter has drawn attention to how these inequalities are reproduced 
through the operation of symbolic violence. For at least two of the students in the 
research group, and possibly many more outside it, it is likely that the selection and 
filtering process, informed by the heterogendered, classed and racialized norms of 
‘beauty culture’, lead to their placement on courses below their school achievement 
levels and, as a consequence, to the loss of one or two years of their 16-19 entitlement 
to education. However, one of the most savage forms of institutionalized symbolic 
violence, disguised by the caring benevolence of most tutors who want ‘their girls’ to 
‘succeed’ in one form or another, is enacted in the contradiction between official 
discourses of ‘success through skills’ and the real value of beauty qualifications for most 
students. Those who do not make it to full time jobs in salons, spas or cruise ships will 
have spent two, possibly three years, and most of their post 16 entitlement, working for 
qualifications that will yield little cultural or economic capital. Furthermore, students’ 
chances of employment are undermined by the mismatch between FE provision and the 
labour market. Whilst the beauty industry in the UK may have expanded in the last 
decade, the rapid growth in beauty therapy courses as a response to the perceived 
needs of employers, together with the possible effects of recession, has meant that 
even the most ‘suitable’ candidates will struggle to find the work for which they are 
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ostensibly qualified.  For FE colleges, however, low level vocational courses such as 
beauty therapy represent the most effective method of  ‘widening participation’ in a way 
that secures government funding currently based on retention and achievement rates.   
Whilst government education and training policy in the late 20th and early 21st centuries 
has been oriented to ‘bringing in the excluded’ (Nickson et al, 2003) it could also be 
understood, in Bourdieu’s terms, as “keeping hold of those it excludes, just relegating 
them to educational tracks that have lost more or less of whatever value they once had” 
(Bourdieu, 1999:425).  As one tutor suggested, whilst most students may never have a 
career in the beauty industry, the course teaches them ‘skills for life’ in and outside of 
paid work– dispositions which will be as useful to them working behind a checkout in 
Superdrug as in a beauty salon, and which are expected to shape their futures as 
‘flexible’, part-time workers, wives and mothers.  
 
Tutors construct a discourse which essentially legitimizes beauty therapy courses as 
training for low wage employment and normative feminine domestic roles. Through this 
lens, the imperative for young women to stay in education and training at all costs may 
have more to do with producing particular types of feminine subjects and less to do with 
challenging social inequality and exclusion. If working class girls with few of no 
qualifications cannot be ‘successful’ in normative terms, they can at least be steered 
away from becoming NEET (see chapter two) and from longer term ‘welfare 
dependency’ towards suitably feminine employment and ‘respectable’ dispositions.  In 
this sense, the ‘success through skills’ discourse also operates as symbolic violence in 
that it obscures the centrality of the gendered and classed vocational habitus which 
tutors aim to instill in students but which is  hidden beneath discourses of skills and 
knowledge.   The next chapter explores this further through students’ experiences of the 
disciplinary regimes on their courses and how these target their bodily and emotional 








Learning to Labour in the College Beauty Salon:  
Grooming the beauty therapist 
Introduction 
 
This chapter seeks to understand how the gendered and classed dispositions of 
participant students are reinforced, modified or changed by their experiences of beauty 
therapy courses.   It is concerned with the processes through which students come to 
acquire, or attempt to resist, the vocational habitus of a beauty therapist and the 
meanings that are attributed to this by students and tutors.  As discussed in chapter 
four, Bourdieu’s understanding of how agents develop a ‘feel for the game’ through 
“embodied engagement with practice” (Hodkinson et al, 2007a: 417) necessitates, on 
some level, a misrecognition of the power relations which constitute and define it (Webb 
et al, 2002).  On this model, the appropriate habitus for a beauty therapist, one that 
makes her “the right person for the job” (Colley et al, 2006), can only be successfully 
produced if the social-cultural conditions of its production remain largely hidden or 
unacknowledged by participants, both students and their tutors. As discussed in the 
preceding chapters, these misrecognitions are maintained through the operation of 
symbolic violence as a “process of social reproduction” (McRobbie, 2004: 103).  The 
ways in which this is enacted through the requirements of the curriculum and tutors’ 
understandings of employer demands, and in the interactions between students and 
between students and tutors are central concerns of this chapter. I also address the 
ways in which misrecognitions operate through a series of dualisms: between ‘care of 
the self’ and ‘care of others’, between ‘looking good’ and ‘feeling good’,  between the 
notions of ‘natural’ and ‘fake’ beauty, and between ‘professional’ and lay beauty 
practices. However, this chapter also sets out to identify instances which might 
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represent a ‘break with doxa’, or suggest a lack of fit between students’ dispositions and 
the normative assumptions embedded in the beauty therapy courses, or in which the 
operation of symbolic violence is interrupted or challenged. My concern here is to 
explore the extent to which the ‘field’ of beauty therapy training opens up or closes 
down possibilities for critical awareness of power relations.   
 
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first focuses on how students are ‘groomed’ to 
service the emotional and aesthetic needs of clients and the ways in which students 
negotiate the demands placed on them by this training.  The second part addresses the 
connected issue of aesthetic labour and how students’ bodily dispositions are 
disciplined to conform to an idealized notion of what a beauty therapist should look like. 
However, in the context of beauty therapy, ‘producing the look’ also involves training 
students as surveillants of other women on the basis of heteronormative, classed and 
racialized notions of ‘attractiveness’. Throughout the chapter I refer to various elements 
of formal curriculum which is similar at both colleges.  Appendix 1 outlines the main 
content of the courses at NVQ Level 1 and 2. 
Producing emotional dispositions: learning to labour with bodies and feelings 
 
Most tutors are at pains to distance themselves from the idea that beauty therapy is 
predominately about producing appearance. Echoing the participants in Black’s (2004) 
study, they position beauty therapy as fundamentally about facilitating wellbeing, 
confidence, and ‘self-making’, and their own role as about training students to perform 
this ‘therapeutic’ work.  However, the connection between wellbeing and appearance is 
a taken-for granted one, always implied if not made explicit: 
 
...yes, of course, we want to make ourselves look nicer, feel better, but, …[if] 
you're feeling better, you're more..enthusiastic, you're more confident, and with 




One of the key discourses used by tutors in talking about the difficulties  involved in  
teaching positions students entering courses as fundamentally ‘narcissistic’ rather than 
‘caring’ and client- oriented.  All the tutors saw the majority of new students, and many 
of the established ones, as primarily concerned with their own appearance and as 
seeing beauty therapy as a vehicle for being able to produce a glamorous and idealized 
femininity. One of the primary tasks for tutors, as they construct it, is to transform this 
‘narcissism’ into ‘care of others’.  
 
Beauty Therapy is all about the client.  It’s all about them, making them feel 
better…and listening to their problems…  I mean listening skills…compassion, 
empathy …it’s just.. they’re quite young and they.. struggle (Marina, Tutor, 
College A). 
 
It is possible that where students are preoccupied with their own performance of bodily 
femininity there is less room for attending to or understanding the  ‘needs’ of others. The 
focus on self-production is certainly suggested in most students’ accounts of ‘choosing’ 
beauty therapy (see chapter seven).  The tension between ‘care of self’ and ‘care of 
others’ is expressed particularly strongly by Jaime: 
 
I like doing it on me, but I don’t like doing it on people, because I don’t…know 
what they like … and I get frustrated…it’s quite hard if they turn around and say 
‘oh, I want foundation’ but [addressing hypothetical client]…’I don’t know if you 
want to like look as if you’ve got make-up on’…it’s… really hard (Jaime, Level 2, 
College A). 
 
Most tutors explain this as a reflection of students’ immaturity. Feminists have long 
argued that, for women, the process of growing up involves developing a self-sacrificial 
disposition toward the needs of others. However, the attainment of contemporary adult 
femininity also requires women to expend considerable time and energy on the 
production of themselves through appearance in a way that is often legitimized via a 
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discourse of hedonistic self-indulgence (Attwood, 2005)66, and is resonant of Foucault’s 
understanding of technologies of the self as ‘practices of freedom’: 
 
One must not have the care of others to precede the care of the self. The 
care of the self takes a moral precedence in the measure that the relationship to 
the self takes ontological precedence (Foucault, 1988, cited in Skeggs, 1997:64) 
 
The beauty therapy student is caught up in these tensions. She must be immersed in 
the practices of feminine self-presentation  and embody this in her appearance and 
demeanor, but in the training salon she must learn to mobilize these dispositions 
primarily as resources for ministering to the emotional and aesthetic requirements of 
other women she may have little in common with and no affective connection to . It is 
unsurprising that the negotiation of these tensions is difficult for new students, 
particularly the younger ones who are arguably still only beginning to negotiate “the 
contradictory sets of regulations into which young women have to insert themselves” 
(Frost, 2001:78). At the same time, however, the way in which many of  these young 
women prioritized their own appearance is in contrast to Skeggs’ care students for 
whom “the care of the self is a distant object….it is others who take moral precedence” 
(Skeggs, 1997: 64) 
 
In terms of ‘readiness’ for this kind of work, there is a difference between those students 
who brought relatively more cultural capital from family background, education, work 
and ‘life experience’ and those who brought less. From the early stages of their courses 
Emma and Abigail were mostly enthusiastic about the salon sessions where students 
are assessed on their performance of treatments on paying clients. In contrast, students 
with fewer resources, who also tended to be those with ambivalent or negative feelings 
about being on their courses, were more likely to express anxiety and reticence about 
performing treatments on strangers, at least in the initial stages of their training.  
Although there are similarities between beauty therapy and other forms of ‘caring’ 
                                                
66   As is encapsulated in the long running L’Oreal marketing campaign strapline, “Because you’re worth 
it”, more recently adapted to “because we’re worth it” (Wolkowitz, 2006:167).    
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labour, this finding differs markedly from Colley’s (2006) research in which girls from the 
most disadvantaged backgrounds who had most experience of caring for elders or 
siblings settled more easily into their care work training.  Many of the beauty girls had 
also cared for younger siblings or other family members and care-related work had 
been considered by several participants. But as suggested in chapter seven, if beauty 
therapy represents an escape from caring for others for some students, the centrality of 
emotional labour in beauty therapy may come as unwelcome surprise. However, there 
are also other reasons for the different degrees of fit between students’ dispositions and 
the demands of beauty therapy. 
 
Unsurprisingly, students with no experience of working in a commercialized context 
(including Level 1 students and students who had entered their programmes at Level 2) 
tended to find client sessions more daunting.  Some Level 2 students who had 
progressed from Level 1 felt that clients had much higher expectations of level 2 
students and were often more demanding.   Because of a shortage of clients, bringing in 
friends and family was actively encouraged by tutors but this was not always easy 
where mothers, sisters or friends were working or struggled afford the cost of a 
treatment. However, where this was possible it was perceived by students as a less 
‘scary’ option because it alleviated the pressure of having to perform in a ‘professional’ 
way, at least when they were not being observed by tutors. 
 
….even though you’re not really meant to, I can have a proper giggle with my 
mates, and like if I go wrong they don’t mind because they like know me. (Amber, 
Level 1, College B).  
 
It may be relevant here to consider the significance of ‘having a laugh’ as a way of 
making life more bearable for those, like Amber, who have little investment in the 
education or jobs in which they find themselves.  The way in which she positions herself 
against the rules stipulated by tutors also suggests that having “a proper giggle” could 
be read as a strategy “for wresting control of symbolic and real space from official 
authority” (Willis, 1977:54), a way of staging some kind of resistance to authority 
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(Skeggs, 2005) and, in this instance, to the discourse of ‘professionalism’ as it is 
promoted by tutors. However, whilst this may signal a habitus at odds with the norms of 
the beauty therapy course, there is no suggestion that Amber and her friends are 
deriding ‘beauty culture’ itself, at least as they understand and embody it. Indeed, this is 
central to the ‘pleasure’ of ‘girly’ friendships and to both their ‘choice’ of beauty therapy 
and their involvement in counter-cultural behavior on the course.   
 
Some participants were concerned about not knowing how to make conversation or 
interact with clients they did not know.  Tutors’ often interpreted this as reflecting a lack 
‘communication skills’. However, the fact that students appeared to be able to 
communicate adequately when performing treatments on family or friends suggests that 
their perceived deficiencies relate to something beyond ‘ordinary’ communication.  
Although lack of confidence may account for these difficulties, the following narrative 
suggests that the ‘problem’ has more to do with students not conforming to the kinds of 
‘body techniques’ (Wolkowitz, 2006) required of beauty therapists as service workers 
and emotional labourers:  
 
…generally a lot of them can't communicate with people.  So we do sort of 
teach  them…. the importance about eye contact…body language, non verbal 
signs…if they are sat on reception….they should be smiling, and you never have 
your hands on your hips or have your arms folded (Sharon, tutor, College A). 
 
Some students talked about actively avoiding contact with clients by crossing their 
names off appointments lists made by tutors at the beginning of salon sessions and 
replacing them with the names of other students:  
 
I get nervous and shy ...… and just like clam up when I’m doing it [laughs]…if 
I have clients in the books now, I rub them out in my name and put in someone 
else’s….We all do it [laughs].  All of us do it… if we can’t be bothered (Amber, 




However, as Amber’s account suggests, this strategy is not only a response to lack of 
confidence but a way of resisting the requirements of the course. Like the Lads in 
Willis’s (1977) study, some of the beauty girls had hit upon a collective strategy to 
subvert a learning culture which was felt as an imposition rather than an ‘opportunity’.  
However, it is also a strategy which threatens to reproduce the ‘failures’ of  previous 
educational experiences. Although it was sometimes possible to go through an entire 
salon session without contact with clients, students were aware that passing the course 
depended on being assessed on their performance with paying customers.  In addition, 
those not treating clients were required to practise beauty techniques on other students 
during the sessions.  They may have been knowingly subverting the rules but 
resistance, in this context, is contained within the familiar and safe boundaries of 




Some students expressed preferences for particular for types of treatments and clients 
and this was often related to the difficulties of managing their own emotional reactions 
and those of clients. 
 
…it’s better doing a manicure, because if [it’s] a facial.. it’s quite hard because 
you’re meant to be making them in a relaxed state, but they don’t want to stop 
talking and you can’t say to them, “stop talking”…One woman was talking…and 
I’d be…wiping the cleaner over her and she’s… yapping away and then she’s 
going, “oh, the bloody cream’s going in my mouth” and I was like, “sorry!” (Kelly, 
Level 2, College B) 
 
The age of clients in relation to type of treatment was also seen as important. For 
instance, Level 2 students often found it easier to do make-up on younger clients 
because they felt more confident in judging the aesthetic ‘preferences’ of women closer 
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to their own age. In some of cases, however, students said that they preferred older 
clients: 
 
I suppose most people here would say, [they prefer] young clients but I don't. 
I prefer the older people that come in. (Speaking in a welcoming tone to mimic 
clients) “Hello dear how are you, I've come for a facial” and, you can really look 
after them (Emma, Level 2, College B). 
 
The tensions involved in having to demonstrate care of others at the same time as 
monitoring and regulating one’s own appearance echoes the dilemma identified by 
Ringrose (2008) in which “girls are supposed to be nice, and yet all girls must compete”  
(Ibid: 40). To the extent that this places students in the contradictory position of both 
nurturing and being in competition with customers, older clients may well be preferred 
as posing less of a competitive threat than younger ones and providing students with an 
opportunity to demonstrate their ability to empathize or care.   
 
Mobilizing a caring performance is particularly difficult when dealing with rude or 
abusive clients. Several students talked about such experiences and about feeling 
humiliated during client salon sessions: 
 
..you get a lot of rude people in.  You can feel…their really bad vibes towards 
you, and … you get nervous…and then you end up messing up the treatment 
and…getting shouted at by your teacher.  And it's just like, ‘oh no, I don't want to 
do this’ (Tania, Level 2, College A) 
 
In a small number of cases, clients had been abusive both verbally and in a way that 
bordered on physical abuse.  For instance, Kelly recounted an incident in which she had 





…I said “we’re just waiting for a new wax pot”.  And she went  “I told you that I 
need to be out by a quarter to three, bitch”…oh for God’s sake, can’t you just use 
that one?”  And I said,  “it will burn you”.  And she went “try it out on 
yourself”….she was like shouting at me…and it burnt my arm…and she went “put 
it on my leg” and I went “I’m not going to…because it will burn you”…..and I put it 
on her leg and she went… “ow!...You stupid idiot!” … and you can’t answer back. 
(Kelly, Level 2, College B). 
 
The accounts of some tutors also suggested that dealing with degrading treatment was 
a significant feature of their working lives as Beauty Therapists: 
 
…it's bloody hard work! You're on your feet all day…you…don't get paid that 
much really, you get treated like a servant, you get spoken to like a servant..  
But…I just think, if you love it … it's not even like doing a job. (Anne, Tutor, 
College B). 
 
This resonates with other studies of beauty related occupations in which therapists 
legitimize their ‘love’ of the work in the face of power inequalities and poor working 
conditions on the grounds that they are performing a socially important function in using 
their ‘superior knowledge’ to care for their clients regardless of how they behave67.  
However, as both Gimlin (2002) and Black (2004) suggest, the ‘deep acting’ which 
allows workers to put the demands of clients before their own feelings or ‘expert’ 
judgments also undermines claims to ‘professionalism’.  Whilst beauty therapists might 
see themselves as having  a “dominant position in the hierarchy of beauty culture” 
(Gimlin, 2002: 29),  the social class differences which often exist between workers and 
clients tend to trump this and undermine the capacity of beauty therapists to assert their 
own judgments in ways that would be characteristic of professional occupations. These 
power differences are arguably exacerbated in the relationship between young 
inexperienced students and the clients using the college salons. In this case, students 
                                                
67  In this sense, beauty therapists could be seen as ‘prisoners of love’ in the same way as care workers 
whose jobs are, according to Folbre (2001), subject to the idea that the intrinsic rewards of caring for others 
is compensation for low pay and poor working conditions. 
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become victims not only of the symbolic violence contained in the gendered and 
classed discourses of beauty therapy, but also of forms of structural and interpersonal 
violence in their dealings with clients.  
 
However, for some students there is clearly a sense of satisfaction in demonstrating the 
‘emotional expertise’ to manage ‘demanding’ encounters (Walkowitz, 2006). This is 
particularly so for students who had brought a relatively a greater amount of cultural 
capital to their courses and whose confidence in communicating with clients and in their 
own skills and abilities allowed them shrug off ‘bad experiences’: 
 
I love it [treating clients]..but…I had a lady in and she obviously knew what 
she wanted and I obviously didn’t give her what she wanted, and she wasn't very 
impressed about that…she told me that it [a facial] didn't last long enough and it 
did last long enough - I made sure of it….  She didn’t really knock my confidence 
because I know I didn't do anything wrong (Emma, Level 2, College B). 
 
The accounts of other students are more resonant of Hochschild’s (1983) understanding 
of the distress caused by the dissonance between a worker’s ‘real’ feelings and those 
she is expected to perform. In Kelly’s case, for example, not being able to “answer 
back” suggests a sense of powerlessness which confirms the low status accorded to the 
beauty therapist. In contrast, the power inequalities which prevent her from asserting 
her own judgment are not as salient for Emma and the cultural capital she is able to 
bring to the encounter may shield her from the ‘hidden injuries of class’ (Sennett &Cobb, 
1972) suggested in Kelly’s account.  In addition, Emma may be much more able to 
perform as a ‘professional’ beauty therapist. This is not necessarily a consciously learnt 
ability on her part but a product of the middle class symbolic resources on which she is 
able to draw. In addition, her future- oriented disposition allows her to see such 








The concept of professionalism is ubiquitous throughout participants’ accounts and is 
constantly circulated in interactions between tutors and students. Tutors often refer to 
specialist skills and knowledge as evidence of the ‘seriousness’ and value of beauty 
therapy. However, the trope of  ‘professionalism’ is mostly used as short hand for the 
aesthetic and behavioural dispositions- being cheerful, polite, confident and attractive- 
required to produce an appropriate service to clients, and is often communicated to 
students in salon sessions via continuously repeated incitements to control their bodily 
and emotional displays in line with this.  This “restricted definition of professionalism” 
(Vincent & Braun, 2011: 775) has been identified in predominantly female service 
occupations not traditionally seen as professional (Hochschild, 1983) and in lower level 
vocational training.  Vincent and Braun, for instance, draw attention to the way in which 
the use of the concept is used on Level 2 and 3 early years training and invokes not 
only ‘specialist knowledge, “but also what sort of person one is, how one appears and 
conducts oneself” (ibid, 2011: 775) 
 
….the language of professionalism becomes a mechanism for fostering 
occupational compliance…through realigning identities and working practices 
(Waring and Waring cited in Ibid, 2011:775) 
 
How this regulation of dispositions might take place in everyday interactions on the 
beauty therapy courses is suggested in the following extract from an observation of a 
level 1 salon session at College B: 
 
Tutor: OK ladies, we need to think about making your client comfortable. 
What do we need to do? 
 
(no response from the any of the fourteen students present who are either 
sitting on treatment beds chatting or moving around the room collecting 




Tutor: We need to ensure good air circulation, minimize smells…eye contact, 
posture, smiling, warm, professional, friendly ….  Why do we do 
consultations? 
Becky (student): We can’t do them [only level 2 and 3 students carry out 
consultations] 
Tutor: How would you say that to them? You could offer them something else. 
Ellie (student): A mini-facial 
Tutor: Well done! 
(Tutor turns to Amber who is about to leave the salon to collect her client from 
reception) 
Tutor: What about your fringe?  
(Sends Amber to get a hair grip) 
 Tutor: That looks more professional doesn’t it? 
 
In this context the language of professionalism becomes a disciplinary mechanism 
aimed at producing the ‘respectable’ (Skeggs, 1997) or ‘appropriate’ (Black, 2004) 
dispositions of a vocational habitus: the ability to manage clients’ experience and to 
‘appeal to their senses’ by “looking good and sounding right” (Wolkowitz, 2006: 86).  It is 
a vehicle through which students are incited to internalize and embody the gendered 
and classed relations of beauty therapy and a means of obscuring the power relations 
underpinning the structural violence of low pay, poor conditions and deference to 
clients.     
 
The claim of professionalism also rests on the framing of Beauty therapy as socially 
valuable and necessary work. The therapeutic discourses of helping ‘people feel better 
about themselves’ so that they “will then do better things” (Anne, Tutor, College B) is 
rehearsed in both the accounts of tutors and students. The implication that engaging in 
beauty practices is not only key to a woman’s psychological wellbeing but also to her 
personal advancement makes it unthinkable that it might also reflect and reproduce 
social and economic disadvantage. Whilst the ‘project of professionalism’ in beauty 
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therapy (Black, 2004) may be useful to tutors in their struggle for recognition and  in 
promoting a vocational identity to students, it also operates as symbolic violence against 
those same individuals, the language of professionalism calling forth a series of 
misrecognitions. 
 
Empowerment, pleasure and success:  inhabiting dispositions 
 
The micro- management of students’ behavior and appearance (Vincent & Braun, 2011) 
is key in defining the dispositional parameters within which they learn what it means to 
be a beauty therapist. However,  it is through the actual practices involved in performing 
the role that students begin to develop, to greater or lesser extents, a commitment to 
beauty therapy and more “embedded working identities”  (Ibid, 2011: 773). Such 
identities develop not just because of cumulative experience 68, but also through the 
increased sense of self-value gained from the mastery of ‘professional’ beauty skills and 
from pleasing clients. This is suggested in the following accounts from student 
interviews conducted towards the end of the academic year: 
 
…the other day I did get a bit nervous because I had to do a facial … [on] the 
Head of College…And she told me that she’s never had a level one perform it 
like that and she said that she was really proud of me and that she really enjoyed 
her treatment (Jenna, Level 1, College A) 
 
I…didn’t know how to do nail art when I first started here, and now I do it…on 
my sister and on my friends, and my boss wants me to do it. She’s going to pay 
me.  When I first started I was just, “oh this is boring.  I don’t want to listen”, but 
[laughs] now…. (Amber, Level 1, College B). 
 
The sense of triumph and transformation expressed in these accounts may in part 
reflect how important this kind success and its recognition are for young women who 
                                                
68
  For Bourdieu, lasting transformations in habitus are brought about through prolonged and continuous  
pedagogic inculcation (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). 
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have been defined as ‘failures’ at school.  Bartky’s analysis is useful here in 
understanding how the disciplinary regimes of beauty therapy, which require workers  to 
develop a more extreme embeddedness in beauty practices in comparison with most 
other women (Gimlin, 2002), actually produce subjectivities partly because of the 
ontological importance of seeing oneself as a skilled and capable person regardless of 
what “it may have cost them to acquire them and… whether, as a gender, they would 
have been better off had they never had to acquire them in the first place” (Bartky, 
1990:77).  In addition, success, as Bourdieu suggests, involves accepting the criteria on 
which it has been recognized (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). Valuing and internalizing 
beauty skills means valuing and internalizing the meanings and social relations 
underpinning beauty culture, at least as it is transmitted through the courses.  Students’ 
sense of ‘empowerment’ in developing and being validated for skills is therefore central 
to the way in which they become immersed in beauty therapy.  This suggests a way of 
understanding women’s relationship to beauty which is very different to that proposed 
by Gimlin (2002) and Davis (1995). Both assume that women’s ‘pleasure’ in ‘doing 
looks’ is testimony to their autonomy and ‘choice’ in using beauty practices for ‘self-
empowerment’. However, the process of vocational identification on the beauty therapy 
courses suggests that these feelings are both produced by disciplinary regimes ,  and 
play a key role in ‘pulling them in’ to normative (hetero)gendered ‘personal’ and 
vocational identities. This also provides a way of thinking about students’ affective ties 
to beauty and beauty therapy in terms of how they function as a form of symbolic 
violence.  When initially ambivalent feelings about beauty therapy are transformed into 
more positive ones it signals a change which brings the subjective structures of the 
habitus closer to the objective structures (Kraiss, 1993) underpinning  the field.  
‘Pleasure’ and ‘empowerment’ may produce the illusion of the self as the ‘right person 
for the job’ (Colley et al, 2003), and erase the relations of domination which have 
produced that self.  
 
The symbolic violence involved in this process is also arguably at work in the way tutors 
see their role in nurturing young women, particularly those perceived as most 




The most rewarding thing is seeing them achieve…People like Carmel, 
who… said, “I can’t do it because I’m thick”…., [she] is so proud of what she’s 
achieved. I’ve got a lovely thank you card from my girls …and inside it said 
“Thank you for putting up with us this year.  We know we’ve been difficult but at 
least we’ve finished…”  (Carol, Tutor, College B) 
 
The considerable work and commitment that goes into teaching students who may be 
bored, alienated from learning and in the beauty classroom partly because of the 
paucity of other options is indisputable. However, the discourse of achievement serves 
to obscure the gendered and classed nature of the ‘transformations’ students undergo, 
whilst the rhetoric of tutors’ caring dedication to ‘their girls’ masks the exercise of 
symbolic violence which makes “the dominant habitus seem more universal and natural” 
(Herr & Anderson, 2003: 419).  
 
 “I just get used to it”: feelings and ‘intimate’ practices 
 
Students are required not only to perform the full range of beauty practices as specified 
in the NVQ curriculum but must also experience how these practices feel to a client.  
Before being, as one tutor put it, “let loose” on paying customers, tutors demonstrate 
each treatment and the various techniques associated with them on students who then 
practice on each other in pairs and small groups.   
 
Amongst the practices which students tend to find particularly difficult are those defined 
as ‘sensitive’ or ‘intimate’ and which usually involve the removal of facial or body hair 
through waxing.  These practices are only taught at Levels 2 and 3 (see Appendix 1), 
not just because of the perceived level of technical skills needed, but also because of 




It… requires quite a bit of maturity to deal with… bikini waxing, underarm waxing 
and lip waxing.  All those sorts of things are quite sensitive (Sally, Tutor,  
College B).  
 
This account acknowledges the central importance of hair removal in producing the 
feminine body and the extreme embarrassment and distress women experience in 
relation to ‘unwanted’ hair. (Chapkis, 1986; Jefferys, 2005; Black, 2004).  The 
normalization of teenage feminine competition (Ringrose, 2008) may in part explain why 
they are perceived to lack empathy or the tact necessary for the ‘sensitive’ regulation of 
the boundaries of femininity: 
 
…at that age… they can be very judgmental …so they judge people quite harshly 
and that’s not being empathetic… We’re there just to make that person feel 
better (Marina, Tutor, College B). 
 
The issues of sensitivity and maturity in relation to bikini waxing encompass a set of 
meanings which are more overtly to do with producing a (hetero)sexualized feminine 
body and it is the practice which Level 2 students expressed most unease about: 
 
 I've never had a bikini wax or seen one or anything like that and it's just a… 
bit weird the first time you do it.  I'm sure it will be fine eventually but…. we all felt 
it you know, that it was a bit strange doing it (Emma, Level 2, College B).   
 
The difficulty  students had in articulating the sexualized implications of bikini waxing 
echoes Black’s notion of sexuality as “an absent present” (Black, 2004:98) in beauty 
salons and may point to a paradox at the heart of the beauty therapy. Whilst beauty 
therapists labour to produce (hetero)sexually desirable feminine bodies, presenting their 
work as ‘serious’ and ‘respectable’ means distancing themselves from these sexualized 
meanings (Ibid: 2004),  a distancing that is also suggested in tutors’ insistence that 




Emma’s response may reflect the ways in which ‘body workers’ in general must learn to 
handle “potentially powerful and unsettling experiences [ which carry] the potential for 
sensate interaction, identification, desire and merging” (Wolkowitz. 2006: 169). In this 
context,  her perception of bikini waxing as “just a bit weird’ might suggest some anxiety 
about the potential for lesbian desire.  However, the heterosexualized nature of this 
particular practice was underscored by a tutor (not in the research group) who told me 
that bikini waxing was as far as they could go in teaching young students the skills to 
perform the more popular salon practice of Brazilian waxing, a practice which, according 
to Jeffreys (2005), owes much to the ‘domestication of pornography’ (see chapter 
three). 
 
On the beauty courses, bikini waxing is perhaps the most ‘extreme’ example of a range 
of appearance practices aimed at producing the objectified feminine body.  It is 
therefore one of the most obvious examples of how the aesthetic labour girls are trained 
to perform on their own and others’ bodies can also be seen as a form of sexualized 
labour, contrary Black’s claims that beauty therapy is not really sexualized work (Black, 
2004).  However, the discourse of beauty therapy as a technology of female wellbeing 
and confidence obscures this, as does the ‘de-sexualized’ appearance expected of 
students at most times.  What is implied here is that beauty practices are about women 
creating themselves for themselves and not about servicing men. However, as some 
commentators have suggested, this discourse is also at the centre of contemporary 
consumer cultures’ attempt to market (hetero)sex to women (Attwood, 2005) and to 
create a ‘new’ sexually autonomous feminine subject who nevertheless embraces a self 
which “comes straight out of the most predictable templates of male sexual fantasy” 
(Gill, 2009:102)69.  The disavowal of sex relies to some extent on the physical absence 
of the male gaze. The beauty therapy training salons are ‘feminine spaces’ and the 
presence of men is relatively unusual and regulated. In this context such discourses 
may be particularly powerful in sustaining the heteronormative illusion that if the male 
                                                
69 The way in which participants’ distance themselves and their practices from sexual connotations is 
similar to the way in which, according to Storr, Ann Summers customers and party organizers “see lingerie as 
‘nice’ when it is ‘not about sex’” (Storr, 2003, cited in Attwood, 2005:399). 
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gaze is absent, so is sex and that beauty therapy is therefore a ‘respectable’ 
occupation.  
 
Desexualizing the bikini wax may help students ‘overcome’ their initial aversion and 
transform it into a pragmatic approach to ‘getting on with the job’:  
 
I think everything’s the same really in that….eugh!...It’s all body… it doesn’t 
bother me now.  Everyone has one done in their lifetime anyway really (Abigail, 
Level 2, College A) 
 
They've just got to get on with it.  They might make a fuss first few times but 
then it’s just…ok (Sharon, tutor). 
 
 However, not all students are able to make this transition: 
 
…there's been..girls that have not really wanted to…. have a bikini wax in 
front of everybody…… But there's two particularly shy girls, and…one of them 
left in the end because she just couldn't…do it (Anne, Tutor, College B).  
 
In learning beauty therapy, students must allow their bodies to be displayed to tutors 
and other students so that treatments can be demonstrated and practiced. Tops have to 
be removed for underarm waxing, massage and even facials. Leg waxing involves the 
removal of lower clothing, and bikini waxing, the partial removal of underwear.  One of 
the essential ‘learning points’ of these practices, according to tutors,  is that students 
become aware of the vulnerability and anxiety that might be experienced by clients and 
learn how to protect ‘modesty’ by closing curtains around treatment beds and using 
towels to cover ‘intimate’ areas of a client’s body.  Treatments which are about 
improving appearance – ‘grooming’ and ‘corrective treatments’ (Black, 2004) - focus on 
most areas of the body.  Arms, legs, feet, pubic region and face are exposed to be 
scrutinized and worked on.  The implicit message that the  bodies on display in these 
salon training sessions are inadequate and in need of  improvement could well reinforce 
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the already developed sense of inhabiting an inferiorized body (Bartky, 1990) suggested 
in many students’ accounts (see chapter seven) .   In addition, more obviously 
sexualized practices may have particular implications for working class girls because of 
their vulnerability to being stigmatized and defined in terms of their sexual behavior 
(Skeggs, 1997; 2005).  It may be for these reasons, rather than any critical resistance to 
the disciplines of beauty, that some students remove themselves from such practices. 
However, a significant question here is why most students appear to overcome 
‘shyness’ in relation to having treatments which involve such bodily display.  
 
Part of the answer must be that bikini waxing is a compulsory element of the course and 
leaving is not always a realistic possibility.  As one student commented, starting another 
course would only be possible if you or your parents could afford the fees and 
equipment.   However, there may also be a sense in which getting used to exposing the 
body during training sessions may be helped by students’ already having a ‘feel for the 
game’ of being “constantly exposed to the objectification performed by the gaze and the 
discourse of others” (Bourdieu, 2001:63).  In addition, the ‘others’ in this 
(hetero)gendered scenario are women whose gaze, unlike the male gaze, is assumed 
to be non-sexual (heterosexual) and therefore non-threatening:   
 
….there was a bit of a problem [with a boy on a BT course]… in that when it 
came to things like bikini waxing…. some of the girls were like “Ohhh” and… 
there wasn’t a good vibe (Sally, Tutor, College B). 
 
The exception which legitimizes these assumptions is gay men/boys who are seen as 
being capable of assimilation into the world of the beauty training salon and are 
attributed with a benign ‘feminine gaze’. 
 
I think even if they did have an interest it would be very intimidating unless really 




The fact that students take the role of beauty therapists as well as clients during training 
sessions suggests a mutuality which echoes the ‘girly’ practices engaged in by students 
outside of their courses with friends and family.  But this sense of being ‘safe’ in an ‘all 
girls together’ environment belies the extent to which women ‘measure’ themselves and 
each other against notions of normative femininity “constructed from within 
heterosexuality and on male territory” (Holland et al, 1998). If beauty therapy and its 
practices are primary sites in securing women’s complicity in the production of femininity 
(Bartky, 1990) then it seems legitimate to argue that a key element of the hidden 
curriculum on beauty therapy courses involves the production of workers as “employees 
of a male gaze” (Renold & Allen, 2006; 462).  
Producing the ‘look’ 
 
I use the idea of ‘producing the look’ to encompass both the ways in which students’ 
appearance is scrutinized and regulated in the production of their bodies as material 
signifiers of the ethos of beauty therapy, and the ways in which the courses attempt to 
produce students as surveillants of other women.  In addressing these issues, I draw on 
both Foucauldian and Bourdieusian approaches.  I conceptualize ‘the look’ in terms of 
an introjected disciplinary male gaze (Holland et al, 1998; Bartky, 1990) through which 
women regulate their own bodily femininity and that of other women.  However, ‘the 
look’ can also be understood through the notion of habitus as gendered and classed 
aesthetic dispositions. The ideal bodily dispositions associated with the beauty therapist 
(as these are understood and promoted by tutors) may have a degree of fit with those a 
student brings to the course, or may require her to adjust her habitus to more closely 
conform to them.  She may also, at times, resist these judgments or at least find ways of 
working around them.  In addition, inasmuch as the habitus embodies accumulated 
capitals (Skeggs, 1997), a Bourdieusian approach also provides a model for thinking 
about how struggles over appearance are informed by the unequal resources students 
and tutors bring to the courses and by the symbolic power of class inflected notions of 
‘appropriate’ or ‘respectable’ femininity as these inform the ‘look’ of the beauty therapist. 
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In drawing on these two frameworks it is possible to explore the ways in which 
disciplinary and symbolic power work as forms of violence obscuring the power relations 
which underpin ‘the look’.  
 
Transforming aesthetic dispositions; femininity and class 
 
As suggested earlier, a key concern of tutors is to transform what they see as students’ 
narcissism’ into ‘care of others’. The tension between these is reflected in the feminine 
aesthetic which a student is required to embody as a trainee beauty therapist.  It is an 
appearance which  demonstrates her own concern with a particular class inflected 
version of femininity (light make-up, manicured nails, clean and tidy hair and uniform) 
whilst at the same time signifying a  ‘rational’ subjectivity as a ‘therapist’  with ‘expert 
knowledge’ of techniques and practices to improve the appearance and ‘wellbeing’ of 
clients.  The beauty therapy students, echoing Black’s (2004) research, are expected to 
wear ‘understated’ make-up and to embody what is often referred to by tutors and 
students as ‘a natural look’ which is nevertheless the product of constant surveillance 
and instruction by tutors and which may ultimately translate into an ‘appropriate’ bodily 
self-production by students.  
 
When we start teaching make-up…we sort of try and soften their look and 
take off their nail extensions and things like…you're breaking down those sort of 
…barriers….you're breaking them down into a beauty therapist as you go along 
really (Sharon, Tutor, College A). 
 
The figure of the beauty therapist, a product of this Goffmanesque ‘breaking down’ 
process, appears to be a feminine subject who is able to demonstrate a kind of mastery 
over the “uncomfortable paradox” of being a being woman (Frost, 2001: 81) in which 
feminine identity is both “welded to the body” at the same time as the body is lived as 
“something not themselves, as something at a conceptual distance from themselves” 
(Ibid, 2001:76). Not only, as Frost argues, does this “sense of separation from the 
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body… happen to girls as they develop and take an ambivalent and critical stance 
towards the ‘not them’ bodies they inhabit” (Ibid, 2001:79; see also Young, 1989), it is 
also arguably a pre-requisite for becoming a beauty therapist. The problem for tutors is 
not primarily about training girls to develop a critical stance towards themselves as 
objects since in most cases, as suggested in chapter seven, this is already an 
established disposition. It is rather a case of ‘breaking down’ and re-shaping the 
aesthetic values or ‘tastes’ contained in the self- critical gaze so that the aesthetic work 
which students have engaged in since childhood can be mobilized as aesthetic and 
emotional labour in the production of acceptably gendered and classed bodies, their 
own and others’.  
 
This process begins at interview. One tutor suggested that ‘an unacceptable’ 
presentation might be a reason to consider rejection.  However, it is also, as one tutor 
put it, “something we can work on”. Recruitment is seen as the beginning of the process 
of dispositional change. In this context, appearance at interview is seen as a legitimate 
target for comment and criticism: 
 
….if somebody turned up and really… hadn’t bothered to make any effort 
I’d…say, “do you think you’ve turned up today appropriately to indicate to me that 
that’s what you want to do?” (Philippa, Tutor and Programme Manager,  
     College B). 
 
That these values are implicitly classed is strongly indicated in tutors’ accounts of the 
ideal beauty therapist. Sharon makes this particularly explicit.  
 
[they are] not allowed to wear any jewellery, so that immediately gets rid of all 
the chavvy rings [laughs]. (Sharon, Tutor, College A). 
 
Whilst the prohibition of jewellery in the training salons is most often legitimized on the 
grounds of ‘hygiene’ there are clearly other concerns at work here. Explicit or implicit 
references to notions of working class femininity as undesirable or ‘unprofessional’ in 
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the context of beauty therapy is ubiquitous in the tutors’ accounts of the presentation 
and behavior of applicants and students. This may in part reflect the class positioning of 
tutors who, at least by virtue of becoming qualified FE teachers, are mainly upwardly 
mobile women from working class or lower middle class backgrounds, may have felt a 
particular need to disassociate themselves and their occupation with signifiers of 
working -classness (Walkerdine, 2001; Felski, 2000). They also see it as part of their job 
to groom students for work in a range of contexts with different class inflected 
appearance rules: 
  
We talk about the way they present themselves, the way they dress… we’ve 
talked about… different types of salons and why some people prefer to go to one 
rather than another…. perhaps an expensive glossy salon or a little country, 
more villagey type one (Carol, Tutor, College B). 
 
However, regardless of the classed locations of the clients whom students are being 
trained to service, the ideal femininity reflected in tutors accounts also resonates with 
the ways in which, according to McRobbie (2004), the female body is increasingly used 
as a site onto which new regimes of class differentiation and antagonism are projected.  
In this context the bodily habitus of working class women, defined by tutors in terms of 
the ‘chavvy vulgarity’ and ‘hyper-femininity’ of cheap jewellery or ‘heavy’ make-up, is 
implicitly counterposed to the “well-groomed success” (Ibid, 2004:101) normatively 
associated with middle class women and to which all women are required to aspire as 
part of the cultural process of post-feminist female individualization (McRobbie, 2009).  
If the ‘fashion-beauty complex’ plays a central role in promoting connections between 
feminine appearance, individualized success and status, it is not surprising that the 
transformation of working class teenagers into beauty therapists who must embody and 
promote these (hetero)gendered and classed norms often involves symbolically violent 
denigratory judgments about their appearance and the notion that these ‘failings’ must 




Everyone's being…looked at… you have to wear make-up,  you have to be 
presentable… and your teacher checks all it …you’ll get told you smell:;  “just go 
and have a wash”, or “go and change your clothes”, because it's not presentable, 
it's not how you should be…. if you haven't brushed your teeth …you've got to go 
and sort it out…My teacher's made me cry many a time…..if you can't do 
something, the whole class has got to know about it. (Tania, Level 2, College A) 
 
Tensions in producing ‘the look’ 
Uniforms 
There is, however, some dissent amongst students about formal notions of an 
appropriate bodily habitus for a beauty therapist, not least in relation to uniforms. 
Although the uniform is ostensibly worn for functional reasons connected to hygiene and 
safety, it is also part of the over-all look which signifies conformity to the norms and 
values of the learning culture as well as those of the beauty industry. The conformity 
expected by tutors, however, is not just a matter of ‘putting on’ the uniform but of 
internalizing its codes (Craik, 2003; 2005).  So, for example, whilst it might help to 
neutralize or ‘cover up’ bodily signs of working class femininity, vocational attributes 
signified by the uniform should also be embodied by students. The uniform, as Craik 
argues, is not only about control of a ‘social self’ but also of an ‘inner self’.  The way in 
which a minority of students embrace beauty therapy as a vocational identity is 
suggested in their favorable view of the uniform as emblematic of becoming  a ‘beauty 
girl’.  Conversely, dissent is suggested in the perception of the uniform as a symbolic 
burden inviting unwelcome scrutiny and creating a sense of dissonance between the 
self and the identity announced by the uniform.  
 
 I think it’s how people look at you… they see a uniform and they think ‘you 
should be looking after yourself’ (Kelly, Level 2, College B). 
 
In bringing about dispositional change, one of the first hurdles for tutors is to instill 




…she won’t come in wearing her uniform…I said to her “right, you’ve got a 
choice, you can either go and put your uniform on and be back in the class in two 
minutes or you can go home and be marked absent (Carol, Tutor, College B). 
 
In Carol’s view, the success of this strategy is indicated when students not only wear 
the uniform but (appear to) demonstrate a deeper and longer term identification with it: 
 
If you read what she put in her presentation, great emphasis on wearing 
uniform and she actually said “I’m going to be better at wearing my uniform next 
year” (Carol, Tutor, College B). 
 
In the context of beauty therapy courses the uniform represents a key site on which 
struggles over appearance and identity take place. The two colleges have similar 
beauty therapy uniforms of a thin black (College B) or blue (College A) cotton tunic and 
femininely styled trousers. The styling is generally disliked by students, although those 
at college B expressed a particular aversion to their cropped trousers.  In both colleges, 
students are required to wear the uniform during salon sessions.  However, many 
change into their own clothes during breaks to avoid being seen in it outside the salons. 
Though some students said the uniform made them uncomfortably cold in winter, the 
reasons usually given for this relate to it being seen as unfashionable, or as being 
impractical in maintaining a feminine appearance. 
 
I don’t like wearing the uniform….. I don’t like three quarter lengths because 
that means you have to shave your legs again and again and…ugh, not nice…. I 
like having long thingies because then you don’t have to bother so much (Louisa, 
Level 1, College B): 
 
One attempt to change quickly out of and back into the full uniform between sessions, 




… when it was break they used to wear leggings and  tops[uniform tunics]  
but we got told off about that… saying it’s unprofessional…you either wear all 
your own clothes or the uniform (Louisa, Level 1, College B ). 
 
Students’ reluctance to be seen in their uniforms may also be tied up with the low status 
publically accorded to beauty therapy which, as suggested in chapter seven, some 
students are well aware of.  Whilst tutors’ investment in promoting the ‘professionalism’ 
of beauty therapy may partly explain their defense of the uniform, which in most cases 
they also wear in college, for students with relatively little vocational investment the 
uniform “may represent a source of embarrassment rather than pride” (Joseph &Alex, 
1972: 720).  In this sense, students may be more sensitized to the structural relations 
conveyed by the uniform (Craik, 2003), relations which become clearer in considering 
the influences on uniforms in commercial beauty settings as well as in the colleges.  
 
The often clinicized look associated with beauty therapy uniforms, and reflected in the 
appearance norms on the beauty therapy courses, is symptomatic of the ways in which, 
as discussed in chapter three, beauty therapists lay claim to a body of knowledge and 
skills comparable with workers in health related occupations widely accepted as 
professions in the traditional sense (Black, 2004).   However, this message is 
undermined by the way in which the uniforms and accompanying body techniques also 
signify the naturalized femininity associated with beauty practices. Arguably, the beauty 
therapy uniform, although varying between sites within the industry , is a case par 
excellence of the contradictory nature of female uniforms which on the one hand signify 
traditionally masculine attributes of regulation, practicality and discipline but on the 
other,  exude particular classed notions of femininity including “tailored modesty, 
meekness and demureness” (Craik, 2003:128). In the case of beauty therapy, uniforms 
must also signify as well as underplay heterosexual attractiveness (Black, 2004). In this 
sense they are markers of subservience and feminine service work, a status which is 
reinforced by their  temporal instability - continually “vulnerable to fashion updates” 
(Craik, 2001: 130) unlike traditional masculine uniforms, (for instance, military or legal 
costume) and quasi-uniforms ( the business suit) . This is reflected in the sartorial 
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trends in dress codes for students in which there has been a movement away from 
clinicized white dress to relatively informal styles and colours.  In turn, this is suggestive 
of a shift in the meanings attached to beauty therapy as it moves into new commercial 
contexts in which ‘leisure’, as well as health and wellbeing, is a key commodity and in 
which new types of service work are being created. 
 
When I was at college [in the late 1980s] we had to have a horrible tent type 
dress-white… it’s much more casual [now] whereas before we were like a nurse 
…… spas are becoming more fashionable, you’re looking at different wear 
altogether and it’s a more leisure type wear (Sally, Tutor, College B). 
 
Students, many of whom would have been negotiating the requirements of school 
uniforms less than a year previously, may also be enmeshed in the oppositions 
inscribed in uniforms, particularly in relation to group identification versus individuality, 
compulsion versus choice and desexualization versus sexualization (Craik, 2003).  
These oppositions mirror the contradictory regulations around femininity and sexuality 
within which young women are obliged to position themselves.  Whereas the uniform 
carries little cultural capital in the perception of many students or in dominant public 
perceptions, individualized displays of femininity through makeup and dress can more 
easily be used in competing for value within the  “local hierarchies of corporal capital” 
(Skeggs, 1997: 104) established by students. 
 
…on a Tuesday we have a practical in the morning and the rest of the day we 
can wear what we want, and it’s just like when you come in… you’ve got to look 
your best because it’s a competition of who looks the best (Abigail, Level 2, 
College A). 
 
In one sense, the demure and subservient feminine habitus signified by the uniform and 
the bodily standardization it imposes is at odds with the sexualized self-production 
necessary for contemporary young women to ‘function as female subjects’ (McRobbie, 
2009). But whilst students might see self- stylization as a way of freeing themselves 
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from the imposed constraints of the uniform and possibly from its association with low 
status work, this ‘freedom’ is contained both by the limits imposed through beauty 
therapy training in which conformity as well as resistance are focused on bodily 
appearance, and by the technologies of self-hood imposed by contemporary 
constructions of heteronormative female individualization (Ibid, 2009).  
 
…you’ve got to wear uniform haven’t you, so like different makeup would 
make you stand out more…. (Abigail, Level 2, College A). 
 
In this sense, the ‘freedom’ of bodily self-stylization is revealed as being as illusory and 
symbolically violent as the ‘professionalism’ ostensibly signified by the beauty therapy 
uniform.  
 
Facials: “feeling bare and horrible” without make-up 
In policing each other’s appearance, students’ notions of what ‘looks the best’ are also 
often at odds with the seemingly paradoxical requirement that they spend considerable 
amounts of time on their courses without make-up or other overtly feminine 
accoutrements. For example, in order to practice facials students must take off all traces 
of makeup and for many of them this is a source of considerable anxiety. 
 
…people don’t want to have facials because they don’t want to take their 
make-up off….Like you get people that put loads of layers on and… they didn’t 
want people to look at them with no make-up on.  Because they might think “Oh, 
she doesn’t look nice” (Chelsea, Level 2, College A) 
 
In contrast to the care students in Skeggs’ study, for whom “ [S]pending obvious 
amounts of time with make-up just to go to work or college was seen to be 
embarrassing and inappropriate” (Skeggs, 1997:108), for most of the beauty therapy 
students, makeup of some sort was considered to be necessary in presenting the self in 




I have to have [makeup] on if I come to college.  I have to have it on if my 
boyfriend comes round. I have to have it on all the time…. if I don’t wear makeup 
I just feel bare and horrible (Amber, Level 1, College B) 
 
I’d put foundation on before going to the shops. I wouldn’t bother doing all my 
eye makeup…[but] I’ll make sure I put foundation on (Anna, Level 1, College A). 
 
That these are young women whose lack of family responsibilities allows them “the 
space and time to act out femininity” (Skeggs, 1997: 108) may in part explain their 
preoccupation with appearance. However, It may also be the case that the increased 
aestheticization of work and social life in the two decades since Skeggs conducted her 
fieldwork might make it more difficult for the beauty students to consider the  
‘performance’ of femininity through makeup and other means as  ‘treat’ reserved for 
‘going out’ (Ibid, 1997). The project of producing the body- as –self has a particular 
relevance when “it becomes increasingly difficult to function as a female subject without 
subjecting oneself to those technologies of self that are spectacularly feminine” 
(McRobbie, 2009:60).  In addition, given that beauty therapy is a prime site in the 
definition and promotion of those technologies it is unsurprising if beauty therapy 
students are under particular pressure to embody such a subjectivity:   
 
I wouldn’t care … like I’d come in with no makeup on....I think it’s how people 
look at you…they see a uniform and they think ‘you should be looking after 
yourself’. (Kelly, Level 2, College B) 
 
Whilst Kelly experiences being subjected to the critical gaze of others as a burden and 
imposition,  other accounts suggest that failing to attract the approving gaze is 
experienced as a distressing invisibility or even, in Bartky’s terms, as a kind of 




…[girls] want to look nice and feel nice about their selves. People take more 
interest in them, like boys.  If you look really nice, then… people, like, look 
again… sort of thing…but if you don't then [long pause] they just walk straight 
past you (Amber, Level 1, College B). 
 
“On this course people don’t care what you look like”: a paradox of surveillance 
The “mundane psychic terror associated with not receiving “looks of admiration”” 
(Goldman, 1992, cited in Gill, 2009: 105) may explain the intense anxiety associated 
with having to remove makeup in the beauty salon, especially given the ‘hierarchies of 
looks’ that operate amongst students.  However, as suggested in the first section of this 
chapter, the training salons are also framed as ‘safe spaces’ away from the male gaze 
in which students can ‘be themselves’ without worrying about what they look like.  
 
Tamsin: ... on this course people don’t care what you look like... 
Ellie: There’s not a lot of bitching like..’urggh she’s ugly’ or anything 
Tamsin: Yes... cause we all have to take our make-up off in facials (Focus 
group, level 1, College B) 
 
The seemingly counter intuitive statement  that no one “cares what you look like” on  a 
beauty therapy course is mirrored in other accounts in which students and tutors stress 
the ‘supportive’ nature of relationships in the training salons and the focus on emotional 
wellbeing rather than personal appearance. In these accounts appearance is again 
framed as a marker and means of  ‘feeling good about yourself’ rather than an end in 
itself in a way that echoes Black and Sharma’s (1999) view that the practice of beauty 
therapy centres around the ‘deficit body’ as ‘lacking in love’ and confidence rather than 
beauty: 
 
…when someone's having a bad day, when they're a bit fed up and feeling a 
bit …fat and spotty…or they need a bit of pampering… they have a facial.  As 
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As a group… they’re usually quite close knit and…there would usually only be 
compliments so “Ooh I really like your hair today”.. “Ooh I love that colour that 
you’ve done” or “Oh I wish I had my hair like that” (Karen, Tutor, College A). 
 
This is in part what Black means when she says that women are not concerned with 
beauty in itself. Rather, beauty practices are used to produce classed, racialized and 
sexualized performances of self, confidence and wellbeing.  On one level, students’ 
intense concern with conforming to and competing on the basis of specific and narrow 
standards of ‘attractiveness’ does not support this instrumental framing of beauty.  As 
Felski (2006) argues, just because Black’s respondents did not use the concept of 
‘beauty’ in interviews does necessarily mean that it was irrelevant to them. It is also 
possible that the adult and largely middle class salon users in her study were more able 
to construct narratives which justified their relationships to beauty practices in ways that 
avoided implications of ‘vanity’ and ‘superficiality’.  However, there is also a sense in 
which Black’s claim is useful in understanding the complexities of surveillance in the 
beauty training salons.  
 
Whilst on one level students are measured (by tutors and each other) on the basis of 
particular, though sometimes competing, aesthetic standards, there is also, in some 
accounts, a stringent denial that there is any one definition of ‘beauty’ and a critical 
perception of dominant standards of appearance:  
 
…students sometimes….say “oh so and so has done this or that” and they go 
yes but that’s not real, don’t believe what you see in the paper ….that’s been 




…when you say ‘beauty’ you instantly think make-up and you think…a 
beautiful woman….  But I think everyone can be  … beautiful.. if you just put 
some make- up it makes you feel better, you should feel like you’re beautiful 
basically (Kelly, Level 2, College B).  
 
What often seems to matter more than conforming to idealized standards of appearance 
is being seen to ‘make an effort’ to ‘take care of’ or ‘make the most of’ yourself, albeit 
with current norms of feminine embodiment as touchstones. The following statement 
reflects the link often made in participants’ accounts between appearance, effort and 
producing the self as a confident, ‘successful’ individual: 
 
….you get people who are like really glamorous and people who just don’t 
try… some people don’t make no effort at all.  And I think the under confident 
people just don’t try (Anna, Level 1, College A) 
 
In these accounts being ‘attractive’ is not an inherent characteristic but something 
anyone can achieve through effort and skill. But far from implying a more benign 
understanding of beauty, the apparently democratic and liberal individualist notion that 
‘everyone can be beautiful’ belies its disciplinary character and the symbolic violence 
operating through it. A woman/girl who does not present herself as ‘glamourous’ or  
hetero(sexually) attractive is not just an inadequate body but  a morally inadequate one 
too (Bourdieu, 2010:294). In a society in which the body has become “the central 
personal project of…girls” (Brumberg, 1998:97) it is not possible to ‘be unattractive’ 
without potentially attracting opprobrium.  “There are”, according to Helena Rubinstein’s 
often cited mantra, “no ugly women, only lazy ones” (cited in Ibid, 2002:19).  
 
The following focus group extract, in which students talk about re-applying make-up 
after facial sessions, exemplifies the way in which those who do not demonstrate a 





Amber: ‘Cause everyone’s the same...they all have to go to the toilet to put 
their make-up back 
Izzy : Straight away before you see ANYONE else  
Amber: Yeah...every single one of us... except Alex.  
Tamsin: (addressing Alex) you don’t really use that much make-up do you? 
Izzy: She’s wearing make-up now 
Tamsin : Do you go to the toilet, Alex, after you have a facial? 
Alex: [very quietly] Mmm 
(Focus Group, Level 1, College B) 
 
The typical post-facial rush to get to the mirrors in the salons and toilets can be 
understood as reflecting both a genuine fear of being seen without make-up and being 
seen not to have a proper feminine concern with self-presentation. In this extract, Alex 
is singled out as violating these norms.   In my perception of this interaction, her sense 
of humiliation was tangible and her barely audible response felt like a confession 
extracted under duress.  She could scarcely do anything else but deny her difference.  
However, the use of understated ridicule and exclusion as sanctions (Osler, 2006) 
against those who do not demonstrate an overriding concern with appearance is not 
only a way of regulating group boundaries (‘every single one of us except Alex”) but is 
also productive of social identities (Currie at al, 2007) by inciting the conformity of all 
participants to normative femininity as it enacted in this setting.  
 
Making distinctions: Looking ‘natural’, looking ‘fake’  
The expectation, discussed earlier, that students should embody a ‘natural look’  is 
reflected in  the more general understanding of the role of ‘grooming’ and ‘corrective’ 
treatments such as makeup or eyebrow shaping in enhancing ‘natural’ features deemed 
‘desirable’ and  de-emphasizing ‘undesirable’ ones.  ‘Natural’ beauty is positioned by 
tutors as the ideal femininity which beauty therapists should embody and produce in 
their clients.  In the accounts of most students, although with some ambivalence, the 
notion of a ‘natural look’ is also used to define an ‘appropriate’ femininity; one that is 
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both ‘attractive’ and ‘respectable’.  The paradox inherent in this concept is dramatized 
by the way in which participants counterpose it to the notion of a ‘fake’ or ‘plastic’ 
appearance produced through cosmetic surgery, false nails and eyelashes and 
exaggerated make-up:  
 
‘Fake’ is, like, Jordan. She wears… false eyelashes and she gets ... botox?  
…She’s plastic with her look. (Chelsea, Level 2, College A) 
 
…it depends on like what kind of person… you are.  Are you going to look as 
if you’re fake- tanned up, you’re covered in make-up and you’ve got long nails?  
Or you can just generally still do it all and take care of yourself and still look 
natural? (Jaime, level 2, College A) 
 
Whilst the ‘fake’ look arguably foregrounds the artifice of femininity as performance 
(Butler, 1990) or masquerade by revealing the work involved in producing it, the 
regulation of appearance through the notion of ‘natural beauty’ subsumes the artifice  
“under the guise of a natural, already present femininity” (Black, 2004:35). The following 
narrative might suggest a particularly astute insight into this paradox: 
 
..when you want a natural look, there's actually a lot of make-up involved in it.  
You've got your concealer to cover your redness; you've got purple concealer to 
cover this, that and the other…  And you have to know what colours to wear with 
the right lighting, like if it's going to be a cloudy day, you don't wear translucent 
powder (Tania, Level 2, College A ) 
 
In this sense, the idea of ‘natural beauty’ is arguably more insidious and symbolically 
violent than ‘fake’ beauty. However, what is perhaps equally as harmful is the dichotomy 
itself, echoing as it does other socially constructed binaries which have regulated 
femininity and divided women against each other. Particularly pertinent here is the 
historical association of cosmetics with sexual availability and prostitution against which 
white, middle class femininity has been positioned as ‘delicate’,  ‘natural’ and 
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‘respectable’ (Black, 2004). Whilst the emergence, in the 1950s, of the notion of 
cosmetics as a tool for enhancing ‘natural assets’ may have partially displaced or 
destabilized  this dichotomy (Ibid, 2004), the disparagement of women/girls who look 
too ‘fake’ or ‘plastic’ recalls and re-establishes classed divisions between ‘nice’ and 
‘bad’ femininities. However, these divisions are now being reproduced in the regulatory 
discourses of post-feminism (Renold & Ringrose, 2008) in which girls and women must 
walk a tightrope between the hypersexualized femininity demanded by the consumer-
led discourses of choice and sexual freedom and older but “tenacious …notions of 
‘good girls’ and ‘bad girls” (Gill, 2009:106). If the rejection of a ‘fake’ appearance by 
students implies a resistance to hypersexualization (Renold &Ringrose, 2008) it is one 
contained within the terms of this heteronormative and classed dichotomy: 
 
What kind of people seem to feel more confident and happy about the way 
they look? . 
 
I  don’t really know…  the ones that are stuck up their own arses [laughs]… 
there’s some girls in college who cake on their makeup on, like a proper slag 
(Amber, Level 1, College B). 
 
Female celebrities are often invoked by both students and tutors as archetypes of ‘fake 
beauty’.  However, Marina’s account indicates that whilst students might disparage this, 
the sexualization of female celebrity also exerts a powerful influence on their 
perceptions of attractiveness: 
 
…what they are looking at is not the before pictures when she [Jordan] was 
natural and a beautiful woman…they’re looking at the big boobs, botox, puffed 
up.. .thinking she’s really attractive and thinking they want to look that way 
(Marina, Tutor, College A). 
 
This paradox underscores the impossibility of making clear distinctions between 
“ordinary practices of femininity” (Currie et al, 2007: 27) and those associated with being 
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too sexualized. For example, whilst one student, Anna, talks about being seen as 
‘plastic’ by other students because she is “addicted” to fake tan, the popularity of this 
practice amongst students, many of whom elect to do an extra course in spray- tanning, 
suggests that the line between ‘fake’ and ‘natural’ is extremely ambiguous.  The same 
kind of tension is reflected in the responses of focus group participants to a photograph 
of two young women dressed in revealing clothes and heavy makeup for a day at the 
races: 
 
 Ella: They’re tarted up 
Sophie: Sluts! 
Karin : They’re probably nice people…but …if they’re going to wear that 
out…in public! 
Sophie:  The one in the pink’s got really bad hair… 
Evie: They’re probably really nice people…just getting a hard time ‘cause they 
look nice…and other people are jealous…  because they’re confident enough 
to be like that…and other people aren’t they get…grief really (Focus Group, 
Level 2, College B) 
Sarah: It doesn’t make them bad people…just ‘cause they…look nice 
 
The difficulties these students have in agreeing on the difference between ‘looking nice’ 
and looking ‘like a slut’ reflects the impossible paradoxes within which young women 
are required to position themselves (Griffin et al, 2006, Frost, 2001).   Likewise, being 
‘fake’ is both reviled and legible as a contemporary embodiment of successful and 
confident (hetero)femininity. To disparage ‘fake’ girls is both to position the self as 
‘respectable’ in comparison and to risk being seen as envious of those perceived to 
have more ‘erotic capital’. Navigating these contradictions may be particularly onerous 
for working class young women for whom appearance may be a particularly important 
resource but who are also more likely to be pathologized as ‘sexually aggressive’ and  
morally suspect  (Skeggs, 2005). In addition, by virtue of their association with vanity 





….people say… “Beauty girl’s-oh they’re all fake; they all love themselves’, 
but we don’t think that because obviously we’re all beauty girls (Jaime, Level 2, 
College A). 
 
As Ringrose (2008) suggests,  “classed discourses set up painful, contradictory 
dynamics” (ibid: 2008:43) and the vehemence with which some  participants invoke the 
discourses of ‘slut’ and ‘fake’ to make distinctions between themselves and other 
girls/women who are not ‘getting it right’ may well emerge from these.  
 
Embodying ‘the look’ 
 
‘Getting it right’, if this is ever possible, requires constant self- monitoring and vigilance 
to the nuances and contradictions involved in the discourses and practices of ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ femininities.  However, whilst it may be the case that the beauty therapy students 
have to negotiate the same minefield of contradictions as other young women, they are 
also subject to the disciplines of beauty culture in a way that other young women are 
not.  This has a number of implications, particularly in relation to how the courses affect 
students’ perceptions of other girls/women and their feelings about their own 
appearance.  In terms of the former, several students talked about developing a more 
critical gaze because of their courses:  
 
..it's making me really look at people a lot more, and be a lot more picky about  
appearances…as soon as someone comes on the telly you look at her 
makeup… and her hair and her face and spots… not… in a bad way, like I judge 
people, just how I can help them and stuff like that… I think it's just something 
that I'll have forever now, that I have been made to look at the length of people's 
eyebrows and the shape of their face and stuff like that… I've been trained to do 




Whilst Emma legitimizes her surveillance of others as a benign ‘professional’ tool with 
which to ‘help’ people, other students struggled to differentiate the more intensely 
critical gaze instilled by their course from the normalized, everyday surveillance girls 
impose on each other: 
.  
..to be honest…I do look at people more now..if their makeup doesn’t look 
nice to me, I think to myself, ‘oh, she hasn’t …’  I won’t say to their face… well, I 
do say it to Cassie, or Cassie will say it to me.  But, then again, what girl doesn’t 
really bitch? But …I don’t really judge people for what they look like. (Lindsey, 
Level 2, College B). 
 
One salient issue here is the ambivalence around ‘judging’ others. Though clearly, as 
Emma recognizes, beauty therapy courses are designed to produce a critical gaze, the 
notion of ‘judging’ others may be felt to jar with dominant discourses of liberal 
individualism that  inform the construction of the beauty worker as a ‘therapist’ who 
makes people ‘feel better about themselves’: 
 
You are trying to teach them not to judge people. It’s not their place to judge 
(Marina, Tutor, College A). 
 
The reason these statements can work without appearing to be obviously contradictory 
is that they are referring to moral judgments based on reading off character from 
appearance.  In contrast, defining a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ appearance is not considered a 
judgment of value in the same way but a matter of the ‘superior’ knowledge held by a 
trained beauty therapist.  Nevertheless, this denial of judgment functions as symbolic 
violence, obfuscating and legitimizing the role that beauty therapy and the beauty 
industry more widely play in the regulation of femininity.  
 
Students’ accounts of how their ‘ways of seeing’ have been changed by their courses 
suggest varying degrees of embeddedness in beauty therapy as a vocational identity. In 
the main, Level 2 students tended to have a more developed sense of how their 
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perceptions of others’ appearance had changed, possibly in part because of their 
exposure to the practices of ‘facial analysis’ and ‘corrective make-up’ (discussed below).  
They saw themselves as being able to look at other women through the ‘gaze of the 
beauty therapist’ and were therefore able to position themselves as relatively 
knowledgeable  and legitimate subjects of beauty culture. However, this does not mean 
that they no longer experience themselves as objects of an external or internalized 
gaze. What many accounts suggest is that the ‘gaze of the beauty therapist’, itself an 
internalized male gaze mediated by the discourses of beauty therapy, is turned back on 
students, imposing an additional set of appearance norms:  
 
I put loads [of make-up] on…two or three times a day.  Well you’ve…got to 
look nice and respectable for clients. If I don’t wear make-up…the clients may 
think “oh, she doesn’t really make an effort” (Amber, Level 1, College B). 
 
It takes longer to get ready in the morning because I now know… what a 
Beauty Therapist is expected to look like (Tania, Level 2, College A). 
 
Students who did not explicitly refer to embodying the appearance of a beauty therapist 
also talked about how their own daily beauty practices had changed. One recurring 
trope in these accounts is the ‘cleanse-tone-moisturize’ regime (Radnor, 1989) which is 
promoted by tutors and the NVQ curriculum as a foundational principle of ‘correct’ skin 
care practice. In popular beauty culture, too, ‘skin care’ has a particularly important 
status in the production of the feminine body and may be one of “ the most important 
aspects of self scrutiny”(Bloustien, 2003: 92) amongst young women:  
 
…it’s teached me how to kind of take care of my skin more.  Because before I 
never used to cleanse and tone and moisturise but now….I do take more care of 





Even  Alex, who expresses very little vocational investment in beauty therapy and is 
seen by her tutor and other students as transgressing appearance norms, sees herself 
as having been changed by the disciplinary regimes around skin care promoted by her 
course. 
 
…you learn about your skin and how to make it…so you get less spots…so I 
always, like, cleanse, tone and moisturize every morning.  I do that and I never 
thought I would (Alex, Level 1, College B). 
 
As Bartky notes, “[L]ike a schoolchild or prisoner, the woman mastering good skincare 
habits is put on a timetable” (Bartky, 2002:19).  The quasi-ritual repetition of beauty 
practices allows their underlying meanings, and the underlying gender order to be 
subjectively learnt through practical and symbolic mastery of beauty practices and 
incorporated in habitus.  For Bourdieu, the durability of a feminine habitus relies on 
repetition;  the continual recalling of the “constraints of clothing or hairstyle” (Bourdieu, 
2001:27) as psychosomatic work imposing limits on the body and subjective 
understandings of the world. For most students, the time and effort involved in this new 
regime is not understood as a burden but as a pleasurable practice which ‘empowers’ 
them to discipline their own unruly and inferiorized bodies. In the context of beauty 
therapy, this is a prerequisite for vocational identification and for becoming 
‘professional’. 
 
In a testimonial in the standard NVQ Level 2 text book. ‘Safia’ a young beauty therapist 
talks about her initial lack of confidence in performing skin treatments on clients and the 
importance of continually practicing ‘skin analysis’. However, her identity as a beauty 
therapist is ultimately legitimized through clients’ perceptions of her appearance. 
 
I began working for a commercial company that does face mapping, 
where…each section is analyzed so as to get a clear picture of what’s happening 
under the skin’s surface. I did as many as I could. Gradually, clients began to say 
that my clear skin was a good advert for the salon…so it did slowly begin to feel 
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as though I was being thought of as a genuine professional (Hiscock & Lovett, 
2010:273) 
 
The sense of ‘empowerment’ produced by the mastery of beauty skills could be seen as 
supporting Davis’s suggestion that engaging in beauty practices can facilitate a 
woman’s ‘transformation’ from “passive acceptance of herself as nothing but a body to 
the position of a subject who acts upon the world in and through her body…an 
embodied subject rather than an objectified body” (Davis, 1995: 113-114).  
 
However, I would argue that whilst students are produced as subjects through the 
practices of their courses they cannot “avoid the entrapment of objectification” (Ibid, 
1993: 113) not least because the pedagogies and practices on the beauty therapy 
courses make perpetual self-surveillance and surveillance of others inevitable. The 
beauty therapist as subject of exchange has to also position herself as an object. Tutors 
may be aware of the problems associated with this and may make attempts to 
ameliorate the potentially harmful effects on students: 
 
…you don’t want them to start fixating…so it’s hard because I have to teach 
them about corrective make-up and where you might put concealer…. Like 
someone in the class has a big nose but I made sure it was never referenced 
to… I do make comments….about how beautiful they are when I am doing 
makeup and things like that.. I do try and give them positive reinforcement 
(Marina, Tutor, College A). 
 
But in spite of her best intentions, the ‘positive reassurance’ she offers students is one 
which retrenches the notion that their value resides in appearance.   
 
Students’ accounts suggest that the intense focus on appearance exacerbates the 
sense of being continually under self-scrutiny and the scrutiny of others.   Beauty 
therapy , perhaps more intensely so than other forms of aesthetic labour, trains girls in 
what Wolkowitz, following Skeggs,  sees as “‘propertizing’ their embodied appearance, 
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reminding them that ….what you look like matters more than…what you know” 
(Wolkowitz, 2006:83).  In fact, in this context knowing and looking become conflated.  
For some students who have come to their courses with an already poor bodily ‘self-
image’,  the dominance of appearance as a signifier of value and the constant 
incitement to make bodily comparisons may well reinforce self loathing and exacerbate 
‘body hatred’ (Frost, 2001). 
 
I thought I was going to go in there an ugly duckling and come out a swan to 
be honest….. but it hasn’t really come out the way that I thought….I don’t feel 
confident within myself…I look at myself in the mirror and think “you’re 
disgusting”  (Jenna, Level 1, College A). 
 
I’m the biggest person there. I’ve got so upset and stuff about when…we 
have to practice on each other…especially because there’s… pretty girls in 
there… you just feel like you’re the odd-one-out.. it’s made it worse. It has really 
made it worse (Kelly, Level 2, College B). 
 
Whilst their courses have intensified the anguish these students feel in relation to their 
appearance, it also seems to have precipitated a more critical understanding of the 
pressures to ‘be beautiful’, particularly in terms of how they bear down on beauty 
students. This is suggested in Kelly’s perception of the uniform, cited earlier, and in 
Jenna’s anger about the pressures to conform: 
 
….being a beauty therapist you feel like you got standards to live to. Like… 
you’ve gotta dress in these certain clothes.  Why can’t you just go to a bloody 
charity shop and get your clothes? But you got to have a designer label to … be 
the best person or have your makeup done or fake hair, you know?  You’ve got 
to be a completely different person to who you are (Jenna, Level 1, College A).  
 
Some students, however, talk about experiencing an increased sense of confidence in 
their appearance. Whilst this may be associated with developing a sense of the self as a 
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‘skilled individual’, it is also connected to acquiring the means to ‘improve’ appearance, 
as suggested in students narratives about their own ‘skin care’ regimes. However, 
students’ accounts are often characterized by ambivalence. 
 
..it does make me feel good about myself because now I know how to look 
after myself… how to look after my skin and how to apply make-up….  But in 
other ways it's not so good because…if you haven't got the perfect skin, you 
know someone's looking and will be saying, “oh have you seen that?..  Especially 
when your teacher's got something to say about it (Tania, Level 2, College A) 
 
One student related her enhanced confidence to developing a more critical reading of 
idealized constructions of femininity, implying that she no longer feels the need to 
measure herself against media created images. 
 
I think I’m a more confident person. I used to be…really shy  but  I think [the 
course] has changed my view on things really…you realize that the girls in the 
magazines are actually airbrushed.  So obviously now I think there is…no such 
thing as a perfect girl (Abigail, Level 2, College A). 
 
However, an awareness of the manipulative intentions behind ‘airbrushing’ is not in itself 
sufficient to spark a more radical rejection of beauty culture which defines the objective 
limits of beauty therapy training and thus the ‘sense of limits’ students are legitimately 
able to have about their own embodiment.  ‘Airbrushed’ beauty, like ‘fake’ beauty, is 
counterposed against  the notion of ‘natural’ or ‘real’ beauty’. In positioning herself 
against the former, Abigail embraces a bodily habitus which is more in line with the 
‘expert’ position of the beauty therapist. The femininity she aspires to resolves the 
tension between narcissistic ‘care of the self’ and ‘care of others’ through a disposition 




I think now that I take more care of myself as what I would have done... And I 
feel like… I can go out and help people to… feel better about themselves…like 
enhancing what people have got (Abigail, Level 2, College A). 
 
 
 ‘Professional’ and everyday beauty practices in producing ‘the look’: A Question of 
Skills 
 
Although nearly all the students routinely engaged in beauty practices before starting 
their courses, the process of habitus change is partly informed by the distinctions made 
between the lay skills and knowledge they bring to their courses and those associated 
with ‘professional’ beauty practices. However, a closer examination of how these 
distinctions are conceptualized raises a number of questions about the hidden 
assumptions underpinning ‘professional’ practices, and about  the status of 
‘professional’ beauty skills and whether they should be validated as specialist skills at all 
(Black, 2004). 
 
The notion that there are correct (‘professional’) and incorrect (lay) technical skills and 
knowledge in the practice of beauty obscures the gendered, classed and racialized 
aesthetic judgments which underpin beauty therapy knowledge.   Nowhere is this more 
evident than in the concepts and practices of ‘facial analysis’ and ‘corrective makeup’ to 
which Level 2 students are introduced. These practices are part of the stock in trade of 
the beauty therapist and require students to learn how to assess their own and others’ 
facial shape and features,  to identify “facial problem areas” (Hiscock &Lovett, 2010: 
333), and to use ‘remedial cosmetics’, together with treatments such as hair removal or 
eyebrow shaping, to enhance ‘desirable’ ‘features and camouflage or de-emphasize 
‘undesirable’ ones.  Whilst tutors and standard text books emphasize the importance of 
producing an appearance which is ‘appropriate’ for a client’s age, ‘ethnic group’  and 
‘personal preference’ (Ibid, 2010) the knowledge on which these practices are based 
are underpinned by a set of class and race inflected assumptions about beauty. 
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Smooth, hairless skin, an ‘oval face’, wide eyes, slim neck, symmetrical and  full (but not 
thick) lips, a small (but not too short, thin or wide) nose, and an absence of ‘blemishes’ 
including freckles and moles (Ibid, 2010) define the standards against which ‘problems’ 
are identified and ‘corrected’. Assumptions about what constitutes an attractive face are 
legitimized and naturalized through these discourses and through technical claims 
about ‘correct’ techniques and practices (Gimlin, 2002). These normalizing judgments 
are elevated to the status of fact in student accounts: 
 
We’ve just done highlighters and shaders…..you want to make an oval 
shaped face with highlighters and shaders. Oval is the normal shape for a face 
(Leila, Level 2, College A). 
 
They are also used by tutors as the basis of making distinctions between professional 
skills and knowledge and those commonly used by students. 
 
…black eyeliner on the inner rim of the eyes.…or very heavy black 
eyeliner..…and that’s such a big no- no…They don’t grasp it, you say, “you 
mustn’t do that because it makes the eyes look smaller” (Sally, Tutor, College B). 
 
Gimlin argues that such distinctions are necessary for beauty workers to be able to 
claim a ‘professional’ standing and to “nullify status differences between themselves 
and their clients” (Gimlin, 2002:27). In the context of beauty therapy courses, they serve 
to create and regulate boundaries between ‘experts’ (tutors) and ‘novices’ (students). 
However, the case made by tutors for there being clear differences between 
‘professional’ and lay skills in the beauty practices taught on the Level 1 and 2 courses 
is often less than convincing: 
 
….they've got to learn how to hold the bottle in a certain way, how to apply it 
correctly ….they sometimes find it quite hard to raise themselves up to the 




They can put makeup on themselves but they can’t do it on somebody 
else…there’s no difference to paint your nails… or to hold somebody’s nail and 
paint it …... but if it’s somebody else’s hand who they know is paying for the 
treatment.… all of a sudden they freak out… it’s all mental. So, no, none of them 
have any technical skills. (Karen, Tutor, College A). 
 
Here, the difference between ‘professional’ and lay practices appears to be less a 
matter of technical skill and more a matter of mastering the dispositions necessary for 
performing intimate body work in a commercialized context.  The way in which tutors 
struggle to define a substantial material difference between professional and lay skills 
calls into question the former’s elevation above the everyday skills acquired, to greater 
or lesser extents, “in the very process of growing up female” (Black, 2004:82).  As 
discussed in chapter three, the naturalization of beauty skills not only prevents their 
conversion “into any form of recognized capital” (Black, 2004:81) for most women in 
most situations but also undermines beauty therapists’ claims to a professional status 
on the grounds of those skills. 
 
 It could be argued that this simply reflects the more general naturalization of women’s 
labour which contributes to the routine de-skilling and low pay associated with most 
forms of traditionally female work and newer forms of ‘feminized’ service work.  This 
may be most pronounced in what England et al (1992) call ‘nurturant work’ which 
includes varieties of face-to-face work with clients, patients or customers. Given its 
association with emotional labour and ‘wellbeing’, beauty therapy may not be out of 
place in this category. England et al (2002) consider that the relative low pay of caring 
labour constitutes a social “equity problem” not just because it contributes to the gender 
pay gap but because it may lead to the undersupply of labour which produces critical 
social benefits. Caring labour is an investment in the capabilities of recipients making 
them “more able to do things that increase their own and others’ wellbeing” (Ibid, 
2002:469).  However, whilst the skills involved in paid childcare,  nursing or social work 
may have a claim to producing these social goods, it is questionable whether the “equity 
problem” of beauty therapy should be located predominantly in its low pay and skill 
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shortages, or in its role in reproducing heteronormative femininity and gendered and 
classed power relations70.  Of course, girls and women often learn and use beauty skills 
without the ‘expert’ guidance of beauty therapists. If the process of learning these 
practices is intrinsic to the ways in which girls come to embody heteronormative 
femininity and thus the social relations of domination, the elevation  of specialist beauty 
skills acts as  a form of symbolic violence, legitimizing the beauty industry and 
entrenching the invisibility of the gendered relations of domination promoted and 
embodied through these practices. As Black suggests, drawing a parallel with Jeffreys’ 
arguments against the notion of ‘specialist skills’ in prostitution, the ‘professionalizing’ of 
beauty skills can be seen as reinforcing “women’s association with a demeaning and 
ultimately harmful industry” (Black, 2004:81). 
Conclusion 
 
Most students enter their courses with what could be described as a ‘feel for the game’ 
of beauty though not, in the main, with dispositions (or pre-dispositions) inclined towards 
the emotional demands of vocational beauty therapy.  Those with the most cultural 
capital at their disposal from family background, education or work, and who saw 
themselves as making ‘positive’ decisions to become beauty therapists, adapted more 
readily and enthusiastically to working with clients and dealing with their demands. 
However, students with fewer resources, often those who were initially most ambivalent 
about the course, also develop, to greater or lesser extents, more vocationally 
embedded identities or at least identities more embedded in the rituals of beauty.  
Habitus change is brought about through several mechanisms discursively connected 
through the notion of professionalism which acts as a powerful but hidden curriculum 
beneath the official curriculum of ‘skills’ and knowledge.  Students learn that behaving in 
a ‘professional’ manner, as it is narrowly defined in this context, leads to the validation 
of their skills.  From being simply ‘what every girls knows’, beauty skills become a form 
                                                
70 I am not suggesting that care work does not reproduce gendered and classed relations- it clearly does. 




of symbolic capital if only in the local context of the beauty salon or in local hierarchies 
of corporal capital. They become the means through which students can experience 
themselves as successful, caring people with abilities that are ‘needed’ and valued by 
others.   They also develop vocational dispositions for beauty therapy by ‘getting used’ 
to practices that initially caused ambivalence or distress.  In the case of bikini waxing, 
the discourse of ‘beauty as wellbeing’ is likely to be conducive in helping them 
dissociate from the sexual implications of this practice and the emotional tensions it can 
generate.  Predispositions to ‘doing looks’ are an important  prerequisite for making 
these transitions but the courses also required students to work on their bodies and 
feelings “in order to learn to labour appropriately” (Colley, 2006:22).  In the main, even 
those students who  initially had very little investment in the course or in emotional 
labour came to identify with the gendered, classed and racialized meanings 
underpinning the notion of a  ‘professional’ body  - looking ‘respectable’,  cultivating a 
feminine but not ‘overtly sexualized’ or ‘fake’ appearance, internalizing the quasi-rituals 
of skin care.  The accounts of Level 2 students mostly suggested an acceptance of the 
normalizing assumptions entailed in ‘facial analysis’ and ‘corrective treatments’.   
Although there was ambivalence about the intensified self-monitoring and monitoring of 
others that these practices precipitated, some students saw this as an inevitable and 
even positive outcome of their training as beauty therapists and it was these participants 
who most obviously exhibited an appropriate vocational habitus, as defined by tutors. 
The value that other students’ accorded to their newly acquired skills and knowledge 
often remained centered on their own bodies and framed in terms of being ‘empowered’ 
to “look after” themselves better . In both cases, though at different levels,  students 
developed a more embedded ‘feel for the game’ of beauty therapy, and a habitus which 
was, to greater or lesser extents, in line with the field.   
 
One of the underlying elements of this habitus seems to be a sense of oneself as a 
subject of beauty culture; someone now knows how to work on her body in order to 
defend herself against the threat of disparaging judgments, and, ideally, to produce an 
appearance and deportment appropriate for the aesthetic and emotional labour of 
beauty therapy. The subject of beauty culture is also someone whose knowledge 
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licenses her to make judgments about other women’s appearance under the rubric of 
care.  This is partly what students mean when they talk about becoming ‘more 
confident’ and what Davis means when she argues that beauty practices empower 
women to ‘transcend objectification’.  However, as I have argued in this chapter, the 
subject positions that beauty therapy legitimizes are always premised on female 
objectification. In this sense, learning to be a beauty therapist involves not just 
emotional and aesthetic labour but also, contrary to Black’s claim, sexualized labour on 
their own bodies and those of other women.  Feeling empowered is not the same as 
‘being’ empowered.    However, the feeling of empowerment is tremendously important 
because it is a subjective vehicle through which symbolic violence works to integrate 
habitus into the values of beauty therapy. If this is the case, then those students for 
whom the course has reinforced the misery and self-loathing connected to appearance, 
and who feel less ‘empowered’ by their experiences, may be in the best position to 
make a break with doxa, as suggested by their critical insights into inequities of gender 
and beauty culture.   However, as Bourdieu (2010) argues, critique is always limited by 
objective conditions. The lack of other viable options may well keep such students on 
beauty therapy courses in which the normative discourses of beauty, wellbeing, care , 
professionalism and skills contain or drown out the possibility of alternative, critical ways 
















Producing the Beauty Girl through 
a Chronology of Violence 
 
In the preceding three chapters I indicated some of the ways in which forms of symbolic 
violence are implicated in students’ initial ‘choice’ to enroll on a beauty course, in tutors’ 
definitions and classifications of students and their potentials, and in students’ 
experience of the pedagogies and practices of beauty therapy training.  In this chapter I 
draw on the ideas discussed in chapter five in order to focus in more detail on how the 
trajectories of students’ have been shaped by symbolic violence “embedded in the 
routines of everyday lives” (Morgan & Bjorkert, 2006:441), and the ways in which this 
hidden form of domination might intersect with economic and structural violence 
(Bourgois, 2001, 2004; Galtung, 1975) and ‘everyday’  interpersonal violence (Scheper-
Hughes, 1996, 2004) in the producing the ‘beauty girl’ and the inequalities and 
disadvantages she faces. 
 
In this chapter, I focus on four contexts in which the lives of beauty girls have been 
shaped by the operation of violence. These have been chosen because they seem to 
most vividly exemplify the operation of symbolic violence or of symbolic violence in 
interaction with other forms of violence.  The examples also illustrate a ‘chronology of 
violence’ in shaping the childhood and school experiences of students, their post-16 
choices, their engagement with appearance practices and their experiences on their 







Symbolic violence and emotion in the process of becoming a ‘girly-girl’  
 
As I discuss in chapter seven, whilst most students’ decisions to enroll on their courses 
was connected to the paucity of other viable options, beauty therapy was also a 
“choosable identity” that fell “within their horizons for action” (Colley et al, 2003:486). 
Both gendered and classed positions and dispositions shaped their ‘choices’. Beauty 
therapy was choosable in part because ‘doing beauty’ was already an important part of 
their lives and identities. For instance, all but one student (Alex) said that from around 
the age of 6 or 7 they had ‘played with’ cosmetics specifically designed for children.  
 
It [beauty kit] just had a little head. It had like a makeup thing, and hair stuff 
(laughs). I just used to put it everywhere. I used to put lipstick on their [friends’] 
eyes, and lipstick on their cheeks. It used to be fun (Amber, Level 1, College B)  
 
….they smell really nice, like you want to eat it [laughs]… I always remember 
that.  Like you get the little lip glosses and stuff and you carry it round in your little 
bag (Kelly, Level 2, College B) 
 
 
These accounts emphasize play and ‘innocence’ in a way that resonates with the  
discourses employed by cosmetics companies to market beauty products to children 
(Jeffreys, 2005), but also invoke the sensuous pleasure in touching, smelling and 
owning these ‘toys’.  Sheila Jeffreys rightly argues that the promotion of cosmetics to 
children as a form of play “will create the ‘choices’ of adult women” and is therefore a 
key element in the process of inculcating femininity and sexual difference. On this view, 
beauty practices are part of a pedagogy and curriculum of femininity,  a ‘habit forming 
force’ (Panosky, cited in Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990:34) which naturalizes gender 
through repetition and internalization.  Jeffreys’ view of the long, painful haul towards 
adult femininity also emphasizes the repression of an earlier, less gendered condition. 
Whilst the curtailment of bodily freedoms, and thus social freedoms, is key to 
understanding the physical and symbolic violence involved in the construction of 
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(hetero)femininity,  Jeffreys seems to underplay the way in which the inculcation of 
gender also produces the experience of femininity not only as ‘natural’ but also as 
potentially gratifying or ‘pleasurable’.  The following narrative about the centrality of 
appearance practices in ‘growing up’ suggests a more insidious operation of power and 
violence than is often implied by Jeffreys: 
 
…from about ten to fifteen I was always in tracksuits ….then as soon as I 
started becoming more like a girl…. growing boobs and stuff Iike that [I] started 
changing… Because…. I want to look more of a girly- girl. It changed ‘cos my 
Nan bought me this really nice pink top…and I don’t really like pink.  But as soon 
as I put it on I really liked it and then my mood…my attitude just changed, so I 
just started changing my dress sense  (Natalie, Level 1, College A).  
 
Natalie  interprets her changing body through normative discourses of sexual difference 
and her experience of this construction of ‘growing up’ is symbolized and confirmed by 
the feminine  clothing she begins to wear. She experiences her body as the ‘natural’ 
basis of “becoming more like a girl” in a way that resonates with Bourdieu’s claim that 
the symbolic ordering of sexual difference   “…comes from the fact that…. it legitimates 
a relationship of domination by embedding it in a biological nature that is itself a 
naturalized social construction” (Bourdieu, 2001:23).  However, what is omitted here, as 
in Jeffreys account, is the relationship between the socially produced body and emotion, 
specifically, in this instance, the pleasures associated with the production of gender.  
Natalie’s changing ‘tastes’ / dispositions are described in terms of the affective language 
of ‘mood’: ‘not liking’ transformed into ‘really liking’ and the emotive resonance of the 
pink top with family connections and gift-giving.    The sensibilities invoked by Natalie 
suggest that the symbolic violence that produces the feminine habitus is effective in part 
because it engages the individual on an affective level. These accounts resonate with 
Adkins’ reading of Bourdieu’s view of emotions as working to ‘rein in’ “the body to the 
habitus” (Adkins, 2004: 15) and with McNay’s claim that emotions “are both shaped by 
latent social structures and also the vehicle through which invisible power dynamics are 




Emotion is also a central component in students’ accounts of the importance of school 
friendships in beginning to use make-up on a daily basis. The importance to girls of  
school-based friendship groups and the role such groups play in producing and policing 
heterogendered identities has been well documented (Renold & Allen, 2006; 
Walkerdine et al, 2001). In my research, the social bonds between girls were sometimes 
cited as a key reason for wanting to go to school when formal education held few other 
attractions. Conversely, being bullied and excluded from groups appeared to be one of 
the main reasons for disliking school. However, most accounts suggest that the desire 
to belong was a key factor in beginning to engage in feminine appearance practices on 
a more regular basis. Five of the thirteen students started wearing make-up to school 
during the first year of secondary education (year 7) and by year 10, all but three 
students were regularly wearing make-up.   
 
….it was the end of year seven, beginning of year eight when my friends used 
to come in wearing…mascara and eye liner …and I used to sit there with no 
makeup on… and all my friends were saying ‘do you wear makeup, do you wear 
make up?’ and I was like ‘no not really’…but then I tried it and I thought oh I look 
alright..so that's why I started wearing makeup (Chelsea, Level 2, College A). 
 
 … two year’s into secondary school, all my other friends just started wearing 
make- up and I wanted to look just as good as them so …  And then, obviously, 
boys were involved, so you had to look good for the boys (Lindsey, Level 2, 
College B) 
 
Lindsey’s account makes it clear that  girls’ friendship groups exist in a context in which 
the approving gaze of boys defines ‘successful’ (heterosexually desirable) femininity.  
The ways in which this gendering process is embedded in a ‘hegemonic heterosexual 
matrix’ (Butler, 1990) is also reflected in the accounts of two students who did not wear 
make-up regularly until year 11 and who both identify the same two critical events as 
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precipitating a sustained engagement with heterosexualized femininity and appearance 
practices; a relatively ‘late’ physical maturation and the school prom. 
 
All my friends were wearing  [makeup] earlier [and] had big boobs as well  
and I was always …putting a bit of padding down my bra… so I could… be 
noticed.  But I never really had an interest in make-up…I think it was..when I had 
my prom …because I was all dressed up and I had all my make-up done and I 
had hair extensions and my hair was beautiful (Jenna, Level 1, College A). 
  
I didn’t wear make-up to school…. I was flat-chested … I looked about 10…  
And then the Year 11 Prom come and I had …my hair cut-off in a bob, and I had 
a Prom dress and all the boys were like, “woah, where did them boobs come 
from?”  And I was like, “don’t pay attention to me now; you never did throughout 
school” (Jaime, Level 2, College A).  
  
In these accounts,  the attainment of an adult identity (being someone, ‘being noticed) is 
synonymous with being on display in a way that exposes a paradox of femininity in 
which women are constituted  simultaneously as subjects (individuals/persons) and as 
objects of the male gaze (stereotypes/non-persons). The desire to ‘be noticed’ also 
suggests  a resonance between symbolic violence and Bartky’s (1990) concept of 
psychological oppression71, an idea which is useful in emphasizing the concrete psychic 
harm produced by symbolic violence in relation to women’s experience of objectification 
as both imposed through the perceptions of others and as a state in which the 
objectifying gaze is internalized.  This “duality in feminine consciousness” (Ibid: 38) is 
suggested particularly in Jaime’s response to the sexualized  attention of boys at the 
prom, behavior which can be identified on a continuum of violence as sexual 
harassment (Kelly, 1983).  Whilst she is critical of their lack of respect and interest in 
                                                
71
 Bartky essay On Psychological Oppression draws on Franz Fannon’s work on the psychological 
effects of colonialism on colonized peoples to theorize the experiences of women under patriarchy, 




her as a person, their behaviour is also experienced as a confirmation of self-value72 .  
However, a positive self- evaluation on this basis can only be maintained through 
continuous attention to appearance beyond the ‘princess at the ball’ moment of the 
prom and when this cannot be sustained the resulting feelings of inadequacy can be 
debilitating: 
 
The day [of the prom] I looked so pretty… but then I can never look like that 
again … I look at myself in other pictures and I think I really used to take time in 
doing my hair and my makeup...  I just feel like…I want to feel beautiful [but]…. I 
feel disgusted when I look at myself in the mirror (Jenna, Level 1, College A) 
 
The significance of the school prom as a rite of passage is suggested in other accounts 
in which preparing for the event included the first (and in most cases, the last) 
experience of visiting a beauty salon as a client. Though this was not specifically 
identified as a reason for enrolling on a beauty therapy course, it was talked about as a 
pleasurable and important biographical moment and, as such, may well have been 
significant in making beauty therapy attractive and ‘choosable’.   
 
…my prom [was] the only time I’ve been to a beauty [salon]…I had my hair 
done and then had my nails and make up. It were actually really nice ‘cos the 
people were nice and… I liked it (Amber, Level 1, College B). 
 
The school prom can be seen as a logical extension of other forms of gendered and 
classed institutional violence in schools (Osler, 2006). For instance, the inclusion of 
beauty therapy as an ‘enrichment’ or assessed curriculum option may well play a part in 
reproducing gendered and classed post-16 choices.  One student spoke about a short 
‘enrichment’ course as a reason for becoming interested in beauty therapy: 
 
                                                
72 This resonates with Best’s research in the US in which the idea of “having a good prom” was 
internalized by young women “as a means to measure their feminine self-worth and to solidify their 
heterosexual identities” (Best, 2005: 203). At the same time, young women’s prom stories reveal their belief 
in the prom as a site in which boys demonstrate their respect for girls by treating them as ‘ladies’. 
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I did a course  while  I was at secondary school in year 9….to learn how to 
give a facial, and paint nails and things like that, so.. even from school I knew 
that I liked doing it.  (Emma, Level 2, College B).  
 
School violence and the production of femininity 
 
In promoting normative constructions of femininity and gender difference, schools  
collude in what Ringrose calls the “violent heterosexualized politics within which girls 
are incited to compete” (Ringrose, 2008: 34) and thus in the kinds of classed, racialized 
and gendered interpersonal violence which, for many of the students, was a central 
feature of their school experience  . Five of the thirteen students said they had been 
‘bullied’ by other girls in ways that had profoundly affected their lives whilst others 
referred to isolated incidents in which they had been victims of ‘bullying’.  Much of this 
aggression appeared to be in some way related to, or expressed in terms of, 
appearance  
 
Both Louisa and Jenna’s accounts suggests that they were subjected to sustained 
campaigns of verbal humiliation throughout much of their secondary schooling.  
 
The bad… [bits of school were] … being bullied… most of my life.  My self 
confidence went down so much because I had…mono-brows.  That wasn’t the 
only… thing….because I was overweight as well and people were like “oh yeah, 
she’s fat”.  (Louisa, L1, College B).  
 
I was always bullied.  I never felt greatly about myself and it was mainly girls 
that got me into all the bullying, well they all bullied me, about not having my hair 




Jenna’s experience culminated in an incident which seems to have been particularly 
significant in sedimenting her disposition towards self-loathing and distrust of others, 
particularly of other girls. 
 
This is the most horriblest thing that ever happened.  I done a talent show ….  
and we were doing a dance… and it was a really good dance … and the people 
were chanting “crusty” at me because of my skin [eczema] ….and chucking stuff 
at me (Jenna, Level 1, College A). 
 
In these accounts, the feeling of shame connected to inhabiting stigmatized bodies 
plays a powerful role in shaping identities organized around bodily appearance. For 
Bartky (1990), shame is an intensely gendered emotion and a consequence of ‘being –
in –the-world’ under conditions of oppression in which women’s selves/bodies are 
marked as inferior. However, shame is not simply a reflection of these conditions but 
also productive of identities. In a Foucauldian sense, it is implicated in the operation of 
disciplinary power over women. In order to experience shame one must have a sense of 
oneself as being watched (Frost, 2001). In this sense, shame is a characteristic of 
symbolic violence as “internalized humiliations and legitimations of inequality and 
hierarchy” (Bourgios, 2001).  Bourdieu argues that experiencing the body with shame is 
a “form par excellence of the experience of the alienated body (Bourdieu, 2001:65). 
However, at the same time, it might be “our bodies’ way of telling us that we are 
interested” (Probyn, 2004:239) and that we desire to be different than we are. Whilst 
Probyn uses shame as an example of how emotions might be catalyst for those in 
positions of privilege to challenge dominant social relations, this insight can also be 
used to understand how shame might instill an obsession with self- transformation in 
ways that unwittingly reproduce them.  For instance, though Louisa presents her 
reaction to being victimized in terms of individualized resistance, her escape from the 
‘bullies’ is predicated on her submission to their judgments and on embracing feminine 




So then doing things like exercising [and] the beauty sort of stuff, made me 
more confident. … and it just makes me forget them and just think… yeah, it’s my 
life (Louisa, Level 2, College B) 
 
For many of the students being included in, or excluded from, friendship groups appears 
to have had an overriding importance in their school lives (Renold & Allen, 2006) and 
may have been a significant factor in their disengagement or self-exclusion from other 
aspects of school and in their low academic achievement. The affects of this may be 
particularly dramatic for previously ‘high achieving’ girls like Kelly whose place at “the 
top of the class” in her first secondary school, partly as a result of intense pressure from 
her father to ‘do well’, appears to have come at the considerable cost of feeling 
separated from her peers and suffering mental health problems which eventually lead to 
her hospitalization: 
 
I didn’t have any friends or nothing. I just had to work and that’s it. But I 
wouldn’t be able to go out and stuff… I was just learning and…I couldn’t, like, 
express myself very well (Kelly Level 2, College B).   
 
The ‘discovery’ of a ‘real’ and ‘happier’ self, facilitated by moving from her father’s 
house to her mother’s, and to a new town and school in which she was able to make 
friends, is connected to turning her back on academic success.  
 
 I wasn’t the person I am today, so I’m glad I moved… because…I used to 
never talk to anybody and now I can’t stop [but] I…. went a bit crazy and just 
didn’t really bother anymore [with school work] (Kelly, 18, NVQ 2, College B). 
 
The sense of incompatibility between academic achievement and  ‘happiness’ may well 
be bound up in the dynamics of class73 and with the contradictory subject positions into 
                                                
73
 Some studies of youth transitions suggest that working class students and their parents might 
prioritize ‘happiness’ over ‘success’ (Bloomer et al, 2002) in response to the ways in which objective 
probabilities of the former and parental experience of schooling shape a ‘sense of limits’. As Walkerdine at al 
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which ‘clever’ working class girls have to insert themselves (Walkerdine et al, 2001; 
Renold &Allen, 2006). Self-exclusion from education, like disciplinary exclusion “can 
very easily contribute towards longer term social exclusion” (Macrae et al, 2003: 90)74. 
However, the ‘happiness’ gained from prioritizing social bonds may be double edged.  
Whilst Kelly talks about close and valued friendships made in her new school, her social 
networks were also the site of a great deal of anxiety connected to her appearance, her 
perceived lack of feminine bodily capital, and her experience of being ‘bullied’.  
 
For other students, self-exclusion from learning or school75 is framed as a direct 
consequence of interpersonal violence: 
 
I would get up in the morning and tell my mum I wasn’t going to school and 
just wouldn’t go.  I got bullied a lot in school… so that’s part of the reason I didn’t 
like going (Lindsey, Level 2, College B).  
  
The first three years… was good.  I think I leant things… but year ten and 
eleven I just went downhill…. They used to make lies up…so I used to get in 
trouble ... they would walk past me in the corridor and trip me up and  chuck 
things at me, make me feel really small and…grab me and beat me up (Anna, 
Level 1, College A). 
 
Anna describes being physically pushed out of the school gates in year 11 by another 
girl who had accused her of racism.  She never returned and the school did not enter 
her for GCSEs. 
                                                                                                                                                          
(2001) suggest, ‘happiness’ might be “incontrovertibly fused with academic success” (Ibid, 2002:135) for 
middle class people, but this is less likely to be so for most working class families.  
 
74 Macrae et al (2003) are predominantly concerned with formal or informal school exclusions rather 
than self-exclusion. However, their arguments are also relevant to understanding exclusion in its broadest 
sense. They argue that dominant or ‘weak’ versions of the concept locate the reasons for exclusion in the 
behavior of individual children.  By contrast, stronger’ versions, such as Osler’s (2006) emphasize the social 
processes and power relations involved in exclusion, the role of ‘gatekeepers’, its policy effects and its longer 
term social and economic impact. 
75 I use the definition of exclusion proposed by Osler (2006) to include self-exclusion (or truanting) from 




As discussed in chapter five, Osler suggests that such experiences are part of the 
institutional and interpersonal violence enmeshed in wider school processes which 
ultimately reproduce the structural violence of unequal access to marketable 
qualifications and longer term life chances.  Girls’ particular vulnerability to self-
exclusion is, she argues, a product of institutionalized gendered discourses which make 
the suffering of girls in relation to verbal and psychological interpersonal violence 
invisible and divert resources for addressing ‘disaffection’ away from girls to 
‘underachieving boys’ whose withdrawal from learning is expressed in more overtly 
‘disruptive’ and physically violent ways.   What Osler sees as the systemic violence 
enacted through these discourses can also be seen as symbolic violence insofar as it 
obscures and legitimizes gendered and classed inequalities. 
 
Arguably, self-exclusion is a strategy used by girls who receive inadequate support 
against ‘bullying’ (Ibid, 2006). Participants who self-excluded because of interpersonal 
violence or other difficulties at school talked about their poor relationships with teachers 
who appeared to dismiss their problems and ignore their potential longer term 
consequences:  
 
…the teachers just let me [leave school], they just didn’t care.  They didn’t 
write letters, didn’t ring up to talk to my mum.  They didn’t get my mum in to talk 
about my career or anything like that.  And I was in Year 11 so I think that was 
stupid of them.  They just left me (Anna, Level 1, College A). 
 
I didn’t really like school…[because of]  the people..the teachers.  I just didn’t 
get along with them. They’d just shout at me for no reason. For like..talking to 
other people and I’d just  stay there with my head on the table and they’d just 
come over and shout at me (Leila, level 2, College A). 
 
In some accounts students represented their relationships with teachers as a reason for 




I was dyslexic and I had… really bad handwriting and my English teacher was 
really mean…because I wrote ‘Louisa’ and it comes up, like, LOOSER. So I 
wrote ‘Louisa Jones’, so she was like “Who’s ‘Looser Jones’?” and….I’m like “it 
says Louisa” and she’s like “well write it properly!” (Louisa, Level 1, College B). 
 
Being belittled in pedagogic interactions which “fail to recognize… [students] as 
persons” (Friere, 1993:37) constitutes a form of interpersonal symbolic violence which 
may be embedded in school cultures and contribute to “an everyday climate of 
incivilities” (Osler, 2006: 578) in which other forms of violence can flourish. Alongside 
the kinds of resistant behavior identified by Willis (1977) and Herr & Anderson(2003), 
this can include physical violence.  That such expressions of anger or frustration run 
counter to the codes of normative femininity is likely to explain why Amber appeared to 
be the only student who had been subject to disciplinary exclusions for physical 
violence, in her case for assaulting a teacher and another girl.  Far more common are 
the kinds of withdrawal  from academic achievement suggested in other students’ 
accounts in which, as discussed in chapter seven, not ‘doing well’ at school is 
represented as a personal failure or a matter of individual inclination. Jaime’s account 
provides one of the most powerful examples of this: 
 
It sounds really bad because of that whole life and what-have-you learning 
[but] I just don’t like learning so, therefore, I don’t want to learn.  So [in] school I 
just literally… bummed around  – I didn’t learn anything…  I just think I don’t have 
any interest, do you know what I mean?....  I’m not that kind of person (Jaime, 
Level 2, College A). 
 
On one level, the way in which Jaime naturalizes her situation allows her to ‘save face’.   
However, such individualized understandings reflect not only the symbolic violence 
enacted through neo-liberal discourses of the self and through the ways in which 
education conceals its political character (Herr & Anderson,2003; Bourdieu & Passeron, 
277 
 
1990),  but also in  the way in which an internalized sense of limits can help to channel 
working class girls into a narrow range of gendered vocational education and training.  
Violence in the production of post-16 choices and beyond 
 
In chapter seven I discussed students’ accounts of their decisions to enroll on beauty 
therapy courses. Here I focus on how gendered and classed constraints on other 
possible options were perceived by students and some of the ways in which symbolic 
and other forms of violence may work to conceal, naturalize and normalize the structural 
power relations in which these constraints are enmeshed.   
 
In many cases, students expressed the belief that girls and boys should not be 
restricted to gender-typical pathways. External constraints in the form of ‘peer pressure’ 
were often understood as a key reason for gendered occupational segregation: 
 
I think we should be able to do the plumbing and plastering as well and not be 
branded like “Oh, she obviously…  I don’t know how to explain it, like a butch girl 
or something…(Abigail, Level 2, College A). 
 
I think if a boy does [beauty therapy] they’re seen as like, “oh, they’re 
obviously gay”.  But … I’d probably be called ‘gay’ if I was to then go and be a 
fireman… but… girls can and boys can do anything they want (Kelly, Level 2, 
College B). 
 
One of the most salient aspects of these accounts is the way in which gender and 
heterosexuality are inseparably interwoven.  Contrary to Beck et al’s ( 2006) research in 
which ‘homophobic’ taunting was seen by young people as predominantly a problem for 
boys who make non-traditional ‘choices’, the risk involved in being seen as ‘gay’/ ‘butch’ 
is represented here as the major deterrent to transgressing the boundaries of gender-
typical training and work.  But whilst inequality in access to training and jobs is 
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understood as unfair to both girls and boys, the use of heteronormative discourses to 
regulate gendered choices is seen as a problem insofar as it stigmatizes those who 
transgress by threatening their assumed normative gendered identities.  The implication 
is that a girl should be able to be a plumber or plasterer whilst still being recognized as 
heterosexual and feminine. Likewise, a boy should be able to be a beauty therapist 
without being ‘terrorized’ with threats to ‘his  masculinity’.  In this sense, the discourse of 
equality drawn on by students is underpinned by an unspoken assumption  of 
heterosexuality and sexual difference. Whilst the direct violence and other forms of 
regulation faced by young lesbian and gay people and to those who otherwise 
transgress heteronormativity are very real experiences (Toomey at al,2011, Epstein & 
Johnson, 1998), these meanings also operate as symbolic violence against those who 
are positioned ‘inside’ as well as ‘outside’ the boundaries of heterosexuality (Jackson. 
2006) on at least two levels .  
 
Firstly, the liberal individualist or  ‘equal but different’ models of gender equality drawn 
on by students throughout their accounts disguises the way in which heterosexuality 
operates  as an organizing structure, ordering perceptions of the social world and what 
is possible within it along gendered lines (Ingraham, 1994) even when inequality is 
being challenged.  Whilst the crossing of gendered occupational barriers has become at 
least more thinkable, if not more possible, the taken for grantedness of (hetero)sexual 
difference is arguably an important factor in understanding why attempts to “encourage 
a more equal balance of the sexes in heavily male or female dominated sectors” have 
had limited success (Beck et al, 2006a :272).  Ironically, the assumption of naturalized 
sexual difference underlying this notion of ‘gender balance’ may militate against equal 
access and can also collapse back into gender normative prescriptions: 
 
I just don’t think it’s right for girls to do mechanics or stuff like that.  It’s weird.  
I wouldn’t like to do it… It’s more of a man’s course than a girl’s course.  You 
can’t imagine a girl like fixing cars- horrible!…Girls are more fragile than men to 




Secondly, students’ tendency to see girls and boys as equally disadvantaged by gender 
stereotyping implies an equivalence that obfuscates the asymmetry of gendered 
‘choices’. The  jobs alluded to in the above quotations follow the pattern of inequalities 
in status and pay accorded to ‘men’s work’ and ‘women’s work’, and these inequalities 
are  inextricably tied to broader power relations between men and women. Both the 
exclusion of women from ‘men’s jobs’ and the social and cultural factors that deter men 
from ‘women’s jobs’ can be understood in terms of the policing of  occupational and 
other boundaries against threats to masculine power.  As Segal  suggests, men have 
collectively attempted to exclude women from jobs and other social spaces constructed 
as male in order to  “to affirm mastery over those they definitively exclude” [and] to 
preserve the category of manhood” (Segal, 1999:169). At the same time, this 
necessitates a “continual and ubiquitous policing of any “effeminate” deviance” (Ibid, 
1999:157), including that associated with men doing jobs like beauty therapy.  
 
It is not hard to see why traditionally male manual occupations which, as Bourdieu puts 
it, “owe much if not all of their value…to [the] image of manliness” ( 2001: 96)76, might 
seem to be  no -go zones for young women. This can be understood as a product of the 
dialectic between the symbolic violence of (hetero)gender which produces a ‘sense of 
limits’ through which women exclude themselves, and the structural violence pertaining 
to the ‘objective limits’ inherent in the organizational structure and culture of male 
dominated jobs and training.   Echoing Bloomer et al’s (2002) research in which girls 
saw male training areas of FE colleges as ‘scary’, ‘non-girl’ spaces, some of the  beauty 
girls represented ‘boys’ courses or courses in which boys outnumber girls as hostile 
territory 
 
If it was me [doing car mechanics] I would be ... nervous…. Because people 
think it’s a boys subject don’t they?...there would be a lot of boys doing it and 
                                                
76
 As Cockburn (1983), amongst others, has argued, this is an image which is central to the construction 
and embodiment of working class masculinities in industrial jobs, an image threatened by the decline of 
heavy industry but which may continue as “class -based survival strategies amongst unemployed men” 
(Charlesworth, 2000, cited in Walkerdine, 2001:66) or in masculinized activities such as boxing and 




they’ll think girls won't know anything about cars.  And like, if someone asked me 
a question and I got the answer wrong and like they’d be laughing (Chelsea, 
Level 2, College A)  
 
Chelsea’s perception of the precarious position of girls on ‘boys courses’ suggests how 
the symbolic violence of hierarchical gender binaries place women in a double bind 
because their gender is not congruent with the work and knowledge associated with 
male dominated occupations (Dennissen, 2010). In this context, girls are expected to 
act in a gender appropriate way (to ‘get the answer wrong’) whilst also being held 
responsible for being able to produce a masculine performance of work (‘knowing about 
cars’).  The cost of getting it wrong, in Chelsea’s view, would be the shame of public 
humiliation meted out to those who are othered by hegemonic masculine norms. 
However, there may also be costs attached to ‘getting it right’ insofar as masculine 
vocational dispositions are not profitable as cultural capital for women in the same way 
as they are for men because women who overstep occupational boundaries “carry with 
them the trait of femaleness by the existence of the perceived biological body” (McCall, 
1992: 850). These constraints inform decisions about future training and employment. 
However, some students were less accepting of exclusion: 
 
They should have a girls class in…building work or something…Because then 
you won’t get the hassle from the boys (Abigail, Level 2, College A). 
 
Abigail may not have been aware of feminist projects dedicated to providing women- 
only construction and related manual trades courses.  However, her understanding that 
girls may be excluded from these occupational areas because of ‘hassle’ from 
boys/men may hint at the threat of sexual harassment , a significant issue for Abigail 
who had left her job as a legal secretary after being harassed by one of the solicitors.  
Whilst sexual harassment may be used as means of protecting male occupational 
territories (McKinnon, 1979; Stanko, 1988; Chamberlain et al, 2008), some research on 
gender inequality in vocational education in the UK and US identifies it as a significant 
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obstacle to women’s participation in training for male dominated occupations (Eardley & 
Manvell, 2006). 
 
There was no obvious indication that specific concerns about sexual harassment had 
informed the decisions of the three students (Kelly, Lindsey and Leila) who had 
previously considered training in areas dominated by boys/men. However, in Kelly’s 
case, a long cherished ambition of becoming a chef was derailed by her ‘discovery’ that 
professional cookery is masculine territory in which her own ‘feminine’ dispositions, 
might be ‘out of place’ or in which girls might be disadvantaged, vulnerable or subject to 
male power in unspecified ways:  
  
I was really put off being a Chef… watching Gordon Ramsay … I was  
watching all those cooking programmes because I’ve wanted to be a cook since I 
was little… I’m a good cook ….And in Catering they’re all boys– there’s hardly 
any girls so I would have felt lost…. I’ve always thought…boys don’t like cooking.   
 
Maybe Gordon Ramsay puts you off, but it turns them on? 
 
Yeah, they want to have power don’t they? 
  
Kelly’s fear of ‘feeling lost’ on a predominantly male catering course is accompanied by 
a sense of outrage at her exclusion and a very conscious rejection of men’s ‘claim’ to 
the skills which she had previously seen as coherent with her own feminized identity. 
She clearly does not simply accept men’s dominance in this sphere as legitimate. 
Indeed, she displays the critical insight of someone who recognizes her exclusion from 
privilege (McNay, 2000). However, I would argue that because her understanding of 
gendered power relations in relation to professional cookery is contained within doxic 
assumptions of natural (hetero)sexual difference, and because she sees her own skills 
as feminine, she is obliged to position herself as an outsider. Thus the potential for 
resistance suggested in Kelly’s account is crushed by the weight of symbolic violence 
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which imposes a sense of limits, reinforced by her awareness of the precarious, even 
dangerous, position of women in male spaces77   
 
Kelly’s response to finding out  that catering is a ‘boys course’ also raises questions 
about the shifting terms of symbolic violence producing femininity and masculinity as  
“constantly transformable act[s]” (Skeggs, 2004:24).  In this context, her sense of being  
excluded can be seen in relation to contemporary shifts in masculinity in which cooking 
in a variety of contexts has been reconstructed as a ‘manly practice’ (Hollows, 2003)78.    
Whilst this does not displace its identification with feminine domesticity, it may well 
further exacerbate the difficulty women have in capitalizing on culinary skills defined, 
like beauty skills, as immanently feminine, whilst enhancing men’s ability to accrue 
capital (Adkins &Lury, 1999) through this kind of work.   
 
This situation is not dissimilar to men’s ‘infiltration’ of other jobs traditionally constructed 
as female-only.  Cross and Bagilhole (2002) argue that when men enter occupations 
identified with women they adapt or reconstruct masculinity in ways that reproduce 
gender advantage regardless of their numbers in any particular  occupation. Whilst  
theorists of individualization valorize the reflexive, self- inventing individual cut loose 
from traditional structures of gender and class, it may be those in positions of privilege 
in relation to these structures who are most able transgress and to do so in ways that 
maintain that privilege (Adkins, 2002; Connell, 1995; Bourdieu, 2001).  Whilst it is 
possible for girls to consider entering male dominated areas, the logic of hierarchical 
(hetero)gender division means that they either do so on unequal terms or, as is more 
                                                
77 Indeed, there is some empirical evidence that sexualized intimidation or other abusive work practices 
in the hospitality industry may function to discourage women from “’invading’ the ‘male turf’ of restaurant 
kitchens” (Hall, 1993: 457; Bloisi & Hoel, 2008).  
78  The traditional gendered division which poses the “mundane [female] cook” against the 
“celebrated”...male chef (Gough, 2007:333) resonates with more recent media representations in which 
cooking has been constructed either as a ‘hyper-masculine’ professional practice, as is the case in Gordon 
Ramsay’s television shows (Hollows, 2003), or as a  ‘male lifestyle activity’ which, according to Hollows, 
amalgamates the figures of ‘the new man’ of the 1980s with the ‘new lad’ of the 1990s to reconceptualize 
domestic cooking as a ‘cool’ masculine leisure practice, as in the case of Jamie Oliver’s  1999 TV series, The 
Naked Chef.  Whilst cooking as routine domestic labour continues to be identified as feminine, the discursive 
masculinization of domestic cookery as  leisure and aspirant lifestyle activity, together the masculine 
construction of the restaurant chef,  may well be a key factor in the increasing numbers of men entering 




likely to be the case, end up excluding themselves in one way or another from, “the 
courses or careers from which they are anyway excluded” (Bourdieu, 2001: 95).  
 
In the cases of the other students who had considered ‘male’ occupations, the 
derailment of their interests in car mechanics and engineering (Leila) and becoming an 
army paramedic or painter and decorator (Lindsey) was explained through oblique 
references to ‘changing interests’ (though in Lindsey’s case, fear of leaving home was 
also stated as a reason for deciding not to join the army). Such changes, however, take 
place against a back drop of normative gender expectations filtered, in part, through the 
regulation of (hetero)femininity in families, education and in girls’ friendship groups 
which may well displace earlier aspirations. Leila’s reference to literally ‘forgetting’ her 
earlier interests may be indicative of the temporary or arbitrary nature of decision 
making for the ‘undecided’ (Du Bois-Reymond, 1998). However, it may also be 
suggestive of (and suggest a challenge to) Bourdieu’s understanding of the 
unconscious processes of misrecognition as an “amnesia of genesis exerted through 
conditions of existence…..[which] implies the forgetting of acquisition, the illusion of 
innateness” ( Bourdieu, 1977:50 ) 
 
I wanted to do like, engineering and learn about cars 
 
What stopped you? 
 
I dunno… my brothers used to…chat about cars and that and I used to just sit 
there and listen to them 
 
When you were making [post-16] choices did you think about that? 
 
No, I’d forgotten about it by then (Leila, Level 2, College A) 
 
In this case, the forgetfulness of history does not specifically suggest misrecognition of 
the social inculcation of gendered choices.  Rather, recalling Jeffreys’ (2005) 
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understanding of gender socialization, self-exclusion is produced here by forgetting a 
‘self’ for whom possibilities outside of normative femininity were thinkable. Leila’s 
recollection of an ‘earlier self’ perhaps suggests that the origins of gendered 
dispositions are not always beyond the reach of consciousness and therefore not 
always durable in the way that Bourdieu suggests.  At least partial recovery of the 
historical production of sex/gender is possible on a cognitive level even for those 
without access to the privileged tools of reflexive sociology. The potential in using such 
personal recollections to denaturalize and  politicize gender relations is precisely the 
epistemological basis of feminist conscious raising (McKinnon, 1997). Whilst Bourdieu 
dismisses this as a misrecognition of the nature of symbolic violence as “mystified 
consciousness” rather than “dispositions attuned to the structure of domination” 
(Bourdieu, 2001:43), the fact that students can both ‘forget’ and remember ‘earlier 
selves’, and denounce inequality and acquiesce to it, suggests that whilst symbolic 
violence is a powerful mechanism in the manufacturing of consent it does not expunge 
ambivalence or always close off the possibility of resistance.  As Skeggs argues, “the 
ubiquitous reinforcement of femininity on a daily basis should alert us to the fact that it 
cannot be purely performative, pre-reflexive or unconscious” (Skeggs, 2004a: 25). This 
suggests that the effectiveness of symbolic violence relies on the continual repetition of 
dominant discourses and practices which drown out other possibilities. The embodiment 
of femininity through the routines of appearance practices, as discussed above and in 
chapter nine, is clearly a key example of this. Another, perhaps more subtle, 
mechanism in the reproduction of gendered and classed dispositions through 
educational and job/career ‘choices’ is the discourse of ‘learning styles’. 
 
Symbolic violence in the construction of learning identities: The case of ‘learning styles’ 
 
In chapter seven I discussed some of the gendered and classed constraints shaping 
students’ learning identities and ‘horizons for action’ and the ways in which these were 
invisibilized behind discourses of personal choice and individual inclination. However, 
one particular discourse not discussed in that chapter,  that of ‘learning styles’, deserves 
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attention because of its ubiquity in participants’ accounts and because it appears to be a 
significant factor both in shaping learning identities and in concealing the social and 
cultural conditions of their construction.  As discussed in chapter two, the idea of 
‘learning styles’ as individual traits, measurable through various types of diagnostic 
instruments, has “gained unquestioned status” (Reynolds, 1997: 117) in schools and 
vocational education as a basis for developing ‘inclusive’ classroom pedagogies.  
 
Many students invoked the idea of being a ‘hands-on’ or ‘practical’ learner as one 
reason for ‘choosing’ beauty therapy or as an explanation for liking the practical over the 
‘theoretical’ or written aspects of the course. This was talked about in a way that 
suggested a familiarity with the discourse of learning styles.    
 
Media [studies] was good. It’s more practical, I’m more into practical 
things…I’m good with like hands-on things (Jaime, Level 2, College A) 
 
I only liked the hands-on side of science…But I didn’t like the like theory side 
of it;  ..The easiest bits [of the beauty therapy course] are practicals… but the 
hard bit is theory….it just goes one ear and out of the other (Lindsey, Level 2, 
College B) 
 
 All students were required to complete a learning styles questionnaire as part of the 
pre-course assessment and selection procedure, although I was unable to obtain 
records for the outcome of these tests for some students.  In both colleges, the 
diagnostic test appears to have been based on the VARK index  (see chapter two). 
Although the tests appear to be extremely crude, with the ‘diagnosis’ based on the 
highest scoring category within as little as one point, most students for whom a score 
was available were deemed to be either visual or kinesthetic learners.  
 
A number of researchers (see Rogers, 2009) have argued that the technology of 
learning styles in delivery and assessment is effective in improving learning when 
students are aware of “their different learning style preferences” and hence “what works 
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best for them” (Ibid: 15). In other words, a student’s individual ‘learning style’ has to be 
accepted, internalized, and used reflexively  in order for it improve learning and 
achievement. This, however, may have very different implications for students 
depending on gender and class positioning and level and type of course.  The subjects 
of Rogers’ study were undergraduate science and medical students and students 
currently on Access to HE courses.  Whilst these students “reported  positive changes 
in their performance as a result of their participation in the study” (Ibid, 2009: 18) it is not 
necessarily the case that underachieving school pupils or students on lower- level 
vocational courses would experience the same positive effects, particularly if the idea of 
learning styles is presented and understood in simplistic and unnuanced ways which 
assume, as seems to be the case here, that learning from hands-on experience 
precludes conceptual or theoretical thought.  In fact, for beauty therapy students who 
define themselves as ‘practical learners’, the discourse of learning styles may actually 
consolidate gendered and classed educational disadvantage. For a start, whilst being a 
‘hands-on’ or ‘visual’ learner may be seen as reflecting dispositions suited to the 
practical and aesthetic aspects of beauty therapy,  a learning identity based on such 
reified ‘traits’ may lead to a sense of inevitability or ‘immanent necessity’ (Bourdieu, 
1990) of the fit between self and a particular vocational pathway, or a vocational rather 
than academic pathway.  This essentialized learning identity may well preclude other 
possible options which are felt to conflict with the internalized ‘learning style’ and thus 
block access to more ‘valuable’ forms of educational capital.  The sense, for example, of 
simply not being able to write or to think in conceptual ways characterizes many of the 
students’ ‘learning identities’. For instance; 
 
I put more effort into the practical because it’s more important to me…. 
because I’m, like, more hands on than using my brain (Anna, Level 1, College A). 
 
Perceptions of beauty therapy students as ‘practical’ rather than ‘academic’ learners are 




…most of our students are practical people and that’s why they pick this type 
of course…only very rarely do you hit someone that cannot pick up the 
practical... so for me the practical skills are actually the easy things to teach 
them. It’s the academic skills that 99 per cent of them struggle with (Marina, 
Tutor, College A) 
 
These perceptions were also implicated in tutors’ approach to teaching anatomy and 
physiology (A&P) which was considered to be the most theoretical and scientific aspect 
of the course. Though they attempted to render it as palatable as possible by integrating 
or ‘hiding’ theory in practical activities, time was also set aside in separate sessions to 
teach basic knowledge about bones, muscles and organs and their relevance to beauty 
practices.   Whilst some theorists of science education might argue that contextualizing 
science in beauty practices should encourage girls’ interests79 there is little indication 
that this was the case for the participants in this study.  Most students said they found 
A& P the most difficult and boring aspect of the course.  However, this may be as much 
to do with how theory is defined in this context and with how it is taught, as with the kind 
of anti- theory/science dispositions which students brought to their courses. When tutors 
referred to ‘theory’ they were often talking about students’ capacity to rote- learn 
technical terms, to be able to list environmental or dietary effects on skin and the effects 
and contraindications for beauty products, and to be able to reproduce this knowledge 
in multiple choice or one-line answer.  Students’ lack of understanding or long- term 
recall was often bemoaned by tutors as an expression of their lack of interest or innate 
ability to deal with anything other than ‘practical’ tasks. However management decisions 
                                                
79
  This is reflected in research which argues that a more ‘feminine’ curriculum for girls would increase 
their interest and participation in school science and related occupations. For instance, Kerger (2011) argues 
that interest in science related topics is divided along gender lines so that girls favour issues that are 
relational and social whilst boys are interested in technology and mechanics.  Hence she suggests framing 
questions in the classroom in ‘gender-friendly’ ways so that whilst boys may respond to “how does a laser 
read a CD” girls will be inspired by questions like “how is a laser used in cosmetic surgery” (Ibid: 608-609) . 
Beyond assumptions about ‘feminine interests’, she does not explain how cosmetic surgery might be ‘girl-
friendly’.  Such approaches have been criticized for excluding the intersections of gender with class, race and 
ethnicity and for reproducing and legitimizing essentialized binary conceptions of gender (Hughes, 2001). In 
addition, Volman (1995) suggests that such approaches when applied to the classroom have had little or no 






about staffing in the face of limited resources may play a key role in producing students’ 
responses.  The perception of some tutors in both colleges was that the decision to use 
beauty therapy staff rather than specialist science teachers (as seems to have been the 
usual practice in the past) was based on ensuring the cost-effectiveness of the 
programmes. Some tutors said that they did not feel confident teaching this aspect of 
the course and this was reflected in its delivery through unguided internet research, 
annotation of diagrams and filling- in missing words on answer sheets, particularly ironic 
given the construction of students as ‘hand-on learners’.  There was often no feedback 
and very little explanation or discussion of concepts or processes. When students asked 
more searching questions they were mostly answered in very cursory ways suggesting 
tutors’ lack of knowledge. The poor quality of science teaching was not lost on some 
students: 
 
I prefer my theory lessons [in school] because everything is explained and 
we’d have a discussion about it.…If I can explain the way something works I 
understand it. Whereas in … [A & P sessions] it's like, “well this bone is called 
that.  There you go”.  “Yeah, but why is it called that?”  “Why?  I don't know”.  So 
all I get is the name of it, not why it's called that (Emma, Level 2, College B). 
 
In this context, the “shrug or…look of incomprehension” ( Meier, 2002, cited in Herr & 
Anderson, 2003: 419) which “captures the spirit of symbolic violence” (Ibid:418) is not 
specifically a reflection of tutors inability to recognize students’ cultural capital.  Rather, 
tutors’ lack of specialist knowledge prevented them from recognizing and developing 
students’ desire to understand and learn.  Although this created anxiety for some tutors, 
it was legitimized by reference to the NVQ assessment criteria which minimizes the 
importance of ‘understanding’ for passing the course. In this sense, the teaching of A & 
P is a site in which both tutors and students are subject to the economic violence of 
underfunding and the symbolic violence contained in the classed and gendered 
discourses of vocational education.  Both of these contribute to the reproduction of the 
social and economic disadvantage of students and workers in low status vocational 
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areas whilst concealing its structural origins behind the discourse of appropriate courses 
for particular ‘types of learners’.  
 
Whilst the A&P modules on the beauty therapy courses could potentially broaden 
‘horizons for action’, as suggested by Bloomer et al (2002) in relation to the academic 
components of other vocational courses, students’ accounts suggest that in most cases 
they did little more than reinforce the practical-academic binary and their self-
perceptions as the kind of people who cannot ‘do theory’- a sense of limits which had 
previously informed some students’ decisions to opt for beauty therapy in the first place 
and to reject other courses, most notably, childcare: 
 
Childcare's more writing and I'm not a… I'd rather do activities like, hands on 
things. I don't like doing science; You don't do it with Beauty [sic]….. I wanted to 
do a hands -on course.  I can't do writing. It's so boring (Amber, Level 1, College 
B). 
 
It is important to emphasize that the experience of not having the skills for academic 
success is a very real one and students are aware of the effects of this on their previous 
and present learning experiences.  For working class girls, the struggle to achieve 
against the ‘objective probabilities’ of success because of lack of access to cultural, 
social and economic capital and subjection to the kinds of school violence discussed 
earlier, may well mean that “more learning is the last thing they are interested in” (Ball et 
al, 2000: 8) and may lead to the avoidance of training that appears to demand anything 
other than the ‘hands-on’ skills of ‘safe’ and familiar practices. However, I would argue 
that  the internalized discourse of learning styles and the binary opposition of practical 
versus academic learning helps to provide an embodied sense of limits which make 
their situations appear natural and inevitable; a product of innate abilities.  It is in this 
sense that the concept of learning styles, promoted as a tool for the democratization of 
learning, can be seen as a form of symbolic violence operating, together with 
structural/economic violence and the forms of symbolic and direct violence which 
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produce feminine dispositions towards ‘doing looks’, to convince these young women 
that beauty therapy must be ‘right for them’.  
“Suffering for beauty”: the embodiment and erasure of physical and emotional 
pain 
 
One of the themes in second wave feminist writing is that in the quest for beauty a 
woman must be prepared to suffer and, simultaneously, to discount this suffering as a 
small price to pay for the gain of an ideal or at least acceptably feminine body. She may 
also learn to tolerate, and even to ‘romanticize’, pain (Dworkin, 1972).  In this section, I 
consider the kinds of physical and psychic suffering which participants (mainly students 
but with some reference to tutors) experience in relation to appearance practices within 
and outside the beauty therapy courses and how these may be caught up in different 
and interdependent forms of violence. 
 
 “When I eat…I feel fat”: cutting the body down to size 
 
Being ‘overweight’ carries implications of moral deficiency in terms of lack of self 
discipline (Bartky, 2002), a particularly powerful discourse in the context of neo-liberal, 
post-feminist culture in which such failings are often read as signifiers of class and 
status (Mc Robbie, 2004) . Unsurprisingly, then, anxiety about weight and size was a 
key theme in students’ accounts.  Six of the thirteen students identified weight or size as 
a particular preoccupation which had led them to engage in body altering practices in 
order to attain or sustain an ‘ideal’ size, though the practices varied considerably and 
included ‘controlled’ diet plans,  uncontrolled dieting, exercise, support groups and, in 
one case, self-hypnosis.  Both Louisa and Tania talked about starting to diet and 
exercise in order to lose weight as a response to disparaging comments from others. 
Louisa’s dieting was prompted by bullying at school.  In Tania’s case, the catalyst 




Did you lose the weight deliberately? 
 
Through an ex-boyfriend, actually… he always used to tell me, “oh, you’re fat 
and no one will want to be with you after me”.  I got depressed because of that.  
 
Tania’s experience resonates with feminist research on how psychological or verbal 
expressions of male violence in intimate partner relationships can impact negatively on 
women’s health by producing feelings of shame, anxiety and diminished self-esteem 
(Kelly, 1988; Morgan & Bjorkert, 2006).  However, it also suggests the way in which this 
expression of violence can operate as symbolic domination when feelings engendered 
by it are internalized in a way that produces complicity with the values imposed by the 
aggressor (bid, 2006). 
 
Although Tania recognizes the mental suffering caused by her boyfriend’s behavior, its 
effects on her own practices are also understood as fundamentally empowering. 
 
I stopped eating all the crap and I used to walk about three miles a day… I 
just lost the weight then and a lot more people were noticing me; I was getting 
attention that I never had before.  So, I sort of took advantage of that and I think 
that sort of got me more friends in school (Tania, Level 2, College A). 
 
The immediate benefits of producing an idealized feminine body as cultural capital 
within friendship networks, or to attract male approval where this is deemed essential to 
maintaining a feminine identity, are undeniable.   However, as Bordo (2003) suggests, 
cultural practices like dieting and exercise may also change the lived experience of the 
body in ways that produce or reproduce a sense of alienation; a sense of the body and 
its hunger as an unruly entity separate from the Self and requiring control. Whilst there 
was no evidence that Tania or any other student was ‘clinically anorexic’, Bordo’s 
comments on the  anorectic’s relationship to her body are useful in understanding how 
dieting might reproduce a fragmented, dualistic sense of the self in which  thinness 




These women experience hunger as an alien invader….disconnected from 
any normal self regulating mechanisms. Indeed, it could not possibly be so 
connected, for it is experienced as coming from an area outside the self (Ibid: 
146) 
 
Amber’s account is possibly the most powerful expression of the way in which 
controlling the body through dieting might produce this sense of mind-body dualism: 
 
I don’t like [eating] because then I feel fat…like I’m… an elephant…  But it’s 
hard, because when you’re starving and haven’t ate for hours, you do need 
something to eat…I did it at work [in a fish and chip shop] a few weeks ago….I 
didn’t eat nothing for breakfast and then went to work and did a two hour 
shift…and my stomach was rumbling and I felt like I was going to faint and I just 
bit into a chip and chucked half of it away (Amber, Level 1, College B)   
 
Like many women, she measured the success or otherwise of this self-mortification by 
comparing herself with other girls in terms of the categories provided by the fashion 
industry, wishing that she was a “size 8’ like the other girls”,  rather than a ‘size 10’  
 
Whilst ‘success’ had so far eluded Amber,  Louisa’s  happiness  with her newly slim 
body remained insecure and  premised on continued control for which she sought the 
support of her mother, who was also a dieter, and a local Weightwatchers group: 
 
My mum comes with me and I’m like a gold member now so she’s like “oh, I 
don’t have to go anymore” and I’m like “well, you still should”!  I only go monthly 
now because I don’t need to go to so [much] anymore . 
 
Her continued reliance on Weightwatchers in spite of having reached what she saw as a  
“healthy” weight, resonates with Watts’s understanding of the costs of identifying the 




…this mode of control is a peculiar example of the proverb that nothing fails 
like success. For the more consciousness is individualized by the success of the 
will, the more everything outside the individual seems to be a threat 
including…the uncontrolled spontaneity of one’s own body….Every success in 
control therefore demands further success, so that the process cannot stop short 
of omnipotence” (Watts, 1970 cited in Bordo, 2003: 145). 
 
The same arguments can be made in relation to exercise for weight loss, although in 
most cases this appeared to be harder for students to engage in than dieting.  Although 
exercise and fitness regimes have become a de rigueur aspect of neo-liberal self 
production, the experience of the body as constantly under scrutiny was clearly a factor 
influencing some students’ reluctance to engage in sport or fitness activities, for 
instance: 
 
….I like going swimming and stuff, but I don’t like the thought of going in..I 
think people are looking at me and.that’s the reason I don’t go… because I feel 
like the biggest one there and I just feel real paranoid (Kelly, Level 2, College B). 
 
In these accounts, the body is experienced not simply as being disconnected from the 
Self but more particularly in terms of its deficiencies which, to greater or lesser extents, 
come to define the Self by constituting appearance as a ‘master status’ and stigma 
(Tsselon,1992). The way in which this creates a sense of limits in relation to physical 
activity is not only arguably detrimental to longer term health but is also suggestive of 
Bartky’s argument that whilst women suffer alienation from the body experienced as 
separate from the Self, “we suffer a different from of estrangement by being too closely 
identified with it” (Bartky,1990:35). Young’s view of the way this type of fragmentation 
informs the imposition and experience of sexual objectification provides a springboard 
for understanding how symbolic violence as ‘internalized intimations of inferiority’ can 





Developing a sense of our bodies as beautiful objects to be gazed at and 
decorated requires suppressing a sense of our bodies as strong, active subjects 
moving out to meet the worlds’ risks and confront the resistances of matter and 
motion (Young, 1979, cited in Bartky,1990;35). 
 
Some focus group participants’ responses to a photograph of women playing rugby may 
be suggestive of the way in which normative femininity informed by this sense of bodily 
limits may militate against activities based on such physical risk- taking and enjoyment 
of the body’s capacity rather than its appearance, especially when activities require the 
crossing of traditional gender lines (Slater & Tiggermann, 2010). 
 
P1:  I couldn’t do that…running and big women and…You’d get all covered in 
mud. 
P2: They end up all butch and stuff don’t they? 
P3: Yeah…muscley and big thighs and stuff 
P1: Yeah, a lot of women rugby players are quite mean and aggressive 
M: Has anybody ever played rugby themselves?  
Several participants:  No 
P3:  Apart from when we were forced to in school …  they split us up into girls 
and boys- and you’d have to, like, tackle the other girls ..and try and hide at 
the back of the sports field and try and not get taken down by one of the 
aggressive girls. 
[laughter] 









The sexualization of appearance practices and the lived body 
 
As Dworkin (1972) argues, ideologies and practices of beauty prescribe how women are 
able to use their bodies.  Whilst some women may use sport and exercise in ways that 
‘re-negotiate’ gendered relationships to the body (Gimlin, 2002) or even resist 
(hetero)femininity (Shakib, 2003), the kinds of physical activities which are very often 
associated with ‘feminine fitness’, for instance aerobics, dance and cheerleading which 
Krahnstoever -Davison et al (2002) refer to as ‘aesthetic sports’, have been criticized as 
forms of ‘body management’ aimed at producing docile, self-disciplining bodies which 
conform to dominant definitions of femininity (Bordo, 2003). This is perhaps most overtly 
reflected in the promotion of pole dancing, a staple of the contemporary sex industry 
(Walter, 2010), as form of exercise sometimes known as ‘cardio strip’ (Jeffreys, 2005)80   
 
The conflation of fitness, health, sex and beauty practices was underscored by an older 
beauty therapy student (not in the research group) who had worked as a lap and pole-
dancer and was planning to start her own business organizing lingerie, beauty and 
keep-fit pole dancing parties.  Most of younger students in the research group did not 
hold the kinds of cultural or economic capital to plan such an entrepreneurial future. 
However, the normalization of femininity as ‘erotic capital’ in which “ the body is 
endorsed as a site of profit” (Coy et al, 2011) was suggested in end- of -year Level 1 
focus groups in which several students agreed that lap or pole dancing would be, in one 
students words, “a pretty good job…. cause you get loads of money for it”. Others were 
more cynical.  For instance, one student  who had  considered taking a job as a lap 
dancer to earn money, and because of an ambition to dance professionally, recognized 
the harmful realities underneath its glamorization:  
 
                                                
80 As one UK website for pole dancing classes euphemistically puts it: 
 
….unlike the boring repetitions of the gym or the uninspiring similarity of most aerobics classes, 
pole dancing is incredibly rewarding. As you progress, you'll find that you're able to do more and 
more fun things on the pole, all the time increasing your fitness and coordination…heeled shoes are 




It would be like blokes treating you like a piece of meat or something and 
there’s lots of drugs and violence that comes with it (focus group participant, 
Level 1, College A). 
 
However, when the idea of pole dancing ‘in private’ or in female only exercise classes 
was raised in one focus group, there was a general agreement that this was a good 
thing for girls. This was echoed in an interview with Amber whose response appears to 
dramatize a severely constricted sense of limits in terms of future life chances, as well 
as the difficulty of defining a distinction between sexual objectification and physical 
activity for one’s own benefit. 
 
If you could do absolutely anything in the world that you wanted to do, what 
would it be?   
 
A pole dancer…  I want to do it for exercise… to lose weight.  I seen it on the 
telly yesterday – it looked really good for exercise.  ….  I wouldn’t want to go in a 
strip club [laughs].  I just want to be a pole dancer to get exercise but I’d do it for 
my boyfriend (Amber, Level 1, College B). 
 
The discourses connected the sexualization of women’s exercise raises a number of 
interconnected issues. Firstly, they promote the idea that even when women engage in 
fitness activities ‘for themselves’ they must be subject to an internalized male gaze 
because the activity is also one that is designed to sexualize the body and to be 
performed for male sexual gratification.  Secondly, Amber’s perception of pole dancing 
appears to mirror the way in which, as discussed in chapter nine, beauty practices such 
as bikini waxing engaged in by women in female-only contexts are simultaneously 
acknowledged and denied as sexual. Thirdly, as Coy et al (2011) argue, the 
glamorization and ‘mainstreaming’ of commercial sex as a model for everyday practices 
of femininity constitutes a form of symbolic violence by obscuring the gendered power 
relations and direct forms of sexual violence which underpin it.  Crucially, it also erases 
the economic violence which informs the involvement of women in ‘sex work’ (Ibid, 
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2011; Jeffreys, 1997).  In this context, the intersection of symbolic and economic 
violence may explain the enthusiasm expressed by some of the focus group participants 
for pole dancing as a form of paid work.   Lastly, the association of  normalized 
technologies of femininity with commercialized sex  may suggest some level of 
synchronicity between the effects of these different practices on women’s lived  bodies.   
 
For instance, some of the documented effects of ‘sex work’, including a sense of self-
disgust and body-hatred, and some of the strategies used by women in an attempt to 
protect themselves from feeling violated, for example, dissociation (Jeffreys, 1997) or 
disembodiment (Coy, 2009) , have resonances with Bartky’s (1990) view of the twin 
expressions of feminine alienation (the body ‘as me’ and ‘not me’) which are arguably 
also reproduced in normalized feminine practices outside of the sex industry.  In both 
cases, a sense of embodiment based on alienation can be understood in terms of the 
development of a habitus which normalizes symbolically or physically violent practices. 
In Coy’s (1990) study one woman described her initial engagement in prostitution as 
“scary at first….but after a couple of weeks I’d just got used to it” (Ibid: 67). This has 
strong resonances with some students’ experiences of ‘getting used to’ the more 
‘invasive’ practices of their courses, most notably, as discussed in chapter nine, bikini 
waxing: 
 
….I never would have done it at the beginning.  But then we had to do it on 
each other …I was a bit nervous about it because you don’t want nothing 
showing or anything and you’re scared that you don’t want everyone in you class 
seeing and everything. But….I just get used to it (Chelsea, Level 2, College A). 
 
In both cases, the internalization of practices as “meaningful expressions of… identity” 
(Coy, 2009: 67) requires a shift in women’s demarcation of  boundaries which  limit use 
of, or access to, their bodies. In the case of prostitution, this shift is more clearly a 
response to male entitlement of sexual access. However, in the case of beauty therapy 
training, whilst students are required to engage in practices that inscribe gendered 
violence on their bodies by marking them as sexual territory, this is obscured by the 
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physical absence of men, the assumed sexual benignity of the gaze of other 
girls/women in the training salons, and the disavowal of sexual connotations through the 
discourse of beauty practices as empowerment and wellbeing.   
 
Taking pains to be beautiful:  making sense of pain in the beauty training salon 
 
References to the pain involved in producing feminized bodies are ubiquitous in feminist 
writing on beauty practices. Though the meaning and relevance of pain in relation to 
beauty is a contentious issue (Holliday & Sanchez-Taylor, 2006), the role that it plays in 
the embodiment of femininity is rarely subjected to sustained analysis. Most scholarly 
work on the experience of physical pain has been from a biomedical perspective 
although since the early 1990s there have been attempts to develop a sociology of pain 
as a challenge to the mechanistic and Cartesian dualistic model of dominant paradigms 
(Bendelow & Williams, 1995).  Most of this research is focused on understanding the 
phenomenological, cultural and social aspects of pain in the context of health and 
illness. Nevertheless, it is useful as a starting point for investigating its meaning in the 
lives of beauty therapy students. 
 
Some of the most negative feeling about beauty practices were expressed in relation to 
pain and discomfort as a common, if not daily, occurrence on the beauty therapy 
courses.  At the same time, however, participants often appeared to minimize its 
importance through laughter and by framing it as something that ‘you just get used to’:  
  
Eyebrow waxing… really hurts and…no matter how many times I have my 
eyebrows done I’m still like, “Oh my God, she’s [tutor] gonna punch me in the eye 
or something” [laughing]…And she’s like “Stop making a funny face” . But I think 
after a while it’s OK. You just kind of get used to it. (Abigail, Level 2, College A) 
 
A key aspect of learning beauty skills is the development of dispositions for ‘coping’ with 
the pain and discomfort associated with them.  Pain is represented as a rite of passage.  
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What is also signalled in students’ accounts is that pain is not simply a physical 
sensation, but a social phenomenon in which, as Bendelow puts it: 
 
[The] Physical experience of the body is modified through the categories 
through which it is known….The experience of living in a…gendered body in a 
hierarchically gendered world must have an impact on the ways in which different 
forms of pain are experienced and expressed(Bendelow, 1993: 290). 
 
In the popular rhetoric of beauty, women are often represented as uniquely stoical. This 
is captured by Dworkin in her assertion that in the ideology of feminine beauty “pain 
teaches an important lesson: no price is too great, no process too repulsive, no 
operation too painful for the woman who would be beautiful” (Dworkin, 1972: 115). 
Whilst this underscores the price women are required to pay for beauty, it also reflects a 
wider discourse about their greater ability to tolerate pain. In the context of cosmetic 
surgery, for instance, surgeons tend to see male patients (a small, but apparently 
increasing market) as ‘difficult’, less able to tolerate pain and requiring more medication 
to cope with it (Flowers, 1991, cited in Davis, 2002). In Bedelow’s research on gender 
and pain perception, both male and female participants typically saw women as being 
physically and emotionally better able to endure pain of all types on the basis of their 
‘biology’ or upbringing.  Men in particular pointed to childbirth as “the ultimate in pain 
experience” (Bendelow, 1993: 287) and both men and women invoked the social 
injunctions against men expressing pain as a barrier to coping with it. Such perceptions 
are arguably rooted in the cultural association of women “with the natural world in the 
form of bodily (implying lower status) functions” (Ibid, 1993: 289).  In this discursive 
context, pain constitutes an abnormal state for men but normality for women. This is 
dramatized in the context of beauty therapy training in which both the presence of men 
as students and their experiences of the pain of beauty practices is perceived as putting 
them in ‘a state of abnormality’: 
 
… and he [male student] was like “I don’t know what you girls all complain 
about” and I went, “go on then Tone, right you can get your bikini line out then” 
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and he went “Go on then”…he wasn’t really impressed with that but he did 
realize what all the screaming was about (Karen, Tutor, College A). 
 
One salient feature of this narrative is how the ‘matey’ humour in the interaction 
between Karen and the male student confirms the lack of congruence between 
‘maleness’ and the practice and pain of bikini waxing.  Another tutor, Sally, talked about 
a male ex-student as ‘a good laugh’ and a ‘good sport’, attributing a kind of nobility to 
boys and men who ‘put up’ with practices seen as the proper and ‘natural’ province of 
women.   Interestingly, this was the only context in which tutors mentioned the pain 
involved in beauty practices, possibly attesting to the way in which it is simply taken for 
granted in the case of female students.  The same assumptions were at work in a 
college –wide charity event held in the student refectory at College B in which four 
young men volunteered to have their legs waxed by two nervous and bemused looking 
Level 3 beauty therapy students. A group of about twenty male students, encouraged by 
a female DJ/MC, cheered and egged on the ‘volunteers’ with banter in which the 
situation was constructed as simultaneously comically absurd and a demonstration of 
‘heroism’. The MC described one of the volunteers as a “brave man….Does he know 
how much it’s going to hurt?”. I would argue that this performance was not about 
‘suffering for beauty’, which is the proper province of women, but about the ability to 
‘triumph over’ the pain associated with femininity and thus over any hint of femininity in 
themselves.  For women, however, there is “very little that is heroic about…femininity” 
(Skeggs, 1997: 36). When pain and its endurance are understood as an imminent 
characteristic of femininity it is effectively invisibilized in the same way that skills 
naturalized as feminine are not recognized as capital carrying skills.  Whilst some might 
want to read this incident as a gender disruptive or queer performance (Butler, 1990),  I 
would argue that it actually reproduces the idea of beauty practices as essentially 
feminine and so reinscribes sexual difference .   As MacKinnon suggests,  gender 
reversals ultimately “affirm rather than [undermine] the standard sexual arrangement as 




According to Bendelow (1995), women’s greater capacity for pain endurance may lead 
to their suffering being ignored by themselves and others in a way that may also have 
implications in terms of the infliction of pain.  It is not entirely clear whether she is 
referring to self or other-inflicted pain, but in response to her suggestion that the issue 
requires further investigation I would suggest that beauty practices may be an ideal site 
because they allow connections to made between these gendered discourses and 
women’s engagement in practices which are ‘self-inflicted’ or ‘self-inflicted by proxy’. A 
further connection which may illuminate this, and one that is seldom made outside of 
radical feminism, is that between socially acceptable practices of femininity and those 
pathologized as ‘self-harm’.   
 
Women voluntarily undergo culturally sanctioned procedures which are 
painful and physically destructive for the sake of Western beauty ideals…what is 
remarkable is that it is culturally tolerable for women’s bodies to be objectified 
and destroyed…. in the service of [these] ideals and men’s sexual gratification. 
What is not… tolerable is for women to objectify themselves and destroy their 
own bodies in ways that do not serve Western aesthetics (Shaw, 2002: 206). 
 
Clearly, not all beauty practices involve the ‘destruction’ of body tissue. Indeed most of 
the practices taught on beauty therapy courses are aimed at ‘preservation’ as well as 
‘improvement’ and the physical pain involved is usually short term.  However, what is 
important in this argument is the idea that both types of practice reflect the way in which 
women learn to “use the cultural language of violence against themselves” (Ibid: 203) 
or, in Bourdieu’s terms, to internalize this violence as habitus.  Shaw is not claiming that 
beauty practices are the same as the deliberate cutting, burning or hitting of one’s own 
body, or that they can be simply equated in terms of the intensity of the mental suffering 
and its consequences or the specific precipitating factors involved.  However, she is 
suggesting that they have a common genesis “in women’s experiences of relational and 
cultural violations, silencing and objectification” (Ibid: 192). In this sense, they are both 
corporeal expressions of women’s responses to structural, direct and symbolic violence.  
In this light, it may not only be relevant that many students expressed dissatisfaction 
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with, or outright loathing of, their bodies, but also that one had attempted suicide and 
three others had been treated, or were being treated, for mental health problems which 
they connected to ‘low self-esteem’. 
 
One interesting question here is the differences and similarities in how pain might be 
perceived in each context. Both types of practice may be understood as attempts to 
reduce psychological pain. In the case of self-injury, physical pain may be important as 
way of dissociating from previous trauma (Favazza,1996) , often including sexual abuse 
(Kennerley, 1996).  Whilst there is no evidence in this or other studies that women 
actively seek pain through everyday beauty practices, dissociation or bodily- alienation 
may be a key linking factor.  Favazza (1996) argues that many self-harmers do not 
report feeling pain when injuring themselves and this may relate to a  “psychological 
chasm between body and self” (Cross, cited in Favazza, 1996:51), a possibly extreme 
experience of the bodily alienation which Bartky sees as a mundane condition of 
femininity. If the body can be perceived at a distance from the ‘self’, or as an ‘object for 
the self’, then its pains may become more tolerable and thus effectively invisible as 
suffering: 
 
I tried wax before and I didn’t like it.  It hurt…I nearly screamed the place 
down.  But now I’m fine so I’d get it done.  Like, every time I wax my legs you 
won’t hear nothing from me now.   I just get used to it. (Chelsea, Level 2, College 
A). 
 
In Bendelow's research, the ability to endure pain is related strongly to the meanings 
people bring to it and the degree to which these meanings legitimate suffering.  For the 
beauty girls’, tolerance of pain and discomfort appeared to be related to the extent to 
which a particular practice was perceived as yielding benefits.  For example prior to 
starting her course, Louisa found having her eyebrows waxed a painful and frightening 
experience and had initially resisted it. However, her mother had insisted and she had 
capitulated on the basis that it would help to stop the appearance related bullying she 
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was experiencing at school.   For others, the pain of some beauty practices is 
legitimated with reference to their perceived pleasurable outcomes: 
 
I don’t really mind if it hurts…I find waxing enjoyable.  It’s just, like, having soft 
skin after. It feels really nice (Lindsey, Level 2, College B). 
 
Whilst the short-term pain involved in practices which ‘improve’ appearance is 
eventually tolerated and effectively discounted, the suffering associated with procedures 
which ‘worsen’ appearance or have longer lasting effects, are more likely to be 
resented.  
 
…you’re meant to do [facials]…. one every four to six weeks, whereas … we 
were doing it every Monday, Tuesday, Friday so my skin was getting so bad and 
[the tutor’s] like, “well you’ve got to bring out the bad like to get the good stuff” but 
my face was getting spotty….I just wasn’t enjoying having facials all the time 
(Jaime, Level 2, College A). 
 
Students who were most ambivalent about their courses were most likely to verbalize 
the health risks of beauty practices and to be critical of tutors’ for not protecting them 
against such dangers. In spite of the fact that health and safety is part of the formal 
curriculum and is constantly emphasized by tutors, adverse reactions to beauty 
products were not uncommon: 
 
I'm allergic to tea tree…I came out in massive big red blisters…  and my 
teacher said oh it’s got tea tree in it!  [But] they put a different product in the 
pot.… I got sent home and I was in so much pain, and they don’t think about that 
(Tania, Level 2, College A). 
 
Both these accounts represent a break with doxa in that they reveal the symbolic and 
direct violence enacted through apparently benign discourses and practices.  However, 
the notion that there is ‘no gain without pain’ (“you’ve got to bring out the bad like to get 
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the good”) reassert doxic assumptions, legitimizing the potentially harmful practice of 
making Level 1 students have facials several times a week. Similarly, the constant 
emphasis on health and safety functions to obscure the potentially injurious nature of 
beauty products. 
 
Pain is an ever present reality on beauty courses. On one level it is very visible. The 
sound of students, and occasionally their clients, in varying degrees of discomfort was 
part of the backdrop to activity in the training salons during my observations. Yet 
because it is trivialized and normalized, as well as naturalized as an imminent 
expression of femininity, it is simultaneously invisible most of the time. In this context, 
whilst some students responded critically to practices they saw as unnecessary, it is 
unthinkable that the pain and discomfort of beauty practices might indicate an 
enactment of gendered violence which is self-inflicted or inflicted by proxy. Learning to 
tolerate and discount pain is a hidden curriculum.  It is not mentioned in the assessment 
criteria or learning outcomes of any of the modules but it is part of the work that 
students are required to perform on their bodies and emotions, not least because 
working on the bodies of other women will at times entail the infliction of pain. Indeed, 
the tensions between caring for a client and causing pain is one of the difficulties of 
learning to labour in the beauty salon:  
 
I don’t like doing waxing on people because I’m scared that I’m gonna rip their 
skin….and then if someone bleeds…I’ll be on the floor passed out because I 
don’t like blood (Abigail, Level 2, College A). 
 
I get jumpy with clients ‘cause I’m worried I’ll hurt them..[I’m] too squeamish. I 
had this client and she was screaming and wouldn’t…let me tweeze her 
hairs…and then the tutor told me off and I got crossed [on the assessment sheet] 
for not doing it (Leila, Level 2, College A). 
 
Students are expected to learn techniques to minimize the risk of injury but there also 
seems to be an unspoken requirement for them to enact a similar kind of self-protective 
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detachment to that often used by nurses faced with the suffering of patients - a 
“dissociation from experiencing the body of the other [in which] the person-to-person 
relationship is objectified as a technical and functional relationship” (Crowe, 2000:966). 
In addition, just as the dissociative tactics used by nurses may be facilitated by the 
discourse of altruism (Ibid, 2000), so the quasi- therapeutic construction of beauty 
therapy as wellbeing acts as a symbolically violent disciplinary discourse which allows 
the beauty therapist to focus on the emotional ‘good’ she is doing for her clients and to 
distance herself from the pain she will inevitably inflict regardless of how proficient her 
skills are. However, unlike health professionals, beauty therapists may assume that 
women who use beauty salons already have feminine dispositions towards suffering for 
beauty. The absence in tutors’ accounts of any reference to the physical pain 
experienced by clients would seem to suggest that it is simply taken for granted.   
Instead, what tutors focus on, as discussed in chapter nine, is the emotional suffering 
connected to inhabiting a deficient body in need of work and the dispositional grooming 
of students to empathize with and ameliorate these feelings. This is consistent with the 
ideological construction of beauty practices as a solution to suffering-a site of 
empowerment and pleasure. Suffering for beauty, whether in terms of pain, discomfort 
or the constant self-discipline involved in it (Bartky, 2002), is a largely unspoken secret 
within the dominant discourses of the beauty training salon. The embodiment of pain in 
beauty practices is simultaneously the embodiment of normative femininity and 
gendered power relations. If social injustice becomes violence when it leads to 
suffering, then the pain and discomfort of beauty practices and the normalization of 
these may represent a particular concrete manifestation of how structural, direct and 
symbolic violence take hold of women’s bodies and how violence “inscribes the body 










My intention in this chapter has been to show how the structural power relations of 
gender and class are expressed, experienced and reproduced through symbolic 
violence, and through direct interpersonal and institutional forms of violence 
experienced over time.  Whilst structural violence, as Bourgois (2002) argues, 
underpins all other forms, symbolic violence is a “lynchpin that sustains power relations” 
(Ibid: 223) by manufacturing acquiescence.  This chapter has pointed to a number of 
manifestations of this.  Symbolic violence operates in the production of subjective limits 
which constrain participants’ sense of who they are and who could be as learners and 
workers.   It incites girls to embrace objectified femininity through practices and 
discourses which naturalize sexual difference and inculcate both pleasure and shame.  
It also erases the discipline, pain and discomfort of beauty practices through the 
inculcating a sense of bodily alienation.  Whilst participants’ accounts suggest 
numerous examples of resistance to symbolic violence, doxic assumptions are 
reasserted by tutors in the training salons, often through the normalizing discourses of 
wellbeing and professionalism.  In general terms, the assumption of (hetero)sexual 
difference appears to be a particularly powerful mechanism in constraining resistance to 
gendered practices;  in Bourdieu’s language, it is a limiting case of symbolic violence.  
However, the symbolic violence involved in subjectification is effective not just because 
it censors counter-hegemonic ways of seeing, but also because it is backed-up and 
amplified by other forms of coercion.  
 
The sometimes devastating forms of appearance-related interpersonal violence 
experienced by some of the participants at school generated degrees of self-loathing 
and shame which, unsurprisingly, produced or reinforced  dispositions inclined to submit 
to the disciplines of beauty practices in order to ‘stop the bullies’, or to “be like everyone 
else” .  In this sense, the production of an attractive feminine body is a concrete 
manifestation how direct and structural forms of violence are inscribed on women’s 
bodies and embedded in subjectivity.  But the effects of peer violence cannot be 
separated from other forms of institutionalized violence embedded in educational 
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cultures:  in formal and informal curriculums, in the interpersonal symbolic violence 
expressed through teachers’ incivilities toward ‘underachieving’ students, and in the 
discourses which deny recognition and support to working class girls, allowing them to 
withdraw from learning or to leave school because they are frightened, isolated or 
demoralized.  For many participants, these networks of violence may well have played a 
key role in limiting their post-16 options and therefore in reproducing structural violence 
through the gendered and classed economic disadvantages they are likely to face 
beyond school and college.  
 
However, students do not simply follow the leanings of a gendered habitus.  Some of 
the beauty girls were constrained to highly gendered pathways partly because of what 
they knew about the dangers of being a girl in a male environment.  Some were clearly 
aware of how male power disadvantages them and whilst none specifically mentioned 
physical or sexual violence in relation to their training decisions, the ambivalence of 
some students about their positioning as objects of the gaze suggests that they are well 
aware of the kinds of sexualized hostility they may have been faced with.  
 
 It may also be the case that this ambivalence partly rests on what Goldman sees as the 
paradoxical terrors of, on the one hand,  not attracting male approval and, on the other,  
the threat of violence “which may accompany presentation of self as an object of desire” 
(Goldman, 1992, cited in Gill, 2009).  In this sense the discourses of beauty may 
constitute a kind of terrorism which plays a role both in excluding girls from male 
dominated areas and in making beauty therapy an attractive proposition. Here structural 
violence, direct violence and symbolic violence are mutually reinforcing. 
 
But far from providing solutions to the terrors of body dissatisfaction and objectification 
(Davis, 1995; Gimlin, 2001),  disciplinary practices such as dieting and aesthetic 
exercise may be premised on, and reproduce, self -objectification through the 
experience of bodily alienation, arguably a case par excellence of the way in which 
symbolic violence works in and through bodies.  Alienation, in Bartky’s terms, is a 
condition of femininity, and it may be the basis of continuities between women’s 
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embodied experience of gendered violence in the contexts of self-harm and the painful 
practices women engage in for the sake of beauty.   The significance of these parallels 
is that they make it possible to contextualize the mundane, putatively self-chosen 
practices of beauty in the wider context of gendered violence. However, what also 
needs to be taken into account is that having arrived on their courses for reasons 
shaped by the interplay of structural, direct and symbolic violence,  beauty therapy 
students do not even have a semblance of choice in whether or not to engage in beauty 
practices regardless of how painful or potentially harmful they are. In this sense, not 
even the designation of ‘self-infliction by proxy’ necessarily describes the types of direct 



























In what follows, I draw together the key findings of this research in relation to the 
research questions discussed in chapter six, I also point to the ways in which this thesis 
might contribute to our knowledge of vocational education, beauty practices, and 
violence.  I also suggest how it might signal directions for future research and briefly 
review some issues arising from the research process. 
Findings in relation to research question 1 
Narratives of choice and constraint 
 
To greater or lesser extents, most participants accounted for their decision to enroll on a 
beauty therapy course through the language of choice or inclination. Whilst a minority 
positioned themselves as autonomous ‘choosers’, others struggled to locate their 
decisions in future oriented, reflexive choice biographies. In some cases, participants 
were keenly aware of the external constraints and injustices which had brought them to 
the beauty training salon.  However, even where participants emphasized the coercive 
nature of post-16 decision making, becoming a beauty girl was mostly understood as 
the best fit possible with their identities and interests given the lack of alternatives.   In 
this sense, beauty therapy was at least a ‘choosable identity’, a default position 
predicated on the contradictory experiences of pleasure, inadequacy and shame 
connected to inhabiting an objectified and inferiorized feminine body.  The mechanisms 
of symbolic and interpersonal violence which inculcate this sense of limits also produce 
dispositions to ‘doing looks’ which may make beauty therapy seem a low risk option, 
something which connects to the already known and familiar.  However, for some 
beauty girls this is not just a matter of ‘calculating’ the best chances of success in terms 
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of qualification and employment.  Beauty therapy is also seen as a solution to personal 
suffering connected to appearance and a way of achieving successful femininity both 
through ‘care of the self’ and ‘care of others’.  
 
However, the beauty girls did not just follow the leanings of their habitus. Their choices 
were constrained by other objective gendered and classed limits.  Most were ‘losers’ in 
the filtering and selection processes of the qualification system which left them with little 
tradable capital in the post-16 education market.  For these students, a low level 
vocational route was a given but male dominated areas of training and employment 
were no go zones, even when they had harboured ambitions for such training or 
understood gendered barriers as deeply unjust. The threat of being subjected to male 
power and the sanctions associated with transgressing heteronormative gendered 
boundaries place profound restrictions on girls’ trajectories making gender-typical 
pathways a choice of necessity. Whilst beauty therapy may have represented, for some 
students, a refusal of the traditional femininity associated with caring courses, the 
centrality of emotional labour in beauty work makes it anything but an escape from the 
necessity of producing a caring Self.  
Findings in relation to research question 2 
Expectations, skills and dispositions 
 
When students arrive at college for their beauty therapy interviews the dispositions (or 
predispositions) they bring with them are already under scrutiny, evaluated by tutors 
against heterogendered, classed and racialized assumptions about what makes an 
ideal beauty student. Tutors position students within a deficit model. The ‘typical’ 
student is understood to be lacking in a number of respects. It is taken as given that she 
will be non-academic and will struggle with the small amount of written work demanded 
by the courses. However, being non-academic is not necessarily perceived as a 
problem, indeed it may even be considered an advantage.   Beauty therapists are taken 
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to be ‘practical people’ and the education provided on the NVQ courses reinforces the 
practical/academic binary through which this is understood. There is scarcely any 
opportunity to develop critical or conceptual capacities or to deepen knowledge about 
the science involved in beauty practices. In this sense, the courses immobilize students’ 
horizons for action.  Whilst practical skills are foregrounded by the curriculum and 
formal assessment criteria, the moulding of bodily and behavioural dispositions is the 
hidden curriculum which engages students and tutors in the work of producing of highly 
gendered and classed vocational dispositions. Predispositions to beauty practices- 
caring about and monitoring appearance- are, as far as tutors are concerned, the 
necessary raw material for producing a beauty therapist.  
 
However, the task at hand is to transform the working class teenager into an aesthetic 
and emotional labourer and this involves “breaking down” aspects of her person. She is 
perceived to be too working class or vulgar in her appearance, too unrestrained in her 
manner, too focused on her own appearance and concerns, and unable to 
communicate ‘appropriately’.  The process of ‘transformation’ is one that involves 
constant disciplinary surveillance of students in order to inculcate the ‘right’ bodily and 
emotional techniques to appeal to (middle class or aspiring) clients. Students must learn 
how to “look good and sound right” (Wolkowitz, 2006: 86).   It is a requirement that they 
position themselves as  objects of the gaze of others whilst simultaneously presenting 
themselves as  caring ‘professionals’, as subjects of beauty culture. The way in which 
these idealized dispositions mirror the contradictions in contemporary constructions of 
femininity between ‘care of the self’ and ‘care of others’ underscores the paucity of 
cultural and economic capital contained in beauty therapy qualifications. Whilst some 
students will progress to Level 3 courses and enter low paid employment in salons, 
spas and on cruise liners, tutors expect that many, if not most, will use what they learn 
on their courses to be ‘better’ workers in routine part-time jobs outside the beauty 
industry, to supplement other sources of income, and to work ‘flexibly’ around the needs 
of children and male partners.  In this sense, beauty therapy courses constitute a 
training ground for low waged and unpaid labour, and for normative, ‘respectable’ 
(hetero)femininity.   
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Transformations and Resistance  
 
There is little doubt that the beauty therapy courses in this study ‘transformed’ students’ 
dispositions, or at least promoted changes which were often subjectively experienced 
as positive and affirming. Students conceptualized this in terms of increased confidence 
and self-esteem.  Whilst not wishing to underestimate the power and importance of this 
in the lives of these young women, such transformations entail costs. Success is only 
meaningful if the criteria on which it is recognized by others is accepted and 
internalized. When students develop dispositions and skills which more closely 
approximate to the dominant habitus of their courses they also more thoroughly embody 
the gendered and classed meanings and social relations underpinning beauty culture. 
For many participants, this meant an intensification of self-objectification.  Though 
beauty practices may have been a central feature of their lives prior to joining the 
course, the quasi- rituals of skin care, legitimized through their association with 
professional knowledge and skills, were transported into their daily routines as a 
constant reminder of the body as a marker of identity and an unruly object requiring 
continual vigilance and work.   For many students, being or becoming a beauty girl 
meant always having to ‘look the part’ and being continually under self-scrutiny and the 
scrutiny of others. For some, the incitement to ‘propertize’ the body as a form of capital 
was understood and embraced (though mostly ambivalently) as an inevitable part of the 
job. This view was held most strongly by those who had brought greater amounts of 
cultural capital to their courses in the first place and who were more able to incorporate 
this demand into their future-oriented biographies. In terms of the dominant habitus, 
these were the most ‘successful’ students, those who most ‘comfortably’ constructed 
their subjective experience of objectification as a form of capital.    
 
In contrast, a minority of accounts emphasized the way in which this intense form of 
aesthetic labour had exacerbated low-self esteem and appearance-related anxieties.  
These were the students who often positioned themselves at a critical distance from 
beauty culture and whose accounts, more than those of other participants, signaled a 
habitus at odds with the field of beauty therapy, at least in terms of its aesthetic 
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dimensions. I interpret the anger of these students as the potential beginnings of a 
resistance to the paradox of femininity (the body –as- me and not- me) and as an 
embryonic refusal of the self-critical gaze which this splitting produces. This gaze is a 
pre-requisite of the critical gaze that beauty therapists are required to direct towards 
other women. Becoming a beauty therapist in this respect is caught up in the tensions 
associated with ‘judging others’.   In the context of the beauty therapy courses, the 
discourses of care, empathy and  professionalism act as a form of symbolic violence 
which legitimizes this gaze, and disconnects it from its usual associations with 
‘bitchiness’ and ‘superficial’ feminine competition. The increased self-confidence which 
most participants expressed towards the end of their courses was bound up with the 
way in which their existing dispositions to self-objectification, and sometimes to the care 
of others, were moulded by their courses into something that could be recognized and 
valued.  The discourse of ‘professionalism’ offers the beauty girl a seductive and 
seemingly transcendent position as a ‘subject of beauty culture’- one who’s skills and 
knowledge have been lifted out of the realm of the everyday mundanity of femininity  to 
be recognized as ‘valuable’ capital, if only in the local context of the training salon.  For 
most beauty girls, being recognized as a ‘skilled individual’ was felt as  powerful and 
transformative , but the sense of ‘empowerment’ is also a mechanism through which 
symbolic violence operates to integrate habitus into the hetero(gendered) and classed 
values of beauty culture and beauty therapy.  
Findings in relation to research question 3 
Networks of violence 
 
Throughout this thesis, my analysis of participants’ trajectories and experiences has 
been informed by the idea that when structural power relations and inequalities harm or 
violate life chances they are transformed into expressions of violence.  On this basis, I 
have argued that beauty girls’ journeys to and through their courses are enmeshed in 
networks of symbolic and other forms of violence. The structural/economic violence of 
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gender inequalities, sexual difference and classed power relations provide the objective 
limits within which ‘choices’ are made and identities are constructed, although these 
limits are often questioned and pushed against.  Symbolic and direct expressions of 
violence mediate the ways in which structural violence is apprehended. Symbolic 
violence works in tandem with direct violence, as in the case of appearance related 
bullying, to exact compliance, however ambivalent, with dominant values. It also 
legitimizes the gendered and classed relations informing beauty therapy training.  
Discourses of professionalism, skills/knowledge, care and wellbeing obscure the 
disciplinary nature of the pedagogies and practices which aim to produce compliant, 
feminized service workers or at least ‘respectable’ (hetero)feminine subjectivities.  The 
symbolic violence underlying the practices of beauty can exacerbate the profound 
suffering involved in inhabiting a body felt to be inferior or inadequate when measured 
against the idealized feminine body which is always invoked, though simultaneously 
denied, in the context of ‘professional’ beauty practice. Paradoxically, however, the 
experience of suffering can also produce critiques of beauty, lending weight to the idea 
that symbolic violence as internalized humiliation and inferiority may be the precondition 
of a critical consciousness. In this sense, symbolic violence by itself does not 
necessarily close down resistant agency. However, other forms of violence, most 
notably the structural/ economic violence that severely curtails access to other training 
and employment options, puts limits on how far critique can be developed. These limits 
are exacerbated by the censorship imposed within the ‘field’ of NVQ beauty training on 
alternative or critical views of beauty practices. Conversely, the operation of symbolic 
violence produces a sense of pleasure and ‘empowerment’ underscoring the way in 
which these subjective responses do not contradict power relations.  Arguably, they 
dramatize the insidious nature of symbolic violence in ‘reigning in the habitus’ in to the 
dominant gendered and classed values of the ‘field’.  
 
I began this research project with the aim of using beauty therapy training as a basis for 
exploring the notion that beauty practices constitute a form of violence against women.  
In the process of research it became apparent that the harms caused by beauty could 
not be separated from the other injuries sustained by beauty girls in the process of 
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becoming women and emotional/aesthetic service workers. Their bodies, their feelings 
about them, and their attempts to produce feminine capital through them, are enmeshed 
in networks of gendered and classed power and violence. Appearance practices from 
make-up to dieting and  the disciplinary regimes of ‘professional’ beauty to which they 
are subjected on their courses are vehicles through which interacting forms of violence 
become inscribed on the body and, to greater or lesser extents, embedded in 
subjectivity. When girls respond to the verbal assaults of bullying, or other intimations 
that they are not attractive enough, by compulsive dieting or other work on their 
appearance, the resulting physical and emotional transformations are manifestations of 
this violence.  When students are required to display particular class inflected forms of 
‘respectable’ femininity in order to appeal to clients, the ‘look’ that is produced is a 
bodily inscription of the symbolic violence involved in the disparagement of working 
class women.   On their courses, students must continually engage in painful and 
sometimes damaging practices but the suffering involved in learning to create smooth, 
hairless skin is discounted or made invisible by discourses which naturalize bodily pain 
as a condition of femininity. Becoming a ‘professional’ beauty therapist requires a 
particularly hyper-feminine embodiment of pain and the direct interpersonal or 
intrapersonal violence through which it is inflicted. The connection between this pain 
and the heterosexualized nature of beauty practices is dramatized when beauty girls are 
made to perform practices which produce the feminine body according to ideals inspired 
by pornographic representations. Bikini waxing, perhaps more overtly than other 
practices, requires students to learn to experience their own bodies as sexual territory. 
At the same time, one of the most insidious expressions of symbolic violence is 
exercised through the discourse of beauty as female wellbeing which both normalizes 
and disavows the sexual nature of this practice and the gendered violence implicit in it.   
Contributions to knowledge 
 
This thesis makes three contributions to knowledge. Firstly, beauty therapy has been 
almost entirely absent from the literature on vocational education and training in the UK.  
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Research on post-16 choices and the production of girls’ vocational dispositions has 
tended to concentrate on care-related courses, their reliance on predispositions to 
caring for others and their production of vocational identities organized around the 
‘caring self’. In focusing on the neglected area of beauty therapy, this research 
emphasizes the possibility that feminine pre-dispositions  based on appearance or ‘care 
of the self’ may be equally important in guiding girls towards training and employment. 
Though beauty therapy is an obvious example, girls’ identification with their bodies may 
play a role in shaping their horizons for action more generally. This may suggest an 
avenue for future research. 
 
Secondly, empirical research on the operation of different forms of violence in social life 
has tended either to focus on the way in which symbolic violence accompanies or 
precedes direct forms of domestic (Morgan and Bjorkert, 2010), sexual (Coy, 2011) or 
political (Bourgios, 2001) violence, or has been concerned with the operation of 
symbolic or other forms of violence in institutional settings (Osler, 2006; Herr 
&Anderson, 2003). Whilst the thesis draws on this research and covers some of the 
same ground, one of its points of departure is its focus on practices which are popularly 
understood in terms of individual choice, expression and pleasure. In positioning beauty 
practices within networks of violence, this research points to the importance of attending 
to the operation of violence where direct physical assaults or other types of direct 
interpersonal coercion may be significant factors but not necessarily the most salient 
ones. In addition, in contrast to previous research which has mainly explored the 
intersections of violence in relation to specific situations, this thesis has pointed to the 
way in which violence may operate across trajectories from childhood to further 
education. However, my research has relied entirely on retrospective accounts of 
childhood and early teenage experience. Future research using more expansive 
longitudinal time frames might be useful in exploring how different forms of violence 
may have cumulative effects over the life course of individuals and groups. 
 
Thirdly, this thesis contributes to our understanding of how beauty practices might be 
involved in violence against women. It extends Jeffrey’s conception of beauty as a 
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harmful cultural practice by pointing to the way in which beauty practices across the 
continuum from less to more physically harmful forms inscribe gendered and classed 
violence on the bodies of girls and women, and to the way in which symbolic violence 




Policies informing careers guidance and post-16 transitions assume that young people 
make, or should make, reflexive choices on the basis of interests and inclinations which 
are tacitly held to be non-problematic.  In ignoring the structural factors which affect life 
chances, and in promoting the idea that young people should follow their  personal 
‘skills’ and interests, these policies leave young people to be guided by a sense of limits 
which may be produced by inequality and injustice.  Deprived of other options, or 
sometimes despite them, some girls follow their inclinations to enter beauty therapy 
courses.  In so doing, they are placed in a ‘field’ which not only reproduces gendered 
and classed inequalities but also imposes profound constraints on their ability to 
develop a critical consciousness of gendered and classed stereotypes or to construct 
horizons for action less tightly bound by them.  This research may provide some support 
for Colley’s suggestion that advice and guidance processes should provide space for 
young people to critically reflect on “why they desire the destinies they pursue” (Colley, 
2006: 27). 
Reflections on the research process 
 
Although I have attempted to understand participants’ trajectories by exploring their 
viewpoints, “hidden knowledges…resistances [and]…entrapping ‘decisions’” (Willis, 
1981: 201), I am aware that my research could be accused of lacking ethnographic 
depth.  With hindsight, focusing on one group of students in one college might have 
allowed for a more intense immersion in the lives of the beauty girls. It would certainly 
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have dispensed with the complicated negotiations involved in timetabling visits to two 
colleges and this may have freed up time for more informal conversations and greater 
participation in the daily college lives of students and tutors. Though interviews and 
focus groups facilitated access to information on multiple aspects of the lives of 
students in the core group, having more time to establish greater familiarity and 
reciprocity may have yielded a more in -depth understanding of the production of shared 
meanings, contradictions and resistances, and of key issues such as family and 
friendship networks.   
 
Broadening out my original focus on beauty practices and violence has entailed 
coverage of a broad range of issues. The thesis thus reveals the complexities involved 
in the production of young women’s subjectivities, though I acknowledge that the 
analysis may at times appear a little dense to the reader. However, I justify this on the 
grounds that it was necessary in order to elucidate the range of social and cultural 
practices in which beauty girls’ dispositions are constructed, and in order to make 
connections between some of the different  social and institutional contexts- family, 
school, peer relationships, educational policy, further education, the labour market, 
cultural sexualization, the beauty industry- through which the heterogendered and 
classed constraints on their trajectories are produced. 
 
In demonstrating how these contexts generate and reproduce networks of violence  and 
how different forms of violence are inscribed on women’s bodies and embedded in 
subjectivity, this study contributes to the broadening out of feminist understandings of 
violence against women and points to the importance of non-direct forms of violence in 
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Appendix 1: Course Content for NVQ 1 and 2 Beauty Therapy 
 
The Beauty Therapy courses at both colleges have a similar content.  The tables 







Communication Skills (Literacy and IT) 
Health and Safety 




Facials and facial treatments e.g. steaming 
Manicures 
Make-up,  facial analysis and corrective make-up 
Waxing –facial, legs, underarm, bikini  
Eye-brow shaping and tinting, eyelash tinting 
Massage 
Anatomy and Physiology (A & P) 
Health and Safety 































I am a PhD student at the University of Bristol and am undertaking research into why young 
women choose beauty therapy as a training and career option and their experiences on these 
courses.  This includes exploring how students on beauty therapy courses learn the skills and 
behaviours necessary to become professionals in this field, and how the courses help shape 
their aspirations for the future. 
 
 I am hoping to conduct research with students and staff on beauty therapy courses in FE 
colleges in the south west of England between April 2009 and July 2010 and would very much 
like to include X College in the study.  The research will involve some interviews, focus groups 
and informal meetings. However, I am well aware of how busy staff and students are (I have 
worked as a lecturer and manager in FE colleges for 16 years) and the research schedule 
would be negotiated to fit around the schedules of staff and students. The findings of the 
research may be of interest to staff and I will be very happy to share them with the faculty. 
 
Confidentiality with respect to the identities of the college and participating students and 
staff will be maintained. Pseudonyms will be used in all documentation and communication 
regarding this research project and all the information collected during the study will be stored 
securely and treated as strictly confidential.  
 
If you think your students and staff might be able to participate in this project I would be 
delighted to hear from you. Please contact me on…………. 
 
If you would like to contact my supervisors to reassure yourself that this is a genuine 
research project, please email either…………… 
 
 





Graduate School of Education/Department of Sociology 
Faculty of Social Sciences and Law 














Thank you for agreeing to participate in this discussion. Your contribution is very 
valuable. 
 
The issues we discuss may be used in research reports but your name, your course, 
your college and the names of anyone connected to you or your course are 
confidential and will not be used in any report or discussed outside of group.  
 
The discussion will last for about 45 minutes to 1 hour. If at any time you decide you 
no longer wish to participate, that’s fine. You can leave the discussion at any time.  
 




I would like to participate in the research and agree to participate in the discussion. I 
understand that the issues discussed in the interview may be used in reports but that all 
personal details will be kept strictly confidential.  
 


























Appendix 4: Consent letter/form - student interviews 
 
Dear student [Name] 
 
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed for this research project. Your contribution 
is very valuable. 
 
I am a research student at The University of Bristol and the subject of my research is 
why young people choose to train for careers in the beauty industry and their 
experiences of this training. 
 
I am interested to hear your views and feelings about anything to do with beauty 
therapy, your course and why you decided to do it, your interests and your ambitions 
or anything else you think is relevant.  
 
The issues we discuss may be used in research reports but your name, your course, 
your college and the names of anyone connected to you or your course are 
confidential and will not be used in any report or discussed outside of the interview.  
All the information collected during the study will be stored securely and treated as 
strictly confidential.  After transcribing the interview, the recording will be deleted. 
 
 
The interview will last for about 45 minutes to 1 hour. If at any time you decide not to 
continue, that’s fine. We can end the interview at any time.  
 
 
Thank you again for your participation. 
 
Mandy Kidd 





I would like to participate in the research and agree to be interviewed. I understand 
that the issues discussed in the interview may be used in reports but that all personal 
















Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed for this research project. Your 
contribution is very valuable. 
 
I am a research student at The University of Bristol and the subject of 
my research is why young people choose to train for careers in the beauty 
industry and their experiences of this training. 
 
I am interested to hear your views and feelings about anything to do 
with beauty therapy, the programmes in your area, your experience of 
working on them and anything else you think is relevant.  
 
The issues we discuss may be used in research reports but your name, 
your college and the names of anyone connected to you or the college are 
confidential and will not be used in any report or discussed outside of the 
interview.   
 
The interview will last for about 45 minutes to 1 hour. If at any time you 
decide not to continue, that’s fine. You can end the interview at any time.  
 
 
Thank you again for your participation. 
 
Mandy Kidd 





I would like to participate in the research and agree to be interviewed. I 
understand that the issues discussed in the interview may be used in 











How  is the course going for you at the moment? 
 
Topics and prompts 
 
1. Influences and interests 
 
Can you tell me something about why you think you decided to do beauty therapy at 
college?  
 
 Other options? What and why? 
 People who have influenced you in making decisions about courses? 
 
 
Can you tell me something about your memories of first learning about or being interested in 
make-up, nails etc (things to do with appearance)? 
 
 Anyone you particularly learnt from/were influenced by? 
 Kids’ make up/beauty-related play ? Who with? Feelings about this at the time? 
 When first bought own adult beauty products? What were these? 
 Visiting beauty salons/having treatments? Who with? Feelings about this at the time? 
     
      School 
Can you tell me something about how school was for you?  
 Likes/dislikes/subjects 
 Teachers 
 Friends- who did you spend most time with? 
 Help with choosing courses/jobs at 16? Feelings about this. 
 
Can you tell me something about what you and your friends felt about make-up, nails, hair, 
clothes etc (things to do with appearance) when you were at school? 
 How important? If important, why? 
 Appearance at school? 
 Appearance outside school? 
 How important type of clothes worn in/outside school? Why? 
 
What sort of activities did you do outside of school? Who with? 
 
Parents and siblings and wider family 
Can you tell me something about your family/people you were around when you growing 
up? 
 Who close to? Who most influenced by? 
 Parents/carers/aunts/uncles’ jobs?  
 Siblings/cousins’ jobs/courses?  
 Did you think about doing same sorts of jobs? 
vii 
 
 What family think about your choice of course? 
 Any family members/friends work in BT type jobs? 
 
 
Other important people  
Can you tell me something about any other people who are or have been important in your 
life? 
 Friends? From school/other? 
 Partner/boyfriend? 
 What jobs/courses do these people do? 
 Their views of your choice? 
 
Work/Interests/activities outside college 
Can you tell be something about work and other things you do outside of college? 
 
 Paid/other work? Feelings about this? If in Salon, how does it compare to college? 
 Other interests/activities? Who with? 
 Things you would like to do but don’t? Why? 
 Recent experience of going to beauty salons/doing nails/make-up/hair? 
 
   
2. Experience of the course 
Can you tell me about more about how you feel/what you think about the course? 
 Likes/dislikes/interesting/boring aspects? 
 Feelings about staff? 
 How would you change course? 
 
Can you tell me something about how you get on with the other students/your friendships 
with other students on the course? 
 Mostly/only girls- feelings about this? 
 
Can you tell me something about your thoughts and feelings about having and giving 
treatments? 
 What do you like/ dislike doing? 
 How feel about giving and receiving treatments with other students? 
 Feelings about treating outside clients?  Men/women? 
 Practice treatments outside of the course? On who? Where? 
 
 
Impact of course on self-perceptions/perceptions of others/aspirations 
Do you think doing the course has changed how you feel about yourself/see yourself? (in 
good or bad ways?) 
 E.g. Self-confidence?  
 E.g. The way you feel about your appearance or other people’s appearance?  
 
Can you describe your usual beauty routine – what do you do each college day/other week 
day /weekends/going out in evening? 
 




If yes, how do you feel about this? 
 
Has the course changed what you think you might do in the future? How? 
 
What can you see yourself doing in 2/5 years time? 
 Work/home life? 
 
 
3. Advantage/ Disadvantage and inequality in education/life 
Do you think you’ve faced any barriers or unfair treatment in any aspect of your life so far?  
 If yes, how dealt with? 
 
Do you think you have had advantages because of who you are? 
 
Do you think being a girl rather than a boy has affected your life in any way? 
 
Why do you think beauty therapy courses are so popular with young women ? 
 Why are there so few boys/men on BT courses? 
 Should boys/men be encouraged to do BT courses? How? 
 Why are there so few women on courses like car mechanics or construction? 
 Should women be encouraged to do these courses/jobs. How? 
 Would you be interested in doing a job like this? Why/why not? 
 Do you know any women doing male dominated jobs? 
 
Closing questions 
What does the word ‘beauty’ mean to you? 
 
How would you explain what being a beauty therapist is about to a school leaver who I     is 
























 How’s the course going? How do you feel about it? 
 
Photographs 
Ask Louisa to look through them and display as she wants  
 
 Who took the photos of you? 
 Other people in the photos?- tell me about them and what’s happening in the 
photos. 
 Bedroom posters? Tell me about them? What do they mean to you? 
 Which of these photos of you do you most like/which least? Why? 
 You seem to pretty happy in these photos-is this true mostly? 
 What kinds of people do you think seem to feel confident/happy about the way 
they look? 
 What kinds of people tend to feel unhappy about the way they look? 
 Do you think it’s the same or different for girls and boys? 
 Do you think most people on your course have a positive or negative self image? 
 Do you think being on the course affects how people feel about themselves? Has 
it changed how you feel about yourself? 
 Has the course changed your beauty routines? What do you do differently? 
 
Things in phiots 
 Kerrang!- do you read this? What do you like about it? Peroxide Pandora 
cartoon? (show her some images- what do you think of these?) 
 CDs/Music- What do you like/dislike?  
 Computer and games. What are you doing in this photo (computer on lap)? 
Who do you play games with? 
 Makeup and hair straighteners etc. Do you own more stuff since starting on 
courses? Do you do make-up hair etc with friends? What’s most important to you 
in all this stuff and why? 
 Tell me about you clothes: favourite/ which you most/least like wearing and 
why? 




 Cartoon cat- who/what is this? Why this photo?. 
 When we last met you said your mum was starting a job?. Has this happened? 






 What have been the most rewarding things about doing the course this year? 
What are the worst things? 
 What skills have you learnt? 
 In the last interview you said you were mainly interested in massage, are you 
still?/other interests developed? 
 What would you say have been the hardest bits of the course/which the easiest? 
Why? 
 How have the tutors helped you/not been helpful? 
 
Concluding 
 Are you still planning to do Level 2? 
 What are you most/least looking forward to on the level 2 course? 
 What are your hopes or fears for the future - jobs and money or other things? 
 When you finish at college, if you could do anything you dream of besides 
massage, what would it be? 
 
 



























Appendix 8: Tutor Interview schedule 
 
Your background 
1. Can you give me an overview of your current job? 
2. Can you tell me briefly about your own background and your route to this job? 
 
The students 
1. Why do you think girls/young women are attracted to beauty therapy 
courses? What kind of young women? 
2. How do you select students? Who gets rejected and why? 
3. What would you say is the ideal beauty student? 
4. What else do students need to succeed on the courses? What types of 
student tend not to succeed? 
5. Do you find that students come to the course with some of the 
skills/knowledge already there? Does this help? 
6. Across colleges, some very strong friendships developed between girls/young 
women but also some conflict? What is this mainly about? What do you do to 
address it? 
7. All girls this year. Why? Is this seen as an issue in the college/ department? 
 
The course 
1. What do students tend to find the hardest aspect of the course? Why? How 
do you address this? 
(Why do many students seem to like theory less than practical work? Is there 
any way of making theory more appealing?) 
2. How important are literacy and numeracy skills? How are these taught? 
3. What advice and guidance provision is there for student progression (to 
industry/other alternative training/HE)? 
4. Some students (across the colleges) have had bad experiences with clients 
as well as very good. Is there a worry that it might put students off? 
 
5. There has been some criticism of the beauty and fashion industries for selling 
unrealistic ideas of what women should look like. Are these issues discussed 
with students? How aware do you think students are of these issues? 





     1. What level qualifications are needed to work in the industry? 
2. How easy is it for today’s students to find work in the industry?    Has the 
recession had an impact? 
3. How many students typically go into the industry? What areas? What happens 
to those who don’t? 
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4. A lot of students seem to want to run their own businesses. How does the 




1. What changes have you seen in what students and clients think is an 
acceptable appearance? 
2. `What would you say is the most rewarding aspect of teaching on this 
programme? What the least rewarding/difficult? 
 
 
Other possible Qs if time 
1. Can you tell me something about your own training as a beauty therapist and 
how it differed from today’s training programmes at FE colleges? 
2. What made you decide to train as a beauty therapist? Influences? 
3. Can you tell me something about your experiences in the industry and your 




























Appendix 9:  Focus group schedule 1 
 
Preparation 
1. Power point set up 
2. Pens and post-its 
3. Consent forms 
4. Flip chart/whiteboard markers 
 
Introduction 
1. Welcome and thanks. Introduce self and research 
2. Overview of topic for group- get to know you, your views on beauty therapy and 
other things. 
3. Idea of focus group. Me facilitator, you talking to each other. Feel free to say 
what you think and feel. No right or wrong. 
4. Consent forms/ethics 








How is the course going? 
What do you most like? 





Students consider images of women  
1. Young women dressed up 
2. Woman on yacht (Ellen McCarther) 
3. Women dancing 
4. Women playing rugby 
5. Woman body builder 
6. Woman working in construction 
7. Woman doing pedicure on man (Jade Goody) 
8. International Women’s day 
 
A. Power point images. For each one: 
a) What is your first reaction? What does image make you feel/think? 
b) How would you describe this person? Personality, likes/dislikes, appearance? 
c) For each scene, would you feel comfortable in it? 
 
B. Give out handouts with images  
xiv 
 
a) Which of these scenes would you feel most comfortable in? Why? 





What makes people want to do beauty therapy courses? 




1. What kinds of people? 
2. What is the attraction of beauty therapy? 





























Appendix 10:  Identification of a theme and its connections- ‘Shame and 
Stigma’ 
 
Extract from a first round student interview 
 
Mandy : Do you remember when you first started being interested, having any kind of 
interest in appearance and hair and makeup and that kind of thing? 
 
Jenna:  Erm, I think it was properly when I had my prom [pause] like because I was 
all dressed up and I had all my makeup done and I had hair extensions and my hair 
was beautiful.  And I think from that day I looked so pretty that day but then I can 
never look like that again and, I look at myself in other pictures and I think I really 
used to take time in doing my hair and my makeup.  Now I just can’t be bothered.  I 
just [pause] I don’t have the thing in my head saying “Oh yeah, I’m going to make 
myself look pretty today, gonna do my hair and makeup”.  I don’t care if I wake up in 
the morning and my hair’s a mess and I’ve got to go out.   
 
M: What about coming into college then?  
 
J: In college, I still,  like, I just bung my hair back and I mean, this morning I took time 
because I had a bath last night and my hair was soft so I thought, oh, I’ll straighten it.  




J: I just like…I, I, just feel like I want to … I want to feel beautiful.  I look at all the girls 
and I think “oh you’re absolutely stunning”.  And people tell me I’m stunning and I’m 
like “No I’m not, why are you lying to me?”  Like,I … oh, it’s so annoying; I’m just … 
I’m attracting all this … like, I’m a magnet but I’m the negative magnet and things are 
coming towards me but I’m pushing it away all the time [laughs]. 
 
M: Tell me something about school and what that was like for you? 
 
Comment [U1]: Ideal self. Transformation 
Comment [U2]: Precariousness of being 
attractive.  Shame/stigma of failure 
Comment [U3]: Comparison of self with 
idealized femininity 
Comment [U4]: Targeting of body/self 
J: I was bullied all the way through school.  I don’t really concentrate because I was 
always thinking about friends.  I wanted to make friends.  So I started smoking when 
I was young, in secondary school [deep breath] and I’ve smoked ever since.  I regret 
it [laughs].  Erm, and I was always,  I was always the piggy in the middle [sighs].  
Like, I was always the one, always there for people when they needed me.  Like, say 
if they’d fallen out with someone they’d always be with me, “Oh there’s the second 




J: Yeah, and like I done a talent show.  This is the most horribleist thing that ever 
happened.  I done a talent show with my two friends and my sister.  And we were 
doing a dance and I sort of choreographed it, and it was a really good dance and er, 
they’d had Christmas crackers and we were on the stage and there’s the assembly 
and the people were chanting “Crusty” at me  [pause] because of my skin and they 
were calling me “Granville” and everything else.  They were like, “Granville, 
Granville” and chucking stuff at me. 
 




M: What did the teachers do? 
 
J: Nothing.   And like, I was like dancing and they just targeted me, and there was 
three others on the stage but everything was coming my way and I, but I carried out the 
whole dance.  I did not give up.  I Done it all and then when I finished the dance I left the 
stage so that I could show them I don’t care about that, but, it did kill me.  Honestly, it 
absolutely embarrassed me.  I felt so degraded.  And, like that’s…. [inaudible]….I did 
beauty because I wanted to be, I wanted to have more and be able to take care of my 
skin and get back to normal.  I don’t feel normal.  I feel like an odd person [laughs] with 
depression, crusty skin and [laughs].  You know, that’s why I don’t feel beautiful in 
myself, like, and like with my phantom pregnancy causing stretch marks and, and I was 
size six.  I was tiny when, before I had this phantom pregnancy and now I just feel fat.  I 
feel like blubber.  I feel like I’ve got stretch marks and crusty skin [laughs]. 
 
xv 
Comment [U5]: Peer violence and academic self-
exclusion 
Comment [U6]: Self-transformation to fit in 
Comment [U7]: Sacrifice. Being -for -others 
Comment [U8]: Critical incident instilling shame 
Comment [U9]: Peer violence. Stigmatization. 
Being-perceived 
Comment [U10]: Targeting of body/self. 
Comment [U11]: Resistance 
Comment [U12]: Stigma/violence embodied 
Comment [U13]: Care of self 
Comment [U14]: Desire for self-
transformation/normality. 
Comment [U15]: Self-disgust. Bodily alienation. 
